Shield of the Americas

Origins and formation

The Shield developed amid the second Trump administration's increased emphasis on the Western Hemisphere in U.S. national-security policy. Prior to the inaugural summit, analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies interpreted the planned gathering as part of a wider effort not only to combat organized crime but also to reduce Chinese strategic influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.^[10] The Polish Institute of International Affairs similarly described the March summit as combining cooperation against organized crime with the administration's effort to reinforce U.S. influence in the hemisphere.^[11]

On March 5, U.S. defense and security officials hosted representatives from 16 other governments at the inaugural Americas Counter Cartel Conference at SOUTHCOM headquarters in Doral. The resulting Joint Security Declaration stated the signatories' intention to expand bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, cooperate on border security, trafficking and critical-infrastructure protection, and participate in a coalition against what the document termed "narco-terrorism" and other shared threats.^[4][3]

The March 5 declaration was signed by the United States, Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago.^[4] The declaration was executed in English and Spanish, with both texts described as equally authentic.^[4]

On the same day, Trump announced the appointment of former homeland security secretary Kristi Noem as U.S. special envoy for the Shield of the Americas.^[12][13]

Inaugural summit

On March 7, Trump convened the inaugural Shield of the Americas Summit at Trump National Doral Miami. The meeting brought together representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago in addition to the United States.^[5] Chile was represented by president-elect José Antonio Kast, who had not yet taken office.^[11]

Trump presented the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition as the military and security partnership associated with the Shield and called on participating governments to increase the use of their armed forces against cartels and transnational gangs.^[2] Senior U.S. participants included Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Noem.^[2]

The summit's agenda extended beyond counternarcotics. U.S. officials also linked the initiative to migration, protection of critical infrastructure and resistance to outside geopolitical influence in the hemisphere.^[10][11]

Although U.S. government sources and subsequent reporting sometimes treated "Shield of the Americas" and "Americas Counter Cartel Coalition" as alternative names for the same initiative, participation at the leaders' summit did not exactly match the states that had signed the March 5 security declaration.^[1][14]

Activation and Panama forum

In the months after the summit, participating countries continued existing bilateral security cooperation with the United States while the U.S. government sought to develop a more permanent regional coordination mechanism. SOUTHCOM described intelligence sharing, combined training, interoperability, maritime interdiction and partner-capacity building as areas of cooperation with A3C members.^[6]

On August 4, SOUTHCOM activated Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere (JTF-WHEM), describing it as a purpose-built joint headquarters for synchronizing U.S. military operations with allied and partner countries throughout the hemisphere. SOUTHCOM commander Gen. Francis L. Donovan selected Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Kevin Jarrard to command the task force.^[6] The command said JTF-WHEM would integrate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, operational planning and multinational coordination while working with the 18 A3C partner nations.^[6]

On August 11–12, Panama hosted the second Americas Counter Cartel Coalition Forum. Ministers, chiefs of defense and senior security officials from the United States and the coalition's regional partners discussed the development of operational plans, division of responsibilities and multinational working groups.^[1][15]

Participants represented Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago.^[1]

At the forum, Hegseth announced that Colombia, under president Abelardo de la Espriella, had joined the coalition, bringing its membership to 19 countries including the United States.^[7][15] Colombia had been absent from the inaugural Shield summit under former president Gustavo Petro.^[7]

The Panama forum coincided with PANAMAX 2026, a multinational military exercise focused on the defense of the Panama Canal and surrounding region. The conjunction of the forum with the exercise reflected the coalition's growing emphasis on existing U.S.-led training, interoperability and planning mechanisms rather than the creation of a new standing multinational force.^[15]

InSight Crime described Colombia's accession as part of the coalition's rapid growth, while questioning how far its expanding membership had been translated into a common operational strategy.^[14]

Peru and the September meeting

Although Peru had signed the March 5 A3C security declaration, it had not participated in the inaugural heads-of-government Shield summit. On September 10, President Keiko Fujimori announced during a visit by Secretary Rubio that Peru would participate in the Shield of the Americas, emphasizing intelligence sharing and coordinated action against transnational criminal organizations.^[16]

On September 22, Trump convened what he described as the second meeting of the Shield of the Americas in New York City during the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly.^[8][17]

The governments of the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago issued the Joint Statement on Defending Hemispheric Sovereignty.^[9] The document expanded the publicly stated scope of the Shield around three headings: economic security, security cooperation and multilateral coordination.^[9]

The governments simultaneously announced their first collective initiative under the new framework, directed at 24 organizations already designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations. The statement expressed an intention, subject to each government's domestic and international legal obligations, to employ measures including asset freezes, immigration and visa restrictions and penalties for knowingly providing material or logistical support.^[9][18]

The list included MS-13, Tren de Aragua, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, Clan del Golfo, the National Liberation Army, several FARC dissident organizations, Shining Path, Brazil's Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho, and armed criminal organizations from Ecuador and Haiti.^[9]

The participating governments also said they intended to request a meeting of consultation within the Organization of American States under Articles 6 and 13 of the Rio Treaty to consider collective action against transnational criminal organizations.^[9]

The September meeting also had a domestic political consequence in Costa Rica. On September 24, President Laura Fernández dismissed Foreign Minister Manuel Tovar after he attended the meeting without informing her, which the Costa Rican government said prevented Fernández from attending herself. The government nevertheless reaffirmed the importance it attached to Costa Rican participation in the Shield.^[19]

Institutional character

Public descriptions of the Shield and the A3C have not always drawn a sharp institutional distinction between them. In August, the U.S. Department of War described the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition as "sometimes called" the Shield of the Americas,^[1] while InSight Crime reported that the two names had become largely interchangeable in official usage.^[14] In practice, however, participation at Shield leaders' meetings and in A3C defense activities has not always been identical.

The initiative is not established by a ratified multilateral collective-defense treaty comparable to the Rio Treaty. Its March founding document is framed as a declaration of intent and states that cooperation is to respect each country's sovereignty, existing bilateral agreements and domestic law.^[4] An institutional analysis by the American Chamber of Commerce in Colombia noted that the publicly available arrangements had not established detailed accession rules, a permanent regional secretariat, a common financing system or formal procedures for resolving disputes.^[20]

Operational coordination has instead developed principally through national authorities, bilateral agreements and U.S. institutions, especially SOUTHCOM and JTF-WHEM.^[6]

Participation

As of August 2026, the U.S. government described the A3C as comprising the United States and 18 partner nations.^[6] Fifteen governments subsequently issued the September 22 Shield statement. The difference reflects varying participation in the coalition's defense activities and high-level political meetings rather than a publicly defined system of separate membership classes.^[1][9]

More information Country, March 5 A3C declaration ...

Participation in major Shield and A3C events in 2026

Country	March 5 A3C declaration	March 7 Shield summit	A3C member by August	September 22 Shield statement
Argentina	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bahamas	Yes	—	Yes	—
Belize	Yes	—	Yes	—
Bolivia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chile	—	Yes Represented by president-elect José Antonio Kast, who had not yet taken office	Yes	Yes
Colombia	—	—	Yes	Yes
Costa Rica	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dominican Republic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ecuador	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
El Salvador	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guatemala	Yes	—	Yes	—
Guyana	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Honduras	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Jamaica	Yes	—	Yes	—
Panama	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peru	Yes	—	Yes	Yes
Trinidad and Tobago	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
United States	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Close

Two of the hemisphere's largest countries, Brazil and Mexico, remained outside the coalition as of the September meeting.^[8]

Leadership and coordination

• 
  Kristi Noem
  U.S. special envoy for the Shield of the Americas
• 
  Pete Hegseth
  Chair of the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition
• 
  Francis L. Donovan
  Commander of United States Southern Command
• 
  Kevin Jarrard
  Commander of Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere

Leadership and coordination are distributed across several U.S. offices rather than concentrated in a single publicly identified multinational headquarters. Kristi Noem, appointed U.S. special envoy for the Shield of the Americas, serves primarily in a diplomatic role, coordinating with participating governments on behalf of the United States.^[13]

Pete Hegseth chairs the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition and has presided over its defense and security meetings, including the second A3C Forum in Panama in August 2026.^[1] His role concerns ministerial-level defense coordination rather than direct command of participating countries' armed forces.

Military coordination on the U.S. side is conducted principally through United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), commanded by Gen. Francis L. Donovan. In August 2026, SOUTHCOM established Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere (JTF-WHEM), commanded by Maj. Gen. Kevin Jarrard, to synchronize U.S. military operations and cooperation with regional partners.^[6]

The coalition has not announced a single multinational military commander, permanent international secretariat or integrated command structure comparable to those of a treaty-based military alliance. Participating governments retain command of their own forces, while SOUTHCOM and JTF-WHEM provide much of the U.S. military infrastructure used for multinational planning, intelligence sharing, training and operational coordination.^[6]

Counter-cartel security cooperation

The coalition's most developed area is security cooperation against transnational criminal organizations. The founding declaration itself did not create a multinational standing force or authorize automatic cross-border operations; instead, it committed governments to deepen cooperation within their respective laws and existing agreements.^[4]

Implementation has therefore relied substantially on bilateral relationships and U.S.-led coordination. JTF-WHEM was established to combine intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, operational planning and multinational coordination with participating countries. SOUTHCOM has identified intelligence sharing, combined training, interoperability, maritime interdiction and partner-capacity building as mechanisms for cooperation with A3C governments.^[6]

This structure means that the coalition functions less like a conventional treaty alliance with an integrated multinational command than as a framework connecting national governments through existing and expanded security relationships. The publicly available founding documents do not establish automatic collective military obligations between participants.^[4][20]

During a September visit to Peru, Secretary Rubio stated that the United States would not undertake unilateral operations against traffickers inside partner countries without their consent, emphasizing cooperation with national governments.^[21]

Economic security and strategic competition

The Shield's policy scope widened substantially between March and September. The original security declaration concentrated on border security, trafficking and critical infrastructure, whereas the September statement added investment screening, critical-mineral supply chains and rules concerning trusted suppliers of digital infrastructure.^[4][9]

Those provisions placed the Shield within a broader debate over strategic competition in the hemisphere. Before the coalition's launch, CSIS analyst Ryan C. Berg argued that the summit could form part of a wider U.S. strategy to counter Chinese influence over infrastructure, trade and strategic sectors in Latin America.^[10]

The economic component nevertheless remained primarily a coordination framework as of September. The public statement did not establish a common market, joint investment authority or binding regional investment-screening regime; rather, participating governments committed themselves to greater cooperation in those areas according to their respective legal systems.^[9]

Financial and legal measures

The September 22 initiative represented a broadening of the coalition's original emphasis on military and law-enforcement cooperation toward coordinated financial, immigration and legal measures. The 15 governments declared an intention to target persons supporting 24 U.S.-designated organizations through measures that could include asset restrictions, immigration controls and criminal enforcement.^[9][18]

The joint statement did not itself make all 24 groups terrorist organizations under the domestic law of every participating country. Its wording expressly conditioned implementation on each government's domestic and international legal obligations.^[9] Consequently, the precise legal effect of the initiative varies among participating states according to their own procedures for sanctions, terrorism designations, immigration restrictions and criminal liability.

Use of inter-American institutions

Rather than creating its own collective-defense mechanism, the September statement proposed using the existing Rio Treaty system. Participating governments said they intended to seek an OAS meeting of consultation under Articles 6 and 13 of the treaty and consider collective measures against transnational criminal organizations.^[9]

This approach potentially links the Shield to the established inter-American security architecture while leaving the coalition itself comparatively informal. Governments participating in the Shield that were not parties to the Rio Treaty stated that they would support the initiative to the extent permitted by their legal obligations and the treaty body's procedures.^[9]