Gusztáv Jány

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Géza Lakatos who served under Jány called him "a blood and guts officer" with a highly forceful leadership style who was extremely brave.^[1] Lakatos added that Jány had a reputation as a "difficult" officer to serve under as he was inflexible and he often lost his temper, broiling over rage at anyone he considered incompetent.^[1] Jány as deeply jealous that Ferenc Szombathelyi had been appointed chief of the general staff even through he had more seniority than Szombathelyi.^[1] Jány asked several times to resign, saying that he felt deeply insulted that an officer lower in rank and seniority to himself had been appointed chief of the general staff, requests that were always refused by the Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, who told Jány that he thought very highly of his abilities, but not just enough to make him chief of the general staff.^[2]

In early 1942, Jány was appointed commander of the 2nd Army that was to go to the Eastern Front.^[2] On 16 May 1942, Jány met with Adolf Hitler, who for the first time explained to him the details of Fall Blau (Case Blue), the German plan to defeat the Soviet Union in 1942.^[2] Operation Blue called for the German Army Group South to advance into the Caucasus to take the oil fields there, which provided the Soviet Union with most of its oil.^[2] To secure the flank of Army Group South as it headed into the Caucasus, a mixed force of German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian forces were to advance across the Kuban plain to the Volga river.^[2] The elite German 6th Army was to take the city of Stalingrad (modern Volgograd, Russia) on the banks of the Volga while the Hungarian 2nd Army was to secure the flank of the 6th Army by holding a line in the lower Volga territory along the river Don.^[2] Jány felt that his soldiers needed more time to train, but was told by Szombathelyi that his men would complete their training while on deployment as the 2nd Army had only a supporting role in Operation Blue of holding the flank of the 6th Army while the Germans engaged in the main action.^[2]

In October 1942, the Defense Minister General Vilmos Nagy de Nagybaczon came to personally inspect the 2nd Army.^[1] Jány painted a grim picture of the 2nd Army to Nagy, saying that his soldiers had to hold over 200 km of the frontline; had only 6, 000 rifles; no modern tanks and no anti-tank guns; a serious shortage of artillery; and suffering from a major shortage of fodder for the horses.^[3] The 2nd Army had to have their supplies hauled up via wagons driven by horses, which was the shortage of fodder was such a major problem as the inability to feed the horses led to shortages of ammunition, artillery shells and everything else.^[4] Jány called the situation of the 2nd Army a disaster in the making and asked him several times to be relieved of command, saying he wanted no part of the disaster that was about to unfold, requests that were always refused.^[4]

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On 19 November 1942, the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad was decided by Operation Uranus, a Red Army offensive that saw the Soviet forces smash through the two Romanian armies holding the flanks of the 6th Army, an operation that resulted in the 6th Army being encircled.^[5] At the same time, the success of Operation Uranus exposed the German Army South to being cut off.^[5] To avoid this fate, Army Group South was told to abandon the offensive into the Caucasus before the Red Army raced across the Kuban plain to reach the Black Sea..^[5] However, Hitler was still determined to relieve the 6th Army in Stalingrad and was not willing to retreat from the Volga.^[5] On 27 December 1942, Szombathelyi sent a message to Jány saying "no one is allowed to retreat; there is no backward, only forward!"^[5] Both Horthy and Szombathelyi knew that the 2nd Army was in grave danger, but were unwilling to order Jány to retreat out of the fear of damaging relations with Germany.^[5] Despite knowing a Soviet offensive against the 2nd Army was highly probable, Jány took no measures to reinforce his lines and was taken by surprise by the Soviet offensive that opened against his army on 12 January 1943, marking the beginning of the Battle of Voronezh.^[6] The frozen Don river posed no obstacle to the Soviet divisions, who broken through the Hungarian lines.^[6] On 15 January 1943, Jány reported that the 2nd Army was on the brink of annihilation and the only way to save the 2nd Army was to retreat.^[6] His request was refused and he was to hold the line.^[6] On 16 January 1943, Jány requested three times for permission to retreat over the course of the day.^[6] At 7 pm, he called a meeting of his staff officers, where he was described as having an unusual smile on his face while looking very haggard and stressed.^[6] At that point, the phone rang and Jány was heard to say in German "I understand, yes, to the last man, shell, hold at the Don".^[6] At that point, Jány phoned in succession Szombathelyi and Horthy, asking for permission to retreat, which was refused by both men.^[6] Jány was widely admired for his bravery, but he seems to have experienced a psychological collapse under the stress of battle, being unable to think clearly while clinging to obeying orders that he knew were impossible to fulfil.^[6]

Jány reported on 16 January that his men were taking heavy losses, but "I have to emphasize that the troops are doing everything of which they are capable".^[6] On 17 January 1943, Jány finally gave the orders to retreat on his own authority.^[7] In the same order to retreat, Jány lashed out at his own men, writing: "The Second Army has lost its honor, because with the exception of a few-true to their oath and duty-they have not carried out what everyone could have expected of them".^[7] Jány went on to accuse his soldiers of cowardice and announced as a form of punishment: "No one will be allowed to return home, not for illness, for wounds, for frostbite...everyone will recover here or perish!"^[7] Jány had made no preparations for a retreat despite requesting one several times, and the retreat of the 2nd Army became disorganised rout.^[7] Jány's retreat order was widely reprinted by newspapers in Germany and Romania.^[7] In Romania, the regime of Ion Antonescu used Jány's retreat order as evidence that the Hungarians were poor soldiers and Romania would soon take back northern Transylvania.^[7] In Germany, the media presented Jány's retreat order as evidence that the Hungarians were useless as soldiers, which provided a scapegoat for the looming defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad with German newspapers saying that the Wehrmacht had fought well, but had been let down by their Hungarian allies.^[7] By 24 January 1943, what was left of the Second Army had retreated back to safety.^[7] On 2 February 1943, the Battle of Stalingrad ended with the surrender of the 6th Army. On 8 February 1943, Jány sent a telegram to Szombathelyi saying that the Germans were using the Hungarians as a scapegoat, saying that Wehrmacht generals showed a marked tendency to put the interests of their own soldiers ahead of Hungarian soldiers.^[8] The Second Army had been destroyed in the fighting along the Don with some 50, 000 Hungarian soldiers killed in action or freezing to death with another 70, 000 being taken prisoner.^[9] Most of the survivors returned to Hungary in May 1943..^[9] On 1 May 1943, Jány returned to Budapest, where he was greeted by Admiral Horthy in a low-key ceremony at the Eastern Railroad station.^[9] Afterwards, it was announced that Jány had retired from the Honved. ^[9]

After the war, he was found guilty of war crimes and executed by firing squad. He was posthumously exonerated in 1993 by the Supreme Court of Hungary.^[10]

The Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross was awarded March 31, 1943.

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