Talk:Hamas/Archive 33

This is an archive of past discussions about Hamas. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 30

Archive 31

Archive 32

Archive 33

Archive 34

Archive 35

Correcting a narrative in the lead section

@Iskandar323:, @Vice regent:, @Smallangryplanet:, @Selfstudier:, @Alaexis:, @Dovidroth:, @Yair rand:, @Eliezer1987:, @Homerethegreat:, @Marokwitz:, @Nableezy:, @Agmonsnir:, @KlayCax:, @Wafflefrites:, @Orgullomoore:, @Skitash:, @Raskolnikov.Rev:, @Lf8u2:

Contradiction in narrative of three lead sentences

The three sentences in the current Wikipedia lead section of Hamas, starting with “While initially…”, about the current (and past) policies of Hamas, are contradictory: the first two tell more or less the same narrative, the third squarely contradicts the first of these sentences.

The first of these sentences (“While initially…”) tells the narrative that although Hamas at early dates [“initially”, as opposed to 2005 and later] has had the purpose to (re)establish a (“Palestinian”) state in all of former Mandatory Palestine, starting with an Agreement in 2005 Hamas settled for the ambition of realizing merely a state on West Bank and Gaza Strip (that is in ‘the 1967 borders’). The second sentence of this trio seems to consolidate that chosen narrative: in 2017, Hamas in a Document would again have “supported” such a “state within 1967 borders”. The third sentence however (“…truce…”) contradicts the narrative of the ‘While…’ sentence: if Hamas had since 2005 settled for the ultimate goal of a 1967-border-state, it would be illogical, contradictory, for Hamas to propose a truce (temporary ceasefire) in the case of that new ultimate Hamas goal being attained.

Narrative by scholar L.Seurat

This contradiction can be put right by realizing that the narrative of the “While initially” sentence is a mistake. This narrative was constructed by one contributor (VR) in 13 edits between 13Oct and early 18Dec2023 and based on a misinterpretation of just one (too) short and out of context quote from one book from a renowned scholar on this topic (and only since 18Dec2023 afternoon was this misinterpretation also projected onto three, equally too short and out-of-context, quotes from two other books).

The expression “acceptance of the 1967 borders”, taken out of the larger context of Seurat’s book’s chapter ‘Introduction’, had arbitrarily been interpreted as: ‘giving up the quest for a state in all of Mandatory Palestine and settling for just a state in the 1967 borders’. But reading the complete reasoning of Mrs. L.Seurat in that chapter, relating to Hamas’s goals in past and present (see the long extract of pages 8–18 of her book I’m giving in this posting), makes clear that Seurat describes Hamas

as having a double strategy since the early 1990s, in which the short-term goal is to create an Islamic authority over part of Palestine, for example West Bank and Gaza Strip, and their long-term goal is still Islamic rule over all of former Mandatory Palestine; as part of that double strategy, Hamas regularly offers a truce (hudna) to Israel in order to realise their first goal (a state in ‘1967 borders’).^[1]

This, by the way, is the new narrative that has recently (April–May) been correctly inserted in section §‘Policies towards Israel and Palestine’, based on the book of Seurat but also on the article of Imad Alsoos of 2021 (currently referenced in the lead section at the end of the sentence about “offers of a truce”).

Proposal for three corrected lead sentences

That corrected narrative (replacing the While initially” sentence), based on correct reading of the book of Seurat (as written since April 2025 in section §‘Policies towards Israel and Palestine’, based there on Seurat and also on the article of Alsoos), can be summarized now in the lead section as:

Initially, Hamas was just seeking a Palestinian Islamic state in all of former Mandatory Palestine. Since the early 1990s, Hamas is following a double strategy. Their long-term goal is still the restoring of Islamic sovereignty over all of Palestine; but their short-term goal is now to first create Islamic authority over part of Palestine (within 'the 1967 borders': West Bank and Gaza Strip^[2]^[3]^[4]), through a truce (hudna) with Israel. ^[1]^[5]^{: 837, 839}

Please note: the three refs placed here after the word “Strip” are the refs already used in the current “While initially” lead sentence; the ref ‘Alsoos2’ with indicated pages 837 and 839 is currently used in the lead sentence about “offers of a truce”).

Corrected sentence about the 2017 Document

The new thing of the 2017 Document is not that Hamas ‘supported a Pal state in 1967 borders’ (how do you ‘support’ what does not exist?-- no source uses those words), but that Hamas publicly stated that it would accept the formation of such a state. Therefore, I propose to clearly say that by paraphrasing the (clear) words of the Al Jazeera article of 2 May 2017, saying:

In their 2017 'Document' or '(new) charter', Hamas publicly accepted the formation of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, but without recognising the statehood of Israel.^[6]^[7]^[8]

There is currently a debate running about that 2017 document: should Wikipedia call it a “charter” or a "Document"? Depending on its outcome, we can write here: “..Document….." or "...charter" or “..'Document' or '(new) charter'..”.

Further notes here: I see no good reason to use the expression “..supported a P state” (within the 1967 borders) because there is no source mentioned using those words; and I see no good reason to use the expression “..recognizing Israel” (words also invented by an editor in October 2023 without motivation) when the source precisely writes “rcg the statehood of Israel”. The ref to Al Jazeera 9Oct2023, in that lead sentence about the 2017 Document, must be removed because it does not refer to the 2017 Document.

As for the current ref note in the lead section: “Sources that believe…” followed by a list of six books: this note combines a Wikipedia assertion (“Sources believe”) with alleged corroboration of it (six citations from books). This is technically incorrect: ref tags are meant for a footnote referring to a cited source, not for continuing the Wikipedia text/assertions. Also, and more importantly: that assertion (‘Sources believe…’) is OR, therefore must be deleted. Belief is a very private affair, the outside world—including Wikipedia editors—can’t say or know what someone believes. Perhaps, those six books simply confirm that in the 2017 Document Hamas declares its willingness to accept the 1967 border state; in that case, a colleague can place those citations back in a technically correct ref note. Personally I’m not allowed to do that, because I have not read those books, except the book of Seurat(pp.61–62).

Removing current lead sentence about “.. truce ..”

The existing lead sentence about truce and two-state solution (until the word ‘solution’) simply is WP:OR, thus must be removed: “consistent with a two-state solution” is not being said by any of the given sources. Meanwhile, the most relevant thing to say about that hudna (truce) is that it is part of Hamas’s double strategy, as I describe today in my proposed three new lead sentences replacing the ‘While initially..’ sentence (see above). I suppose, details like ‘10–100 years’ (entered here on 25Oct2023 apparently to further promote such a truce as ‘consistent with a two-state solution’) can be left in the lower section Hamas#Truce proposals: a lead section should confine itself to the most important facts. The last part of that lead sentence (‘…long-term objective…’) has already been replaced and incorporated in my proposed and necessary rewriting of the “While initially” sentence, see above.

Discussing this proposal

Edits don’t need explicit consensus or consent from others in advance; they have presumed consensus until they are disputed or reverted. Ofcourse, in possibly controversial matters, it can be useful or at least careful to try to first discuss it on talk page, and that’s what I’m doing here now. If you have any objections against this edit proposal, or suggestions for improvement, please say so now, and perhaps we can reach a compromise before I edit the article. If you have objections after my edit, try to further improve the then existing version “through minor changes rather than taking an all-or-nothing position” (thus constructively pursuing some compromise or consensus).

Recently though, I posted a similar edit proposal here and alerted eightteen contributors about it. One positive reaction followed, and no negative reaction. After five days, I implemented my proposed edit(22April), and within six hours it was reverted, by one of those 17 alerted but not reacting editors, but with no valid reason for reverting: his edit summary said “you do not have consensus for this sweeping change[incorrect and irrelevant: edits have always ‘presumed consensus’ until they are challenged, absence of (wide) explicit foregoing consensus is no ground for reverting], your talk discussion garnered no support for this[incorrect, one man supported it], and you are misrepresenting the sources[this is too vague, but even after my asking him to be precise about that ‘misrepresenting’ (talk page,27April) he didn’t clarify this; so, obviously this was only a pretext for disruptively reverting an edit that he ‘just didn’t like’ ]”. Reverting an edit (to break the “presumed consensus”) but then refusing to discuss the (feigned or suggested) disagreements is a form of gaming the system and is strictly forbidden. Reverting without valid reason is a form of disruptively ‘stonewalling’ a status quo. If similar disruptive conduct will be performed again in reaction on this new proposed edit, by the same or by another editor, the suspected editor(s) will be dealt with according to our guidelines, which can result in them being blocked or banned. Not reacting now on this opportunity to discuss (even though you have been alerted) and then after my edit reverting the whole edit for criticism on detail(s) that could also have been mended through smaller changes – because pushing the revert button is easier than going through the labor of improving the newly existing version – will also be considered disruptively stonewalling a status quo and dealt with accordingly. --Corriebertus (talk) 17:52, 6 June 2025 (UTC)

References

[1]
Seurat 2019, pp. 8–18: [p.8]"Promulgated on 15 November 1988 in Algiers, the PLO’s … a realistic stance towards Israel, which made Yasser Arafat a partner in discussions to come, as compensation for his implicit recognition of the State of Israel and his acceptance of a territorial division of Palestine.[footnote: Signoles – Le Hamas au pouvoir et après? – Milan Actu, 2006] From its very first communiqué on, Hamas denounced these Palestinian initiatives (…) Confronted with the pursuit of colonization [Hebron etc.] and delays in the Israeli Army’s redeployment schedule in the West Bank, the Oslo Process increasingly appeared as a failure in the eyes of the Palestinians [p.13](…) Without forming or representing a state, Hamas conducts a ‘classic’ foreign policy in accordance with a number of canons listed in the scientific literature. (…) A few official Hamas sources have nevertheless exposed the broad lines of the movement’s foreign policy: the Charter…1988, the Introductory Memorandum,[footnote: See Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000), 292.] an internal document entitled ‘The Interim Policy of Hamas and its Political relations’, written by the members of the outside leadership in the early 1990s,[footnote: Quoted by Khaled Hroub who states that he saw this document in April 1995, in Amman. Hroub, Hamas, Political Thought and Practice, 50, 191.] and finally the Document of General Principles and Policies published on 1 May 2017. These documents provide scholars with two conflicting versions of the principles governing the movement’s foreign policy. [p.14]The Charter … emphasizes the necessity of defending Palestine against any foreign usurpation.[footnote: On modern Islamist discourses on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, see Beverly Milton-Edwards, ‘Political Islam and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict’, Israel Affairs 12, no. 1 (2006): 65–85; Iyad Barghouti, ‘Islamist Movements in Historical Palestine’, in Islamic Fundamentalism, ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996).] Although the Charter does not place any restrictions on negotiations with Israel, it does not mention the possibility of establishing specific relations with non-Arab or non-Islamic entities … the Charter is close to classic Islamic doctrine … since it puts forward a dualist vision of the universe, which is divided between Muslim states (Dâr al-Salâm) and those that are not (Dâr al-Harb).[footnote: This doctrine had seen important changes as from the nineteenth century. The author notes that Islamic theory has accepted the notion of territorial limits and the adoption of the principle of sovereignty. Majid Khadduri, ‘The Islamic Theory of International Relations’, in Islam and International Relations, ed. H. Proctor (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965).]
Since the early 1990s, Hamas began to formulate its foreign policy discourse in a way very different from the binary vision of the Charter. The internal document ‘The Interim Policy of Hamas and its Political relations’ discussed by Khaled Hroub reflects a new conceptualization of foreign relations (…) At the heart of this new doctrine is a distinction between ‘short-term policy’ and the ‘long-term solution’.[footnote: Beverley Milton-Edwards and Alastaire Crooke, ‘Elusive Ingredient: Hamas and the Peace Process’, Journal of Palestinian Studies 33, no. 4 (2004): 39–52.] The former, often described as an ‘interim’ solution, was put forward for the first time in 1988 by Mahmoud al-Zahar, who was addressing [p.15]Shimon Peres, and then by Sheikh Yassin.[footnote: Al Nahar, 30 April 1989.] The latter solution, also decribed as ‘historical’, emphasizes the sacred aspect of Palestine as a waqf (…) This dialectics between tactics (short term) and strategy (long term) is present in an informal manner in many documents and articles written by figures affiliated to Hamas. The aim is to create on a specific territory (buq‘a) an authority (Sulta) … [as] the start of the fulfilment of Hamas’ strategic goals: … the re-establishment of Islamic sovereignty over all of Palestine. The concept of truce (hudna) … permits implementing the short-term solution without discarding the historical one … Hamas’ leaders consider that a traditional peace treaty like those in the Western tradition would be surrender, while a truce would provide an alternative allowing one to wait for an inversion in the regional ratio of force to the Palestinians’ advantage. According to this doctrine, Hamas is not in favour of pursuing fruitless negotiations (‘abathîya) leading to a rump state without any sovereignty. (…) As from 1994, Hamas dismissed several Israeli initiatives, considering that with the exception of humanitarian matters like prisoner exchange, the only acceptable language against occupation was resistance.[footnote: This rejection of any contact with Israel followed Israeli instructions prohibiting any dialogue with Hamas members. This was one of the results of the transformation of the Intifada into an armed conflict. Communiqué of Hamas on 20 February 1994, quoted by Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice.] (…) [p.16]Simultaneously, some leaders consider that, in case Hamas gathers sufficient forces for real negotiations and upon the condition that Israelis accept concessions to Palestinian people, they are not opposed to the principle of negotiation for a long-lasting truce (hudna tawîla). The position of Hamas therefore remains quite ambiguous in this respect. [p.17]Finally, on 1 May 2017, Hamas published its Document of General Principles and Policies. (…) Since 2006, [the Hamas leaders] had been debating the opportunity of providing Hamas with a new political document that would reflect the movement’s current strategy in a more comprehensive way than the Charter. Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012. Yet these compromises linked to the strict framework of [p.18]reconciliation agreements between Palestinians had never been displayed as an integral part of Hamas strategy. From 2017 on, Hamas would endorse them as its own political stands and not as simple concessions to Fatah (…)"
[2]
Seurat 2019, pp. 17–19: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012."
[3]
Baconi 2018, pp. 114–116: "["Prisoners' Document"] enshrined many issues that had already been settled, including statehood on the 1967 borders; UN Resolution 194 for the right of return; and the right to resist within the occupied territories...This agreement was in essence a key text that offered a platform for unity between Hamas and Fatah within internationally defined principles animating the Palestinian struggle." *Roy 2013, p. 210: "Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas's Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization's willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-state solution should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two-state solution, that is, a Palestinian state within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem and the refugee right of return."
[4]
Baconi 2018, pp. 82: "The Cairo Declaration formalized what Hamas's military disposition throughout the Second Intifada had alluded to: that the movement's immediate political goals were informed by the desire to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders."
[5]
[6]
"Hamas accepts Palestinian state with 1967 borders: Khaled Meshaal presents a new document in which Hamas accepts 1967 borders without recognising state of Israel Gaza". Al Jazeera. 2 May 2017.
[7]
"What will the Israeli-Palestinian conflict look like in 30 years?". The Jerusalem Post. 22 September 2023. Even Hamas in 2017 said it was ready to accept a Palestinian state with 1967 borders if it is clear this is the consensus of the Palestinians.
[8]
Seurat 2019, pp. 61–62

Corriebertus (talk) 17:52, 6 June 2025 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 16 June 2025

Edit request 16 June 2025

Sunni islam in infobox

Edit request 28 June 2025

Looking for source on gender politics

Edit request 29 June 2025

Edit request 12 July 2025

Fbi

Edit request 31 July 2025

Edit request 1 August 2025

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 1 August 2025

Edit request 3 August 2025

Removal of sourced material on antisemitism

@Raskolnikov.Rev in opposition of the editing policy, this edit of yours removed much relevant, reliably-sourced content, without preserving the citations anywhere else in the article. As a result, the following sources have been completely scrubbed from the article:

Aaronovitch, David. "The New Anti-Semitism", The Observer, 22 June 2003.
Laurence F. Bove, Laura Duhan Kaplan, From the Eye of the Storm: Regional Conflicts and the Philosophy of Peace, Rodopi Press, 1995, ISBN 90-5183-870-0, p. 217.
Mark Weitzman, Steven Leonard Jacobs, Dismantling the Big Lie: the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, KTAV Publishing House, 2003, ISBN 0-88125-785-0, p. xi.
Human Rights Implications of the Resurgence of Racism and Anti-Semitism, United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights – 1993, p. 122.
Michael P. Arena, Bruce A. Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat, NYU Press, 2006, ISBN 0-8147-0716-5, pp. 133–134.

What reasons can you provide to justify the removal of all citations to each of these sources? PhotogenicScientist (talk) 19:57, 4 August 2025 (UTC)

I also believe that the removal was unjustified. This information is well-sourced and if there are concerns about duplicated content, it should be merged rather than removed. Alaexis_¿question? 20:46, 4 August 2025 (UTC)

As I indicated in my edit summary, all the content was already in the section with high quality multiple RS. There is no need for excessive citations, particularly when some of those sources are of questionable and lower quality in contrast to the multiple high quality sources we already have cited for those points. I am in particular referring to the Aaronovitch Observer piece, the Congressional report and the Weitzman/Jacobs piece.

This is in accordance with editing policy:

WP:CITE: "The goal is to verify content, not to overwhelm it with redundant or unnecessary references. Adding multiple citations is allowed, but they should add value. Lower-quality citations do not add value if high-quality ones already verify the material."

WP:V: "Material must be attributable to reliable sources. If a high-quality source already verifies the information, there’s no need to supplement it with less reliable ones."

However, as there is no harm in keeping the high quality RS that contained notable analyses in addition to the ones already there, I have incorporated them into the section.

To further explain my reasoning for the sources I did not re-add: As regards Aaronovitch, I do not believe we need to cite a newspaper article by a commentator who is not an expert when there is already expert high quality RS cited for a point. Regarding the second, it is a very general vague statement in a Congressional report that there is "very clear evidence" of "antisemitic statements in the writings and manifestos of organizations like Hamas and Hizbullah". This is first of all a primary source, and secondly it is a very broad general statement with no additional information and thus fails notability and quality for being cited when we already have multiple high quality secondary RS cited for that point. The Weitzman/Jacobs piece similarly only makes a general broad statement that the Protocols "has fueled the imagination and hatred of Jews and Judaism, from the captains of industry like Henry Ford, to teenage Hamas homicide bombers." We already have high quality RS that make the point that the Protocols-type language in the original charter is antisemitic. I do not see the additional value of adding this source with a very general statement to it. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 02:30, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

Additions to subsection Allegations of Antisemitism, section Policies towards Israel and Palestine

Edit request 14 August 2025

Edit request 12 August 2025

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 26 August 2025

Duplication

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 3 September 2025

Paraguay

Typo

Edit request 11 September 2025

Section titles

Edit request 14 September 2025

Hudna

Recognition of Israel

The text to the right is in the article right now. It gives undue weight to one interpretation of the 2017 document by Brenner and ignores other things that Hamas did not do, for example actually recognising Israel which is very pertinent for this section. We should attribute Brenner's opinion as it's just that - it's not written in the Hamas document and it's not the scholarly consensus view. Alaexis_¿question? 14:48, 12 September 2025 (UTC)

The consensus scholarly view is that Hamas accepts the 1967 borders including in the 2017 charter, as we state multiple times on the page despite your repeated attempts to have it removed and minimized.

You are also misrepresenting the views of Kearas it relates to the 2017 charter accepting it.

Moreover, the section already includes the points you want to include in its first paragraph:

"Hamas leaders have repeatedly emphasized they do not recognize Israel. But Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders in signed agreements (in 2005, 2006, and 2007) and in its 2017 charter. Some scholars saw Hamas' acceptance of the 1967 borders as a tacit acceptance of another entity on the other side, while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine. Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated. Others argue that the long-term objective and lack of official recognition of Israel is merely maintained as a bargaining chip for future negotiations. Several scholars have compared Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel to Likud's lack of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza."

So your edit of this in the fourth paragraph is itself a violation of WP:DUE and NPOV. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 16:22, 12 September 2025 (UTC)

Where does the claim that "Hamas "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto" appear, other than in Brenner's book? This is a rather unusual claim and I haven't seen it elsewhere. Note that this is different from recognition of Israel. We have multiple sources that say that Hamas has maintained its goal of liberating all of the former Mandatory Palestine, so we should attribute this claim to Brenner and not write it in Wikivoice. Alaexis_¿question? 19:06, 13 September 2025 (UTC)

It is not an unusual claim at all. It was widely reported in coverage of the charter (and also of the 2006 manifesto), and is included in other RS including Hroub, Kear and others, and it is the consensus view in RS that Hamas accepted the 1967 borders. If you are saying that you have never seen this anywhere, then you lack the competence to edit this section.

Moreover, we already note that some other scholars claim Hamas retains its belief in a complete liberation of Palestine, while also noting that yet other scholars disagree with this. This is incidentally a consensus version of the section you had agreed to and are now seeking to yet again alter in violation of NPOV standards.

But thank you for clarifying that you are not interested in attribution here for any other reason than to push a POV that is contrary to the broad view in RS. This is why I oppose its inclusion, as it is not a controversial claim that requires attribution. Please do not add it again in violation of WP:BRD and please do not engaged in WP:BATTLEGROUND. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 20:06, 13 September 2025 (UTC)

Please refrain from personal attacks.

Thanks for providing sources. As media pieces they are of lower weight than academic works. Also note that the full sentence in the Reuters article reads "The Palestinian Islamist group Hamas on Monday dropped its longstanding call for Israel's destruction, but said it still rejected the country's right to exist and backs "armed struggle" against it." This is exactly the point I'm making - saying one without the other is a violation of NPOV.

Are there any scholarly sources that claim that "Hamas "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto"? Alaexis_¿question? 20:44, 16 September 2025 (UTC)

References

Edit request 8 September 2025 Paraguay

Flag

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section. A summary of the conclusions reached follows.

The RFC below supports A or C but not B.

Participants numerically supported and found reliable sources to back either option A or C. NCTC clearly states the green flag is for the military wing (the Al-Qassam Brigades) and labels the white flag as the "Hamas Flag". If option C is implemented, a caption would need to explain at least that this is associated with the militant wing.

Hamas#Symbols needs to be updated to reflect a more accurate understanding, and it could use this source. The image caption in this section should also be clarified if the image is kept; "Hamas flags" could be challenged as ambiguous or incorrect when talking about the green flags associated with the militant wing. If option A is implemented, it would probably be satisfying to supporters of option C to put the green flag image in this section and explain it.

It would be consistent with consensus for that section to point out that the white flag was used on the group's former web site, and that it is typically seen at certain types of events, if it is pictured in reliable sources (of which helpful lists have been provided). I think this would be helpful background for readers to know what it means to be the flag of Hamas but not its militant wing. No one has to take that recommendation - it's not mandated by the consensus here - but I wanted to make the distinction between that and what these lists of images cannot be used for. The point was made that simply pointing out things in verified images is not original research. These photos were more successfully challenged as original research when used to establish what is the "official" flag of the Hamas political organization. That challenge makes sense under Wikipedia policy against original synthesis. So we can't use the lists as citations for the "official flag" claim, we should written sources like NCTC that do support this claim directly, without synthesis.

Participants (echoing the article) point out that "Hamas" is ambiguous because it is also used to refer to the militant wing, leaving room for sources to be unaware that different ends of the organization use different flags, or to conflate them, or describe "a" Hamas flag as "the" Hamas flag. This may be what is happening in The New Arab and Jenna 2014, which say the green flag is "the" Hamas flag. So even if we count them as reliable, these sources aren't as determinative as sources which demonstrate awareness of both flags and both wings.

Participants found the Tim Marshall book actually says it's "not fair" to call the green flag "the Hamas flag", but note it does appear at Hamas rallies. The article cites this source and needs to be updated to more accurately reflect what it says or drop it entirely. Personally, I recommend using this source to note the presence of this flag at rallies; it is more helpful background information for readers to understand how the flags co-exist and how to interpret images.

-- Beland (talk) 03:53, 19 September 2025 (UTC)

In oct 2024 the flag in the infobox was changed from the green flag with the Shahada to a white flag with Hamas' political emblem. The change was only motivated by two photos. On the other hand, the "Symbols" section states that the green Shahada flag is the flag of Hamas, and this statement seems to be backed by reliable sources. I do note that the flag has been questioned on this talk page before. If Hamas doesn't really have a flag or if it's complicated, then we should probably start by discussing a rewrite of Hamas#Symbols. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 10:19, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

I could go around all day finding hundreds of images of the white emblem flag of hamas. The shahada flag is literally in use in the emblem of their military wing, and I do think that the Symbols section should be rewritten/moved to the Qassam Brigades article, which sources also refer to as "Hamas" (see the article hatnote) 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 10:25, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

As it is now, the infobox is inconsistent with a sourced claim in the body; this is clearly unacceptable. Please suggest a rewrite of the Symbols section, backed up by reliable sources. (Simply referring to images or photos is original research.) —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 10:38, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

Simply referring to images or photos is original research
How do you think we determine the flags of entities without an official document describing their flags?

Anyways the sources currently used for the paragraph about the flags currently are Tim 2016, p. 148, who says that it is not fair to call the green calligraphic flag "the Hamas flag" (see ), and Jenna 2014, who uses FOTW (see WP:FOTW) as a source (which cites a 2007 version of this wikipedia for the shahada flag, see WP:CIRCULAR). The best thing that we should do for now is to remove that paragraph entirely 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 11:15, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

@St.nerol why did you revert? There is nothing in the talk page 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 15:40, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

I just spent a couple of extra minutes trying to format the quote. Anyway, the full quote from Tim Marshall 2016 is

Its official flag simply features the shahada in white calligraphic writing on a green background. [...] it is not fair to call this ‘the Hamas flag’, as its components suggest that it is a flag for any Muslim; however, it does remain the emblem most often seen at Hamas’ mass rallies and is one under which all, except for the few remaining Gazan Christians, can gather even if they also display the symbols of the other groups operating in the Strip[.]

Fair or not fair, the source does state that this is the official flag of Hamas, not just of the Quassam brigades or the military wing. So I reverted the change that deleted the material and ask that we try to obtain a consensus here before significantly editing the reading. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 15:50, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

@St.nerol Oh alr. How do you know that he is referring yo the political wing and not their military wing? After all, read the name of the book 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 16:09, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

Well, he talks about mass rallies and that almost everyone can gather under it (at least hypothetically). And the book is not just about military flags but flags relating to "power and politics". I have yet to see a reliable source saying that the green one is not Hamas' official flag, or one which says that it's for the military wing specifically, or one which gives precedence to the white flag with the emblem. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 16:49, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

Absent an RS saying that the white flag is the primary official flag, it should be removed from the infobox. I would not reinsert the green flag without further discussion. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 17:22, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

I'm also not convinced that Jenna 2014 (Mother Jones) is circular. It seems to me that the link to FOTW is for image credit, not for the information itself. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 19:21, 5 August 2025 (UTC)

@St.nerol I am not denying the fact that the green flag is a "Hamas flag", to be exact, it is the flag of the Armed wing of Hamas. This US-govt owned website even recognizes it as such . I dont see a policy that goes around the lines of "images are not as reliable as text". I also like how Jenna 2014 conveniently ignored the white flag that was next to the shahada flag, possibly so that she could keep the entire article with just pngs of Arabic text (ooo, spooky). Images of members of Hamas's Political Bureau are always with them next to the white flag: Khaled Mashal ; Khalil al-Hayya ; Zaher Jabarin , and the images are endless. One thing to note is that it is hard to find images of them next to the green flag, unless they have a thing to do with their armed wing. It would also be nice if one of the 1,557 watchers of this talk page to voice their opinion here :) 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 08:07, 6 August 2025 (UTC)

Granted the NCTC page on Hamas is a reliable source supporting a white party flag and a green military flag. So I agree at least that the solution is not obvious. I maintain that reliable sources generally seem to identify the green Shahada flag as "the Hamas flag". Here's one more example: Is the Hamas flag the same as the Palestine flag? (The New Arab). I'm not saying that "images are unreliable", I'm saying that you and I drawing conclusions from samples of photos would be a clear cut example of WP:OR. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 10:36, 6 August 2025 (UTC)

the thing is that "the Hamas flag" statement is a vague one. Sources refer to the Qassam Brigades as "Hamas" too. I think that maintaining the status quo for the infoboxes is the solution for all this confusion in the sources, although we could display both flags like the Mujahedeen-e Khalq article does, but I'm not a big fan of it 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 11:10, 6 August 2025 (UTC)

Maintaining status quo in the Infobox would contradict MOS:IBP. The infobox should reflect the article. And given that the sources mostly agree that the green one is "the Hamas flag", I don't see how we could describe it any other way. How could we just assume that these descriptions refer specifically to the associated paramilitary? —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 18:36, 6 August 2025 (UTC)

Because we are allowed to notice stuff. I'm sorry but I'm not going to ask you to reread the hat note of this article. Pinging the regular contributors at this article for their opinions: @Iskandar323 @Vice regent @Smallangryplanet @Selfstudier @Alaexis @Raskolnikov.Rev @Corriebertus @Sean.hoyland 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 18:45, 6 August 2025 (UTC)

The hatnote says that their military wing is often referred to as just Hamas in Israeli sources. Here is Al-Jazeera: "Hamas's flag is green" ; and "Germany bans Hamas flag", illustrated with the green Shahada flag . Here's Time: "Hamas' flag is green" . —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 09:47, 7 August 2025 (UTC)

@Abo Yemen: This matter needs an RfC. If you could start one, please do it. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 14:38, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

alright, just give me a moment 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 14:44, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

RFC: Flag of Hamas

Which flag should be used in the infobox?

A: White, emblem flag (status quo)
B: Green, Shahada flag
C: Both (e.g. People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran's infobox)
D: Neither (infobox without a flag)

𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 14:55, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

White, emblem flag
Green, Shahada flag

A - per my reasoning above, namely because the green flag is used exclusively by the military wing of Hamas, Qassam Brigades who are referred to as "Hamas" by media outlets. The distinction between those two flags are made here 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 15:20, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

Comment: The green flag was used from 2013 until Oct 2024, when it was replaced by the white by Abo Yemen. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 15:55, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

actually it was there on this article even before I was born (or maybe after I was, either ways it was there since 2007), but that doesn't make it correct. Plus I've explained the change in the talk page thread that I've linked to above 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 16:16, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

The first representative image added to the article was the white flag, included back in 2004, over 20 years ago. Although that file has since been deleted, a 2005 description confirms it depicted the white flag with the Dome. Paprikaiser (talk) 20:18, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

@Paprikaiser: Your diff and the description confirms that the logotype of Hamas was first added in 2004. The logo or emblem is currently at the top of the infobox, and nobody argues about it. But the first time a flag was added seems to be this edit in 2007. It was the green Shahada flag. It was moved to the infobox in 2013 where it remained until this edit, ten months ago. The white flag was introduced by the next edit. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 13:15, 10 August 2025 (UTC)

@St.nerol just vote in the RfC please. Our messages above are still available for everyone to read 𐩣𐩫𐩧𐩨 Abo Yemen (𓃵) 13:30, 10 August 2025 (UTC)

Option A Their website was taken down at some point, but here is a working archive. The white flag is the only one shown and is also the only one regularly used in press releases (example). It can also be seen here behind a Hamas spokesperson. Conflating it with the shahada flag, which is used exclusively by the military wing, seems misleading, especially since this article is about the political wing. Paprikaiser (talk) 20:16, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

C, I dont see any particular reason to not have both up since the former appears to the offical flag used by the Hamas (as per Paprikaiser's comment) but the latter is very much more famous at least in the western world and immediatly synonymous with the org, I think there should be an explanatory note explaining the situation with the green Shahada flag though. AssanEcho (talk) 22:28, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

I support option C per AssanEcho R3YBOl (🌲) 22:34, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

Option C per above. Skitash (talk) 23:12, 9 August 2025 (UTC)

Option B per MOS:IBP: "The purpose of an infobox is to summarize, but not supplant, the key facts that appear in an article." The article clearly describes the green flag and the emblem, but not the white flag. The emblem has its place in the top of the infobox, and the green flag was in the lower part of the box for 11 years, until this last October. There is one RS which shows the white flag as the flag of Hamas, but at least half a dozen which describes "the flag of Hamas" as green. I'm open to hear a case for rewriting the symbols section, which might make option C acceptable, but starting with the infobox puts the cart before the horse. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 13:56, 10 August 2025 (UTC)

Option A - The green Shahada flag is not the official flag of the Hamas political organization. I challenge anyone to provide an official source or endorsement demonstrating that this flag has been publicly adopted as a representation of the political party.

Below is a list of meetings held with various Hamas officials, involving both internal members and external delegations. In all instances, only the official political flag is present or usually accompanied by the Palestinian national flag.

The following is a non-exhaustive selection of photographs from such meetings over the years.

19 March 2024 Chinese envoy meets Hamas chief Haniyeh after first visit to Israel since Gaza war began. Flags on display, all left to right: Hamas and Palestine
2 November 2022 Taliban, Hamas officials meet in Turkey. Flags on display: Palestine and Hamas
14 October 2023 Hamas, Iran leaders agree to 'continue cooperation' after attack on Israel. Flags on display: : Hamas and Palestine per video
13 February 2024 Iran's Foreign Minister Meets Hamas Leader In Qatar. Flags on display: Hamas and Palestine
20 June 2024 Resistance must make Israel pay heavier price for aggression: Iran interim FM. Flags on display: Palestine and Hamas
3 February 2025 Iranian Foreign Minister In Meeting With Hamas Leadership In Qatar: Iran Welcomes Gaza's 'Historic Victory' And Will Continue To Support It; We Coordinate Extensively With Qatar. Flags on display: Palestine and Hamas
21 February 2017 Haniyeh Sinwar discuss transition of command in Gaza. Flags on display: Hamas and Palestine
11 October 2023 A Hamas leader refuses to admit his group planned to kill civilians. Flags on display: Hamas and Palestine.
18 October 2024 Hamas announces the martyrdom of Yahya Sinwar. Flags on display: Hamas and Palestine
8 March 2008 Talk to Al-Jazeera with Head of Hamas’s political bureau, Khaled Meshaal. Flags on display: Hamas and Palestine.
25 April 2008 Israel dismisses Hamas truce offer. Flags on display: Hamas and Palestine.

Therefore, Option A as it is the white flag with the emblem you will consistently see in official political settings: press conferences, diplomatic meetings, delegation visits, and media statements from the political leadership. Lf8u2 (talk) 19:59, 14 August 2025 (UTC)

We do not need "official sources", we need reliable sources. Drawing conclusions from photos is original research. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 10:03, 19 August 2025 (UTC)

This is not original research. If drawing conclusions from photos is original research when those photos are in RS, then drawing conclusions from written content from reliable sources would also be considered original research.

The published sources I cited (CNN, Reuters, The Economist, Al Jazeera, and The Guardian) are all considered generally reliable. I acknowledge that MEMRI, the Jewish News Syndicate, and the Palestinian Information Centre are not RS, but it's not as though they manipulated the flags in their photos.

As the opening paragraph of this article states: “The Islamic Resistance Movement, abbreviated Hamas […] is a […] political organisation with a military wing, the Qassam Brigades.” It is not about the military wing. As already noted by Abo Yemen, a distinction is clearly made between the political and military wings. Therefore the green shahada flag is not relevant here. Lf8u2 (talk) 02:13, 26 August 2025 (UTC)

The implication of your argument would seem to be that everything about Hamas' military wing should be deleted from this article, just because there is also a page which is exclusively about the Quassam Brigades? You wouldn't find consensus for such changes—this page is about all of Hamas. —St.Nerol (talk, contribs) 16:47, 13 September 2025 (UTC)

A per above V. L. Mastikosa (talk) 02:43, 26 August 2025 (UTC)

Option C as per AssanEcho's argument. Frankserafini87 (talk) 14:03, 27 August 2025 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Auschwitz

Why should their statement mentioning Auschwitz be in the antisemitism section? The Jpost article used as the source never mentions antisemitism so it's WP:OR to put it there. Alaexis_¿question? 14:36, 12 September 2025 (UTC)

It should be there as it is directly relevant to the section on antisemitism, which includes the claim that Hamas denies the Holocaust, so the RS statement that they do not deny the Holocaust but acknowledge it is a direct response that allegation which is in line with the purpose of that paragraph. The claim that acknowledging the Holocaust and Auschwitz concentration camp as being unrelated to accusations of Holocaust denialism and so it woud be OR to include is not serious. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 16:15, 12 September 2025 (UTC)

This is improper synthesis. It's your own conclusion which is not backed by any RS.

Please provide sources that link this statement to Hamas's antisemitism. Alaexis_¿question? 16:58, 12 September 2025 (UTC)

The recognition of Auschwitz' role in the Holocaust being a recognition of it is not improper synthesis, and it directly addresses the claim in the section of Hamas' alleged Holocaust denialism. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 17:06, 12 September 2025 (UTC)

I've asked for a third opinion at the relevant noticeboard. Alaexis_¿question? 19:26, 13 September 2025 (UTC)

By that logic every WP article is improper synthesis as no one RS has written the whole article in one place AlexBobCharles (talk) 14:26, 13 September 2025 (UTC)

I think the quote belongs in that section but disagree with Raskolnikiv.Rev’s interpretation of it. The section deals with their attitude to the Holocaust and Auschwitz is obviously part of the Holocaust. In my view, the comparison made in the quote is Holocaust relativisation not Holocaust acknowledgement. (Many

Holocaust deniers say things like “the Holocaust didn’t happen and what the Jews are doing is the real Holocaust”.) We rightly don’t give either interpretation though, but simply report the quote. I think it’s fine as it is. BobFromBrockley (talk) 04:34, 20 September 2025 (UTC)

2017 charter and antisemitism

Our current text, in the section on antisemitism, says the 2017 charter “condemn[s] antisemitism and the persecution of the Jews”. The two sources cited for this aren’t online so I can’t see what they actually say. What the charter actually says is “Hamas rejects the persecution of any human being or the undermining of his or her rights on nationalist, religious or sectarian grounds. Hamas is of the view that the Jewish problem, anti-Semitism and the persecution of the Jews are phenomena fundamentally linked to European history and not to the history of the Arabs and the Muslims or to their heritage.” That’s not a condemnation of antisemitism, just of persecution in general, along with a denial of antisemitism. If the two sources opine that this is a condemnation of antisemitism, we should attribute their opinions as our words are evidently not an accurate summary of the charter. BobFromBrockley (talk) 04:43, 20 September 2025 (UTC)

You are correct, the sources also do not say this, they quote from the charter and say they remove the antisemitic language which we already note in the first part of the sentence, while quoting the other parts you cite from it. I believe we should also follow the text of the charter, and include a citation of that.

This seems like a good alternative: "Hamas' 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language of the original, stating that their struggle is against Zionism and not Jews, while rejecting persecution or denial of rights of any human being on nationalist, religious, or sectarian grounds. It also says that the Jewish question, antisemitism, and the persecution of Jews stem from European history rather than Arab or Muslim heritage, while advancing goals for a Palestinian state that many see as consistent with a two-state solution."

If that looks good to you we can proceed with that fix. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 08:35, 20 September 2025 (UTC)

Good with me BobFromBrockley (talk) 17:53, 20 September 2025 (UTC)

Have updated it now. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 23:22, 20 September 2025 (UTC)

Section placing: Allegations of antisemitism

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 September 2025

Link of the Hamas website

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 5 October 2025

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 7 October 2025

extrajudicial execution of citizens

A Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for speedy deletion

Is "political position" relevant in this way?

Though Hamas is technically a party, are definitely not left-wing, and while there are some sources which say the organization is right-wing, it seems discordant with the goal of providing a clear understanding of the group to call it "right-wing," as this has a connotation very specifically tied to a Western political context which might just not be so applicable here. Might it simply be more accurate to just say "Islamist?" I don't believe this is a controversial designation, and it has far more reliable sources and is significantly more descriptive in its meaning. WriterOfScrolls (talk) 19:48, 15 October 2025 (UTC)

This information in the infobox is not discussed in the article, nor is "islamist". My five cents, for the time being, it can be removed from the infobox, until an editor writes a section called Political position that gives more information. Lova Falk (talk) 10:44, 16 October 2025 (UTC)

I think this is sensible. WriterOfScrolls (talk) 04:47, 17 October 2025 (UTC)

It's definitely worth discussing this in the body of the article. I think that it's not a good reason to remove this characteristic as it's backed up by reliable sources.

The term "right-wing" is used for movements all over the world, for example those in India and Japan. Alaexis_¿question? 15:04, 17 October 2025 (UTC)

@WriterOfScrolls, consider Grey Wolves (organization) who are described as right-wing and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh which is described as right-wing in the first sentence of the lede (though not in the infobox where only its Hindutva ideology is mentioned). A movement can be both Islamist and right-wing (or Hindutva and right-wing), there is no contradiction here. Alaexis_¿question? 15:08, 17 October 2025 (UTC)

I am forced to admit that you're right about this, and I do think this is really an issue of "Left-wing" describing something generally coherent and "Right-wing" describing everything else. But this is not the place to discuss that issue. I don't know how to close the talk section, though. WriterOfScrolls (talk) 17:20, 17 October 2025 (UTC)

RFC: Flag of Hamas

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