1988 Chilean presidential referendum
1988 referendum in Chile on extending the rule of Augusto Pinochet
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A national plebiscite was held in Chile on 5 October 1988 to decide whether Augusto Pinochet, the head of a military dictatorship that had ruled the country since the 1973 coup d'état, would remain president for a further eight-year term. Voters were asked simply to approve or reject Pinochet as the sole candidate proposed by the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces, a mechanism set out in the transitory provisions of the 1980 Constitution.
5 October 1988
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Plebiscite: President of the Republic Augusto Pinochet Ugarte | ||||||||||||||||||||||
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Results by commune | ||||||||||||||||||||||
The "No" option won with 55.99 percent of valid votes against 44.01 percent for "Sí," ending the possibility of Pinochet extending his rule and triggering a one-year transition mandated by the constitution. The opposition's victory was underpinned by a mass voter-registration drive, the legalization of political parties, and a television advertising campaign—built around the slogan "Chile, la alegría ya viene" ("Chile, joy is coming") and a rainbow logo—that is widely credited with having outperformed the government's "Sí" campaign. Presidential and legislative elections were held in December 1989, and Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin took office on 11 March 1990, formally ending seventeen years of military rule.
Background
Army General Augusto Pinochet and the commanders of the Air Force, Navy, and national police seized power on 11 September 1973 in a coup that deposed the democratically elected Socialist president Salvador Allende, who died as the presidential palace was bombarded.[1] A military junta led by Pinochet, Air Force General Gustavo Leigh, Navy Admiral José Toribio Merino, and Carabinero General César Mendoza took office that evening. The following day the junta suspended the 1925 Constitution and Congress, and although its four members had verbally agreed to rotate the presidency, an advisory committee staffed by officers loyal to Pinochet recommended against it; on 18 December 1974, Pinochet was declared Supreme Leader of the nation, and thereafter the junta functioned solely as a legislative body until the return to democracy.[2]
Over the following seventeen years, agents of the state and its collaborators were responsible for the killing or forced disappearance of more than 3,000 people and the torture or political imprisonment of tens of thousands more, according to the later Rettig and Valech truth commissions.[3]
A commission set up by the junta on 24 September 1973 drafted a new constitution, completing its work in 1978; the Council of State, chaired by former president Jorge Alessandri, reviewed the draft before it was submitted to Pinochet and the junta in July 1980. A constitutional referendum regarded by some observers as "highly irregular"[4] and "fraudulent"[5] approved the new 1980 Constitution on 11 September 1980 by a reported 67 percent.[6]
The Constitution took effect on 11 March 1981 and established a transitional period during which Pinochet held executive power and the junta held legislative power. Under its transitory provisions, no later than ninety days before the end of that period the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces and the Carabineros' general director—or, failing unanimity, the National Security Council together with the comptroller general—were to propose a single candidate for president of the following term, to be ratified or rejected by the electorate in a plebiscite.[7] If voters approved the candidate, he would take office on 11 March 1989 for an eight-year term, with parliamentary elections to follow nine months later; if they rejected him, Pinochet and the junta would remain for one further year, until 11 March 1990, ahead of new presidential and legislative elections.
Road to the plebiscite
Electoral and party legislation
Chile's electoral registers had been closed since 19 November 1973, when the junta decreed their cancellation. A law on the organization of the Electoral Service, promulgated on 1 October 1986, provided for the reopening of registration boards within five months,[8] and the registers reopened on 25 February 1987, the first opportunity for Chileans to register to vote since the coup. The first person to register in the commune of Santiago was Augusto Pinochet himself.[9] Ultimately close to 91 percent of eligible citizens registered, a turnout so large it unnerved both the government, which feared a mass registration of opponents, and the opposition, which worried about double-registration meant to sabotage the count.
A separate transitory provision of the 1980 Constitution had banned party-political activity until an organic law on political parties took effect. That law, No. 18,603, was finally promulgated on 23 March 1987 after several years in the legislative process, allowing parties to organize legally for the first time since the coup.[10] The right-wing National Party became the first party to be legally recognized, on 23 December 1987;[11] in the following months several parties on both sides of the plebiscite, including National Renewal, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Communist Party of Chile, were legalized in turn.[12]
Nomination of Pinochet
From around 1986, Pinochet made increasingly explicit his intention to stand as the regime's candidate, declaring on 11 July that year that "nobody can deny the government's right to project itself beyond 1989." On 7 September 1986 he survived an assassination attempt by the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez on a road near the Cajón del Maipo, in which five of his bodyguards were killed. In July 1987 he appointed Sergio Fernández, who was credited with having helped secure victory in the 1980 referendum, as interior minister to help manage the plebiscite campaign.
In the dictatorship's final years, the commanders-in-chief of the Navy, Air Force, and Carabineros distanced themselves from Pinochet and pressed for a civilian candidate to represent the regime, but Pinochet insisted on standing himself.[13] The commanders met on 12 July 1988 to agree procedures for the nomination, and on 18 July set 30 August as the date on which the candidate would be announced.[14][15] On 30 August 1988, as expected, the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces and the Carabineros' general director formally proposed Pinochet as their candidate; he accepted in the same ceremony and delivered a 25-minute address.[16] The plebiscite was called for Wednesday, 5 October 1988.
The "Sí" option was backed by the parties that would later form the Alianza—Independent Democratic Union and National Renewal—along with the National Party, the Liberal Democrat Party of Chile, Radical Democracy, National Advance, the Democratic Party of Chile, and the Party of the South.
Opposition
Despite initial disagreement over the legitimacy of the 1980 Constitution, the opposition ultimately chose to participate within its framework. On 2 February 1988, thirteen opposition organizations agreed to campaign for "No" and to press for minimum guarantees of a clean vote, forming the Concertación de Partidos por el No, the direct forerunner of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia. After Pinochet's nomination was announced, seventeen parties—including the Christian Democrats, the Socialists (in several factions), the Humanist Party, and the Party for Democracy—signed a joint declaration, Principios básicos de institucionalidad democrática, stating that a "No" victory would mark the starting point of a process to rebuild genuine democracy in Chile.
The plebiscite
As set out in the 1980 Constitution, the plebiscite offered two choices:
- Yes: the proposed candidate is approved. Pinochet takes office on 11 March 1989 for an eight-year mandate, and parliamentary elections are held nine months after he is sworn in. The junta continues to exercise legislative power until the newly elected Congress takes office on 11 March 1990.
- No: the proposed candidate is rejected. Pinochet and the junta remain in power for another year beyond the original eight-year mandate. Presidential and parliamentary elections are held three months before Pinochet's extended term expires. The newly elected president and Congress take office on 11 March 1990.
Voting was open to Chilean citizens and to foreign residents of at least five years' standing who were 18 or older on election day. Only those on the electoral roll could vote, and while registration was voluntary, voting was compulsory for those registered.
Political endorsements
Yes
- Democratic Party of Chile (Partido Democrático de Chile)
- Great Civic Front of Chile (Gran Frente Cívico de Chile)
Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente)
Liberal Democrat Party of Chile (Partido Liberal Demócrata de Chile)
National Advance (Avanzada Nacional)
National Party (Partido Nacional)
National Renewal (Renovación Nacional)- Radical Democracy (Democracia Radical)
Social Democrat Party (Partido Socialdemócrata)- Party of the South (Partido del Sur)
- Poder Femenino (women's civic movement supporting the government)
No
Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)
Christian Left (Izquierda Cristiana)
Communist Party of Chile (Partido Comunista de Chile)
Humanist Party (Partido Humanista)
Liberal Party (Partido Liberal)
MAPU Obrero Campesino- National Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Nacional)
National Party for the NO (Partido Nacional por el NO)
Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia)
Popular Socialist Union (Unión Socialista Popular)
Popular Unitary Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria)
Radical Party (Partido Radical)
Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria)- Social Democracy Party of Chile (Partido Social Democracia de Chile)
- Democratic Socialist Radical Party (Partido Radical Socialista Democrático)
Socialist Party of Chile (Almeyda faction) (Partido Socialista-Almeyda)
Socialist Party of Chile (Historic faction) (Partido Socialista-Histórico)
Socialist Party of Chile (Mandujano faction) (Partido Socialista-Mandujano)
Socialist Party of Chile (Núñez faction) (Partido Socialista-Núñez)
The Greens (Los Verdes)
Null vote
Chilean Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Chileno), a populist party created by pro-junta factions to draw support away from the "No" vote.[17]
Campaign

Alongside the registration drive, the television campaign is regarded as one of the decisive factors in the outcome of the plebiscite. For the first time in Chilean history, both options were guaranteed free electoral advertising slots (franjas) on state-run television, in addition to prime-time slots available only to the government. The National Television Council set the schedule on 26 August 1988: broadcasts on weeknights from 10:45 to 11:15 p.m. and on weekends from 11:30 a.m. to noon, with Televisión Nacional de Chile anchoring the national feed.[18] A draw on 1 September determined that the "No" campaign's segment would air first on the opening night, with the order alternating daily thereafter.[19] The first spots, of 15 minutes each, aired on 5 September 1988 and continued daily until 1 October.
The No campaign

The No campaign was led creatively by Eugenio García, with José Manuel Salcedo, psychologist Jorge Cucurella, publicist Ernesto Merino, and a political scientist on the production team.[20] Its logo, a rainbow designed by Raúl Menjíbar, was intended to represent both the plurality of the opposition coalition—each member party was assigned a color, including orange for the Humanists, green for the Social Democrats and ecologists, red for the Socialists, blue for the Christian Democrats, and yellow for the Party for Democracy—and hope for a better future.[21] The production combined blunt testimony from victims of torture and relatives of the disappeared with an upbeat tone that stressed a "No" victory would restore democracy rather than return the country to the socialist government of Salvador Allende, a message reinforced by the appearance of right-wing figures campaigning for "No."
A popular jingle, "Chile, la alegría ya viene" ("Chile, joy is on its way")—lyrics by Sergio Bravo, music by Jaime de Aguirre, performed by Rosa Escobar and Claudio Guzmán—became the campaign's signature.[22] Chilean and international celebrities appeared in its spots, including journalist Patricio Bañados—previously banned from television by the regime—along with Sting, Jane Fonda, Richard Dreyfuss, Sara Montiel, Robert Blake, Paloma San Basilio, Christopher Reeve, singer Joan Manuel Serrat, and Chilean folk singer Florcita Motuda, who composed two songs for the campaign. One widely remembered spot featured a woman describing being tortured after the 1973 coup, followed by her son Carlos Caszely, a leading Chilean footballer of the era and a critic of the regime.[23][24]
The government censored part of the "No" broadcast on 12 September 1988, when the National Television Council blocked an interview segment in which judge René García Villegas accused the National Information Center of torture; in response, the "Sí" campaign declined to air its own chapter the following day, saying the decision was meant "to preserve equal conditions in the public debate."[25]
The Yes campaign
The "Sí" campaign pursued two main goals: reminding voters of the political chaos that preceded the 1973 coup, which it blamed on supporters of "No," and softening the public's perception of Pinochet as an authoritarian, rigid figure. Early spots emphasized economic achievements under the dictatorship, but when this failed to resonate the strategy shifted to attacking the "No" advertisements and publicizing polls purporting to show broad support for the government.
The "Sí" franja was produced largely by members of the armed forces together with an advertising team led by Argentine executive Marcelo López and including Manfredo Mayol, Carlos Alberto Délano, Joaquín Lavín, Jovino Novoa, and Jorge Eugenin, director of the División de Comunicación Social (Dinacos).[26] Its spots included jingles bordering on a personality cult around Pinochet, such as the anthem "Un horizonte de esperanza" ("A Horizon of Hope") and a Rapa Nui-language song, "Iorana, Presidente," composed by then eight-year-old Laura Alarcón Rapu. Singers Marcelo Hernández, Willy Bascuñán, Arturo Giolito, Ginette Acevedo, Patricia Maldonado, and Benjamín Mackenna; television presenters Jorge Rencoret and Katherine Salosny; and athletes Patricio Cornejo, Hans Gildemeister, and Elías Figueroa all appeared in its broadcasts. From 18 September the "Sí" franja was restructured under presenter Hernán Serrano to more closely mirror the format of its rival, adding personal testimonies alongside an increasingly aggressive strategy of mocking the opposition's spots.
Interior Minister Sergio Fernández, one of the campaign's chief coordinators, later acknowledged its failure:
The (campaign) results were poor. In a few days nobody could ignore the evident technical superiority of the No campaign: superior in argumentation, superior in filming, superior in music. Its signature tune, with the slogan "La alegría ya viene" (Joy is coming) as its main element, was so catchy that even the Yes campaign creatives hummed it during their brainstorming sessions.
Rallies

Both sides staged mass rallies. On 22 September the "No" campaign launched the ten-day "March of Joy" (Marcha de la alegría), which drew supporters from Arica in the north and Puerto Montt in the south to converge on Santiago.[27] These marches were repeatedly interrupted by the Carabineros or the secret police, and demonstrators were attacked by armed pro-"Sí" supporters without police intervention. The "Sí" campaign responded with its own rally in downtown Santiago on 2 October, the day after the "No" march reached the capital, formally closing the campaign period. News coverage of both events was widely seen as favoring the government side.
Foreign involvement
Hungarian-American investor George Soros provided advice and funding to the "No" campaign; according to Máximo Pacheco Matte, the assistance included polling and research that had previously "been hidden from us for 17 years," which proved "crucial for the preparation of the famous television program of the 'No' campaign and for the victory in the plebiscite."[28] The U.S. government-funded National Endowment for Democracy—which has been linked to the CIA[29]—together with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, contributed roughly one million dollars to the "No" campaign during the Reagan administration and sent election observers.[30][31] These observers helped establish a parallel vote-counting system in conjunction with German foundations and the Committee for Free Elections. Political scientist David Altman has written that Pinochet allowed "a certain degree of freedom to carry out a mobilization campaign against the regime."[32]
Opinion polls
Pre-election polling was volatile and, in several cases, contradictory, reflecting the difficulty of surveying opinion after fifteen years of dictatorship. A survey by the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) found that among "No" voters, a poor economy (72 percent) and unequal income distribution were cited more often than human rights concerns (57 percent) as reasons for their vote.
| Pollster | Date | Yes | No | Undecided |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CED/FLACSO | June 1987 | 12.4% | 47.3% | 40.3% |
| CERC | November 1987 | 31.1% | 40.3% | 18.2% |
| Gallup | December 1987 | 39.4% | 26.6% | 34% |
| CEP/Adimark | June 1988 | 37% | 41% | 22% |
| CERC | August 1988 | 30.8% | 40.6% | 22% |
| CEP | September 1988 | 27% | 45% | 23% |
| CEP/Adimark | 3 October 1988 | 32% | 52% | 16% |
| Skopus | 3 October 1988 | 53.9% | 46.1% | — |
Source: compiled from contemporary press reports.[33][34][35]
Most published polls in the final weeks nonetheless underestimated "No"'s eventual margin, and several late "Sí"-aligned polls—including one attributed to the government's own intelligence services—predicted a comfortable government win, a discrepancy later cited as evidence that state polling had been used as a campaign tool.
Foreign interference
Days before the vote, the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States were warned of a possible move to suspend the plebiscite, amid reports that figures close to Pinochet were prepared to provoke violence as a pretext for cancelling it; both governments contacted Pinochet directly, and he pledged to respect the outcome.[36]
Election day
Rumors of a possible boycott had circulated after a suspicious power outage on the night of 4 October. A tense calm prevailed on the morning of 5 October at the more than 22,000 polling stations set up nationwide to receive some 7.4 million registered voters. Pinochet cast his vote at the Instituto Nacional polling station at 10:10 a.m.
Vote counting quickly became a point of contention. The opposition's parallel counting system, run through the Committee for Free Elections, began reporting a clear lead for "No" during the afternoon, while the government's official channel lagged and, in its first partial report at 7:30 p.m.—based on only 72 of more than 22,000 polling tables—showed "Sí" leading 57.36 percent to 40.54 percent, a figure the "No" command publicly denounced as manipulated. Subsequent official tallies narrowed steadily and then reversed the result as more tables were counted; by 11:00 p.m. the government's own count, from 677 tables, showed "Sí" and "No" nearly tied, and shortly afterward "No" pulled ahead in successive updates.
Reports that the "No" side was winning reached the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces and Carabineros through their own subordinates well before the government's official channel acknowledged it, and they sought an audience with Pinochet, which he initially declined. At midnight, Air Force commander Fernando Matthei told reporters as he arrived at La Moneda that "No" had won the vote. At 12:18 a.m. on 6 October, Pinochet met with his ministers and reportedly told them: "Gentlemen, the plebiscite is lost. I want your resignations immediately. That is all." He then met with the full junta.
At 2:00 a.m., interior undersecretary Alberto Cardemil announced the final official count to the press: 43 percent for "Sí" against 54.7 percent for "No." Chileans began celebrating in the streets that morning, and that evening Pinochet, in a televised address, acknowledged the "No" victory and pledged to continue the process laid out in the 1980 Constitution.
Aftermath

According to later accounts, Pinochet supposedly considered plans for an auto-coup to avoid stepping down.[37] As early returns favored "No," official reporting was suspended and television coverage of the count went dark for a time on election night.[38] Sources have described Pinochet attempting to manufacture a pretext for retaining control by encouraging street unrest, but Carabineros General Director Rodolfo Stange refused an order to lift the police cordon around Santiago that was preventing large gatherings.[37]
General Jorge Ballerino, commander of the Military Institutes; Miguel Ángel Poduje, Minister of Housing; Sergio Fernández, Minister of the Interior; General Gabriel Omeño, Chief of Order the Chilean Carabineros and Sergio Valenzuela, Chief of the Presidential General Staff who were present in La Moneda Palace with Pinochet, deny those accusations and claim that there wasn't a plan to disregard the results of the referendum.[39]
During the subsequent junta meeting, Pinochet is said to have proposed granting himself extraordinary powers to have the armed forces secure the capital. According to Matthei's later published memoirs, he refused outright and tore up a draft decree that would have authorized such powers; Admiral Merino and General Stange took the same position, insisting the result be respected.[40] Without their backing, Pinochet accepted the result and the constitutional transition proceeded. In a letter published in El Mercurio on 10 January 2012, however, Matthei stated that he had never actually torn up any decree, and that there had never been genuine intent to disregard the plebiscite's result.[41][42]
I have pointed out that on the night of the plebiscite, we had differing views among ourselves regarding the best way to ensure public order—always within the framework of the Constitution and the law—as is only natural at such a crucial moment and among people who had lived through and acted in the exceptional circumstances that marked those times. That is how it was, and I believe that the Chilean people’s moderation and good sense prevailed that night.
I assure my fellow citizens that there was never the slightest hesitation on the part of President Pinochet or any member of the Governing Junta regarding respect for the results of that plebiscite and thus strict compliance with the provisions of the very Constitution that we had proposed to the country.[41][43]
— Fernando Matthei in his letter Los hechos son los hechos (Facts are facts) in January 10, 2012
The remaining junta members, who had favored a civilian candidate over Pinochet, regarded the plebiscite as his personal defeat.[13] Under the constitution's transitory provisions, Pinochet's term was automatically extended by one year, to 11 March 1990, pending new elections. In 1989 Pinochet and the opposition negotiated 54 constitutional amendments intended to ease the transition, approved by 91 percent of voters in a referendum on 30 July 1989. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held as scheduled on 14 December 1989; Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin won the presidency with 55 percent of the vote, and he and the newly elected Congress took office on 11 March 1990, formally ending military rule in Chile.
Results
| Choice | Votes | % | |
|---|---|---|---|
| For | 3,119,110 | 44.01 | |
| Against | 3,967,579 | 55.99 | |
| Total | 7,086,689 | 100.00 | |
| Valid votes | 7,086,689 | 97.72 | |
| Invalid votes | 94,594 | 1.30 | |
| Blank votes | 70,660 | 0.97 | |
| Total votes | 7,251,943 | 100.00 | |
| Registered voters/turnout | 7,429,404 | 97.61 | |
| Source: Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones | |||
Of 7,429,404 registered voters, turnout was 97.5 percent. Of valid votes, "No" won 55.99 percent to 44.01 percent for "Sí"; including null and blank ballots, the government's own tally on election night put the margin at 54.7 to 43 percent.[44]
Results by region
| Region | «Yes» | % | «No» | % | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I | Tarapacá | 75,849 | 44.71 | 93,800 | 55.29 |
| II | Antofagasta | 84,259 | 39.32 | 130,052 | 60.68 |
| III | Atacama | 49,400 | 43.84 | 63,293 | 56.16 |
| IV | Coquimbo | 114,250 | 46.02 | 133,997 | 53.98 |
| V | Valparaíso | 324,058 | 42.69 | 434,997 | 57.31 |
| VI | O'Higgins | 164,430 | 44.08 | 208,574 | 55.92 |
| VII | Maule | 220,742 | 48.83 | 231,348 | 51.17 |
| VIII | Biobío | 409,513 | 44.71 | 506,513 | 55.29 |
| IX | Araucanía | 220,090 | 54.05 | 187,071 | 45.95 |
| X | Los Lagos | 242,457 | 50.15 | 240,984 | 49.85 |
| XI | Aysén | 19,238 | 49.99 | 19,245 | 50.01 |
| XII | Magallanes | 35,549 | 42.36 | 48,372 | 57.64 |
| RM | Santiago Metropolitan | 1,159,275 | 40.98 | 1,669,333 | 59.02 |
| Total: 7,086,689 | 3,119,110 | 44.01 | 3,967,579 | 55.99 | |
"Sí" carried only the Araucanía and Los Lagos regions, in Chile's south, while "No" won every other region, including a decisive 59-percent majority in the populous Santiago Metropolitan Region.
Legacy and popular culture
The plebiscite is widely regarded as the turning point of the Chilean transition to democracy and is credited, along with the 1989 elections, with having ended military rule through an institutional process rather than a violent overthrow. Pinochet nonetheless remained army commander-in-chief until 1998 and subsequently served as a senator-for-life.
The 2012 film No, directed by Pablo Larraín and starring Gael García Bernal, dramatized the making of the "No" television campaign; it mixed archival footage from 1988 with a fictionalized narrative and became the first Chilean film nominated for the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film, at the 85th Academy Awards.[45] The film received some criticism, including from participants in the original campaign, for its portrayal of how the "No" strategy was developed.[46]
See also
Further reading
- Ethan Kaplan, Fernando Saltiel, Sergio S. Urzúa. 2019. "Voting for Democracy: Chile's Plebiscito and the Electoral Participation of a Generation." NBER.
- Cavallo, Ascanio, Manuel Salazar and Óscar Sepúlveda. La historia oculta del Régimen Militar: Chile 1973-1988. Santiago: Grijalbo-Mondadori, 1997.
- Spooner, Mary Helen. The General's Slow Retreat: Chile After Pinochet. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.