Talk:Kashmir conflict/Archive 7

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Alternative text

As the three sections of Dixon plan, 1950 military standoff and Nehru's plebiscite offer do not represent all the significant viewpoints adequately and suffer from too much of Srinath Raghavan and Mahesh Shankar POV, all neutral editors can now work on a more neutral and scholar-abiding text here. KA$HMIR (talk) 16:45, 11 January 2018 (UTC)

Dixon plan

I think we should start with modifying these sentences. The 1950s saw the mediation by Sir Owen Dixon, the UN-appointed mediator, who came the closest to solving the Kashmir dispute in the eyes of many commentators. Dixon arrived in the subcontinent in May 1950 and, after a visit to Kashmir, proposed a summit between India and Pakistan. The summit lasted five days, at the end of which Dixon declared a statewide plebiscite was impossible. We should replace this with a brief line that Dixon came to implement Sir McNaughton's demilitarisation proposals (we can add a brief sentence or two about McNaughton in the previous section since he did his stuff for the UN,) and he made a number of demilitarization proposals which India rejected then the Dixon plan came up as a lst resort. Otherwise the present text leaves readers in a vacuum about why Dixon came, what he and his work were for. This way readers can also see the connection between the UN's work and Sir Owen Dixon, and this keeps the thread of the sequence of events going. We can remove the commentators commentary, its unnecessary POV, and replace it with the historical facts. We will need to gather a maximum number of scholarly sources and work on an acceptable version. Dilpa kaur (talk) 17:15, 11 January 2018 (UTC)

That is not quite accurate. Dixon was the replacement for UNCIP. When the UNCIP disbanded itself, it recommended that it should be replaced by a single mediator. Dixon was the chosen mediator and, after him, it was Frank Graham and so on. All of them were called "UN Representatives for India and Pakistan". Dixon's remit was to achieve demilitarisation if possible and otherwise make any proposal that he found suitable for achieving a solution. It was in the second part of his remit that he came up with what is now called the "Dixon Plan". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:18, 11 January 2018 (UTC)

According to the reliable sources Sir Owen Dixon was appointed by the UNSC to implement McNaughton's demilitarization proposals.^[1] Do you have a source which contradicts this? KA$HMIR (talk) 19:02, 11 January 2018 (UTC)

Yes, Korbel's book, p.168. You can also see the UNSC resolution, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b). -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:16, 11 January 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta (6 December 2012). Jammu and Kashmir. Springer. pp. 153–155. ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6.

There is no contradictions between Korbel, UNSC paragraphs and Gupta. Lets see the texts rather than just taking your word,

Gupta says (p 156):At the next meeting the Security Council appointed Sir Owen Dixon as the U.N. representative for India and Pakistan on 12 April 1950. He was to implement the McNaughton proposals for the demilitarization of the state...According to the Resolution of 14 March 1950, the U.N. Representative would assume the functions of UNCIP one month after both the parties had accepted...^[1]

Korbel says (p 168) The resolution was carried on March 14, 1950....It called upon India and Pakistan to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a programme of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal. It further decided to replace the United Nations Commission by a representative entrusted with arbitrary powers to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarization.^[2]

They both say the same thing. Yes the UN representative was to replace the council but their job was to work on the basis of McNaughton's demilitarization proposals.^[3] There is no disagreement in the sources. There should not be much ado about nothing. ~~ ~~

You don't see the contradiction because you failed the read the sentence that follows on page 168, as well as the paragraph 2(b) of the resolution. Your understanding is incomplete. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:44, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta (6 December 2012). Jammu and Kashmir. Springer. pp. 156–. ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6.
[2]
Josef Korbel (8 December 2015). Danger in Kashmir. Princeton University Press. pp. 168–. ISBN 978-1-4008-7523-8.
[3]
Verinder Grover; Ranjana Arora (1 January 1999). 50 Years of Indo-Pak Relations: Chronology of events, important documents, 1947-1997. Deep & Deep Publications. p. 301. ISBN 978-81-7629-059-3.

I have also just investigated the texts. There is no contradiction. You have certainly failed to prove it. The following sentence in Korbel nowhere contradicts the fact that Dixon was sent to implement McNaughton's proposals. In fact the quoted extract provided by Dilpa supports it. Also rather than repeating vague references to paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) with no explanation I suggest you take a read of paragraph 1 for the context. If you still insist there is a contradiction in the face of all the facts you are welcome to leave the constructive discussion. Aamiriik (talk) 11:06, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

It doesn't matter whether you see a contradiction or not. What matters is that I have objected to the proposed revision because it is a selective misrepresentation of the situation. It is paragraph 2(b) of the resolution that supports the "Dixon Plan". It cannot be omitted. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:38, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

Paragraph 2 (b) reads: To place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to place before those Governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which has arise between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir

Where does it say anything about the Dixon plan? It says about the mediator suggesting to the two governments anything they think will be a good solution to the dispute. This would include all of Dixon's proposals, which India rejected, not just the Dixon 'plan'. You also did not make your objection clear. What was being conversed upon was writing that Dixon came to implement on the basis of McNaughton's demilitarization proposals. All the sources agree on this. Your objections lack grounds and are a fallacy. Dilpa kaur (talk) 12:44, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

Leaving aside the sidetrack, I have worked on the script for the brief replacement of the first few sentences under Dixon plan. Here's a version I have worked on using the cited sources

The United Nations Security Council appointed Sir Owen Dixon as the UN representative who was to implement General McNaughton's proposals for demilitarization and also requested this representative to suggest to the two governments any solutions which they believed could assist towards a resolution.^[1]^[2]

KA$HMIR (talk) 15:53, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

KA$HMIR, theres still a structural issue. To assist with the flow of the story, I have come up with a brief description of the McNaughton phase which can go at the end of the preceding section UN mediation. I have not gone in detail but two sentences of summary will do.

The Council appointed General McNaughton as its president who proposed a scheme of demilitarization and disbanding of local armed forces, on both sides of the Line of Control, which Pakistan accepted and India rejected; India suggesting that only the Azad Kashmir forces be disbanded and that India and the Indian Kashmir government be allowed to administrate the Northern Areas instead of the local authorities. The proposal was accepted by most members of the UNSC which passed a resolution calling on the two states to demilitarize on the basis of the McNaughton proposals.^[3] Dilpa kaur (talk) 16:35, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

For the record, I have already objected the proposed Dixon intro (2nd last above) for being a selective misrepresentation of the facts. You won't get it past me. As for the second proposed text, it is already covered in the UN mediation section at a level appropriate to this article. Note that the first RfC had a clear outcome. All details of such mediations should go into the UN mediation of the Kashmir dispute article. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:12, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta (6 December 2012). Jammu and Kashmir. Springer. pp. 156–. ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6.
[2]
Josef Korbel (8 December 2015). Danger in Kashmir. Princeton University Press. pp. 168–. ISBN 978-1-4008-7523-8.
[3]
Michael Brecher (1953). The Struggle for Kashmir. Oxford University Press. pp. 105–106.

@Dilpa kaur: thats fine. Just insert ″for a plebiscite″ after ″disbanding of local armed forces″ for clarity, otherwise how will readers know what the McNaughton proposals were for? KA$HMIR (talk) 19:04, 12 January 2018 (UTC)

Sorry for my late arrival.I have been extremely busy. But I have also worked out alternative texts for all three sub-sections during my long absence.

The UNCIP appointed its successor, Sir Owen Dixon, to implement demilitarization prior to a statewide plebiscite on the basis of General McNaughton's scheme, and to recommend solutions to the two governments.^[1]^[2]^[3] Dixon's efforts for a statewide plebiscite came to naught due to India's constant rejection of the various alternative demilitarisation proposals, for which Dixon rebuked India harshly.^[4]

Dixon then offered an alternative proposal, widely known as the 'Dixon plan'. Dixon did not view the state of Jammu and Kashmir as one homogeneous unit and therefore proposed that a plebiscite be limited to the Valley. Dixon agreed that people in Jammu and Ladakh were clearly in favour of India; equally clearly, those in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas wanted to be part of Pakistan. This left the Kashmir Valley and 'perhaps some adjacent country' around Muzaffarabad in uncertain political terrain.^[5] Pakistan did not accept this plan because it believed that India's commitment to a plebiscite for the whole state should not be abandoned.^[6]

Dixon also had concerns that the Kashmiris, not being high-spirited people, may vote under fear or improper influences.^[7] Following Pakistan's objections, he proposed that Sheikh Abdullah administration should be held in "commission" (in abeyance) while the plebiscite was held. This was not acceptable to India which rejected the Dixon plan on . Another grounds for India's rejection of the limited plebiscite was that it wanted Indian troops to remain in Kashmir for security purposes, but would not allow Pakistani troops the same. However, Dixon's plan had encapsulated a withdrawal by both sides. Dixon had believed a neutral administration would be essential for a fair plebiscite.^[8]
Dixon came to the conclusion that India would never agree to conditions and a demilitarization which would ensure a free and fair plebiscite.^[9] Dixon's failure also compounded American ambassador Loy Henderson's misgivings about Indian sincerity and he advised the USA to maintain a distance from the Kashmir dispute, which the US subsequently did, and leave the matter for Commonwealth nations to intervene in.^[10]

The first paragraph, in case anyone misconstrues it as a conversion attempt of plan to mission, is a brief introduction of only 2 sentences which maintain the flow of the text from the previous UN mediation section. How Dixon's statewide role was converted into the Valley only plan, because of constant Indian rejections of various demilitarisation proposals, has also been briefly covered to keep the flow between UN mediation and Dixon plan going. The bulk of the section continues to be about the Dixon plan. Loy Henderson's assessment and Commonwealth intervention recommendation is necessary to keep the flow going between Dixon plan and the next section which talks about Commonwealth and British intervention.

The controversial former Indian soldier Srinath Raghavan's space has also been reduced. India's rejection of the Dixon plan and its stated reasons for rejection as well as Dixon's remarks have also been included. Pakistan's rejection has been modified to contextualise the reason for its rejection. Dixon came originally for a statewide plebiscite so Pakistan's rejection of the plan was justified and this needed to be put into context without impugning on the space for Dixon plan. 'Bluntly' rejected is a non-neutral POV description with an objective of making Pakistan look bad. KA$HMIR (talk) 05:20, 23 February 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta (6 December 2012). Jammu and Kashmir. Springer. pp. 156–. ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6.
[2]
Josef Korbel (8 December 2015). Danger in Kashmir. Princeton University Press. pp. 168–. ISBN 978-1-4008-7523-8.
[3]
Victoria Schofield (1996). Kashmir in the crossfire. I.B. Tauris. p. 174. ISBN 978-1-86064-036-0.
[4]
Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta (6 December 2012). Jammu and Kashmir. Springer. p. 160. ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6.
[5]
Snedden, Christopher (2005), "Would a plebiscite have resolved the Kashmir dispute?", South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 28 (1): 64–86, doi:10.1080/0085640050005614
[6]
Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta (6 December 2012). Jammu and Kashmir. Springer. p. 161. ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6.
[7]
Christopher Snedden (2005) Would a plebiscite have resolved the Kashmir dispute?, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 28:1, 75, DOI: 10.1080/00856400500056145
[8]
Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta (6 December 2012). Jammu and Kashmir. Springer. p. 162. ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6.
[9]
Bradnock, Robert W. (998), "Regional geopolitics in a globalising world: Kashmir in geopolitical perspective", Geopolitics, 3 (2): 11, doi:10.1080/14650049808407617, More importantly, Dixon concluded that it was impossible to get India's agreement to any reasonable terms. 'In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarisation in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled.
[10]
Howard B. Schaffer (1 September 2009). The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir. Brookings Institution Press. p. 30. ISBN 978-0-8157-0370-9.

Review of the revision: Dixon Plan

Below is the combined text of the old and new versions of this section, old text removed in purple and the new text added red:

Nehru then proposed a partition-cum-plebiscite plan: Jammu and Ladakh would go to India, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas to Pakistan, and a plebiscite would be held in the Kashmir Valley. Dixon favoured the plan, which bears his name till this day.^[1] Dixon then offered an alternative proposal, widely known as the 'Dixon plan'. Dixon did not view the state of Jammu and Kashmir as one homogeneous unit and therefore proposed that a plebiscite be limited to the Valley. Dixon agreed that people in Jammu and Ladakh were clearly in favour of India; equally clearly, those in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas wanted to be part of Pakistan. This left the Kashmir Valley and 'perhaps some adjacent country' around Muzaffarabad in uncertain political terrain.^[2] However, according to Dixon, Pakistan "bluntly rejected" the proposal. It believed that the plebiscite should be held in the entire state or the state should be partitioned along religious lines.^[2] Pakistan did not accept this plan because it believed that India's commitment to a plebiscite for the whole state should not be abandoned.^[3]

Dixon also had concerns that the Kashmiris, not being high-spirited people, may vote under fear or improper influences.^[2] Following Pakistan's objections, he proposed that Sheikh Abdullah administration should be held in "commission" (in abeyance) while the plebiscite was held. This was not acceptable to India.^[5] which rejected the Dixon plan on . Another grounds for India's rejection of the limited plebiscite was that it wanted Indian troops to remain in Kashmir for security purposes, but would not allow Pakistani troops the same. However, Dixon's plan had encapsulated a withdrawal by both sides. Dixon had believed a neutral administration would be essential for a fair plebiscite.^[6] At that point, Dixon lost patience and declared failure.^[1] Dixon's premature withdrawal has been criticised, but perhaps Dixon had not realised how close he had come to solving the dispute.^[7]

Dixon came to the conclusion that India would never agree to conditions and a demilitarization which would ensure a free and fair plebiscite.^[8] Dixon's failure also compounded American ambassador Loy Henderson's misgivings about Indian sincerity and he advised the USA to maintain a distance from the Kashmir dispute, which the US subsequently did, and leave the matter for Commonwealth nations to intervene in.^[9]

Comments

I have ignored the preamble about demilitarisation which needs to be discussed separately.
The text beginning "Nehru then proposed..." has been deleted. Why?
"Dixon then offerd..." why is this here, unsourced, when another source said that Nehru had offered?
"Pakisan bluntly rejected..." Why was this removed?
The new text says Pakistan did not accept because it believed in India's commitment etc. Which source justifies the causation implied by "because"? How did the belief become a cause for rejection?
Why was the footnote "Nehru asked Dixon..." removed?
New text "which rejected the Dixon plan on [incomplete]". The source does not say this. It says it rejected "the plan", the plan being the one being discussed, i.e., the plan for neutral administration.
"but would not allow Pakistani troops the same". Did anybody claim that Pakistani troops were needed for security purposes? Where?
Last paragraph, concerning "demilitarization". Why is this here, when it was already covered in the preamble?
Loy Henderson's observation about "sincerity". Where is this in Schaffer? Why is Henderson's view essential when we know that another American ambassador, Chester Bowles, held exactly the opposite view? (Schaffer, page 33ff).

KA$HMIR, can you answer these questions please? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:58, 7 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, pp. 188–189.
[2]
Snedden, Would a plebiscite have resolved the Kashmir dispute? 2005.
[3]
Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir 2012, p. 161.
[4]
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 15, part I, p.227, quoted in Shankar, Nehru's Legacy in Kashmir 2016, p. 10
[5]
Nehru asked Dixon, "What could be more advantageous to Pakistan, than to be able to say that they had “kicked out the Kashmir Government and the India Government from Kashmir…[that would be] patently ninety per cent of victory for Pakistan then and there, quite apart from the plebiscite."^[4]
[6]
Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir 2012, p. 162.
[7]
A. G. Noorani, The Dixon Plan, Frontline, 12 October 2002.
[8]
Bradnock, Robert W. (998), "Regional geopolitics in a globalising world: Kashmir in geopolitical perspective", Geopolitics, 3 (2): 11, doi:10.1080/14650049808407617, More importantly, Dixon concluded that it was impossible to get India's agreement to any reasonable terms. 'In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarisation in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled.
[9]
Schaffer, The Limits of Influence 2009, p. 30.

Thank you for finally raising your concerns after a lengthy hiatus. I am hopeful this will be more constructive than previous discussions. I will issue an invitation To editor KA$HMIR: to reply to this. Let us hope he is not as busy as he said he was back in late February. But I will say Kautilya3 your objections lack cites to policy. And contradictions are emerging in your stances. Chester Bowles does not contradict Henderson, you even argued against including Bowles when he said Nehru was insincere. Now you claim that he held the exact opposite view (he did not). And why is Henderson an issue now when you yourself supported including his assessment. You said and the American ambassador's assessment of them is entirely pertinent

Most of the remaining issues raised by you now are pedantic. This objection * "but would not allow Pakistani troops the same". Did anybody claim that Pakistani troops were needed for security purposes? Where? lacks substance. No one needs to claim anything because we are reading that Dixon was opposed to India's demand that only it gets to keep its troops and not Pakistan in the plebiscite zone. Dixon believed in the necessity of a neutral administration. And its common sense that if India wanted its troops in Kashmir and won't allow the other party in then its because of a bad faith motive to make sure which way the vote goes.^[1] And that is why he commented as he did that India would not agree to fair conditions and demilitarization Demilitarization in the last paragraph is Dixon's assessment.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 02:28, 7 March 2018 (UTC)

RegentsPark can you please advise NadirAli to focus on the substance, if he can, and stop pontificating about procedure/policy/opinions or whatever. I have raised specific questions of substance, which should be answered with substance. Perhaps this comment can be hatted too. There is too much noise on this talk page and it is becoming hard to see what is going on. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 03:01, 7 March 2018 (UTC)

Kautilya3 can you change the heading and tone of this section? There is already a WP:CONSENSUS here now on the accepted textual version and the WP:ONUS is now on you as the only dissident to explain their objections rather than ask questions. I have already replied about the substance. And procedures and policies are integral to content discussions and cannot be excluded. For that you would need to propose a Wikipedia policy change.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 03:42, 7 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Bruce Riedel (29 January 2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Brookings Institution Press. pp. 48–50. ISBN 0-8157-2409-8.

Point #7

Kautilya3, your claim is: * New text "which rejected the Dixon plan on [incomplete]". The source does not say this. It says it rejected "the plan", the plan being the one being discussed i.e. the plan for neutral administration.

The source given for the consensus text, Das Gupta, 162, actually does say this.

On 16 August 1950 the Indian Prime Minister rejected the plan for limited plebiscite on the following grounds:...4)The security of the State necessitated the presence of Indian troops and the exclusion of the Pakistani troops from the plebiscite area. India would not depart from that principle. Sir Owen Dixon disagreed with the Indian position. He aired his views that a neutral administration was necessary for a fair plebiscite, that the exclusion of Indian troops...were essential prerequisites of the same.

It says it rejected the plan for a limited plebiscite. One reason was that it wanted Indian troops, which Dixon said was not a prerequisite of a neutral administration. It's explicit and there can be no fiddling about this fact.

Nadir has rebutted your objections to the consensus text on demilitarization and about the Pakistani troops/neutral administration. That should be good enough. You should also be careful not to start over-exacting. There are ARBIPA sanctions in place.—TripWire^{________ʞlɐʇ} 12:23, 7 March 2018 (UTC)

TripWire, please note that the term "Dixon Plan" does not appear on page 162 of Das Gupta or anywhere in this discussion. The first time the term is used in the book is on page 206 where it is attributed to the J&K Government bodies.

The phrase "rejected the plan for limited plebiscite" has been used in the source (and nobody writes in a mathematically precise language to guard against future misinterpretations), but you will see on page 160 how India reacted "favorably" to Dixon's suggestion and how Nehru himself suggested limiting plebiscite to the Kashmir Valley. The objections listed on page 162 are regarding the specific administrative arrangements that Dixon proposed, not to the idea of limited plebiscite. So your interpretation is not supported by the source. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 03:02, 9 March 2018 (UTC)

To editor Kautilya3: The plan for a limited plebiscite is the same as the Dixon plan (the Valley only plebiscite proposal), or are you now trying to claim it was something different? It would help the discussion progress without over focusing on minute details.

It would also help if you could be more consistent in your reasoning. You first claimed that India only objected to the plan for neutral administration. TripWire pointed out to you that the source says India objected to the plan of limited plebiscite. Now you have done a turn around and are either trying to say that the Dixon plan was not the same as the limited plebiscite plan or you are trying to say ″Yes the source does say that India rejected the limited plebiscite plan but India did not reject the idea of it, just the conditions for it″. The second objection also lacks substance because no one has said anything about ideas. They have not been mentioned at all.

Its true that the Gupta source says on page 160 that India reacted favorably to the plan. But the context needs to be accounted for. All of Dixon's previous proposals were rejected by India, something that Dixon had to condemn (same Gupta source).^[1] And this plan was Dixon's last go. So rejection or acceptance of the idea after so many rejections of other ideas is meaningless anyhow. Gupta, who you have called an ″excellent source″, is I agree a good source but needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. International reviewers say he was writing under his national limitations.^[2] Gupta's reviewer Richard Wheeler also said ″Dr Das Gupta contends that Nehru was then ready to accept a partition in Jammu and the north generally along the ceasefire line, with a plebiscite in the Kashmir valley alone. Pakistan, however, insisted on an overall plebiscite and the opportunity to pursue the matter was lost. Since Dixon's proposals for a limited plebiscite were in fact rejected by Nehru, essentially over the means of administering such a plebiscite, one may doubt whether India would have ever agreed to a procedure acceptable to Pakistan, even if the latter had accepted the idea in principle″^[3]

Even if this review was ignored, the Gupta source does not support your objection. Gupta says quite plainly ″the Indian Prime Minister rejected the plan for limited plebiscite″. It is meaningless whether India accepted the idea of it or not, what matters is that India rejected the plan for limited plebiscite, as stated in the source. The consensus text already has India's grounds for the rejections (″essentially over the means of administering such a plebiscite″) and Dixon's reactions to them, as covered by Gupta.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 06:30, 9 March 2018 (UTC)

NadirAli, read the policies you are citting, in particular WP:CONTEXTMATTERS. It's not what you think it says. So, your argument does not hold any water. —MBL ^talk 16:20, 9 March 2018 (UTC)

Both of you are saying consider the context. I agree. The context says that it is the specific administrative arrangements proposed by Dixon is what is meant by "the plan for limited plebiscite". Other plans were certainly possible. For instance, Loy Henderson proposed various measures of his own to the US State Department . Bajpai pointed out the a paper given to Nehru during the [summit] conference and asked why its provisions would not do . Many variations of the plan for limited plebiscite were possible. The text constructed by KA$HMIR suggests that the whole idea was rejected by Nehru. Completely misleading. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:00, 9 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta (6 December 2012). Jammu and Kashmir. Springer. p. 160. ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6.
[2]
Richard S. Wheeler. “Jammu and Kashmir (Book Review)“ ‘’The Journal of Asian Studies’’, vol. 29, no. 4, 1970, p. 975.
[3]
Richard S. Wheeler. “Jammu and Kashmir (Book Review)“ ‘’The Journal of Asian Studies’’, vol. 29, no. 4, 1970, p. 976.

Your sentences 4-7 are off-topic and you need to remember this is not a forum. WP:CONTEXTMATTERS is for the context of sources not the context of the subject. The objections made are also incoherent, because there is no suggestion in the consensus text of anyone rejecting any idea. The wording from Gupta calls it a rejection of the limited plebiscite plan because of certain administration objections and obviously the consensus text is faithful to that as required by WP:STICKTOSOURCE. India's grounds for rejection are covered and there is nothing more that could be wanting. And because India rejected the plan in the end it cannot be accepted that India ever accepted the idea, according to reviewers of Gupta's book. The reviews are why context matters as reviewers say Gupta was writing according to his national limitations. India's demand to keep its troops in Kashmir during the limited plebiscite was obviously not a good faith objection. Historians have said that Nehru had always wanted to keep Indian troops in Kashmir during a plebiscite to influence the vote.^[1] Dixon also did not think India's rejection of the plan on such a ground was in good faith and he concluded that India would never agree to conditions for a fair plebiscite. So to say that India accepted the idea would introduce POV to the article.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 01:47, 10 March 2018 (UTC)

Don't be so quick to claim "consensus" when you are not even understanding what is "context matters". I don't any forum-y argument above. Also how many historians have said that? Capitals00 (talk) 13:38, 10 March 2018 (UTC)

Bruce Reidel is not a historian. He is a CIA analyst turned a security specialist. He apparently doesn't know that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 said that Pakistan must withdraw all its troops and nationals from the entire state. This was supposed to be complete and unconditional. There was never any such requirement on India. Please stop spreading your canards. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:58, 10 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Bruce Riedel (29 January 2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Brookings Institution Press. pp. 48–50. ISBN 0-8157-2409-8.

Regarding Gupta, it is acceptable up to the point where they don't contradict the other scholars i.e. that India rejected the Dixon plan over XYZ in the end. Stating India was okay with the idea of the plan is shown to be doubtful per Wheeler, as above. The academic consensus for the background of Dixon's plan, and all the other developments between 1947 to 1954 have already been clearly shown from Shankar and Roepstorff's review of Raghavan. No point in flagging a WP:DEADHORSE. Mar4d (talk) 08:06, 10 March 2018 (UTC)

A variety of views can be also observed. It is up to you to prove which argument is undue and which one isn't before claiming the academic consensus which is not really established by cherry picking sources. Capitals00 (talk) 13:38, 10 March 2018 (UTC)

Of course, it contradicts the other scholars, e.g., Snedden says, "Secular India was prepared to countenance this suggestion under certain conditions, chiefly to do with its security forces and administration being in charge of Kashmir while the plebiscite was conducted."^[1] He doesn't say it rejected anything. Raghavan is specific about what Nehru rejected, "He also assured Liaquat that the voting would be fair: in the plebiscite area, government functionaries would be replaced by United Nations appointees. Dixon should have known better; for Nehru had explicitly ruled this out during the discussions on an overall plebiscite. Unsurprisingly, Nehru rejected the idea yet again."^[2] Even Das Gupta meant this, which is clear from the context surrounding his statement. The KA$HMIR text is WP:POV and a distortion of the source. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:54, 10 March 2018 (UTC)

Kautiltya3, you need to strike out your comments like the one regarding Bruce Riedel, because they are BLP violations. The historian has a bachelor and masters in history (and his book received accolades)^[3]. You have been warned about this before. The people you are quoting, as a matter of fact, would have no qualifications in history. Snedden is a political scientist and Srinath Raghavan's MA and PhD was in War Studies, regardless of what Indian sources may call him. Even so, you already know the problems with Raghavan's work from scholarly reviews, that it is a non-traditionalist account and Raghavan has a habit of selecting and omitting facts to suit his biases. Raghavan also hasn't provided any good reason for India wanting to keep its troops in the plebiscite zone. Actually, he has just skipped over mentioning India's objection to the fair demilitarisation scheme at all even though everyone else knows about it. That is not specificity, that is the selection bias in action. Mar4d (talk) 04:57, 11 March 2018 (UTC)

I am not sure why we are discussing Riedel, who does not even mention Dixon's name anywhere. This is an attempt to derail the discussion. I have mentioned above the scholars who do discuss Dixon, and it is clear that they do not support KA$HMIR's text. As for Raghavan being a historian, pretty much every review of his book called it history, including Roepstaff's. There is no comparison between Riedel and Raghavan. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:18, 11 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris 2015, pp. 205–206.
[2]
Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, pp. 188–189.
[3]
Silvestri, F. (2015), Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back by Bruce Riedel. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013. 230pp., £18.99, ISBN 978 0 8157 2408 7. Political Studies Review, 13: 157–158. No one is more qualified than Bruce Riedel to provide a clear and rounded picture of the nature of US foreign policy towards the subcontinent. His long experience as a Central Intelligence Agency analyst and political adviser, and his extensive research on this topic contribute to making this book one of the most accurate and interesting analyses of the tangled relationship between Washington, New Delhi and Islamabad. His book is easily accessible and of interest not only to a niche audience of South Asian scholars, but also to young students who want to have a general overview of American engagement in the subcontinent.

Qualifications, not reviews, make one a historian. Leaving aside that Raghavan has zero qualifications to be a historian (so not a WP:HISTRS), for there are very few qualified historians cited on Kashmir conflict, the authoritative ones being Victoria Schofield, Zutshi, McMahon, the quotes shown are not even contradicting Gupta. Gupta said India rejected the limited plebiscite plan on certain grounds. Everyone agrees on that. There is no contradiction by Snedden and Raghavan up to the point of India's final rejection. Snedden and Raghavan are just going over (selectively in Raghavan's case) India's grounds for rejecting the limited plebiscite in the end. The issue raised in this discussion is whether India accepted the idea or not. Looking at Das Gupta's reviewer Wheeler, India's acceptance cannot be affirmed. One of the few true qualified historians (unlike Raghavan) and authoritative (and very weighty) accounts of the Kashmir conflict, Victoria Schofield, records this: Dixon's commitment in trying to resolve the problem was not lost on the Indians. Patel wrote to Nehru that Dixon was working to bring about an agreement on the question of demilitarisation.. 'If we are not careful, we might land ourselves in difficulties, because once demilitarisation is settled, a plebiscite would be, as it were, round the corner.'^[1] So what we see is that Nehru was afraid that Dixon might actually finally bring the plebiscite into action. That shows a lack of commitment. Now looking at Snedden he does say India would have countenanced the plan had its condition of keeping its security forces (at least Snedden is honest enough to mention this, Raghavan lacks the decency to acknowledge this factor) there been accepted. But then the qualified historian Bruce Riedel points out that India had always wanted to keep its troops in Kashmir during any possible plebiscite to make sure which way the vote goes. So India's objection to the plan because it wanted its troops to stay in the plebiscite area cannot be seen as a good faith reason. Overall, the sources are contradicting on whether India would have actually countenanced the plan, the more authoritative ones are showing India wouldn't have. But what they all agree on is that India rejected the plan on certain grounds in the end. The consensus text has not even discussed the opinions (of which there are many) on whether India accepted the idea or not, it just has the facts of what happened (Indian rejection and its grounds). So all I see is an attempt to slip in some irrelevant and apologetic opinions, mainly from non-WP:HISTRS.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 01:32, 12 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Victoria Schofield (30 May 2010). Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. I.B.Tauris. pp. 101–. ISBN 978-0-85773-078-7.

Nimitz replacement

Until now Kautilya3 has not shown a RS which explicitly contradicts the proposed text, at best it only offers supplementary information, not contradictory. Kautilya3, if you don't stop making baseless objections you will be taken to mediation. Your latest edit defies this ongoing discussion which will decide what will go in these three sections and breaks WP:CONSENSUS and is full of POV problems and quotes WP:CHERRYPICKED to blame Pakistan. KA$HMIR you might want to take a look. Dilpa kaur (talk) 01:45, 10 February 2018 (UTC)

Here is a description in another RS. (Sumit Ganguly)They also reached an informal agreement thay the initial UN appointed plebiscite administrator.Adm Chester W. Nimitz of the United States, would have to be replaced.India had taken the lead in pushing for Nimitz's removal because it had perceived a pro-Pakistani bias on the part of the United States in the Security Council debates. However, when word of this informal agreement became public, an outcry ensued against the Indian position throughout influential sections of the Pakistani pressn Nehru and Bogra, to their mutual credit, nonetheless managed.to limit the damage and placed the negotiations back on track.

So we see a few things. Nimitz was appointed by the UN. India took the lead in getting rid of a UN appointee. Bogra even agreed to getting rid of Nimitz despite the outcry on his country. In light of these facts your edit is not WP:NPOV. Dilpa kaur (talk) 09:57, 10 February 2018 (UTC)

The edit you mention has not touched the Dixon Plan section at all. Please don't mix up issues. It is hard enough already.

The edit added sources, which were amply mentioned in my discussion of the RfC above, and copy-edited the text to remove duplication. There is essentially no change to content of the section. If you want to make any headway here, please try to be as clear and accurate as you can possibly be. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:00, 10 February 2018 (UTC)

Regarding your proposed text, your intention is apparently to convert the section titled Dixon Plan into one on Dixon Mission. That is a violation of the first RfC, which had consensus. In fact, I intend to, change the title of the section to Partition-cum-Plebiscite proposals, which is a potential solution to the Kashmir dispute that has been discussed by various parties, not only Dixon. I will also be expanding it to cover the other discussions. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:06, 10 February 2018 (UTC)

As far as I see, this edit was completely non-neutral and in contravention of the suggestions being discussed above. I am baffled as to how you changed the original text without discussion on the actual reason for stall in proceedings due to Nimitz, and by removing India's non-approval of him. Mar4d (talk) 04:50, 11 February 2018 (UTC)

Mar4d I regard this revert as obstruvtive. It cites WP:NOCON, without actually stating any rationale for the revert. Moreover, it is reversing well-sourced content that too in footnotes, based on sources amply mentioned in the previous discussions already, in particular Gowher Rizvi, an Oxford historian.

RegentsPark, the edit restrictions on this article seem to be becoming a farce. It seems more serious action is necessary to stop this obstructionism. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:55, 11 February 2018 (UTC)

I don't think so Kautilya. Some give will always happen and that's what we're seeing here. Mar4d, I don't see anything wrong with Kautilya's edit summary (the one you're objecting to). The "This" in "this stalled" clearly refers to the Nimitz issue in the previous sentence so the only effect of that edit is on a change to the copy, not the content so your reversion does not make sense. --regentspark (comment) 21:54, 11 February 2018 (UTC)

Well, this is the second time in the last couple of days that Mar4d has done a frivolous revert. His edit summary "AFAIK, there is a section on talk where modifications to this entire section are under discussion, so this disputed content is in complete disregard and violation of that; please note WP:NOCON and WP:BRD" is meaningless to the point of being absurd. The talk page section on "Nehru's plebiscite offer" is totally empty, as everybody can see below. Mar4d is merely shooting for his partisans without even aiming. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:35, 12 February 2018 (UTC)

To editor Regents park:, Dilpa kaur has outlined above why Kautilya3's edits are not WP:NPOV edits. There are other accounts of the Nimitz issue in the reliable sources besides Rizvi. Dk has quoted an account from Ganguly ^[1] which informs us that India took the lead in demanding Nimitz's removal even though Nimitz was a UN appointee. Yet Kautilya3's POV edit lays the blame on Pakistan for stalling the proceedings, even though the Ganguly source tells us the Pakistani PM Bogra agreed to removing Nimitz and brought the negotiations back on track despite the outrage in Pakistan for agreeing to an Indian demand. There needs to be WP:BALANCE. Kautilya3's POV edits are also accompanied with pointless opinionated quotes from Gowher Rizvi which are critical of Pakistan. It should not be forgotten that Kautilya3 had removed relevant (and longstanding) quotes of Sir Owen Dixon about the Dixon plan, which were critical of India, with a frivolous edit summary claiming that the sources cited, Bradnock and Schofield, were 'partisan'. I honestly this is tendentiousness for what it is when senior editors such as me and Mar4d can identify it. I'm not sure ANI is the right place to resolve it either. What should I do about this?--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 03:52, 13 February 2018 (UTC)

There is no contradiction between Rizvi's account and Ganguly's account. Both of them say that Bogra agreed to the replacement of Nimitz during the negotiations and later backtracked, apparently under some form of "outcry" whose nature is not clear. I can cite Ganguly too perfectly well for the same content. What is the supposed WP:NPOV issue, and why was the content reverted for a second time? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:46, 13 February 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Sumit Ganguly (5 January 2002). Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947. Columbia University Press. pp. 24–. ISBN 978-0-231-50740-0.

1950 military standoff

The third and fourth paragraphs of this section are coincidentally alright. The problems are the first two paragraphs. It is not a neutral description. It is only a description of the tensions from an Indian standpoint. No surprise that the source is again the Indian soldier Raghavan. Instead it will be better to use Michael Brecher's The Struggle for Kashmir (119-126) which gives a more neutral account for the same events. So now I have changed it for good measure.

The convening of the Constituent Assembly in Indian Kashmir in July 1950 proved contentious. Pakistan protested to the Security Council which informed India that this development conflicted with the parties' commitments. The National Conference rejected this resolution and Nehru supported this by telling Dr Graham that he would receive no help in implementing the Resolution.^[1] A month later Nehru adopted a more conciliatory attitude, telling a press conference that the Assembly's actions would not affect India's plebiscite commitment. The delay caused frustration in Pakistan and Zafrullah Khan went on to say that Pakistan was not keeping a warlike mentality but did not know what Indian intransigence would lead Pakistan and its people to. India accused Pakistan of ceasefire violations and Nehru complained of 'warmongering propaganda' in Pakistan.^[2] On 15 July 1951 the Pakistani Prime Minister complained that the bulk of the Indian Army was concentrated on the Indo-Pakistan border.^[3]

The prime ministers of the two countries exchanged telegrams accusing each other of bad intentions. Liaquat Ali Khan rejected Nehru's charge of warmongering propaganda. Khan called it a distortion of the Pakistani press' discontent with India over its persistence in not holding a plebiscite and a misrepresentation of the desire to liberate Kashmir as an anti-Indian war. Khan also accused India of raising its defence budget in the past two years, a charge which Nehru rejected while expressing surprise at Khan's dismissal of the 'virulent' anti-Indian propaganda. Khan and Nehru also disagreed on the details of the no-war declarations. Khan then submitted a peace plan calling for a withdrawal of troops, settlement in Kashmir by plebiscite, renouncing the use of force, end to war propaganda and the signing of a no-war pact.^[4] Nehru did not accept the second and third components of this peace plan. The peace plan failed. While an opposition leader in Pakistan did call for war, leaders in both India and Pakistan did urge calm to avert disaster.^[5]

The Commonwealth had taken up the Kashmir issue in January 1951. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies suggested that a Commonwealth force be stationed in Kashmir; that a joint Indo-Pakistani force be stationed in Kashmir and the plebiscite administrator be entitled to raise local troops while the plebiscite would be held. Pakistan accepted these proposals but India rejected them because it did not want Pakistan, who was in India's eyes the 'aggressor', to have an equal footing. The UN Security Council called on India and Pakistan to honour the resolutions of plebiscite both had accepted in 1948 and 1949. The United States and Britain proposed that if the two could not reach an agreement then arbitration would be considered. Pakistan agreed but Nehru said he would not allow a third person to decide the fate of four million people. Korbel criticised India's stance towards a ″valid″ and ″recommended technique of international co-operation.″^[6]
However, the peace was short-lived. Later by 1953, Sheikh Abdullah, who was by then in favour of resolving Kashmir by a plebiscite, an idea which was "anametha" to the Indian government according to scholar Zutshi,^[7] fell out with the Indian government. He was dismissed and imprisoned in August 1953. His former deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was appointed as the prime minister, and Indian security forces were deployed in the Valley to control the streets.^[8]^[9]

There is no need in a section about Indo-Pakistan conflict to write about land reforms, such things can go down in internal history. Its source Raghavan was just writing an apologetic narrative for India. We want neutrality. KA$HMIR (talk) 05:24, 23 February 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Michael Brecher (1953). The Struggle for Kashmir. Oxford University Press. p. 119.
[2]
Michael Brecher (1953). The Struggle for Kashmir. Oxford University Press. p. 120.
[3]
Michael Brecher (1953). The Struggle for Kashmir. Oxford University Press. p. 121.
[4]
Michael Brecher (1953). The Struggle for Kashmir. Oxford University Press. p. 122.
[5]
Michael Brecher (1953). The Struggle for Kashmir. Oxford University Press. p. 123.
[6]
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict 2003, p. 83-86.
[7]
Zutshi, Languages of Belonging 2004, p. 321.
[8]
Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, p. 225.
[9]
Shankar, Nehru's Legacy in Kashmir 2016, pp. 6–7.

Review of the revision: 1950 military standoff

Here is the old and the new text side by side: the old text in purple and the new text in red. (I have omitted the text relating to Commonwealth mediation, which was unchanged.)

In July 1950, Sheikh Abdullah sought to introduce far-reaching land reforms, but the Prince Regent Karan Singh insisted that they had to be carried out by a Legislative Assembly. Abdullah then proposed electing a Constituent Assembly, which was approved in April 1951. Abdullah wanted the Constituent Assembly to decide the State's accession. But this was not agreed to by the Prime Minister of India, as it would represent "underhand dealing" while the matter was being decided by the UN.^[1]

The convening of the Constituent Assembly in Indian Kashmir in July 1950 proved contentious. Pakistan protested to the Security Council which informed India that this development conflicted with the parties' commitments. The National Conference rejected this resolution and Nehru supported this by telling Dr Graham that he would receive no help in implementing the Resolution.^[2] A month later Nehru adopted a more conciliatory attitude, telling a press conference that the Assembly's actions would not affect India's plebiscite commitment.^[3]

Around this time, the Korean War broke out and the West grew anxious about defending the Middle East from possible communist attacks. They sought Pakistani help but were aware that Pakistan desired guarantees of security against an Indian attack. The international scene was in a flux.^[1]

Towards the end of 1950, sections of Pakistani leaders grew impatient about the lack of progress in the UN, and raised a hue and cry. The Prime Minister of North-West Frontier Province promised a jihad by the Pashtun population of Pakistan. The governor of Punjab declared that the "whole of Asia would be engulfed in a war". The calls for a holy war reverberated through the Pakistani society.^[4] The delay caused frustration in Pakistan and Zafrullah Khan went on to say that Pakistan was not keeping a warlike mentality but did not know what Indian intransigence would lead Pakistan and its people to. India accused Pakistan of ceasefire violations and Nehru complained of 'warmongering propaganda' in Pakistan.^[3]

India grew anxious and raised the issue with the western powers. Receiving no response, following a rash of violent incidents in Kashmir Valley in June 1951 and reports of Pakistani troop movements, India decided to move its troops to the border. According to Nehru, "our lack of proper defenses on our frontiers would itself be an invitation to attack." A military stand-off ensued, lasting from mid-July 1951 till the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951. India resisted pressures from western powers for standing down, claiming that the troop deployment was a necessary deterrent. Meanwhile, the elections to the Constituent Assembly passed off peacefully, the Assembly convening on 31 October.^[4] On 15 July 1951 the Pakistani Prime Minister complained that the bulk of the Indian Army was concentrated on the Indo-Pakistan border.^[5]

The prime ministers of the two countries exchanged telegrams accusing each other of bad intentions. Liaquat Ali Khan rejected Nehru's charge of warmongering propaganda. Khan called it a distortion of the Pakistani press' discontent with India over its persistence in not holding a plebiscite and a misrepresentation of the desire to liberate Kashmir as an anti-Indian war. Khan also accused India of raising its defence budget in the past two years, a charge which Nehru rejected while expressing surprise at Khan's dismissal of the 'virulent' anti-Indian propaganda. Khan and Nehru also disagreed on the details of the no-war declarations. Khan then submitted a peace plan calling for a withdrawal of troops, settlement in Kashmir by plebiscite, renouncing the use of force, end to war propaganda and the signing of a no-war pact.^[6] Nehru did not accept the second and third components of this peace plan. The peace plan failed. While an opposition leader in Pakistan did call for war, leaders in both India and Pakistan did urge calm to avert disaster.^[7]

References

[1]
Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, pp. 190–191.
[2]
Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, p. 119.
[3]
Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, p. 120.
[4]
Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, pp. 191–217.
[5]
Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, p. 121.
[6]
Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, p. 122.
[7]
Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, p. 123.

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:41, 11 March 2018 (UTC)

Comments and questions

The sequence of events for the Constituent Assembly election has been deleted, claiming that it is irrelevant to the India-Pakistan conflict. I don't buy this, because Pakistan's contention seems to be that the Indian Government was convening the Constituent Assembly whereas it was the Kashmir Government that was convening it. This fact cannot be omitted.
Dr. Graham issue has no place in this section, as per RfC. Neither do I see how a rejection of support to Dr. Graham says anything about the Constituent Assembly.
A month later Nehru adopted a more conciliatory attitude. Not a "month". Check the source. Secondly, India assured all the parties in the Security Council itself that the Constituent Assembly would not affect India's commitments. Das Gupta says, "The Security Council, in its turn, passed a resolution on 30 March 1951 refusing to accept the verdict of the Constituent Assembly if it should ever contemplate ratification of Kashmir's accession to India.[4: S/P.V. 539, 30 March 1951] India reassured all, however, that the decision of the Constituent Assembly would not stand in the way of India's commitments in regard to Kashmir.^[1]^[2] Raghavan says matter-of-factly "Meantime, the idea of a constituent assembly ceased to be an alternative to a plebiscite."^[3] So Nehru wasn't saying something new and "conciliatory" on 11 June. He was merely reiterating what has already been said.
Korean war fall out deleted without explanation. The fact that the western powers were seeking Pakistan's participation in middle east defence is important and cannot be omitted.
Discussion of jihadist and war-mongering propaganda deleted without explanation. This is amply corroborated in Brecher too, e.g., "All parties and almost all newspapers supported the Jehad campaign, the difference being only one of degree and tone"^[4] Das Gupta too refers to "the sustained campaign of jehad there and Pakistan's staged military precautions"^[5]
New text added: "The delay caused frustration". What delay?
Zafrullah Khan's statement is WP:UNDUE because it is contradicted by scholars, who say there was warlike mentality amply evidenced.
Text deleted: "India grew anxious" etc. Why was it deleted?
Text added: "On 15 July 1951 the Pakistani Prime Minister complained". No need to attribute it to the Pakistani Prime Minister. Scholars have that the Indian Army was moved to the border. So, did the original text. WP:NPOV says, do not state facts as opinions.
Loads of new text added regarding exchange of telegrams, the purpose of which seems to be to advertise the so-called "peace plan" of Pakistani Prime Minister. This is Goebbelsian. Nehru asked for a no-war pact, and Liaquat's response was to place three conditions for the no-war pact and dress it up as a "peace plan". Brecher's assessment that Nehru's rejection of the conditions was "not unexpected" and that these issues "had been the subject of correspondence between the two Prime Ministers for almost eighteen months without mutual satisfaction" (p.123) have been omitted. Even more importantly, "It would seem that any no-war declaration signed by Pakistan would not be applicable to Kashmir" (also p.123). This too has been omitted. This is a blatant misrepresentation of the source. All chance of neutrality has been thrown to the wind!
While an opposition leader in Pakistan did call for war. No, this is WP:CHERRYPICKED. "All parties and almost all newspapers engaged in jehad campaign" according to the source (p.125). Leaders in both India and Pakistan did urge calm to avert disaster. This is not in the source.

On the whole, this revision replaced the entire text of the old version, but it suffers from serious WP:V and WP:NPOV problems. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:49, 11 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir 2012, p. 185-186.
[2]
S/P.V. 538, 29 March 1951 : India's representative Sir B.N. Rau: "The constituent assembly cannot be physically prevented from expressing its opinion on this question if it so chooses. But this opinion will not bind my Government or prejudice the position of this Council."
[3]
Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, p. 189.
[4]
Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir 1953, p. 125.
[5]
Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir 2012, p. 170.

I don't see these as reasonable, policy based rejections. Brecher records that Nehru supported the resolution of the Constituent Assembly against the UN resolution concerning it. Brecher says this attitude was shown with his statements that he made to Graham. The RfC in case you may not remember was about whether or not to have a detailed coverage of the UN mediation (Frank Graham's mediation). I don't see any coverage of UN mediation here. Its just shows Nehru's attitude to the Constituent Assembly, which was a violation of India's commitments according to the UN, which he conveyed to Graham. Gupta does not give a date for when Nehru's later conciliatory attitude arrived, so there's no contradiction as far as 'month' is concerned.

I have read Brecher's version of the 'war-mongering propaganda' and I am afraid you are dropping page numbers out of chronological order which is not helpful. Citing Gupta for the so-called 'war-mongering propaganda' is also pointless here because reviewers say he wrote according to his national limitations.

Brecher begins on page 119 with the contentious Constituent Assembly whose resolution against the UN resolution Nehru supported. Then Nehru apparently softened his stance. On page 120 Brecher documents the frustration all this caused in Pakistan. Zafarullah Khan's June statement, one of several official statements expressing this frustration, is not contradicted by these unnamed scholars you claim charge Pakistani media of war-mongering propaganda because Zafarullah is implying (by ″we do not know what India might forces us or the people of Pakistan into by its intransigence″) that any possible future war-mongering in Pakistan would be because of Indian intransigence regarding the Kashmir dispute. So the cause of any such propaganda, if it happened, is important. These causes are documented by Brecher in pages 119 and 120.

Zafarullah suggesting that Pakistan was not thinking in terms of war came before the Indian accusations of warmongering. So if there really are any historians who explicitly endorse those Indian allegations it is still very flimsy to cite them for the claim that Zafarullah's statement is WP:UNDUE because the timeline renders them unrelated.

Brecher writes on page 120 that Nehru accused Pakistani media in July of warmongering propaganda and massed troops on the frontiers. Pakistan also charged India with raising its defence budget and countered Indian allegations of warmongering propaganda by explaining ″You have been at aims to distort the significance of expressions of discontent which have appeared in the Pakistani press over your persistent refusal to allow a peaceful solution through a free plebiscite in Kashmir. You have construed the expression of of the natural desire for the liberation of Kashmir as propaganda for war against India.″ After that Nehru wanted a no strings attached peace plan. Pakistan also offered a peace plan but with the condition that Kashmir be resolved by plebiscite. Nehru rejected this part of the peace plan which once again shows India's lack of commitment to plebiscite, the theme of all our discussions. Th peace plan also had troops withdrawal and an agreement of no-war propaganda. India did not agree to the peace plan. Had it did it would not have to complain about the Pakistani media again. After all this page 125 of Brecher says that all political parties and newspapers in Pakistan supported the Jehad campaign (this India could have averted had it accepted Liaquat Ali Khan's peace plan which incorporated a no-war propaganda guarantee). And this propaganda, if it happened, is not a big deal because Liaquat Ali Khan explained that such emotion was an expression of discontent at India's filibustering. The few WP:RS who do make allegations of war mongering propaganda only accuse the Pakistani press and sections of the Pakistani leadership, not at the Pakistani state as a whole (for that you would need an explicit WP:RS. The same is not true of India's movement of troops to the border, which was a state action, which is why Liaquat Ali Khan's complaint and its inclusion is reasonable.

You should also keep in mind that reviewers have noticed some very ready partiality towards India from Brecher so he also needs to be taken with pinches of salt.^[1]--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 02:02, 12 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Spear, Percival. Pacific Affairs 27, no. 4 (1954): 384. ″Again he seems rather too easily to accept the Indian arguments both for accession by legal instrument in Kashmir and by popular vote in Junagadh, and does not strengthen his case by quoting Mr. Campbell Johnson, who would be regarded in Pakistan as highly interested and prejudiced, in support.″

I find upon further reading that KA$HMIR has not mentioned the war hysteria against Pakistan in India. After the Delhi Agreement there were 27 violations Pakistan had to report of instances where influential Indian newspapers were inciting war against Pakistan. India only reported 8 violations from Pakistan's side. When Pakistan complained about the Indian propaganda the Indian government plea was that it couldn't do anything about its press' warmongering because of limited constitutional scope. Pakistan had to point out that India should not have undertaken an international obligation it could not keep.^[1] This is all documented in an academic source passed through peer reviews as amply evidenced^[2]^[3] and scholarly with one exception (coverage of the 1965 war).^[4]^[5] Korbel also mentions India's war hysteria. It turns out Brecher's partiality towards India is deeper than we knew.

The peace plan of the Pakistani Prime Minister turns out to be a well-documented and sincere proposal.^[6] Nehru's rejection of it was responsible for the continuation of the problems.^[7] In light of all this I think KA$HMIR's work could have done with these important details.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 07:03, 12 March 2018 (UTC)

I have added the page number for Brecher's discussion of jehad propaganda. (p.125) You would have known it of course, since you have read the entire discussion in Brecher and summarised it accurately. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:38, 12 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Golam Wahed Choudhury (1971). Pakistan's relations with India. Meenakshi Prakashan. pp. 174–175.
[2]
Palmer, N. (1969). Pacific Affairs, 42(1), 113-115. ″This study is fullest and most satisfactory in dealing with the historical background, the circumstances of partition, and the first decade of Indo-Pakistan relations.″
[3]
Wilcox, W. (1969). The Journal of Politics, 31(3), 833-836.″Choudhury's book is a well written defense lawyer's brief, setting his client's actions in the most favorable light and marshalling considerable evidence to sway the jury.″
[4]
Palmer, N. (1969). Pacific Affairs, 42(1), 113-115. ″While the author's pro-Pakistan bias is understandably evident throughout the study, it descends from the level of scholarly analysis only in the treatment of the September 1965 war between India and Pakistan.″
[5]
Wilcox, W. (1969). The Journal of Politics, 31(3), 833-836. ″The book, however, was written at Cambridge and its restrained tone reflects some detachment.″
[6]
Golam Wahed Choudhury (1971). Pakistan's relations with India. Meenakshi Prakashan. p. 173. Liaquat's offer was sincere and honest: it was not fair to call it 'conditional'.
[7]
Golam Wahed Choudhury (1971). Pakistan's relations with India. Meenakshi Prakashan. p. 173. Nehru's rejection of the five-point peace plan kept alive the explosive situation in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent

Kautilya3's unverified claim which he believes in with such certainty because it is contradicted by scholars, who say there was warlike mentality amply evidenced, needs corroboration from multiple reliable sources and independent historians. If there are sources which ostensibly support this claim they need a hard examination of their context and wording. For all we know any such source might just be describing the Indian interpretation or reaction to talk of jihad in certain Pakistani circles or might have more nuanced descriptions than claimed or there might be deeper issues because there was confirmed/known war hysteria from India against Pakistan after April 1950. Brecher's quote of Liaquat Ali Khan's rebuttal to Nehru demonstrates that India misconstrued or misrepresented the usual daily talk of liberation of Kashmir and frustration with Indian intransigence as ″warlike propaganda.″ Simplistic brandings of complex subjects such as jihad will not cut it.—TripWire^{________ʞlɐʇ} 12:47, 12 March 2018 (UTC)

Can you tell how many sources have you actually looked into? At least those that are already mentioned above. Read WP:RS properly. What has really convinced you to not to use Raghavan as a source? Capitals00 (talk) 13:24, 13 March 2018 (UTC)

To editor KA$HMIR: If you read the well-evidenced G W Choudhury (cited by 98) against the less weighty Srinath Raghavan (cited by 87) and Das Gupta (cited by 27) you will learn a number of important things. First there was warmongering propaganda against Pakistan in India from the Indian press, political parties and prominent leaders. The propaganda from the Indian side was to undo partition and eliminate Pakistan as a whole. Gupta and Raghavan do not say anything about this because of their selection bias known to reviewers. If there was talk of jihad in Pakistan, it was limited to liberating the Muslims of the disputed territory of Kashmir and not a call for war against the entire of India. This is documented on page 166 of G W Choudhury. That Brecher did not document these is explained by the reviewers who report him to be more partial to India.^[1]

Choudhury documents that India justified massing its troops on the Pakistani border on two grounds. That there had been frontier incidents, even though the United Nations Observer said the blame was on both sides. India's second ground was that Pakistan had allegedly infiltrated it's agents into Kashmir, but for that India provided no proof.

G W Choudhury also documents on pages 165 and 168 that Pakistan did not move any troops to the border to confront the larger concentration of Indian troops until 15 July. In short, India's massing of troops on the border was an aggression on her part and reflected the warmongering of the Indian nation which had not reconciled itself to the creation of Pakistan.

G W Choudhury reports on page 172 that when Nehru refused Liaquat Ali Khan's peace plan proposal Nehru said that while India wanted to avoid war with Pakistan it would still not withdraw its troops from the Pakistani border. This was to be even if Pakistan was to withdraw its troops. (This is open aggresiveness.) Then Liaquat Ali Khan invited Nehru to discuss any part of the peace plan he wanted but then Nehru refused and called it conditional, which Choudhury reports it was not.

Choudhury explains on page 174 that India kept its troops on the Pakistani border while claiming it had no intention to attack just so that Pakistan could be kept overawed and busy so that the Kashmir constituent assembly could do its formal vote to join India. This was the purpose of the whole drama.

I think you have attached too much importance to the pro-Indian scholar Michael Brecher when we have another scholarly account giving us a more transparent picture with evidence. I see that WP:BALANCE in this specific section needs improvement.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 23:54, 13 March 2018 (UTC)

I am afraid your bean-counting approach to measuring citations serves no useful purpose. Golam Wahed Khan's book was published in 1968. Over years, citations accumulate. In the first ten years of its existence, GW Khan's book had 11 citations . In comparison, Raghavan's book has had 87 citations in eight years. If you want to count beans, you should at least count them properly.

You have yourself pointed out Wayne Wilcox's characterisation of this book as a "defense lawyer's brief". He also clubs it with a B.L.Sharma's book which is similarly partisan. He also states: "Only the wary scholar will be able to learn much that is new from these protagonists' proceedings." I wonder if we Wikipedians can be expected to be such "wary scholars".

In any case, I note that GW Khan does admit: "No doubt, there had been talk of Jehad or liberation of the Muslim poulation of Kashmir in Pakistan, but there has never been any political movement or agitation in Pakistan which wished to annex any part of India.." Stripping out the defense lawyer tactics, we notice that he does admit to the jihadist talk. However, he does not examine where and when this came from and what it represented, as an objective scholar might be expected to do. He is dismissive. Let us look at it:

The prime minister of the NWFP claimed that "the day we become desperate and lose all hope of a just solution to the problem, not only the entire Pathan population of Pakistan and tribal areas will rise up for holy jehad in Kashmir but our brothers from across the Afghan frontier will also throw in their lot with us for the cause."[11: Pakistan Times, 27 December 1950]^[2]

Two points are worth noting: the date, 27 December 1950, full six months before India moved troops to the border, and the man, the prime minister of the NWFP, the same man who launched the 1947 jehad against Kashmir, only three years prior. Do these facts make any impact on GW Khan's treatment of the issue? No.

I don't suppose we need to bother about this source any further. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 07:27, 15 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Spear, Percival. Pacific Affairs 27, no. 4 (1954): 384. ″In the long discussions on the conditions for the plebiscite in Kashmir there would seem to be a certain readiness to accept Indian reasons for rejecting each proposal as brought forward, and to underrate the significance of the Pakistani acceptance of the arbitration proposals.″
[2]
Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India 2010, p. 191.

Ultimately scholars cares for number, not rate, of cites from the citation index. Had Raghavan's methodology not been considered so partisan by the reviewers we might have reconsidered when and if his cites beat Choudhury in the future. Palmer Norman characterises Choudhury's book in the same league with Das Gupta, although we will have to give more WP:WEIGHT per current citation indexes to Choudhury than Gupta. Contrary to your comment, Wilcox does not put Choudhury in the same partisan boat as Sharma. He says quite the opposite.^[1]^[2] Its also no good to jump on ″defense lawyer's brief″ without reading the more special words right after ″marshalling considerable evidence to sway the jury″. With reviews pointing very favourably to his historical research and evidence, there is now no disposing of Choudhury's historical analysis. Srinath Raghavan, who lacks ″theoretical reflection″ and ″fails to theorise the findings accordingly″, cannot hope to have his selective methodology-based book compared with the historical work of Choudhury which is based on considerable evidence and research.

On the content discussion, G.W. Choudhury's apprises us that the jehad talk in Pakistan was relatively mild compared to the warmongering in India. This nullifies the old discarded-by-consensus version which tried to justify Indian military presence on Pakistani borders by painting Pakistan as the provocateur. The quote from the Pakistan Times, manipulated by Raghavan whose methodology is known for its selective bias, will not help you, because talk of war came from both sides, but was much worse from India's. The two countries had agreed in the April 1950 Delhi Agreement there would be no war propaganda. But it still continued in 1950 from India's side at more than thrice the rate in Pakistan.^[3] India refused to take action against its press. India's political parties and prominent leaders were also actively begging the fantasy of nullifying partition by war^[4] (which Pakistan has been constantly threatened with by the militarily larger India since 1947).^[5] Brecher, called out by scholars for his pro-Indian tendencies, has ignored the more noteworthy Indian warmongering. So KA$HMIR (talk · contribs) has given WP:UNDUE focus to the lolly-size jehad talk in Pakistan.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 04:27, 16 March 2018 (UTC)

Your citations to Choudhury are falling flat because they take us to a Google Books edition (a nonstandard one) that doesn't have a preview. You need to give us quotes for us to make any sense. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:17, 16 March 2018 (UTC)

Some points based on the provided sources: India's stated reasons for amassing troops on the Indo-Pakistani border were (1) ceasefire violations, for which both sides were to blame according to the UN observer, and (2) its allegation that Pakistani agents were in Kashmir, a charge India never provided any evidence for. Rewriting history is not our job. I am afraid that the WP:CONTEXT matters. Since Indian media and politicians were demanding an invasion of Pakistan and a reversal of partition, it would be WP:PROPAGANDA to make it seem India stationed her troops on the border to counter imaginary threats from Pakistan, whose interest was confined to liberating Kashmir. The reliable scholarly reference Pakistan's Relations With India: 1947-1966 (which is praised for its research base and evidence, thus being far superior to Raghavan's War and Peace in Modern India, whose evidence is known to have been drawn selectively as explained in detail per above), gives witness to that most of the warmongering, threats and aggression came from India, not Pakistan.^[6]^[7]^[8] I am afraid history cannot be changed. Regards, Mar4d (talk) 06:27, 17 March 2018 (UTC)

The source, Pakistan's relations with India by Golam Wahed Choudhury appears to be a snippet to me as well and I don't think that these sources or quotations unequivocally lend support to your above statements. One part of this Choudhury's book which reads, "but there has never been any political movement or agitation in Pakistan which wished to annex any part of India," seems to be WP:RGW. Capitals00 (talk) 09:11, 18 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Wilcox, Wayne. "Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966 (Book Review)". The Journal of Politics. 31 (3): 883-886. These two recent studies..are not comparable.
[2]
Wilcox, Wayne. "Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966 (Book Review)". The Journal of Politics. 31 (3): 883-886. The most salient issues between India and Pakistan are set in vivid relief and the historical research alone should justify the wide acquisition of this book [by Choudhury]. Mr Sharma's book requires a more patient reading The general tone of the book [by Sharma] is propagandist.″
[3]
Golam Wahed Choudhury (1971). Pakistan's relations with India. Meenakshi Prakashan. p. 175.
[4]
Golam Wahed Choudhury (1971). Pakistan's relations with India. Meenakshi Prakashan. p. 165.
[5]
Golam Wahed Choudhury (1971). Pakistan's relations with India. Meenakshi Prakashan. p. 166.
[6]
Choudhury, Golam (1968). Pakistan's Relations with India: 1947-1966. Praeger. p. 178. Indian leaders...continued to express the hope that partition would ultimately be undone; in particular they envisaged the possibility of annexing East Pakistan. Pakistan's resentment...was confined to a disputed area...when as a result of Indian intransigence the prospects of a peaceful solution of the Kashmir issue seemed bleak, there were outbursts of anti-Indian feelings in Pakistan...Alleged talk of 'holy war' or Jehad referred to the disputed territory of Kashmir. But in India, leaders, press and even scholars had no hesitation in expressing the hope of undoing the partition and thus annihilating Pakistan.
[7]
Choudhury, Golam (1968). Pakistan's Relations with India: 1947-1966. Praeger. p. 175. Most of those quotations related to the period after the signing of the Liaquat-Nehru Agreement of April 8, 1950 under which India and Pakistan undertook not to permit propaganda in either country...seeking to incite war between the two countries. The government of Pakistan initiated twenty-seven complaints of flagrant violation of the Agreement by a number of influential Indian newspapers, but no effective action was taken by the Indian government, the plea being that its scope for action was limited by the India constitution. The Pakistan government pointed out that, if this were the position, the government of India should not have undertaken an international obligations which it was not in a position to carry out. The government of India made only eight complaints about alleged violation of the Agreement.
[8]
Choudhury, Golam (1968). Pakistan's Relations with India: 1947-1966. Praeger. p. 166. Liaquat drew attention to the continuous and blatant propaganda for war against Pakistan, and indeed for the very liquidation of Pakistan, carried on by the Indian press, prominent leaders and political parties which openly adopted as an article of creed the undoing of partition.- which meant nothing but liquidation of Pakistan. No doubt there had been talk of Jehad or liberation of the Muslim population of Kashmir in Pakistan but...Pakistan's grievances have always been confined to Kashmir which...is a disputed territory. It was wrong to construe expressions giving vent to feelings of frustration over the failure of peaceful methods of solution in Kashmir as a desire for war against India. But, in India, the creation of Pakistan itself is still regarded as a tragic mistake which ought to be corrected.

Nehru's plebiscite offer

Soon after the election of Bogra as Prime Minister in Pakistan he met Nehru in London. A second meeting followed in Delhi in the backdrop of unrest in Kashmir following Sheikh Abdullah's arrest. The two sides agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. ^[1] Scholar Noorani says the agreement Nehru reached with Bogra was only an act to quench the Kashmiri unrest^[2] although Raghavan disagrees.^[3]

They also agreed informally to not retain the UN-appointed plebiscite administrator Nimitz because India felt a pro-Pakistan bias on America's part. An outcry in Pakistan's press against agreeing to India's demand was ignored by both Bogra and Nehru who kept the negotiations on track.^[4]

The USA in February 1954 announced that it wanted to provide military aid to Pakistan. The USA signed a military pact with Pakistan in May by which Pakistan would receive military equipment and training. The US President tried to alleviate India's concerns by offering similar weaponry to India. This was an unsuccessful attempt. Nehru's misgivings about the US-Pakistan pact made him hostile to a plebiscite.^[5] Consequently, when the pact was concluded in May 1954, Nehru withdrew the plebiscite offer and declared that the status quo was the only remaining option.^[6]

Nehru's withdrawal from the plebiscite option came a major blow to all concerned.^[7] Scholars have suggested that India was never seriously intent on holding a plebiscite, and the withdrawal came to signify a vindication of their belief.^[8]^[12]
Indian writer Nirad C. Chaudhuri has observed that Pakistan's acceptance of Western support ensured its survival.^[13] He believed that India intended to invade Pakistan twice or thrice during the period 1947–1954. For scholar Wayne Wilcox, Pakistan was able to find external support to counter "Hindu superiority", returning to the group security position of the early 20th century.^[14]

I will say here that the last paragraph is actually longstanding content deleted it in November under a misleading edit summary even though that content was never contested during the content dispute in November. It was a convenient deletion. I have also removed Shankar because his WP:WEIGHT is nowhere compared to the rest of the scholars, by his own admission. KA$HMIR (talk) 05:26, 23 February 2018 (UTC)

Thank goodness you're here! I was beginning to worry. I have been waiting for you on the sidelines to come and assist in developing this page to a Class A standard and have been popping in and out just to keep an eye on this page muddied by the POV pushers. About your version I like it and think it has achieved the WP:NPOV Wikipedia articles need. There is likely to be a moaning from the POV pushers, but that can be solved at WP:DRN if need be. Again welcome back!! Dilpa kaur (talk) 09:59, 23 February 2018 (UTC)

Yes indeed KA$HMIR. Excellent work. I see you have taken care of all Wikipedia policies including WP:DUE and WP:WEIGHT. You have represented the WP:RS With a WP:BALANCE and treated both India and Pakistan fairly as the WP:INDEPENDENT WP:RS do. But I do think we can do with even less of Raghavan and Shankar. There are grammar issues too but those can be fixed. There is also an ongoing discussion at WP:DRN about one sentence under the 'plebiscite offer' section but the solution for that can be included later. I will be adding your version to the mainspace soon. I don't believe any neutral user would oppose your neutral text but in case any POV minded person does decide to throw a muck under some excuse or the other that can be solved, as Dilpa says, in a fresh case at WP:DRN or mediation.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 05:13, 24 February 2018 (UTC)

There was some content that needed to be checked for neutrality, keeping in mind representation of various WP:RS adequately concerning this issue. It's been raised previously. A good start would be the section labeling of Nehru's plebiscite offer, and we can hopefully take things forward from there. The "offer" of plebiscite for instance was an incentive to prevent the local uprising and get the UN out of the way, or else the Kashmiris would have turned to popular agitation. Some sources regarding this are attached.^[15]^[16] That being said, the rest is better. Cheers, Mar4d (talk) 09:23, 24 February 2018 (UTC)

KA$HMIR's alternative texts are WP:NPOV and give a neutral and fair description of all sides in the conflict, and represent the various WP:RS adequately. The content is flawless and everything's WP:DUE and nicely flows. I also agree with Mar4d that the third section needs re-labelling.—TripWire ︢ ︢ ︡ ︢ ︡ ︢ ︡ ︢ ︡ ︡ ︢ ︡ ^ʞlɐʇ 09:56, 24 February 2018 (UTC)

My dear Mar4d, a number of SWJN volumes are available on archive.org. You don't need to play hide-and-seek with Google Books snippets. I suggest you download the relevant volumes and read them. Perhaps start with volume 22, p.203, the first letter cited by Mahesh Shankar. You will be much enlightened. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:27, 26 February 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Sumit Ganguly (5 January 2002). Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947. Columbia University Press. pp. 24–. ISBN 978-0-231-50740-0.
[2]
A.G Noorani, Kashmir: Bridge, not a Battle Ground, Frontline 23, no.6 (30 December 2006)
[3]
Srinath Raghavan (27 August 2010). War and Peace in Modern India. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 125. ISBN 978-0-230-24215-9.
[4]
Sumit Ganguly (5 January 2002). Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947. Columbia University Press. pp. 25–. ISBN 978-0-231-50740-0.
[5]
Sumit Ganguly (5 January 2002). Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947. Columbia University Press. pp. 25–. ISBN 978-0-231-50740-0.
[6]
Shankar, Nehru's Legacy in Kashmir 2016, pp. 12–13.
[7]
Shankar, Nehru's Legacy in Kashmir 2016, p. 12.
[8]
Shankar, Nehru's Legacy in Kashmir 2016, p. 6.
[9]
Noorani, A. G. (1996), "Partition of Kashmir (Book review of Pauline Dawson, The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The UN MIlitary Observer Group in India)", Economic and Political Weekly, 32 (5): 271–273, JSTOR 4403745
[10]
Crocker, Walter (20 November 2011), Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate, Random House India, pp. 48–, ISBN 978-81-8400-213-3
[11]
Zachariah, Benjamin (2004), Nehru, Routledge, p. 180, ISBN 978-1-134-57740-8
[12]
A. G. Noorani wondered whether India "seriously contemplated" plebiscite even in 1948.^[9] Australian diplomat Walter Crocker believed that Nehru was never seriously intent on holding a plebiscite and was determined to get out of it.^[10] Scholar Benjamin Zachariah states that Nehru abandoned the idea of plebiscite by late 1948, but supported it in public till 1954.^[11]
[13]
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict 2003, pp. 85, 257.
[14]
Wilcox, Wayne (1968). "China's strategic alternatives in South Asia". In Bingdi He; Tang Tsou (eds.). China in Crisis, Volume 2: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives. University of Chicago Press. pp. 397–398. ISBN 978-0-226-81519-0.
[15]
Jawaharlal Nehru. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second series, Vol.23 (1 July 1953-30 September 1953). p. 347. [To Karan Singh, 21 August 1953]: Recent events in Kashmir have had a very powerful reaction in other countries. This is against us completely. I am not referring to Pakistan which has grown madly hysterical. If this hysteria continued, it would inevitably produce reactions in Kashmir among the pro-Pakistani elements and their sympathisers. The result would be no period of quiet at all and constant trouble. But for some kind of an agreement between us and Pakistan, the matter would inevitably have been raised in the U.N. [United Nations] immediately and they might well have sent down their representative to Kashmir. All this again would have kept the agitation alive and made it grow. In the circumstances, this is a good statement and helps us in trying to get a quieter atmosphere
[16]
Altaf Gauhar (24 October 1996). Ayub Khan: Pakistan's first military ruler. Oxford University Press. p. 265. ISBN 978-0-19-577647-8. [Quoting Sheikh Abdullah] The State was then in the grip of a popular agitation and a little pressure from Pakistan would have helped the resistance movement, but Pakistani Prime Minister, Bogra, decided to fly to New Delhi and embrace Nehru as his `Big Brother', little realising that the Indians were in a particularly vulnerable position at that time and needed to come to a show of understanding with Pakistan to demoralise the Kashmiris. Pakistan fell into that trap.

Indian intransigence would be a good title. Or a longer title of Nehru-Bogra talks and US-Pakistan military pact. But the former would be better because the pact was just an excuse used by Nehru. It should be added into the new version that the US-Pakistan military pact was actually a splendid excuse for Nehru to go back on his agreement with Bogra. We should also add that Bogra pointed out that India's military spending was three times of Pakistan's and the Pakistanis had the right to be uneasy when our army was rapidly growing. Many of my Indian countrymen even today feel excruciating heartburn at the partition of their beloved Bharat Mata and secretly want it undone. In those days the desire was very public. So Pakistan had good reason to be afraid and boost its military strength. It had nothing to do with Kashmir.^[1]

References

[1]
Golam Wahed Choudhury (1971). Pakistan's relations with India. Meenakshi Prakashan. In May 1954, the news of American military aid to Pakistan was published, which gave Pandit Nehru a splendid excuse to go back on his commitments to hold a free vote in Kashmir. So far, India's inability to hold the plebiscite had been a disagreement over demililtarisation now began the second excuse : Pakistan's new military strength. It was in vain that Mohammed Ali (Bogra) pointed out that India was spending three times as much as Pakistan on its armed forces. Knowing that powerful sections of the Indian public made no secret of their resolve to annul the partition of the subcontinent by force, Pakistan had cause for uneasiness at the rapidity with which India was arming herself. If either country staged a military comeback in in Kashmir after demilitarisation, Mohammad Ali wrote, war might engulf the entore subcontinent, and therefore it did not really matter where troops were deployed. The danger to peace in Asia arose not so much out of military aid but from disputes relating to Kashmir and other matters which affected the well being of millions. But Nehru's objections to military aid to Pakistan dominated the correspondence and ultimately wrecked the direct talks which Muhammad Ali began with great hopes. Pakistan's Prime Minister tried again and again to impress on Nehru that the over-all military strengths of the two countries outside Kashmir could have no bearing on the issue if demilitarisation were accepted. But, thanks to Nehru's intransigence, no progress towards this goal could be made.

General comments

Thanks to KA$HMIR for producing detailed counter-proposals. I see that the differences between the current version and the proposed versions are quite a few, and it will take us some time to work through them. I am unfortunately exceedingly busy at this time of the year and won't be able to devote much time to this for a couple of weeks at least. Here are some general principles that I have tried to follow in writing the content I have written, and I recommend that we all follow them.

As an an encyclopedia, we focus on facts as much as possible and leave out views. The views are too many and we cannot possibly cover all of them as required for WP:NPOV. In most cases they are also unnecessary because the facts speak for themselves when covered in enough depth.
There are pretty much no uninvolved writers on the Kashmir dispute. Whether they be Indian, Pakistani, British or American, all the countries have official state positions on the dispute, and the writers by and large follow them. Instead of worrying about involvement, I use the evidence base used by the writers (mentioned in footnotes) to decide what to keep and what to omit.
In course of time, more and more historical materials become available, which expands the knowledge base of the scholarly community. So the scholars that come later in time and use the new evidence base should be preferred to older writers and older writings. For instance, almost all of Nehru's writings during his tenure, stretching to some 50 volumes, are published. So, scholars now know what Nehru was thinking. They don't have to speculate, like the older writers used to do. All the British and American foreign policy documents from the forties and fifties are now published. So, the scholars know what strategies these countries employed to favour one country or the other and put pressure on them etc. Owen Dixon's private papers are now in Australian archives. So, the scholars that accessed them know what issues Dixon faced and why his efforts didn't succeed. WP:NPOV does not require us to give the same weight to the older writings which took place in relative ignorance as we give to the modern writings.
We need to check book reviews or later citations, whenever they are available, to find out about the biases and deficiencies inherent in the written works. We also use this information in deciding WP:WEIGHT.
WP:HISTRS recommends that we use "historians" that have professional training in history, have PhD's and write peer-reviewed articles. Unfortunately, not enough historians study the 20th century conflicts, but some do. When available, we prefer them to non-historians. We also prefer scholars (with PhD's and academic careers) to non-academic writers. Some writers are notable for "writing". They write opinions but write them exceedingly well. Needless to say, they have no place at all in discussing history or political affairs. Nobody knows whether their opinions have any validity.

So, if and when I come to review the proposed paragraphs, these are the principles I will use. When we run into disagreements, I will take them to WP:DRN. For the time being, let me just say that none of the proposed sections is ready for the mainspace. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:52, 24 February 2018 (UTC)

There is a clear WP:CONSENSUS among editors who have been deeply involved on this talkpage for many months now (and not just been dropping by to do reverts and give one-liners on talkpages before disappearing) that the new version is the rightful WP:NPOV version. Your response, which has no specific objection to anything in the new version, seems like WP:STONEWALLING. I am also sorry to say some of your principles are downright unacceptable. Editors who come to this page here are bound only to follow Wikipedia policies, not the self-made policies of others. No editor WP:OWNs this page to enforce their self-invented policies.

Your principle number 1 is agreeable but most of the content in the new version are facts anyway, your version was Raghavan/Shankar's opinion. Opinions are barely mentioned in the new version and when they are (such as Noorani and Raghavan) it is to document serious scholarly disagreement to comply with WP:BALANCE.
Principle number 2 is wrong and WP:OR. Western scholars are uninvolved and neutral. Multiple WP:RS^[1]^[2]^[3] document it is Indian WP:POV to assume that there is a Western bias on Kashmir. There isn't. So you will have to drop this principle because it isn't agreeable and won't get you anywhere.
And evaluating evidence behind scholars' conclusions is not our job, its the job of WP:RS. Everyone here is familiar with your WP:OR method of questioning of scholars' conclusions which is why RegentsPark has already warned everyone that arguments on Wikipedia should be limited to the reliability of sources and their weighting to decide on content inclusion/exclusion. If you start arguing here about evidence this page will become a WP:OR and WP:FORUM mess and you will potentially be breaking sanctionable ARBIPA sanctions.
For your fourth principle, well HISTRS is a piece of advice and is not an enforceable policy like WP:RS that is mandatory to follow. No one has the right to enforce essays. Reliable scholarly sources will do.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 05:26, 25 February 2018 (UTC)

Whether something can be stated as a fact or it is a view of the writer certainly depends on whether it is evidenced. When one writer speculates contradicting an evidenced fact mentioned by another writer, we cannot possibly give the same WEIGHT to both the writers. In any case, I would like to request RegentsPark's input on these principles. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:43, 25 February 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Vernon Hewitt (15 September 1997). The New International Politics of South Asia: Second Edition. Manchester University Press. pp. 110–. ISBN 978-0-7190-5122-7.
[2]
Teresita C. Schaffer; Howard B. Schaffer (5 April 2016). India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy. Brookings Institution Press. pp. 50–. ISBN 978-0-8157-2823-8.
[3]
Howard B. Schaffer (1 September 2009). The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir. Brookings Institution Press. p. 30. ISBN 978-0-8157-0370-9.

Purely on a principle basis, I agree with Kautilya3's principles 1, 3, 4, and 5 but not with 2. We shouldn't a-priori assume bias from any writer, whatever their nationality, particularly if they are writing in scholarly journals (2) but, if that bias has been pointed out in reliable sources (as Nadir Ali seems to indicate) then we should treat that source as biased. We should use later citations rather than older ones (unless we are indicating a viewpoint that was held at that earlier time) (3), particularly when relevant information became available later. We should prefer academic historians over non-academic ones (5) unless we are including an important non-academic viewpoint - this should really be a no-brainer. That said, the devil is in the details and I'll leave it to you all to either decide how they apply here or to take it to dispute resolution. --regentspark (comment) 16:51, 25 February 2018 (UTC)

So now that you know principle 2 is not allowed in the equation you will not argue using the scholars' evidence base because evaluating a scholar's evidence is for the WP:RS to do and not editors. Every editor will have different interpretations of the evidence and this would create a WP:OR and WP:FORUM disaster as NadirAli warns. The arguments that matter here are WP:WEIGHT of WP:RS. Dilpa kaur (talk) 02:52, 26 February 2018 (UTC)

RegentsPark could you kindly inform Kautilya3 to stick to the topic and not change the topic. He starts asking for WP:CENSORSHIP when he is unable to give a solid proper response.--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 04:12, 7 March 2018 (UTC)

Controversial sentence

″Scholars have commented that the failure of the Security Council efforts of mediation owed to the fact that the Council regarded the issue as a purely political dispute without investigating its legal underpinnings.^[1]

References

[1]
Korbel (1953, p. 507): "With the hindsight of six years, the Council's approach, though impartial and fair, appears to have been inadequate in that it did not reflect the gravity of the Kashmir situation.... The Security Council did not deal with either of these arguments [India's assumption of the legal validity of the accession and Pakistan's refusal to recognize its validity]. Nor did it consider the possibility of asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the juridical aspect of the conflict under Article 96 of the Charter. Nor did it invoke any provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, which deals with 'acts of aggression'."

Subbiah (2004, p. 180): "From the beginning, the Security Council framed the problem as primarily a political dispute rather than looking to a major legal underpinning of the dispute: the Instrument of Accession's validity or lack thereof."

This is a WP:CHERRYPICKEDed and WP:POV sentence trying to couch India's feelings in scholarly terms.

It is evident that this sentence is pushing India's UN case which was based on the legal value of the Instrument of Accession and the alleged illegality of Pakistani intervention.

Indian commentator Subbiah who is one of the two sources cited for this contentious sentence is obviously spilling out the same Indian grievances as the other Indian commentators and Indian case representatives at the UN. Why not seek out other WP:RS from neutral Western experts?

″H.S. Guraraj Rao says that public utterances such as these by members of the Security Council demonstrate their ignorance of the background of the "Kashmir problem," because at no time has India withdrawn its charge of aggression. However, such utterances may show that the members of the Security Council do understand the background of the Kashmir dispute.″^[1]...This shows that the sentence's gripe against the UN Security Council that it did not consider the legal underpinnings and aggression charges is unwarranted.

This, ″Indian commentators emphasize the legality of India's acts, condemning Pakistan for the use of force and coercion. However, such arguments must be viewed with an eye on India's overall conduct. Junagadh, one of the three Indian states which had not determined their future at the time of partition, consisted of a Hindu majority ruled by a Moslem dynasty. Here, India rejected the Moslem ruler's decision to accede to Pakistan″^[2]....and...″Indian commentators brand Pakistan as the aggressor in Kashmir, using force and coercion to usurp the territory. But here again, India's claims must be considered in context with its words and deeds elsewhere. India's treatment of Junagadh and Hyderabad must be considered in viewing Pakistan's actions in Kashmir and its claim of anticipatory self-defense″.^[3]...shows that the WP:CONTEXT is important. India's own aggression into territory which legally acceded to Pakistan has to be considered in the same breath as India vents chagrined legalistic arguments and charges of Pakistani aggression. As such India's case falls flat because its own grievance contradicted its conduct. No point in pointing figures at the UNSC.

This sentence is also cherrypicked because the sentence relies on Korbel, but Korbel disagrees with the meaning of the sentence. Korbel says....″India again based her whole stand on Kashmir upon the conviction that Kashmir was already a part of India, against which Pakistan had been an aggressor. She expressed thorough indignation that this important fact had been ignored by the Security Council, by the Commission, and by Sir Owen Dixon. This was not quite the fact, of course; both the resolution of the Commission and the recommendation of Sir Owen Dixon had given concrete expression to its disapproval of the Pakistani army's presence on Kashmir. On the other hand, if India felt so strongly that the aggressiveness of Pakistan in Kashmir was the heart of the dispute, why had she not asked the Security Council to deal with it according to Chapter VII of the Charter, which is concerned with 'Acts of Aggression'? Why had she invoked only Chapter VI concerning 'Pacific Settlements of Disputes'? This may, of course, have been a serious error in political judgement on her part which she was now attempting to correct. But it is highly questionable whether, having decided to follow one procedure, India could now legitimately insist that the Security Council could proceed only on the basis of the assumption of Pakistan's 'act of aggression.' But finally, and it would appear decisively, India had already accepted as the basis for the solution of the Kashmir dispute the Commission's resolutions which contained no direct condemnations of Pakistan, and by so doing had forfeited the right to fall back on such arguments as Pakistani 'aggression.'″^[4]

What we see here is that India had forfeited its right to fall back on the argument of Pakistani aggression when it accepted the Commission's resolution. Why didn't the one who relied on Korbel to write this sentence not include this fact?

Or this? It would have closed the aggression narrative which forms the context of this contentious sentence.″One would be more readily inclined also to understand the moral motives which underlie the Indian attitude toward the Kashmir conflict if they emanated from principled policy applicable to any international situation. But if India seriously considered Pakistan to be an aggressor in Kashmir, how could she decline to see an act of clear-cut aggression in the participation of Chinese troops in the war against the United Nations in Korea?...the United Nations had openly condemned the aggression of the North Korean Communists...Pandit Nehru called the move unwise, declaring, 'It was clear it wouldn't help to call a country an aggressor when you intended having dealings with it in order to reach settlement by negotiation and the two approaches are directly opposed to each other.' There is apparently some inconsistency between this attitude and his continued insistence that Pakistan be named as an aggressor in Kashmir, a dispute which he has always declared should be settled by negotiation.″^[5]

This sentence requires modification to conform with WP:NPOV and WP:BALANCE. JosephusOfJerusalem (talk) 07:01, 18 March 2018 (UTC)

References

[1]
Howley, James (1991). "Alive and Kicking: The Kashmir Dispute Forty Years Later". Penn State International Law Review. 9 (1): 102–103.
[2]
Howley, James (1991). "Alive and Kicking: The Kashmir Dispute Forty Years Later". Penn State International Law Review. 9 (1): 96.
[3]
Howley, James (1991). "Alive and Kicking: The Kashmir Dispute Forty Years Later". Penn State International Law Review. 9 (1): 97.
[4]
Josef Korbel (8 December 2015). Danger in Kashmir. Princeton University Press. pp. 180–181. ISBN 978-1-4008-7523-8.
[5]
Josef Korbel (8 December 2015). Danger in Kashmir. Princeton University Press. pp. 181–. ISBN 978-1-4008-7523-8.

Consider reading WP:FALSEBALANCE while you are at this. Capitals00 (talk) 09:54, 18 March 2018 (UTC)
I will be happy to update this paragraph with Korbel's own comments. (But I am busy right now. It will probably be the next weekend before I can come back to it.) Please note that this is a comment on the Security Council, not India or Pakistan. More detailed analysis including Howley's commentary can go in the UN mediation of the Kashmir dispute article, which I hope to work on during the summer. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:42, 18 March 2018 (UTC)

I saw the edit summary but it is not good enough to qualify as a policy-based revert. Howley sketches out the position of Indian commentators, ″Indian commentators emphasize the legality of India's acts, condemning Pakistan for the use of force and coercion″ and ″Indian commentators brand Pakistan as the aggressor in Kashmir, using force and coercion to usurp the territory″. Subbiah espouses pretty much the same rhetoric about ″legal underpinnings″ which Korbel explains includes matters of ″validity of accession″ and ″acts of aggression″. So by reason of the shared position Subbiah is to be lumped together with the rest of his compatriot commentators. Korbel is not an Indian commentator but he is not supporting the spirit being passed through behind those words either, he is pointing to the opposite. He ought to be quoted in full not get his words WP:CHERRYPICKED. As it stands the text is representing a POV which contradicts Korbel. JosephusOfJerusalem (talk) 11:20, 19 March 2018 (UTC)

As per the guidance given by RegentsPark above, your argumentation is not permissible. I am personally willing to go further than RegentsPark, as mentioned in my comment above his. But I would want to see evidence for bias in the source, not based on imagined parallels with X, Y or Z. So, Subbiah is not an "Indian commentator" both for RegentsPark and me. If you want to make such a case, take it to WP:RSN. As for Korbel, his criticism of the Security Council is fairly clear, and the quotation provided states it explicitly. The statement you object to, is talking about the Security Council, not about India or Pakistan. You should not be making the same broken point again and again, at the pain of getting cast as WP:TENDENTIOUS. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:28, 19 March 2018 (UTC)

Adding 1971 War to the list of conflicts fought in Kashmir

Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir

On situation of Aksai Chin prior to 1962 war

Guruharpal Singh source

February 2019 Attack

Semi-protected edit request on 19 February 2019

9/11 attacks on the United States

Accusing POV issue because removing uncensored material

Semi-protected edit request on 6 March 2019

China involved?

MarkH, What you say, "There are several reliable sources attesting to China's administration of Shaksgam Valley and Akshai Chin and a subsection on the Sino-Indian War", is very much true. But this does not imply that China is involved in the "Kashmir conflict". The Sino-Indian border dispute is an entirely separate dispute/conflict, with entirely different origins. Somebody seems to have added this bit with a WP:FAKE citation. I am afraid it must go. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:17, 22 March 2019 (UTC)

The Sino-Indian War is literally a subsection of this article, China has claims in the Kashmir region, and China does not recognize India's claims (at the very least). Having a war and territorial claims in the region certainly counts as involvement, does it not? There are also plenty of reliable sources detailing (and explicitly naming) China's "third-party role" in the conflict (e.g. BBC, United States Institute of Peace). I've added these refs to that sentence in the lead. — MarkH21 (talk) 21:31, 22 March 2019 (UTC)

Playing a "third party" role does not imply being involved in the conflict. Britain, the US and the Soviet Union have also played third party roles, and the US continues to play it. That doesn't mean they are involved parties.

India and Pakistan claim the entirety of "Kashmir". That defines this particular conflict. China has never claim anything of the sort. You can't magnify a border conflict into a Kashmir conflict. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:42, 22 March 2019 (UTC)

I think we have different definitions of the conflict here. The Kashmir conflict is often described as the entire territorial dispute between all three nations claiming some or all of the Kashmir region, in addition to the multiple different groups within Kashmir (academic book about that subject) – it does not refer solely to the India–Pakistan bilateral dispute. That's why the lead also reads primarily between India and Pakistan. Here's another source (Peace Insight which is part of Peace Direct) that reads "the conflict in Kashmir continues today, involving three nuclear powers - China, India and Pakistan - who are in dispute over the territory." My understanding is that you define it as solely the conflict between India, Pakistan, and the groups within Kashmir. Nevertheless, the lead now explicitly says that China has also been involved in the conflict in a third-party role because the definition of the breadth of the conflict is not agreed-upon. Is that okay? — MarkH21 (talk) 22:01, 22 March 2019 (UTC)

Note: that while Britain, the US and the Soviet Union have played some role in the conflict, they did not fight wars over territorial claims to the region nor do they administer any portion of the region. If India and Pakistan claim all of the Kashmir region in a bilateral conflict then China certainly has been "involved" in the conflict on the basis of: 1) claimed part of the region, 2) militarily fought in the region over those claims, and 3) administers part of the region — MarkH21 (talk) 22:05, 22 March 2019 (UTC)

I can live with the current mention in the lead. Thanks for all your work in cleaning up the lead. And, thanks also for the Peace Direct web site, which I didn't know about! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:50, 22 March 2019 (UTC)

Article 370

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change "The conflict started after the partition of India in 1947 as a dispute over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir" to "The dispute began in 1947 with the Pakistani tribal invasion of Kashmir"

The current text suggests that the conflict originated as part of the partition, however it was not the case. Kashmir had decided to exercise its right to remain independent post partition, but Pakistan tried to convince the then ruler to join Pakistan. When he did not agree, Pakistan decided to forcefully take control of independent state of Kashmir. It resulted into conflict when the king Hari Singh signed a treaty with India Suryap2011 (talk) 22:19, 12 August 2019 (UTC)

Partly done. "after the partition" does not mean originated from partition. But there was no mention of the tribal invasion, which I have now added. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 05:46, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

It’s not clear that this is a better introduction. Invasion by Pakistani militias sure, but “tribal invasion” is hardly an impartial term. Plus, it is not referenced that this invasion was really the impetus for the allegiance of the local ruler to India. — MarkH21 (talk) 08:09, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

MarkH, can you explain this revert? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:21, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

It’s in the comment directly above yours here, in the previous section. — MarkH21 (talk) 08:22, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

Have you read the article body? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:24, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

Yes, I don’t see why you would assume I haven’t. The conflict arises from a much more complex issue than just a “Pakistani tribal invasion.” To say so is disingenuous and disregards the rebellions, ethnic tensions, and massacres from both sides. — MarkH21 (talk) 08:29, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

Sure, it wasn't idyllic peace earlier. But the ruler had to accede to India because of the tribal invasion, which was about to overrun Srinagar. The term "tribal invasion" is used in numerous scholarly sources , and is not "contentious" as per Ian Copland:

As is well known, this Hindu-ruled Muslim majority state could conceivably have joined either India or Pakistan, but procrastinated about making a choice until a tribal invasion - the term is not contentious - forced the ruler's hand.^[1]

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:11, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

References

[1]
Copland, Ian (Spring 2003), "War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947-48 by C. Dasgupta (review)", Pacific Affairs, 76 (1): 144–145, JSTOR 40024025

Okay sure, after the Poonch rebellion and bloody conflict resulting directly from the Partition, as implied by this source. I’ll revise your change to reflect this background while keeping the reference to the invasion. — MarkH21 (talk) 15:32, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 3 October 2019

Semi-protected edit request on 7 October 2019

Pathankot tehsil

Semi-protected edit request on 10 November 2019

Gilgit-Baltistan is not part of kashmir

Before 1936 Gilgit-Baltistan was consist of several independent states. During soviet expansion in 1936 British government in subcontinent planned to merge all the states of Gilgit-Baltistan and name it as Gilgit agency then it was given on the lease for 60 years to Maharaja Hari Singh who was the ruler of kashmir at that time. But later on during partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. Maharaja Hari Singh was paid by Indian counterpart to expand there borders till Gilgit-Baltistan region. At that time Major Brown was assigned as political agent for Gilgit-Baltistan by British govt and he come to know about the fake contact, which was not accepted by British govt as Maharaja Harisingh was not authorized to do any contract with any state. Then group of rebellions and with the help of british forces invade dogra raj. Then later on people of Gilgit-Baltistan merge with the Pakistan on bases of 2 nations theory. Ismailmughal89 (talk) 23:36, 18 August 2019 (UTC)

Welcome to the club. Neither is Ladakh a part of Kashmir, nor Jammu, nor Mirpur nor Poonch. But the British terminology is that 'Kashmir' (see that page please) covers all of them.

Also your history is quite broken. Baltistan was never a part of any 'agency'. And, the Gilgit Agency (which controlled Chilas, Ishkoman and other principalities) and the Gilgit Wazarat (the leased area) were different. Half the bill for the Gilgit Scouts was paid for by the Maharaja throughout its lifetime, and it was fully paid by him after its return in June 1947. Major William Brown, who was the commander of Gilgit Scouts (not the Political Agent of Gilgit Agency), was Maharaja's employee when he mutinied. So were Mirza Hassan Khan and the rest of the 6th Kashmir Infantry stationed at Bunji. And Colonel Aslam Khan, who took over the command from William Brown, was an employee of the Azad Kashmir provisional government.

Gilgit-Baltistan (then called 'Northern Areas') was signed over to Pakistan by the Azad Kashmir government in the so-called Karachi Agreement. Since Pakistan never wanted to make this agreement public, it generated the propaganda that Gilgit wasn't part of Kashmir. It is quite nonsense. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 02:00, 19 August 2019 (UTC)

Gilgit-Baltistan has been a part of Kashmir historically and politically. Of course , Geographically it is a different area of the realm of Jammu and Kashmir , however , it is a part of the Kashmir conflict. Muhammad Taha Tariq Ahmed Kashmiri (talk) 12:54, 26 February 2020 (UTC)

Talk:Kashmir conflict/Archive 7

Alternative text

Dixon plan

Review of the revision: Dixon Plan

Point #7

Nimitz replacement

1950 military standoff

Review of the revision: 1950 military standoff

Nehru's plebiscite offer

General comments

Controversial sentence

Adding 1971 War to the list of conflicts fought in Kashmir

Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir

On situation of Aksai Chin prior to 1962 war

Guruharpal Singh source

February 2019 Attack

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9/11 attacks on the United States

Accusing POV issue because removing uncensored material

Semi-protected edit request on 6 March 2019

China involved?

Article 370

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Semi-protected edit request on 3 October 2019

Semi-protected edit request on 7 October 2019

Pathankot tehsil

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Gilgit-Baltistan is not part of kashmir

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