Ra'ad al-Hamdani

Hamdani graduated from the Iraqi Military College in Baghdad in 1970 with a BA in military science.^[2]

He served in the 71st Brigade as a first lieutenant, which saw action on the Golan Heights as part of the 3rd Armoured Division during the Yom Kippur War.^[3] He attended Bakr University from 1978 to 1980 after the war and graduated with a MA in military science from the Iraqi Staff College during that time.^[2][4]

During the Iran–Iraq War Hamdani served as a staff officer in various armoured and reconnaissance units, joined the Republican Guard in 1982, and served as a senior training officer between 1987 and 1989.^[2] He received both of Saddam Hussein's sons; Uday and Qusay, as well as Tariq Aziz's son, to serve as officers in his battalion. This was done as a political stunt, so Saddam and Tariq Aziz could claim their sons were fighting in the war. However, Hamdani was told not to let any of the sons die.^[5]

Prior to the outbreak of the Iraq War, al-Hamdani knew that an outbreak of war was imminent between the United States and Iraq, and he sought to implement a strategy of partial force. He was approached by Qusay Hussein on 21 August 2002, who asked him about the possibility of war. When Hamdani confirmed that this was possible, Qusay asked for how long the Republican Guard could hold out against an attack. Hamdani responded that if his strategy of partial force was applied, the Republican Guard could last 6 to 8 months against an invasion. On 30 June 2002, during a meeting, Hamdani told Saddam Hussein, then-President of Iraq, that war with the United States was imminent. He proposed that to mitigate the decaying state of the military, that the Iraqi Armed Forces use the strategy of partial force. Although Saddam allowed him to explain for over 45 minutes, some Republican Guard and Ministry of Defense officials did not agree, his strategy was thus not applied in full.^[6]

As commander of the II Republican Guard Corps, Hamdani was given responsibility for the Karbala region. Hamdani was further stripped of units after Qusay Hussein believed that the U.S. invasion of the South was a feint. Hamdani protested this and argued that unless reinforcements were rushed to the Karbala gap immediately to prevent a breach, U.S. troops would reach Baghdad within 48 hours. His suggestions fell on deaf ears.^[7] Hamdani was ordered to launch a counterattack in response to the continued U.S. advance, resulting in a night raid on 2–3 April which was repulsed with heavy casualties. The U.S. counterattack the following morning totally routed the Republican Guard forces.