Bull bridge accident

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When examined by the driver and fireman, one of the cast-iron girders of the bridge was found to have fractured, unusually, near to one of the abutments rather than at the centre of the beam. The track was supported by a pair of identical girders with Barlow rails cut to length laid across the inner flange, with asphalted ballast on top, just below the sleepers. When Captain Henry Whatley Tyler of the Railway Inspectorate examined the fracture surface, he found it rusted over, but the evidence of those who had seen it first showed just what had happened. The cast iron girder had broken vertically from an enormous defect in the web and flanges, where there was a complete gap between the sides. The girder was completely defective here, but why no one had spotted it before the accident remains a mystery. Tyler suggests that it may have grown from an internal void with time simply because such a defect would surely have been discovered either by the foundry or the builders. The girder had been installed 23 years before, in 1837, and should have supported a central load of 90 long tons (91,000 kg) if in good condition. The pair of girders should have supported a total load of 360 long tons (370,000 kg) distributed over all the structure, and Tyler stated that the girder was much bigger than was needed for the job. The engine weighed 31 long tons (31,000 kg) and the tender 18 long tons (18,000 kg).

The source of the defect remains unknown but may have been caused initially by a "cold shut," where the molten metal does not fuse during metal casting. It often occurs when two waves of fast cooling cast iron meet, but why it should have occurred only about 10 feet (3.0 m) from one end remains unknown. It could have grown with repeated loading from passing traffic, and Tyler thought it lucky that it had failed when a goods train passed, rather than a passenger train, when casualties would have been inevitable. So it is possible that fatigue had caused the failure by the steady growth of a brittle crack from the initial defect.

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Together with the Wootton bridge collapse the following year in 1861, there should have been some concern within the railway companies about the number of cast-iron girders used as underbridges on railway lines. Engineers would also have been aware of the problems of cast iron in railway bridges after the failure of the Dee bridge in 1847. Whether or not such structures were inspected is unknown; it seems not, as several more collapses occurred some years later, at the Inverythan crash and the Norwood Junction rail accident in 1891. Thereafter, the vast majority of cast-iron underbridges on the rail network were eventually replaced by wrought iron or steel structures, although some cast-iron underbridges remain today, e.g. Robert Stephenson's High Level Bridge in Newcastle.

• Lewis, Peter R. (2007). Disaster on the Dee: Robert Stephenson's Nemesis of 1847. Tempus.

53°03′59″N 1°27′50″W / 53.0664°N 1.4639°W / 53.0664; -1.4639