Osami Nagano

Nagano was born in Kōchi to an ex-samurai family. In 1900, he graduated from the 28th class of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy, ranking second in a class of 105 cadets. After completing service as a midshipman on the cruiser Hashidate and the battleship Asahi, he was commissioned an ensign and assigned to the cruiser Asama. During the Russo-Japanese War, he served in a number of staff positions. The closest he came to combat was commanding a land-based heavy naval gun unit during the siege of Port Arthur.^{[citation needed]}

After his promotion to lieutenant in 1905, Nagano served on the battleship Shikishima. From 1905 to 1906, he studied naval artillery and navigation. From 1906 to 1908, he was chief gunnery officer on the cruiser Itsukushima. In 1909, he graduated from the Japanese Naval War College.

In 1910, Nagano was promoted to lieutenant commander and assigned as chief gunnery officer on the battleship Katori. From January 1913 to April 1915, he was a language officer in the United States, during which time he studied at Harvard Law School.

During World War I, Nagano was executive officer on the cruisers Nisshin and cruiser Iwate. In 1918, he was promoted to captain. In 1919, he received his first (and only) ship command, the cruiser Hirado.^[3]

From December 1920, Nagano was a military attaché to the United States. In this capacity, he attended the Washington Naval Conference. In November 1923, he returned home, although he returned to the United States on official visits in 1927 and 1933. In December 1923, he was promoted to rear admiral.

In February 1924, Nagano was chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff Third Section (Intelligence). From December 1924, he commanded the 3rd Battleship Division. From April 1925, he commanded the 1st China Expeditionary Fleet. In December 1927, he was promoted to vice admiral.

From 1928 to 1929, Nagano was commandant of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy. Nagano introduced and influenced Progressive education method such as Dalton Plan to Japanese Naval Academy.^{[4] [title missing][author missing]}

From 1930 to 1931, he was vice chief of the Navy General Staff, in which capacity he attended the Geneva Naval Conference. He attended the London Naval Conference 1930. From 1933 to 1934, he was commander in chief of the Yokosuka Naval District. On 1 March 1934, he was promoted to admiral and appointed to the Supreme War Council. Nagano was the chief naval delegate to the London Naval Conference 1935.^{[citation needed]} Japan withdrew in protest from the 1935 London Conference after it was denied naval parity with the United States and Great Britain.

In 1936, Nagano was appointed Navy Minister under Prime Minister Kōki Hirota. Later in 1937, he became commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet. By April 1941, he had risen to the very top of the Japanese Navy leadership to become chief of the Imperial Japanese Naval General Staff.

A staunch believer in Nanshin-ron, Admiral Nagano played a central role in Japan's decision to go to war with the United States. After Japanese forces occupied southern Indochina on 24 July 1941, the U.S. and its Western Allies froze Japanese assets within their borders thereby resulting in a halt on all oil shipments to Japan.^[5] At the end of the month, Nagano informed Emperor Hirohito that the nation's oil supply would run out in two years if the embargo was not lifted.^[6] Consequently, he advised that Japan should be ready for war within that timeframe if attempts at diplomacy failed.^[7]

At a liaison conference held on 3 September 1941, both Nagano and the Army's Chief of Staff, General Hajime Sugiyama, called for Japan to be committed to war if negotiations with the West had not been successfully concluded within the first 10 days of October. After being endorsed by those present, the aforementioned proposal (formalized in a document entitled Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies) was presented to the Emperor for his approval.^[8]

On 5 September 1941, Admiral Nagano and General Sugiyama and were called before Emperor Hirohito to brief him on the proposed movement toward war set forth within the Essentials. ^[9] When Hirohito admonished the service chiefs for adopting such bellicose positions despite having no guarantee of victory, Nagano made the following argument:

"If we were to compare today's U.S.-Japanese relations to a sick patient, the patient is in dire need of an operation. If we don't operate, and instead leave him be, the patient will gradually be weaker and weaker. Not that there isn't any hope of recovery. But we must decide while there still is a change [for the success of the operation]. The high command desires diplomatic negotiations to reach a successful conclusion. But in case of its failure, I am afraid that we must pluck up enough courage and operate."^[10]

Despite expressing concern over the Essentials' prioritization of war over diplomacy, Emperor Hirohito refrained from overruling its recommendations, which were adopted as national policy at the ensuing Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941.^[11] However, on October 17, Hirohito overturned the results of the Imperial Conference upon naming General Hideki Tojo as Prime Minister and explicitly charging him with the task of "mak[ing] an exhaustive study" of alternatives to conflict with the West.^[12]

In October 1941, Admiral Nagano ordered the Japanese Combined Fleet to make preparations for war.^[13] Viewing it as a needless diversion of Japan's carriers, Nagano initially opposed Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's planned attack on Pearl Harbor but reluctantly approved the operation after Yamamoto threatened to resign as the Combined Fleet's commander.^[14] Later, on 1 November 1941, he ratified the decision to launch an attack on Pearl Harbor while diplomatic negotiations remained ongoing to ensure complete surprise.^[13]

According to some Japanese sources, Nagano presented a peace proposal before a conference in November 1941 but this was struck down by Prime Minister Tojo.^{[15][16][unreliable source?]} By 1 December 1941, the Emperor gave his imperial sanction for war against the Western powers.^[17]

As Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Nagano oversaw all military operations carried out by the Japanese Navy during most of World War II. Upon its entry into the conflict, the Empire of Japan conquered a broad swathe of territory in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific including Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and the Philippines in a matter of months.^[18][19] However, the tide of the conflict turned against the Japanese after their military was decisively defeated at the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal.^[20][21]

In 1943, Nagano was promoted to marshal admiral. After losing the Emperor's confidence by 1944 , Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō removed Nagano from his post and replaced him with Navy Minister Shigetarō Shimada. Nagano spent the remainder of the war as an advisor to the government.

• According to the opinion of the Japanese government, if Japan accepts the demand of the United States, Japan will perish. However, even if Japan fights against the United States, Japan may perish. That is, accepting the request of the United States will destroy Japan without fighting the United States. Even if we fight against the United States, if Japan can not avoid the danger of extinction, if Japan defeats without fighting with the United States, the Japanese people will truly disappear from the earth. However, if Japanese people can fight and show the spirit of defending Japan, even if Japan fights against America, our descendants will always rebuild Japan. We hope to solve problems in diplomatic negotiations. But unfortunately we will be fighting if we are to be commanded to wage war. (September 6, 1941, Osami Nagano)^{[22][title missing]}

After World War II in 1945, the American Occupation forces arrested Nagano. He was charged with Class A war criminal charges before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo. When US naval officers interrogated him, he was described as "thoroughly cooperative", "keenly alert", "intelligent", and "anxious to develop American friendship."^[23] He died of a heart attack due to complications arising from pneumonia in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo before the conclusion of his trial.

• Chen, Peter. "Nagano Osami". World War II Database. Retrieved 3 August 2007.
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey. "Interrogations of Japanese officials". Retrieved 3 August 2007.
• "How Japs Fight". Time. 15 February 1943. Archived from the original on 20 March 2007. Retrieved 14 August 2008.
• Brannon, John G. "John G. Brannon Papers". Georgetown Law Library Manuscripts Collection. hdl:10822/555530.