Talk:Erwin Rommel/Archive 4

As I went through the portions of the article, I noticed that passages attributed to Lewin could be somewhat biased, bordering on wp:peacock, as in:

• Rommel is regarded as having been a humane and professional officer.^[1]
• Rommel led by example. In 1933 when he became commander of a Hanoverian. He felt a commander should be physically more robust than the troops he led, and should always show them an example.^[2]
• Rommel understood and accepted that with war would come casualties, but he was not one to accept the unnecessary loss of life. "Germany will need men after the war as well" was a comment he frequently made.^[3]
• In terms of making tactical decisions quickly, he believed the commander needed to be at the crucial place at the crucial time.^[4][5]
• To succeed he had to accept risks that commanders like Montgomery were never forced to take.^[6]

Etc.

I came across this chapter by Alaric Searle in Rommel: A Reappraisal (Ian F. Beckett. ed.), where he refers to "effusive and often uncritical biographies, extolling the virtues of Rommel as commander and master of maneuver" (p. 7), but missing the larger point of Rommel's service to the regime and his myopic views of Germany's strategic situation. Searle offers example of such biographies (p. 26, note 1):

• Ronald Lewin: Rommel as Military Commander
• David Irving: On the Tail of the Fox (I believe it's already been purged from the article)
• David Fraser: Knight's Cross : A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

Further, passages attributed to Liddell Hart sound quite effusive as well. I don't have a critique of his work as related to Rommel, but Smelser & Davies in The Myth of the Eastern Front discuss him offering a '"lauditory foreword'" to Mainstein's memoirs Lost Victories. This sounds similar to what he is offering here:

• Quote from Liddell Hart in his intro: Awe for his dynamic generalship developed into an almost affectionate admiration for him as a man...
• He is regarded as one of the most skilled commanders of desert warfare in the conflict.^[7]
• Said B. H. Liddell Hart, the Blitzkrieg method could not be better epitomised in a single sentence.^[8]|group=N}}
• A major aspect of his success was his grasp of the psychological shock such attacks had upon the morale and fighting spirit of the enemy forces.^[9]

Etc.

I would suggest that these sources be minimized if possible, especially as they related to Rommel's character, leadership abilities and "humanitarianism". Hope this is helpful! K.e.coffman (talk) 02:45, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

I have to say I do not find this helpful. "The Myth of the Eastern Front" by Smelser & Davies should not drive the editing of an article. I have not been impressed by what I have read. It strikes me as highly biased in its own right. It gets 2 1/2 stars at Amazon. Some of the review comments:

While the first five chapters of "The Myth of the Eastern Front" are in general soundly and fairly dispassionately presented, the next three chapters are far from dispassionate or unvested. The authors lose much if not all of their objectiveness and in their presentation of this portion of the book so overstate issues as to make a parody of their own thesis.

And now you propose we dispense with secondary sources? Because they are "effusive and often uncritical"? Have you read Desmond Young? Jackson? They look at the war from a British point of view. Would Lewin's works on Ciphers, Wavell or Montgomery also be suspect of the same sort of distortions? People like Brigadier Desmond Young, Ronald Lewin and William Jackson were officers of the British Army that fought against the Germans in North Africa and elsewhere. They did not come under some sort of spell. What's more, Erwin Rommel was not a Nazi. Thus he is an absurd target for the opinions of Smelser & Davies. It's nonsense. Gunbirddriver (talk) 10:56, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

The section "Rommel's style as military commander" is far too long (1988 words) and needs to be trimmed substantially. I think most of the POV stuff is in that section? This is the sort of content that will have to be removed. Many of the notes need to be removed as well. I have Fraser here and it seems okay as far as basic facts - there's nothing in it so far that's contradicted in the other three books I have on hand for the re-write. My plan was to nominate for Good Article, at which point I need to be able to vouch for and defend every statement in the article, so I am not keen to leave material in unless I can confirm it using books I have on hand. Everything I've updated so far has been checked in this manner, from early life through El Alamein, so any content cited to Lewin up to that point also appears in at least one of the other sources I have here (Butler, Fraser, Douglas-Home, and Hoffmann). — Diannaa (talk) 05:37, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

Thank you both for your comments. Yes, most of the "effusive" language comes from Lewin and Liddell Hart, and primarily in the Leadership/Character sections, as well as in the lead. Fraser did not raise any issues for me as I was scanning the article. In Lewin's case, he's citing Mellenthin in one instance ("Said staff officer Friedrich von Mellenthin: "The Afrika Korps followed Rommel wherever he led, however hard he drove them...") and Liddell Hart in another ("Said B. H. Liddell Hart, the Blitzkrieg method could not be better epitomised in a single sentence.") -- I think these tertiary references should go.

On The Myth of the Eastern Front, I personally enjoyed reading this book. It was the first source I came across that answered the question for me "why do I feel like I've entered a parallel universe when I'm reading WWII wikipedia, specifically the Waffen-SS/Wehrmacht personnel and unit articles?" For example, such language as a Wehrmacht general being praised for his humanitarianism; "the consummate SS man"; and Manstein disobeying the Commissar order, along with a Waffen-SS general who disapproves of it. The examples are too numerous to list here; I've been keeping a tally on my user page, if you are interested: Dubious unsourced claims and non-NPOV language and Alternate History Department.

I was so overwhelmed by the volume of these examples, that I felt compelled to research post-war Waffen-SS revisionism and rewrite the article on HIAG, the Waffen-SS lobby group in the 1950-1990s.

After The Myth of the Eastern Front, I've read other sources that support Smelser and Davies's findings:

• Citino, Robert M. (2012). The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1826-2.
• Wette, Wolfram (2007). The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674025776. (see my discussion with another editor on Mellenthin's talk page re Citino & Wette)
• Alaric Searle in Rommel: A Reappraisal (the language on "effusive" and "uncritical" in ref to Lewin & al. comes from Searle, not from Smelser & Davies)
• MacKenzie, S.P. (1997). Revolutionary Armies in the Modern Era: A Revisionist Approach. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-09690-4.
• Kienle, Polly (2005). "Still Fighting for the Myth: German Wehrmacht Officers' Reports for the U.S. Historical Division". H-net.com. {{cite web}}: |archive-date= requires |archive-url= (help)

The latter article references a German-language work by Bernd Wegner that defines the post-war efforts by former generals as "erschriebene Siege"--"victories through writing". The works by Citino, Wette, MacKenzie and Wegner highlight how such writing impacted the post-war Western historiography to create a "mystification" of the German officer corps.

So yes, my BS antennas come up when I see a section named "Humanitarianism". Definition of a humanitarian is "a person promoting human welfare and social reform"; I don't think that applies to a general whether he's American, British or German.

In any case, Diannaa appears to be taking care of that, so I just wanted to raise my concerns. I do believe that a critical attitude to WWII sources written in the first couple of decades after the war may be in order, as much of the WWI historiography has been reevaluated in the recent decades. K.e.coffman (talk) 20:29, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

Well, we are not speaking of all German officers. We are speaking here of Rommel. Everyone loves a revisionist. You seem very uncritical of the critics. In the passage of Searle you link to he argues Rommel does not deserve credit because he was not at his headquarters when the D-Day invasion occurred, thus he could not move his forces forward when the invasion occurred. Does he know why Rommel was not there? He went to argue with Hitler over the necessity to move the mobile formations forward into the Normandy area. He could not move them forward without Hitler's permission. Why does Searle not make that point clear in his criticism? Seems pertinent. It's a rather dishonest criticism, and answering these is a bit like chasing your tail.

Still you have not answered the question. Why did British officers who fought in the war or led the war write about Rommel in a favorable light? This would include Wavell, Auchenlick, Alexander and Winston Churchill, for heaven's sake. According to the theory we are to accept from Smelser and Davies it is because they feared the Soviet Union, unnecessarily apparently, and had their heads turned by German officers who were dishonest in their recollections. They go on to argue that all German soldiers should be looked at critically because Hitler ran an evil regime. They are all to be held accountable. A communal guilt. It's a rather presumptive view which I do not agree with. As to the British officers mentioned above, the comments from them all came either during the war or immediately after. No time to befriend the defeated Germans. How does that work in terms of the Smelser and Davies theory, exactly? Gunbirddriver (talk) 01:12, 8 February 2016 (UTC)

I got the Rommel Reconsidered by Searle & al. (that's how it was issued in the U.S.); it provide interesting insights regarding the "Rommel myth", as "the necessary image manufactured to serve the German rearmament" (Searle, p. 9) and driven by "different agencies [that] adopted Rommel for their own ends". (Connelly, p. 157) The question "why the British had such a positive attitude towards Rommel" is addressed as follows:

• Rommel had already achieved fame in the U.S. and Britain even during the war, with "the press repeatedly pointing out [Rommel's] great, quasi-mythical strength", so turning him into an icon was not difficult. (Connelly, p. 158)

• The 1950s German rearmament was highly dependent on the image boosting that the former Wehrmacht generals needed. Journalist and historian Basil Liddell Hart was one of the first proponents of these two interconnected initiatives. In his 1948 book on Hitler's generals, he devoted a chapter to Rommel, portraying him as an outsider to the Nazi regime. Additions published in 1951 show that Liddell Hard played his role in the creation of the Rommel myth, concluding by: "... his gifts and performance ... qualified him for a place in the role of the 'Great Captains' of history" (Searle, pp. 8, 27)

• "The Rommel myth came to be cemented through the mutual self-interest and cooperation between former German generals and the British," writes Searle. One of the results of this was the 1950 biography by Desmond Young, who collaborated with Hans Speidel among others, with Liddell Hart also supporting the project. Speidel had already written in 1946 that he planned to turn Rommel into "the hero of the German people", for which Rommel was a suitable candidate since his forced suicide lead to the assumption that he had not been a supporter of Nazism. Young subscribed to this "generous view", subtly conveying that Rommel served the regime, but was not part of it. (Searle, p. 9)

• However, even the "Rommel apologists" were faced with a challenge of explaining away Rommel's duties as a liaison between the Wehrmacht and the 'Hitler Youth in 1937. Young described Rommel's involvement in strictly military terms and alluded to a falling out between Baldur von Schirach and Rommel, with the former supposedly referring to Rommel as "not ideologically sound enough" (per Young). The reality was different, however, with Rommel proposing a plan that would have subordinated HJ to the Wehrmacht, removing it from the NSDAP control. Schirach was outraged; he appealed to Hitler, and Rommel was quietly removed from the project. (Searle, pp. 19-20)

• Searle points out that Young's claim that Rommel was brought into close proximity to Hitler in October 1938 "for the first time" is "patently untrue", as Rommel had been seconded to Hitler's personal protection during the March 1938 Anschluss. Young simply omits this fact casting doubts on the veracity of his other accounts. (p. 21)

• Searle provides further discussion on Rommel's relationship with Hitler and the regime, noting that Rommel had not only "found favor with the Nazi regime, but also ... was delighted with the preferential treatment he was receiving". He wholly subscribed to the Nazi view of reality, writing to his wife in Oct 1939 from the devastated Warsaw: "The inhabitants drew a breath of relief that we have arrived and rescued them." (p. 24)

• Connelly discusses Liddell Hart's Rommel Papers (first published in German under a "revealing title" War Without Hate) as one of the two "crucial texst" that lead to the "Anglophone rehabilitation" and a "Rommel renaissance" (the other being Young). Both Young and Liddell Hart "set the stage for all post-war interpretations of Rommel", which consisted of three themes (1) Rommel's ambivalence about Nazism; (2) his military genius; and (3) the chivalrous nature of fighting in North Africa. This tradition included uncritical works by Sir John Squire, Ronal Lewin, David Irving, and General Sir John Hackett. For example, David Fraser described Rommel as a "Soldier without Politics" (chapter title). In contrast, German biographies, such as by Wolf Heckmann, are far less sympathetic. (p. 163-164)

• Fraser gets the nod from Connelly as the writer who "pushed furthest" "romanticising of Rommel", in "dramatic, swirling prose that encapsulates the post-1945 hagiographic approach". From Fraser: "great master of manoeuvre in war", whose personality "transcends time" and "cuts like [a] sabre through the curtains of history", etc. (almost half a page of Fraser is quoted on p. 169).

This is from a quick glance. I would recommend this book for a contemporary view on Rommel from British historians. Besides Searle and Connelly, the volume includes chapters by Niall Barr, Peter Lieb, Claus Telp and Russel A. Hart, covering campaigns in 1941 and 1942 in Africa and in 1944 in Normandy.

On the topic of The Myth of the Eastern Front, since there were concerns about its veracity, here are two reviews: one by a professional historian, and another one, surprisingly nuanced, from feldgrau.net of all places. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:49, 21 February 2016 (UTC)

This section is entirely about Rommel's performance in France during 1940 and North Africa during the successful period of German operations there. His subsequent performance is not discussed, and it gives a misleading impression to readers (for instance, he didn't lead from the front in Normandy). Nick-D (talk) 05:41, 5 March 2016 (UTC)

Normandy was a defensive battle, so it was handled differently. Same could be said at El Alamein. In each case the attacker is coming towards you, so the decisive point is in your defensive line at the point of the attacker's choosing. He was frequently at the front during the battle for Normandy, and traveled back and forth quite often. It was Rommel that set up the defense in depth south of Caen that resulted in the check of Montgomery's Operation Goodwood. His contributions in Normandy were all blunted by the stifling restrictions put upon all commanders from Hitler and OKW. Forward control was a concept of the panzerwaffe that was largely put in place by Guderian, and was made possible by the communication arrangements Guderian made which allowed the commander to control the division from any unit in the division. Rommel took it farther than most, and in some cases too far. Could be expanded, certainly. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:36, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

I've just changed the first sentence of the "Views on the conduct of war" section again. My rationale is that the claim that "he was not one to accept the unnecessary loss of life" is essentially WP:PEACOCK language as 1) no competent and non-criminal military leader of any rank accepts the unnecessary loss of life among the personnel under their command or defeated enemy forces, so the implication that he was somehow unusual in this regard is entirely false 2) as is also normal for all military leaders he sought to maximise thee losses of the enemy forces he fought through casualties or prisoners: he may not have wanted to kill or injure more Allied troops than he had to, but this doesn't make him unusual - it just means he obeyed the laws of warfare by encouraging and honouring surrenders. Nick-D (talk) 00:19, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

actually, fair point. Tweaked. The notion that Rommel was "not one" do do what all competent military officers do is WP:PEACOCK

Of course it was a fair point. That is why I changed it back. It would have been better for you to come to the talk page and discuss rather than to keep reverting. What you have been doing generates edit warring, and for an administrator it is a strange behavior to exhibit. I can accept your final version, but I do not think it is any improvement over what was there before, and am disappointed it took you so long to realize you were changing the wording contrary to the wording in the source citated.

As to the facts, Rommel did take a tremendous number of prisoners in both wars. He treated them as fellow soldiers. Prisoners were not mistreated if Rommel had anything to say over it. His behavior in this regard was different than what I have read of any other officer, either side of the conflict. Granted, his efforts to encourage opponents to surrender worked towards achieving his goals, and if they would not surrender he would do what was necessary to achieve his goal, but that is different than just doing what any competent officer would do. When the Italians started shipping oil across the Mediterranean in the hulls of hospital ships Rommel was extremely angry with them. Why was that, do you suppose? Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:12, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

Well, we all make mistakes, admins included: at least I ended up semi-reverting myself. If you'd also like some feedback, blanket reverting problematic text back in without considering alternate wording also isn't best practice. Western Allied commanders routinely also regularly treated prisoners well. Nick-D (talk) 04:32, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

It did not need to be reworded, and the changes you were making were contradicted by the text that was used as the citation, so your edits needed to be reverted. Once reverted you should have gone to the talk page to discuss. It is bold edit-revert-discuss. You failed to do that, and now seem to think by characterizing your edits being reversed as blanket reverting is some sort of equivalence. It is not. I was attempting to bring to your attention the fact that the sentence was supported as it stood, and added the citation as a necessary proof. That would not be blanket reverting. Regardless, you should not change the text to remove something the citation supports, and my including the direct quotation in the citation should not have been necessary. You should have looked at the citation yourself (i.e. looked it up and found out what it said) rather than reverting two more times. It appears you finally read the quote I included, and finally decided to "tweak" your wording. That is nothing to ballyhoo. Administrators should be held to a higher standard. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:26, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

Please see Foundational works above for the contemporary assessment of Young's 1950 work on Rommel. It's a WP:Biased source, and potentially unreliable, as discussed by Searle. The other source (Luck) is WP:Primary as the participant in the events, and biased at that (as described in The Myth of the Eastern Front). I will add citations to this effect to Hans von Luck; that's another problematic article in the WWII mythology genre, with 24 citations to Luck's memoirs, more than all other sources combined. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:52, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

I've tweaked my wording a bit per the quoted source. The notion that Rommel was unusual in doing this is clearly false. Nick-D (talk) 03:56, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

From looking further at this section, it says that " The Afrika Korps was never accused of any war crimes". This may or may not be true (and the Holocaust was going on behind the German front line), but it certainly isn't the case for the German forces in Normandy which Rommel also led. Nick-D (talk) 04:03, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

No, that is true, and I believe it is mentioned. 2nd SS Panzer Division's killing of civilians at Oradour-sur-Glane. Rommel asked to be allowed to punish the division. Officers of the Herr had operational control of SS units in their area of command, but they had no authority over them in regards to their behavior. Anyway, Rommel protested and requested permission to discipline the division. He was told by Hitler it was none of his concern. I believe his efforts here show a certain degree of moral courage, as certainly officers challenging Hitler's decisions and those of the SS were often arrested or shot. It is easy for us in a quiet study to say what one should or should not do. It was a lot harder to do so in Nazi Germany. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:47, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

I plan to add the below content to the article in the next few days. Since it would be a large addition, I'm posting it here first, in case there are critiques or commentary. Content starts below:

The Rommel myth

The larger-than-life persona of Rommel continues to intrigue both scholars and the general public. The military historian Peter Caddick-Adams in his 2012 work Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives writes that Rommel's "image, carefully cultivated during his lifetime, was also carefully reworked after his death". He notes three stages that led to the firm establishment of the Rommel myth, starting with the inter-war period that saw Rommel in a self-promotion mode. During the early war campaigns, Rommel's successes made him indispensable to Nazi propaganda. Finally, following a forced suicide, Rommel emerged as the "acceptable face of German militarism, the 'good' German who stood apart from the Nazi regime".^[1]