Talk:Enigma machine/Archive 2
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Image
A new image that may be of some interest: commons:Image:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-2007-0705-502, Chiffriermaschine "Enigma".jpg - a 1943 German photograph of a machine. Shimgray | talk | 19:06, 5 December 2008 (UTC)
- there is a new High resolution image of the Enigma machine which I think is better than image currently in use. Slavomir.Freso (talk) 09:06, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
Scherbius and Koch discussion
I'm not Dutch, but the changes you guys made - deleting Koch - are based on poor historic research and taking for granted just any source. Karl de Leeuw, a Dutch historian already in 2003 proved that the Enigma was invented by two Dutch navy officers, Spengler and van Hengel. Koch, who was working together with Scherbius. There is no doubt about the solid research and sources of this work of historian de Leeuw, which was published in Cryptologia. His work is acknowledged and confirmed by other historians. I understand that some people are a bit bitten in the **** that their version is fiction, and I understand their err. In those days, the patenting of such machines was a very obscure thing, played in the world of intellingence secrets. More here. Do whatever you want with it, but base your actions (deleting/adding stories) on the work and sources of historians, and don't base them on an opinion. Karl de Leeuw on the invention of the Enigma Dirk (talk) 15:37, 19 December 2008 (UTC)
- Indeed, Spengler and van Hengel are now known to have come up with the first rotor machines (as far as we know), but that doesn't mean they invented Enigma, which was a specific family of rotor machines. A corrective article on the history of Koch, Scherbius and Enigma was published in Cryptologia also, see . — Matt Crypto 21:19, 19 December 2008 (UTC)
- Hi Matt, the article you mention is from 1999, the cryptologia article that explains the invention of that machine is from 2003! That later article is a correction of the 1999 article, not the other way around! They did invent the machine. Of course, it was scherbius that named it Enigma, but who named it how is not the discussion. The simple fact is that the machine that was later called Enigma is invented by the two Dutch naval officers. No more no less. Saying that Scherbius made the Enigma is the same as commercialising a DW (Disk with Music) but actually produce a CD. It's not becaus you gave it a name that you invented it.84.197.193.79 (talk) 12:14, 20 December 2008 (UTC)
- De Leeuw's paper does not at all, as I read it, claim that Spengler and van Hengel invented Enigma, but rather that they were the first known inventors of a rotor machine. In that sense, they no more invented Enigma than they invented (say) Fialka, SIGABA and KL-7. All these machines are far from being merely rebranded carbon copies of the earliest rotor machines; nor was Enigma, which had a number of patents filed about its specifics. — Matt Crypto 17:46, 20 December 2008 (UTC)
- Hi Matt, the article you mention is from 1999, the cryptologia article that explains the invention of that machine is from 2003! That later article is a correction of the 1999 article, not the other way around! They did invent the machine. Of course, it was scherbius that named it Enigma, but who named it how is not the discussion. The simple fact is that the machine that was later called Enigma is invented by the two Dutch naval officers. No more no less. Saying that Scherbius made the Enigma is the same as commercialising a DW (Disk with Music) but actually produce a CD. It's not becaus you gave it a name that you invented it.84.197.193.79 (talk) 12:14, 20 December 2008 (UTC)
international
I just wondered about the various contry/language specific articles on Enigma, in particular the editing-policy thereof. being myself a german engineer I found that the german page is somewhat quick to remove edits, while the same edits are easily accepted in the other languages for their significance. So do not miss the version checks on wikipedia !
Plugboard
Every unclassified source I am familiar with has indicated that the steckerboard added very little additional cryptographic strength. 143.232.210.46 (talk) 23:59, 8 June 2009 (UTC)
- What sources are you reading? — Matt Crypto 06:18, 9 June 2009 (UTC)
The plug board added a huge amount of cryptographic strength. There are a total of 150,738,274,937,250 ways to arrange it! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.98.214.216 (talk) 14:32, 3 August 2011 (UTC)
- The fact that the plugboard can be plugged in an astronimical number of ways does not necessarily mean that it adds any significant cryptographic strength to the overall system. The Poles themselves realised very quickly that the plug board did not affect their ability to find potential machine settings from the double indicator. Once a potential key setting was found, the plugboard merely turned the otherwise legible German into a partial simple substitution cypher. A simple substitution cypher is virtually child's play to analyse. The Germans continued to hold the view that the plugboard would severely hamper analysis of the machine, precisely because it would disguise a successful attempt by not immediately revealing readable German. The reality was, because of the Poles' realisation of its effects, that it was hardly any impediment at all.
- One of the frustrations of cryptoanalysis is that there is absolutely no sense of being close to finding the solution. You either have the answer - or you don't. The idea behind the plugboard was that if the code breakers thought they might have a solution, the fact that they were not reading German would make them believe that they had not got the solution after all. The reality was that the code breakers already knew that the text they were looking for was German encyphered by a simple substitution cypher (the plugboard) which negated the security it was meant to provide. The addition of more plugboard leads was to disguise the plain text more effectively. The basic idea of adding a cryptographically very weak substitution cypher (something no military grade cypher system would normally consider) on top of a cryptographically strong system like Enigma might have succeeded in delaying or preventing its analysis had it not been rumbled so early on. The fact that it was only a partial substitution made it stand out. Had the Germans used 13 plugboard leads right from the start, things may have been very different. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 13:20, 21 June 2013 (UTC)
- I'll second DSP; the plugboard was an illusion of security. The Poles developed techniques that basically ignored the plugboard and the ring settings were only a slight inconvenience. In 1935, the Poles, could break a plugboard Enigma in 15 minutes. How much security could it add? The number of permutations may be large, but that doesn't necessarily make the solution difficult. Glrx (talk) 19:41, 21 June 2013 (UTC)
Poles
Where is missing information about that Poles first broke the Enigma? --DumnyPolak (talk) 01:04, 12 June 2009 (UTC)
- Cryptanalysis of the Enigma; this article is focused on the machine itself, not the history of its solution. — Matt Crypto 15:04, 12 June 2009 (UTC)
- I think the information that the code was broken and by whom is quote important. For your reference, a recent BBC article on the role of Polish mathematicians in breaking the Enigma code: --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk 18:23, 24 July 2009 (UTC)
- Thanks for the reference, although you might recall I'm already fairly well acquainted with the Polish mathematicians' role in breaking Enigma, and I'm enthusiastic that they get the recognition they deserve (for example, I helped get Marian Rejewski to Featured status in part for that reason). My argument here would simply be that there was a lot of history of breaking various Enigma systems by different nationalities, in different times and places -- Poles, French, British, Americans -- and that this colourful history might be better treated in detail in a separate article. — Matt Crypto 19:56, 24 July 2009 (UTC)
- History is very simple, in 1932 three Polish mathematicians for the first time managed to decipher enigma and shared their results with the French and British intelligence service, where works on this machine were continued. I think that you are omitting the most essential fragments of history. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 157.25.200.133 (talk) 13:50, 11 September 2009 (UTC)
- ...in different times and places -- Poles, French, British, Americans
- I think the information that the code was broken and by whom is quote important. For your reference, a recent BBC article on the role of Polish mathematicians in breaking the Enigma code: --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk 18:23, 24 July 2009 (UTC)
Americans? What had to do Americans with Enigma? Probably a Hollywood science fiction films about this machine like britisch film ENIGMA with Kate Winslet :-)) - Markus —Preceding unsigned comment added by 157.25.200.133 (talk) 14:27, 11 September 2009 (UTC)
- They made lots of fast bombes, for a start. — Matt Crypto 14:47, 11 September 2009 (UTC)
but the bombes were a British invention (Fdsdh1 (talk) 12:55, 9 December 2012 (UTC))
- The bombes were indeed a British invention by Alan Turing with an important addition by Gordon Welchman, probably inspired by the Polish bomba kryptologiczna. The Americans made almost all of the fast bombes used in implementing Turing's methods for decrypting messages from the four-rotor naval Enigma. --TedColes (talk) 14:11, 9 December 2012 (UTC)
- There is terrible mess and the mistake. The proper name is cryptological bomb, and it was invented by Różycki, Rejewski, Zygalski team and gifted to British and French intelligence, fully working devices. British including Turing were adopting the cryptological bomb to increasing complication of Enigma internals, mostly by adding additional segments as German were adding elements into enigma, and make them work faster by use of electrical motors etc. Just like RAM is added to a PC, first PCs have 640KB and nowadays 16GB, but you can't say that by adding new modules a RAM has been reinvented, as somebody has invented this already before. Turing was using mathematical theories invented and developed by above mentioned Polish team, first of all because he was bright enough to understand it. The rules and essentials has not been changed, only the level of complexity was increasing, what caused much more possible combinations and hence required much more (complex and faster) devices to break it, so British were doing this. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.27.208.66 (talk) 22:40, 24 June 2013 (UTC)
- The articles Cryptanalysis of the Enigma and Biuro Szyfrów describe the pioneering Polish work on the breaking of Enigma. As far as I am aware, these article accurately reflect the published literature. The recent edits by an anonymous editor differ from the published sources. If that editor has better evidence, that should be cited, preferably in the other two articles with, perhaps, a brief reference in this article – which is primarily about the machines themselves.--TedColes (talk) 07:16, 25 June 2013 (UTC)
- I disagree with you. Because this Enigma machine, breaking the code by Polish, and continuation of their work in Bletchley Park was the reason Nazists has lost the WWII and our world is in the shape we know it. Therefore this facts must not be omitted. Of course a separate article can be reasonable (I think I will do it in the nearest free time). Anyway consequences of breaking code are equally (or even more) important then technical details. Problem with sources implies from fact that that was one of most top secret of WWII, without it Germans would change and it would be meaningless. So in many sources this facts are omitted not because POV but because many authors are not aware of real true, as it was long time hidden as deeply as possible. After WWII Poland were "silently occupied" by Soviet Union and in this situation alive Enigma codebreakers had to keep silence if they wanted not to be sentenced to death for cooperation with "Western Imperialists" or lost their life in any other way by "unknown assassins" from KGB. And for a long time after war truth about Enigma was top secret still. For many, many reasons: eg. Churchill was aware London is to be bombed, with details were when - but could not take countermeasures without compromising the source - broken Enigma code. And also there were several other big war operations which were influenced by Enigma, I think making a list of them may change understanding of "what&why" in some parts of WWII. Also US were benefiting for some intelligence info, but the source were never unveiled. That, to keep broken Enigma code in secret, cost British many lifes lost, but has saved other lifes and was the most essential reason of victory in WWII - Churchill has admitted this. Polish were aware of this from the beginning before WWII has broke out, that is why they passed this to French and British (who were not believe that time that Polish has broken Enigma code) - they were aware the time is coming. Hitler has lost WWII when Enigma was broken, in 1932.
- My point is that this article ought to be balanced as for many readers this will be basic source of knowledge about Enigma case. Hence technical details are not the only important things about it. Of course they are important and well written - but this is not enough. Rule of reasonable compromise. The sources is a question of spare/free time I will have. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.26.234.112 (talk) 10:39, 25 June 2013 (UTC)
- The articles Cryptanalysis of the Enigma and Biuro Szyfrów describe the pioneering Polish work on the breaking of Enigma. As far as I am aware, these article accurately reflect the published literature. The recent edits by an anonymous editor differ from the published sources. If that editor has better evidence, that should be cited, preferably in the other two articles with, perhaps, a brief reference in this article – which is primarily about the machines themselves.--TedColes (talk) 07:16, 25 June 2013 (UTC)
- There is terrible mess and the mistake. The proper name is cryptological bomb, and it was invented by Różycki, Rejewski, Zygalski team and gifted to British and French intelligence, fully working devices. British including Turing were adopting the cryptological bomb to increasing complication of Enigma internals, mostly by adding additional segments as German were adding elements into enigma, and make them work faster by use of electrical motors etc. Just like RAM is added to a PC, first PCs have 640KB and nowadays 16GB, but you can't say that by adding new modules a RAM has been reinvented, as somebody has invented this already before. Turing was using mathematical theories invented and developed by above mentioned Polish team, first of all because he was bright enough to understand it. The rules and essentials has not been changed, only the level of complexity was increasing, what caused much more possible combinations and hence required much more (complex and faster) devices to break it, so British were doing this. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.27.208.66 (talk) 22:40, 24 June 2013 (UTC)
- The bombes were indeed a British invention by Alan Turing with an important addition by Gordon Welchman, probably inspired by the Polish bomba kryptologiczna. The Americans made almost all of the fast bombes used in implementing Turing's methods for decrypting messages from the four-rotor naval Enigma. --TedColes (talk) 14:11, 9 December 2012 (UTC)
- There is no evidence that the breaking of Enigma (and Lorenz) is the reason that Germany lost the war. There are many factors to consider. The view that is most widely held is that the Bletchley codebreakers probably shortened the war by two years. That is all that can be said. It cannot be stated with any certainty who the victor would have been had the war followed its course. Germany may well have succeeded in developing the atomic bomb or may have succeeded in perfecting their long range ballistic missiles (designed to take the war to America). Someone may have succeeded in assasinating Hitler ending the war by another route. No one is in any position to second guess how things would have turned out but for the activities of Bletchley Park and others. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 10:08, 26 June 2013 (UTC)
- It has to be noted that although both the Poles and British employed machines known as Bombes (regardless of how they spelt or pronounced them), the two machines although they operated on the same basic principle, in fact operated in very different ways. The Polish machine exploited a procedural flaw in the way the Enigma machine was used, the double encryption of the individual message key where the machine searched for rotor settings where the transmitted six letter group decrypted to a repeated three letter group. The setting was not unique for any transmitted group, so it was necesary to try each possiblility as it was found.
- The British machines would not have been able to operate this way as the double encryption had been abandoned before their bombes had been developed. Instead, the British machines exploited two systematic flaws that had been discovered in the way that the enigma worked coupled with a procedural flaw in the way it was used. The first systematic flaw was known from when the Poles first intercepted the commercial Enigma back in 1929. It was immediately known that Enigma would never encrypt any letter as itself. The procedural flaw was that German operators resorted to using jargon when assembling their messages. This allowed the codebreakers to engineer a situation for the signal units to report which they would do with predictable phrases and wording (this was known as "gardening"). The British were able to compare the received message with the megssage that they predicted the Gemans would send. If they found an alignment where none of the letters matched, then there was more than a sporting chance that the received message was the encrypted version of the plain text.
- Through examination of these messages, the British had noticed that the Enigma was exhibiting a phenomenon dubbed as circular encryption (the second systematic flaw). In a fragment of message, when the plain text is compared to the cypher text, it was found that (say) a 'G' was encrypted as a 'T' at one point in the text. Later in the same fragment a 'T' was encrypted as a 'G'. Although such a feature was a possibility in any message fragment, the British realised that it occured vastly more frequently than probability dictated that it should have done. Another example of this circular encryption is where (say) a 'K' would be encrypted as a 'D'. Further on a 'D' would be encrypted as a 'S'. Further still an 'S' was encrypted as a 'K', giving a circle of three. The larger circles were preferred because although their occurence were a little rarer they significantly reduced the possible settings where the bombe would report a viable setting. As the codebreakers examined messages they looked for these relationships over a number of messages from the same theatre. These relationships were used to produce a 'menu' for the bombes. What the bombes then did was search for those rotor positions where all the circular encryptions found in the messages were possible. To be strictly accurate, Turring's view on what the bombes did was to eliminate all the rotor positions and settings that would not produce all the found circular encryptions. As each possibility was found, it was tested on a British Type X machine (a machine functionally the same as an Enigma that printed its output on paper tape). Once the minor inconvenience of the plugboard was circumvented and German was printed out, all the other messages from the same theatre (which used the same settings) could then be decrypted. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 11:14, 25 June 2013 (UTC)
Please see also my comment under "Polish Contribution" in this talk page. 108.222.214.13 (talk) 19:05, 20 July 2013 (UTC)
The second paragraph is poorly written, and here's why:
It presently reads as follows:
- The machine has become well-known because Allied codebreakers were able to decrypt a vast number of messages which had been enciphered using the Enigma. The intelligence gleaned from this source, codenamed ULTRA by the British, was a substantial aid to the Allied war effort. The exact influence of ULTRA is debated, but an oft-repeated assessment is that decryption of German ciphers hastened the end of the European war by two years.
WHAT source??? The second sentence practically contridicts the first sentence because the way it's presently written, no mention has yet been made of the fact that Enigma eventually did fall into Allied hands. It's true that it's mentioned later in the body of the article, but that doesn't alleviate the fact that these sentences don't make sense in their present form. The words this source (emphasis added by me) do not reference what the source is/was. I suggest that between the 1st and 2nd sentences, another on should be added, one that would read, "That changed, however, when Allied forces captured an Enigma machine from the Germans, providing a valuable source of previously secret/classified information to Allied leaders . . . " or words to that effect. Please forgive me if I've added this new topic of discussion incorrectly; I still haven't figured out the procedure, and no one has ever responded to my repeated requests for assistance. Magnet For Knowledge (talk) 03:41, 27 June 2009 (UTC)
- Allied reading did not begin "when Allied forces captured an Enigma machine from the Germans." It began seven years before the war, when the Poles first reconstructed the machine on the basis of mathematical analysis and French-supplied intelligence materials. See "Biuro Szyfrów" and "Cryptanalysis of the Enigma." Nihil novi (talk) 04:48, 27 June 2009 (UTC)
- You started the discussion topic just fine. Feel free to drop me a message on my talk page if you've got any questions about editing procedure, or there's the Wikipedia:Help desk. As Nihil novi has pointed out, the decryption of Enigma was not initially a result of capturing a physical device, but of logical and mathematical analysis. (Seizing a physical Naval Enigma did help Bletchley Park in World War II, as the Navy variant had additional security features.) So I don't feel there's any problem with the word "source" as it stands. — Matt Crypto 15:08, 27 June 2009 (UTC)
Please see also my comment under "Polish Contribution" in this talk page. 108.222.214.13 (talk) 19:05, 20 July 2013 (UTC)
The following must be wrong (under Indicators)
There is no secret in the following procedure, so an attacker only needs a machine. Somehow there must be a daily code incorporated into the procedure.
- During World War II, codebooks were only used each day to set up the rotors, their ring settings and the plugboard. For each message, the operator selected a random start position, let's say WZA, and a random message key, perhaps SXT. He moved the rotors to the WZA start position and encoded the message key SXT. Assume the result was UHL. He then set up the message key, SXT, as the start position and encrypted the message. Next, he transmitted the start position, WZA, the encoded message key, UHL, and then the ciphertext.
Tuntable (talk) 00:31, 30 July 2009 (UTC)
- The secret was "the rotors, their ring settings and the plugboard". — Matt Crypto 07:20, 30 July 2009 (UTC)
Computerramjet (talk) 20:19, 4 January 2015 (UTC)
- I stumbled with this as well. I found this site http://www.matematiksider.dk/enigma_eng.html#turing_bombe helpful in understanding the indicator procedure. At first, the idea of transmitting the random indicator setting in clear text seemed to be completely insecure, but as Tuntable states, the rotors, rings and plugboard are still secret so there is still a 'daily key' although with a shorter effective key length. However, since the random indicator is only used to encode a short random message key, it would make it harder to decipher the 'daily key', so maybe the shorter effective key length wasn't viewed as a problem. It would be nice if someone could clarify the indicator procedure and discuss the issues associated with transmitting the random indicator setting in clear text. Also, how did this new procedure impact the bombe? From what I understand the bombe required longer cribs to create loops in the menu. That wouldn't work for short random message keys, so did the bombe determine the daily key (without a global initial position) and the message key (initial setting), and then only the daily key would be used to decode other messages?
The setting used by hobbists from 1970-1985 to receive feeds from reuters, etc, was REDRUM. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.134.243.171 (talk) 06:02, 23 April 2010 (UTC)
Decoding
So how were the messages decoded (assuming one had the codebooks or equivalent)? There should be a bit more on the subject. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.254.147.68 (talk) 15:27, 17 November 2009 (UTC)
- Currently we have, "At the receiving end, the operation was reversed. The operator set the machine to the initial settings and typed in the first six letters of the message (XHTLOA). In this example, EINEIN emerged on the lamps. After moving his rotors to EIN, the receiving operator then typed in the rest of the ciphertext, deciphering the message." — Matt Crypto 16:18, 17 November 2009 (UTC)
- Also see the article Cryptanalysis of the Enigma.--TedColes (talk) 06:22, 18 November 2009 (UTC)
Arthur Scherbius
Not an inventor. Just a patent owner. Vlsergey (talk) 01:10, 1 March 2010 (UTC)
- An Error in the History of Rotor Encryption Devices? — Matt Crypto 06:59, 1 March 2010 (UTC)
- There was much activity in and around the idea of mechanical cipher machines in the last year of WWI. Dutch officers, Koch, van Damm, Scherbius, and in the US Hebern. It seems to have been one of those ideas which were in the air. The light bulb was another, and so was the telephone. Clearly quite few folks had similar ideas. Unless there's some reason to believe one of them was copying from another, perhaps they all qualify as inventors? ww (talk) 21:41, 5 April 2010 (UTC)
- Somewhat after the event I know: but in general the person credited as being the inventor of anything is the person whose name appears on the patent. For Enigma, that is Arthur Scherbius. Thomas Edison is often cited as America's greatest inventor because his name appears on numerous patents. The reality is that Edison invented absolutely nothing himself as he employed armies of scientists and engineers to invent things for him. Edison's name also appears on several US patents for inventions that were actually invented in Europe and were thus unknown in America when he took out the patent. DieSwartzPunkt (talk) 10:21, 26 June 2013 (UTC)
American involvement
Editor Vumba is right in saying that American cryptographers were more focused on the Japanese codes than Enigma. By the time that the US joined WWII, the British at Bletchley park had worked out how to break most of the enigma ciphers. It is wrong, however, to say that US cryptos did not get involved. They had liaised with Bletchley Park before and soon had a contingent there. They ran one of the Bombe outstations and their naval bombes were of immense use to the whole Enigma-breaking activity.--TedColes (talk) 17:55, 8 April 2010 (UTC)
One cannot re-write history. The US certainly made great use of the information as did other (limited) allied commanders. But to say that the US had a major role is strictly nationalistic. Lets stay with the facts. If TedColes has specific references to add please do so.--Vumba (talk) 20:09, 12 April 2010 (UTC)
- "But to say that the US had a major role is strictly nationalistic." No, not really, and it's well documented in the literature. If Ted doesn't point you in the right direction of reliable sources, I will if I can get half an hour to spare. (I'd also suggest that to question someone's motives as "nationalistic" is not really on.) — Matt Crypto 21:56, 12 April 2010 (UTC)
- I think that the following quotations from A. P. Mahon in THE HISTORY OF HUT EIGHT1939 – 1945, which was written in 1945, makes the point of the importance of the American naval contribution to the decryption of a vast number of messages which had been enciphered using the Enigma. They relate to the situation in 1943.
- p. 88:
Before attempting to assess the value of the contribution of Op-20-G, which was immense, and also the difficulties which arose, which were fairly numerous, it is essential to understand that they were very different from ourselves in their fundamental organization. They were second in the field and agreed, and kept to the agreement, to play second fiddle and so naturally the people they put into their German machine cryptography were not the best cryptographers they had, but rather efficient and intelligent organizers with cryptographic knowledge.
- And p. 91:
The acceptance by Op-20-G of the principle of pooled bombe resources was a fairly slow one. … By the time the Second Front opened very close and efficient cooperation existed. Priorities of keys were decided at weekly meetings at which the U.S.N. representative was present and Op-20-G stuck most loyally to the priorities as laid down, running a vast number of Hut 6 jobs and enabling them to break keys which would have otherwise have remained unbroken. I think it is a considerable tribute to the good sense of all parties concerned, and most especially to Op-20-G who were in a somewhat irksome position, that relations were at all times extremely cordial and that it was possible to get so much work so efficiently done when the machinery had to be shared by 3 groups of people, each feeling at heart that their own particular problem was the one which really mattered.
- For the US Army's considerable contribution, I would refer to: The US 6812 Division Bombe Report Eastcote 1944
- --TedColes (talk) 09:41, 13 April 2010 (UTC)