Conventional Deterrence

Conventional Deterrence is a 1983 book by the American political scientist John Mearsheimer. It is about deterrence theory and aims to explain how a party may or may not choose to initiate a war depending on its expected costs, with analyses of cases from World War II and the Arab–Israeli conflict, and implications for the Cold War in Central Europe. According to Mearsheimer, failures in modern warfare most of the time happen when a party erroneously thinks a rapid and low-cost Blitzkrieg is an available option.^[1][2]

Conventional Deterrence was published by Cornell University Press and was Mearsheimer's first book. Andrew P. Rasiulis called it well researched and refreshing in its emphasis on conventional forces in a time when many other analysts overestimate the role of nuclear weapons. Rasiulis wrote that Mearsheimer disappoints by not analyzing the relationship between conventional forces, nuclear weapons and political goals.^[1] Patrick M. Morgan wrote that Mearsheimer has "devised a seemingly useful theory" for estimating NATO's ability to deter possible attacks from the Soviet Union in Central Europe.^[2]