Gordon's Flank Attack

On May 3, the Union commander in chief, General Ulysses S. Grant , began the Overland Campaign and crossed the Rapidan River, hoping to advance through the Wilderness forest. On May 5, at 11:00 a.m., General Richard Ewell's corps met with the enemy's advance units at Sanders Field, and the Battle of the Wilderness began. Ewell deployed Rodes's division to the right of the road and Johnson's to the left. At 1:00 p.m., Warren's corps attacked his position and overthrew Rodes's division, but Early's division arrived and drove the Union forces back. Ewell did not pursue this success, not wanting to become involved in a major battle.^[5]

During these battles, Gordon's brigade fought as part of Early's division on the corps' right flank. That evening, the brigade was transferred to the corps' left flank and placed to the left of Pegram's brigade , the far left. Gordon sent scouts to identify the enemy battle line in front of the brigade. The scouts returned at sunrise on May 6. They reported that the Federal line extended only as far as Pegram's brigade, where it disappeared into dense brush and ended. There was no enemy in front of Gordon's brigade, and the brigade's flank extended well beyond Sedgwick's corps. Gordon realized his brigade had a chance to break through to the enemy's rear and attack them from an exposed flank. To confirm his suspicions, he sent another group of scouts to confirm the first report and check for additional enemy units behind the Federal VI Corps. The second reconnaissance completely confirmed the reports of the first. Gordon later wrote that everything inside him trembled with the realization of the incredible possibilities that this incident offered.^[6]

Around 5:00 a.m., skirmishing broke out on the front of Sedgwick's corps . By 6:00 a.m., the firing had died down, and Gordon decided to check the Union flank himself. He went into the woods with a cavalry reconnaissance detachment, stayed there for an hour, and found that the reports were accurate down to the last detail. Moreover, he discovered a small clearing in which a brigade could be formed for an attack. Gordon decided that he could attack Sedgwick's flank with one or two brigades, overturn the outermost brigade, and then continue the advance south, with the remaining brigades engaging from the front and joining the flanking attack one by one. In Gordon's opinion, this attack could destroy the entire offensive potential of the enemy army and threaten its very existence.^[7][8]

Gordon relayed his observations to his adjutant, Thomas Jones, and sent him a report to division commander Jubal Early. Along the way, Jones met corps commander Ewell and informed him that Gordon had discovered an exposed enemy flank and was prepared to attack it with two or three brigades. Early arrived during the conversation and categorically opposed the attack. He was certain that Burnside's corps was behind Sedgwick's corps , which would attack Gordon's column and destroy it. Jones relayed this conversation to Gordon, who personally went to corps headquarters. This was between 8 and 9 a.m. Gordon was absolutely certain there were no reserves behind Sedgwick's line, but Early was adamantly convinced otherwise and disregarded the intelligence data and Gordon himself. Ewell hesitated. He was ultimately responsible for the outcome, despite the fact that he was unfamiliar with the terrain of the proposed attack and did not want to contradict Early. Ewell's adjutant later wrote that Ewell was inclined to side with Gordon, but yielded to Early's categorical position. Ewell decided to explore the area himself, but business distracted him from these plans.^[9]

Around 1:00 PM, Robert Johnston's North Carolina brigade arrived on the battlefield from Richmond. It was also transferred to the left flank and positioned further to the left of Gordon's brigade. After the arrival of these reinforcements, Gordon again requested permission to attack, but was again denied. Early was still confident that Burnside's corps was in the second line of Federal defenses and therefore did not want to risk his reserves.^[10]

The position of the federal flank

General Early was mistaken in believing that Burnside's corps was behind Sedgwick in the second line. At 10:00 a.m., Burnside was leading his corps toward the center of the Army of the Potomac, while Sedgwick's corps line was weakening. The battle of May 5 had inflicted some damage on the corps, and the fighting on the morning of May 6 had weakened it further. Truman Seymour's brigade stood on the far right, and to the left was Neil's brigade, which had shifted even further to the left in the morning, forcing Seymour to stretch his brigade line. To strengthen his flank, Sedgwick transferred Alexander Shaler's brigade there at 2:00 p.m. Shaler positioned his three regiments at an angle to the corps line, facing north. However, during the day, one regiment had to be deployed as a picket line, and the other was sent to reinforce Neil's brigade. Ultimately, Shaler's third and final regiment was transferred to a front-line position, leaving its flank exposed. "The most astonishing thing was that an army of 100,000 men stood with an open flank, with a single battle line and no fortifications," Shaler later wrote. "I immediately notified General Seymour that I would not be held responsible for any disaster that might befall us in this area."^[11]

Decesion making

During the day, General Ewell suddenly changed his mind and approved Gordon's plan of attack. The reasons for his decision have long been the subject of debate. Ewell himself claimed in his report that he did so after personally reviewing the situation: "About 0900 I learned from General Gordon... that his scouts had found the enemy's right flank exposed, and he proposed to turn it, but this was opposed by General Early, who considered it unsafe. The situation required my personal review, which was done as soon as my other duties permitted, but as a result of this delay and other unavoidable circumstances, the maneuver did not begin until nearly sunset. After reviewing, I ordered the attack and detached Robert Johnston's brigade from Rodes's division to reinforce Gordon"^[12], provides a similar account of the events.^[13]

Jubal Early wrote in his memoirs that he was the one making the decision. Finding that Burnside's corps had withdrawn and that the threat to his left flank had been eliminated, he advised General Ewell to approve Gordon's proposal. Gordon himself does not mention the circumstances of his decision in his report. He briefly states that late on May 6 he received orders from General Early to begin forming a brigade. He later recounted this story in more detail in his 1903 memoirs. According to a later version, General Lee personally attended a conference with Ewell and Early, listened to Gordon's arguments, and, contrary to Early's opinion, ordered the attack. This version of events was also included in Douglas Freeman's biography of General Lee. Gordon published this version after the deaths of Lee, Ewell, and Early, but Early's adjutants (such as John Daniel) were still alive and declared it a fabrication. According to Daniel, Gordon appeared before Early at 5:30 p.m. and asked permission to launch the attack on his own responsibility. Early replied,"Very well, General Gordon, go ahead and execute it."^[14]

The available evidence suggests that Lee and Ewell met and discussed the possibility of attacks on the afternoon of May 6, but the exact location is unknown. It is highly likely that Lee insisted on attacking the Union right flank. He was in fact planning an attack on his army's right flank and was interested in a simultaneous attack on Ewell's front. Gordon's presence at these negotiations is unlikely, as is the idea that Lee forced Ewell and Early to act against their wishes this would be inconsistent with his usual command style.^[15]

Having received permission, Gordon immediately led his brigade into a clearing behind the Union right flank and formed it perpendicular to the enemy line. Johnston's brigade stood to the left. Pegram's brigade was to attack from the front. General Early's adjutant, John Daniel, was charged with coordinating the advance of all three brigades. The entire formation took place in complete silence, and even the officers' orders were whispered. The 1st Battalion, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, stood at the outermost of the Union line at this time. Its ranks were resting, preparing food, and burying the dead. Wounded returning from no man's land noticed movement in the enemy ranks and warned that "in a minute all hell will break loose." Nevertheless, Gordon's attack took the New Yorkers completely by surprise. A witness recalled that the sudden appearance of Confederates from the flank and rear forced the Union troops to flee immediately, abandoning pork in the frying pans, coffee on the fire, and rifles on the ground. Shaler's units fled immediately, exposing the flank of the 110th Ohio Regiment, which eventually began to retreat as well. The colonel of the 122nd Ohio discovered the enemy when they were already in the rear of his regiment.^[16]

The Confederates managed to easily overthrow Seymour's brigade, but then they ran into some trouble. To Seymour's left stood Neil's brigade, which was attacked from the front, but Neil reformed his second line facing north and met the enemy attack.^[17]

When Gordon's attack began, Shaler and Seymour were in the rear at Sedgwick's headquarters. Seymour was just saying that his men had already withstood two attacks and might not withstand a third when gunfire began to rang out. All three Sedgwick, Shaler, and Seymour rushed to their positions and arrived just as Seymour's last unit was retreating. The Confederates had come so close that their mounted officer pointed a pistol at Sedgwick and shouted, "Surrender, you damned son of a bitch!" but was immediately shot by a New York private. The Confederates were keeping up a heavy artillery barrage, while the Union troops had no artillery of their own. Sedgwick found himself at the line of Neil's brigade, trying to stop the retreating troops: "Halt, for God's sake, men," he shouted, waving his sword, "don't disgrace yourselves and your general like this!" He noticed the standard-bearer and called him to him, but at that moment a rifle volley rang out, killing the standard-bearer and wounding Sedgwick's horse. The general was forced to retreat to the rear on foot.^[18][19]

Shaler also attempted to halt his brigade, but was suddenly surrounded by Confederates and captured. Seymour, who had been attempting to locate the enemy, was also captured. Seymour and Shaler were sent to the rear of Ewell's lines, to Robertson's Tavern, where they were provided with breakfast and a bed. An eyewitness recalled that the tall, thin Seymour looked odd next to the short Shaler as they both marched to the rear.^[20]

When news of the attack reached George Meade's headquarters (commanding the Army of the Potomac), Meade himself was absent (he was at Grant's headquarters), and Andrew Humphreys had assumed temporary command. News came in one after another that Sedgwick's corps had been routed, the Confederates were moving in the rear, and Sedgwick and General Wright had been captured. Meade soon arrived with Grant. They were also informed that the corps had been routed and that headquarters were in danger. "Do you mean to say that the VI Corps is no longer fit to fight in this campaign?" Meade asked sarcastically, to which he replied, "We're afraid so." Lyman recalled that Grant became a little alarmed at these words, but Meade maintained his composure. "Nonsense," he said, "if they've broken our line, they can't do anything overnight." Grant ordered reinforcements to be sent to the dangerous area, after which he returned to headquarters, sat down on a chair in front of the tent, lit a new cigar and remained an “island of calm” in the midst of the general panic.^[21]

It was at this point that the famous scene occurred: one of the officers approached Grant and said, “General Grant, this problem is not to be underestimated. I know Lee’s methods from past experience; he will throw his army between us and the Rapidan River and cut us off from communications.” Grant replied, “Oh, I’m tired of hearing what Lee is going to do. Some of you are inclined to think that he will suddenly turn a double somersault and land in our rear and on all our flanks at once. Go to your unit and consider what we are going to do ourselves, not what Lee is going to do.”^[22]

Meanwhile, Gordon's attack was gradually losing steam. Coordinating the advance of three brigades was completely impossible in the dense forest. The commander of the 31st Georgia Regiment reported to General Early that he had reached the enemy's fortified line; Early ordered Pegram's brigade to advance, led by Colonel John Hoffman after Pegram's wounding. However, due to inaccurate orders, three of Hoffman's regiments went right, two left, and the colonel himself lost contact with the brigade. Johnston's brigade was also unable to help: it was positioned in the second line behind Gordon's brigade, but no one knew the enemy's position, the attack plan, or the terrain. The brigade advanced through the dense forest, guided by the sounds of battle, but deviated too far to the left, toward the Germana-Plank Road. It was likely this maneuver that gave rise to rumors of Confederates advancing along this road into the rear of the Union army. Realizing that he had become dangerously separated from his own men, Johnston returned the brigade to its original position.^[23]

John Daniel, General Early's aide-de-camp, who was tasked with coordinating the attacking forces, noticed that the attack was stalling and led one of Hoffman's regiments to Gordon's aid, but was wounded in the leg and left the battlefield. With no one left to coordinate the offensive, Early decided not to risk the remaining divisions. At this time, Hayes's brigade was also awaiting orders to begin the attack , but it was decided not to commit it. Meanwhile, reinforcements were arriving on the Federal flank: the 10th Vermont and 106th New York regiments from William Morris's brigade arrived, and Sedgwick risked transferring the 121st New York and 95th Pennsylvania regiments from Colonel Upton's brigade to the hot spot.^[24]

Gordon's attack fizzled out, and he then addressed Pegram's brigade personally. Participants recalled him, with tears streaming down his face, begging them to join him and take the enemy's fortifications. Some agreed and went with him toward the Union positions. Around 10:00 PM, advancing through dense woods, the Confederates saw people lying on the ground and mistook them for their own skirmish line. But they turned out to be Federals, who stood up and fired a volley at almost point-blank range, from 15 feet, according to eyewitnesses. Gordon was forced to retreat. "Hardly a single one of our men was wounded during this attack," recalled a Union soldier, "but killed and wounded rebels literally covered the ground."^[25]

Gordon managed to inflict significant losses on the enemy army, capture two brigadier generals, and seriously intimidate the Federal command, but he failed to achieve his main goal the defeat of Sedgwick's corps. The Confederates retreated but maintained their line of battle. Sedgwick had bent his flank, and it was now held by Neil's brigade. In his report, Gordon wrote that he had lost 50 men; in his postwar memoirs, he claimed 60 casualties, half of which were lost during the second night attack.^[26][27]

On the morning of May 7, General Lee arrived at the scene of the evening attack, and at his request, Gordon showed him the offensive area. In daylight, the aftermath of the attack became visible: abandoned knapsacks, ammunition pouches, and muskets. More than 400 bodies of fallen Union soldiers were also discovered on the battlefield. The next day, May 8, Lee, likely impressed by Gordon's success, placed Gordon in command of Jubal Early's division, who temporarily commanded the I Corps.^[1]

Result of the Attack

After the war, debate raged over whether Gordon was close to victory and whether his attack could have changed the course of the battle. General Early, in his memoirs, was skeptical of the attack and its prospects. He wrote that Gordon was saved by darkness; otherwise, the enemy would have noticed the disorder in his units. Furthermore, in the darkness, the Union forces overestimated the attackers' numbers. General Johnston believed that the attack's poor organization prevented it from achieving all its objectives. He said his brigade would have accomplished much more if he had been given all the necessary information from the start. An officer on Pegram's brigade staff also wrote that Gordon's success was impressive, but was not promptly followed up by Pegram's brigade due to conflicting orders. Gordon himself was convinced that he would have achieved greater results if the attack had not been delayed by Ewell and Early. He wrote that he was convinced that if the attack had begun earlier and with good support if the brigades had been brought into the fight one by one as the enemy retreated from their front Grant's entire right flank would have been routed, and perhaps the entire Army of the Potomac would have been threatened. Forty years later, in his memoirs, he wrote that the best opportunity Lee's army had ever had was missed because of the slowness of his commanders.^[28]

Historian Gordon Rhea wrote that it is difficult to decide which side was right in this debate. Both Early and Gordon's decisions were equally sound. Subsequently, conflict arose between the generals, which requires a critical eye to everything they wrote about each other. General Lee seemed to favor Gordon on this issue. After the war, he is believed to have said," Gordon started too late and had insufficient reinforcements to achieve any serious result." General Grant, in his report, praised Sedgwick's abilities and made no mention of Sedgwick allowing his corps to be suddenly attacked from the flank. However, Leeman, an officer on Grant's staff, considered this episode the most shameful page in the history of the VI Corps. General Humphreys criticized Sedgwick for failing to watch his flank and missing the chance to conduct a similar attack the day before. General Seymour received the heaviest criticism. In a letter to Haleck on May 7, Grant claimed that it was Seymour's regiments that had caused the entire flank to collapse. " Milroy's old brigade was attacked and fled in disorder, without resistance, dragging the rest with it," he wrote. A participant in the events from Seymour's brigade also wrote that the ignominious rout was solely due to the incompetence of the commanders. Colonel Joseph Keifer later wrote that Grant made Seymour's brigade the scapegoat to shift the blame. It was Shaler's brigade, not Seymour's, on the flank, he wrote, and Seymour probably could have led better, but the brigade itself fought bravely.^[29]