Hwasong-11A
North Korean short-range ballistic missile
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The Hwasong-11A[a] (Korean: 《화성포-11가》형; lit. 'Mars Artillery Type 11A'),[b] also known as KN-23 under the United States naming convention,[8] is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile. Unveiled in February 2018 and first test-fired in May 2019, Hwasong-11A is the most notable variant of Hwasong-11 series of solid-fueled SRBMs. Analysts believe the missile, with its quasi-ballistic trajectory and a range of up to 900 km (560 mi), may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defenses. It can be launched from road-mobile platforms, railway car and silo. Variants of Hwasong-11A include larger warhead version, smaller version and underwater-launched version. The missile is reported to be used by Russian force during Russo-Ukrainian war.
| Hwasong-11A | |
|---|---|
 Artist rendition of the missile | |
| Type | Short-range ballistic missile |
| Place of origin | North Korea |
| Service history | |
| Used by | North Korea (Korean People's Army Strategic Force) Russia |
| Wars | Russo-Ukrainian war |
| Production history | |
| Designed | 2018 |
| Manufacturer | February 11 Plant |
| Specifications | |
| Mass | 8,729 kg (19,244 lb) |
| Length | 8.77 m (28.8 ft) |
| Diameter | 1.1 m (3 ft 7 in) |
| Warhead | 500–1,500 kg (1,100–3,300 lb), nuclear and conventional |
| Engine | Solid composite propellant |
Operational range | 190–900 km (120–560 mi) |
Guidance system | Inertial navigation system (INS), possible satellite navigation |
| Accuracy | 35–200 m (115–656 ft) |
Launch platform | 8×8 wheeled TEL Tracked launcher Railway car Silo |
Description
The Hwasong-11A bears an external resemblance to the Russian Iskander-M and South Korean Hyunmoo-2B short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), being distinguished by its elongated cable raceway, different jet vane actuators and smooth base. Like the Iskander-M, it flies in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, flattening out below an altitude of about 50 km (31 mi) where the atmosphere is dense enough so the missile's fins can change course along its flight path.[8][9][10]
Data from test-fires shows a minimum range of 190 km (120 mi) using depressed trajectory,[11] with the maximum range being assessed as 900 km (560 mi),[12] putting all of South Korea within range.[9] With a 500 kg (1,100 lb) warhead,[13] the missile has an estimated range of 450 km (280 mi).[8] The missile's warhead section has enough space for up to 1,500 kg (3,300 lb) of high explosives compared to 700 kg (1,500 lb) for Hwasong-5 (Scud-B) and 800 kg (1,800 lb) of 9K720 Iskander.[14] It can be conventional, likely unitary or submunition, or nuclear.[8] The Hwasong-11A is also capable of carrying the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead.[15] Its active steering capability could make it accurate to within 35–200 m (115–656 ft) CEP, depending whether the missile uses satellite guidance or INS alone.[10][14]
The Hwasong-11A's launch platform is diverse. It can be launched from wheeled (four-axle) or tracked transporter erector launcher (TEL).[16] Hwasong-11A also has railway-based mobile launch platform,[17][18] as well as silo-based launcher.[19] The four-axle truck used in test-fires is different from the truck used to carrying the missile during 8 February 2018 military parade.[20]
It is significantly larger than the Iskander, with estimated length and diameter to be 8.77 m (28.8 ft) and 1.1 m (3 ft 7 in), respectively.[11] However, the mass estimation of Hwasong-11A is different, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies giving a mass of 3,415 kg (7,529 lb),[8] while a 2026 assessment published by 38 North estimates it to be 8,729 kg (19,244 lb) for flight simulations.[11] The missile likely using the same 1.1 m (3 ft 7 in) diameter motor as the Pukguksong-1. The motor is somewhat lengthened, having only one stage, compared to the Pukguksong-1. The motor has a very different structure, compared to the Iskander. Its TEL has more space for the missile, as it lacks the structure immediately after the cab.[21][22]
The missile is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6. Being road-mobile and solid-fueled, it can be moved and fired more rapidly, making it more difficult for an opposing force to locate and target before firing. Once launched, the missile's low apogee, short overall flight time, and ability to conduct a terminal "pull-up" maneuver makes it harder to detect and be intercepted by traditional missile defense systems. Its increased accuracy also reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.[8][9][10]
The Hwasong-11A is likely to feature some form of foreign involvement such as parts, as when compared to the later developed Hwasong-11B (KN-24), the Korean Central News Agency focuses mainly on the deployment of the missile, with little coverage on its research. While the Hwasong-11B are called "Juche projectiles", it is never mentioned for the Hwasong-11A. The focus on the combat-readiness of the system suggests that it had been deployed for a while but not tested, like the Hwasong-10.[23] It still bears significant differences from the 9K720 Iskander.[24]
History
In mid-October 2017, North Korea apparently tested a solid-fueled engine in Hamhung, possibly a static test of Hwasong-11A's engine.[24]
North Korea first displayed the Hwasong-11A publicly in a military parade on 8 February 2018. The first flight test was on 4 May 2019. Five days later, North Korea test-fired another two missiles.[8][9]
On 17 May 2019, the missile was designated by the United States Forces Korea as KN-23. Further test-fires were carried out on 25 July and 6 August 2019, as well as in 2021, 2022 and 2023. Except for two tests on 6 October 2022 and 19 March 2023, which had one missile launched, all tests of Hwasong-11A had two missiles test-fired.[8][9][25]
After the confirmation of KN-24's official designation (Hwasong-11B) in October 2021, it was suggested that the official designation of the missile, then known by its United States designation (KN-23), could be Hwasong-11A.[26] During the "Weaponry Exhibition-2023" military exhibition held in July 2023, North Korea confirmed this designation.[27]
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2025, North Korea is possessing more than 17 Hwasong-11A launchers, in road- and rail-mobile variants.[28]: 268
Nearly two years since the revelation of the official designation, on 9 May 2025, North Korea named Hwasong-11A in state media for the first time as part of their coverage for a missile test that occurred on the previous day.[4]
Use during Russian invasion of Ukraine
The missile has been identified to be used during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, since 2023. An unknown number of North Korean ballistic missiles were transferred to Russia in October 2023, according to declassified US intelligence informations. Based on debris left by Russian attacks on Ukrainian targets on 30 December 2023, the ring housing the control vanes have been identified as the characteristics of Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B missiles.[29] The barometer on the missile was found to have a Hangul character, and various parts of the missile were stamped with the possible factory name.[22]
According to the Conflict Armament Research (CAR), 75% of components in the guidance control system for the Hwasong-11A fired at Kharkiv are based on American parts.[30] They also indicated that some of the missiles were newly produced.[31]
During the Kharkiv strikes of 2 January 2024, Ukrainian authorities noted that the missiles used were of North Korean origin, noting that the shape and design were different than that of Iskander missiles. On 29 April 2024, the UNSC confirmed that the munitions used during the strike were that of Hwasong-11A missiles.[32][33]
On 7 May 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that the missiles have a high failure rate. According to these officials, half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air.[34] In February 2025, it was also reported the Hwasong-11A has been used in Ukraine,[35] with an improved CEP of 50–100 m (160–330 ft).[36]
In August 2024, the CAR documented the debris of four additional North Korean ballistic missiles that landed in Ukraine. These debris, retrieved in Bila Tserkva, Vitrova Balka, Rozhivka, were identified as debris from Hwasong-11A (or Hwasong-11B).[37]
According to Ukraine, at the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied Russia 148 Hwasong-11A and 11B missiles. Ukraine also claimed that Russia launched Hwasong-11A in the 23 April 2025 Russian attack on civilians in Kyiv.[38] According to Reuters's information from a Ukrainian source, the Hwasong-11A missiles were armed with a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) warhead.[39]
In May 2025, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) published images of Hwasong-11A's debris collected in Ukraine.[37]
List of tests
Confirmed tests
| Attempt | Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) | Location | Number of missiles tested | Outcome | Additional notes | References |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 4 May 2019 | Hodo Peninsula, Kangwon Province or Wonsan | 2 | Success | These missiles reached an apogee of 60 km (37 mi) and a range of 240 km (150 mi). The footage was apparently manipulated, and the missiles were probably fired from two different vehicles. Kim Jong Un oversaw the test. | [8][9][21][25][40] |
| 2 | 9 May 2019 | Baegun, North Pyongan Province or Kusong | 2 | Success | Both missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee. One had a range of 420 km (260 mi) and the other had 270 km (170 mi). At least one missile may have used depressed trajectory. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. | [8][9][25][41] |
| 3 | 25 July 2019 | Hodo Peninsula, Kangwon Province[25] | 2 | Success | Both missiles again reaching 50 km (31 mi) in altitude, but demonstrating greater ranges of 430 km (270 mi) and 690 km (430 mi), before landing in the Sea of Japan. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. | [8][9][25][42] |
| 4 | 6 August 2019 | Kwail Airport, South Hwanghae Province[25] | 2 | Success | Two missiles were launched and overflew the North Korean capital region. These missile achieved an apogee of 37 km (23 mi) out to 450 km (280 mi). Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. | [8][9][25][43] |
| 5 | 27 January 2022 | Hungnam, Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province | 2 | Success | These missiles flew 190 km (120 mi) to a maximum altitude of 20 km (12 mi) and demonstrated depressed trajectory. North Korea stated the test was to confirm the power of an air burst conventional warhead. Taken together, this suggests that the missile is operational. | [25][44] |
| 6 | 1 October 2022 | Sunan District, Pyongyang | 2 | Success | These missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee. One missile flew 400 km (250 mi), the other flew 350 km (220 mi). Kim Jong Un oversaw the test. | [25][45] |
| 7 | 6 October 2022 | Samsok District, Pyongyang | 1 | Success | The missile achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee and flew 800 km (500 mi). The missile was launched just about 15 minutes after the launch of a KN-25 (600 mm multiple rocket launcher) missile and may have used an irregular trajectory. Kim Jong Un oversaw the test. | [25][45] |
| 8 | 14 March 2023 | Jangyon County, South Hwanghae Province | 2 | Success | According to North Korea, these missiles hit the target 611.4 km (379.9 mi) away. South Korea said that these missiles had flown 620 km (390 mi). | [25][46][47] |
| 9 | 27 March 2023 | Chunghwa County, North Hwanghae Province or Ryokpho District, Pyongyang | 2 | Success | These missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee and flew 350 km (220 mi). According to North Korea, the missiles exploded at an altitude of about 500 m (1,600 ft) above a target near Kimchaek. The launch was a simulation test of a nuclear attack in the air. | [25][48][49] |
| 10 | 8 May 2025 | Wonsan | At least 1 | Success | Kim Jong Un oversaw the test along with senior officials. The missile achieved 100 km (62 mi) apogee, flew 800 km (500 mi) and was launched along with five to eight 600 mm multiple rocket launcher (KN-25) missiles. According to North Korea, the launch was to familiarize military units with the operation of the weapon systems (including Hwasong-11A) and assess the quick reaction reliability of the command and control system in any nuclear crisis. | [4][50][51][52] |
Alleged tests
Member states of the United Nations Security Council alleged that there were test-fires of Hwasong-11A on 5 June 2022[53] and 9 November 2022.[54] It is also possible that a test of Hwasong-11A took place in June 2023, with two missiles being launched and one of which travelled 900 km (560 mi).[12]
An alleged test-fire of Hwasong-11A took place on 4 January 2026,[55] but it is highly likely that it involved Hwasong-11E, based on the description of "hypersonic missile" by North Korean state media.[56]
Variants
Along with the base version, Hwasong-11A has some variants:
Railway-borne missile
Design and development
On 15 September 2021, North Korea test-fired two missiles from a modified railway car, rather than the typical road-mobile launcher. These missiles appeared to be baseline Hwasong-11A versions. They flew much further than any previous flight of the weapon, and went an even greater distance than the larger variant tested earlier in 2021. Such excess range could indicate it hadn't previously been tested out to its maximum range, or that the design underwent modifications such as a reduced payload or flight profile improvements. The launch railcar used two side-by-side erector/launcher mechanisms like the side-by-side arrangement used in the TEL. The use of a rail-mobile system is unusual for an SRBM, as road-mobile launchers are easier for deploying and hiding relatively small missiles, while railway missiles are restricted to the rail network. Adding railway launchers may be an effort to further increase and diversify the country's SRBM missile force, since modifying existing railcars to fire missiles could be a way to supplement a limited number of launch trucks, or possibly to test the concept before applying it to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A rail-borne ICBM would have advantages over one carried by a wheeled TEL, as such large liquid-fueled missiles carried in railway cars would be able to move more places and be kept in a higher readiness state.[17][18]
On 14 January 2022, North Korea again tested railway-launched Hwasong-11A. The next day, the Korean Central News Agency released photos of the test.[57]
List of tests
| Attempt | Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) | Location | Number of missiles tested | Outcome | Additional notes | Reference(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 15 September 2021 | Yangdok County, South Hamgyong Province | 2 | Success | These missiles, which were launched from railcar by a railway missile regiment, travelled 800 km (500 mi), to a maximum altitude of 60 km (37 mi) before landing inside Japan's exclusive economic zone. Pak Jong-chon oversaw the test. | [25][58][59] |
| 2 | 14 January 2022 | Uiju County, North Pyongan Province | 2 | Success | These missiles flew 430 km (270 mi) and achieved 36 km (22 mi) apogee. | [25][60] |
| 3 | 2 November 2022 | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Information based on images released by the Korean Central News Agency on 7 November 2022. The missile appears to be railway-borne. | [61][62] |
Silo-based missile
Design and development
On 19 March 2023, North Korea test-fired a baseline Hwasong-11A from an underground silo that is located within Sohae Satellite Launching Station, the first known missile launch from silo of North Korea. The silo was constructed for less than two months.[19][25]
The silo use of missiles can help North Korea fire it with little warning while avoiding outside surveillance.[63]
List of tests
| Attempt | Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) | Location | Number of missiles tested | Outcome | Additional notes | References |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 19 March 2023 | Sohae Satellite Launching Station | 1 | Success | The missile reached 50 km (31 mi) apogee, flew 800 km (500 mi) and may have utilized an irregular trajectory. Kim Jong Un and his daughter oversaw the test. | [25][64] |
Larger variant
Hwasong-11C is the larger version of Hwasong-11A, claimed to have a 2.5 tons warhead.[1]
A variant with 4.5 tons warhead, called Hwasong-11C-4.5, was tested on 1 July 2024 and 18 September 2024.[65][66]
Smaller variant
Hwasong-11D is the smaller variant of Hwasong-11A, with reduced range.[1]
It was tested on 16 April 2022, 2 November 2022, 9 March 2023 and 17 May 2024.[25][61][67]
Hypersonic glide vehicle variant
The Hwasong-11E is a Hwasong-11C-based variant of Hwasong-11A with hypersonic glide vehicle, first displayed in 2025 during a military exhibition.[68]
SLBM variant
Hwasong-11S is the underwater-launched version of Hwasong-11A.[1]
It was tested two times, on 19 October 2021 and 25 September 2022.[25]
See also
- Hwasong-11B – (North Korea) (KN-24)
- 9K720 Iskander – (Russia)
- Hyunmoo-2 – (South Korea)