Talk:Logical positivism/Archive 2

"...not an axiomatic system that's unable prove its own consistency."

Under the heading "Philosophy of Science," the following sentence needs fixup. (I suggest changing "and" to "which" and inserting "and" before "while". But I don't want to mess with something that is far from my area of expertise.):

"Upon the global defeat of Nazism, and removed from philosophy rivals for radical reform—Marburg neo-Kantianism, Husserlian phenomenology, Heidegger's "existential hermeneutics"—while hosted in the climate of American pragmatism and commonsense empiricism, the neopositivists shed much of their earlier, revolutionary zeal.[1]" RogerKni (talk) 17:54, 11 January 2016 (UTC)

I'm going to go ahead and change "removed" to "the removal", and insert "and" before "while". If this isn't right, please correct my correction. RogerKni (talk) 03:34, 12 January 2016 (UTC)

What more can be said about it? Understandably, those with sufficient interest in topic to spend their time at work on this entry would include cultists. But one might wish for a more neutral point of view. Badiacrushed (talk) 11:50, 25 April 2017 (UTC)

The entry gives the impression that all logical positivists were emotivists/non-cognitivists. This is not true. Schlick, the leader of the circle, was a cognitivist (of the naturalist variety) and he defended his views at length in his book on ethics. Please fix the article to reflect this. On the whole, the article gives the impression of being written by people who want logical positivism to be a more united movement than it ever was. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.83.60.122 (talk) 18:03, 20 January 2019 (UTC)

Too technical was the best flag I could find. The text regarding Popper seems pompous and almost deliberately dense. What does the last phrase in this sentence mean:

Popper thus identifies falsifiability to demarcate not meaningful from meaningless but simply scientific from unscientific — a label not in itself unfavorable.

The use of language would be more appropriate in a 16th century Court circular:

Popper finds virtue in metaphysics

As summarized this too seems to be nonsensical:

Something is referred to as "observational" if it is observable directly with our senses. Then an observation term cannot be applied to something unobservable. If this is the case, there are no observation terms.

Something is termed observable if it is observable with our senses. The term cannot be applied to something unobservable. So .....??? Can anyone translate the section into something less flamboyant and more straightforwardly comprehensible?

p.s I added an article flag, again the best I could find, as the style of the section is common throughout the article. LookingGlass (talk) 09:11, 7 September 2016 (UTC)

I think the biggest flaw here is the lack of accessibility in the wording to people who aren't philosophers. I'm going to go through and attempt to revise some of the language while not misrepresenting the original contentLartola (talk) 07:30, 25 September 2019 (UTC)

Many sentences are written in appallingly poor English, e.g. missing a vital auxiliary verb. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.2.222.183 (talk) 10:55, 6 July 2014 (UTC)

Yes, it seems to have been written by someone who did not know the meaning of words very well. Seadowns (talk) 17:05, 13 May 2020 (UTC)

Summarize Timeline Fact Check

What a bizarre article! I read the first sentence : "Logical positivism, later called logical empiricism, and both of which together are also known as neopositivism, was a movement in Western philosophy whose central thesis was the verification principle (also known as the verifiability criterion of meaning)." and was left reeling. Hans Reichenbach's formulation of logical empiricism is distinct from logical positivism, rejecting a machian phenomenalism. If the same thing has two names, wherefore "both" and anyway "neopositivism" has a broader meaning. I think the article needs to be approached in a different encyclopedic fashion. Leutha (talk) 08:19, 15 August 2020 (UTC)

@Leutha: I agree that this article's lack of clarity about the issues you mention is a problem. The fact that logical empiricism redirects here, so that some people's, perhaps many people's, first explanation of the terms logical positivism and logical empiricism will be the lead of this article, urges a more adequate treatment of these terms. It is hard to explain these terms: as Richard Creath wrote toward the beginning of his article "Logical Empiricism" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The term 'logical empiricism' has no very precise boundaries and still less that distinguishes it from 'logical positivism'. It is therefore hard to map." Despite the difficulty, Wikipedia should do better than this article.

Anyone interested in taking up the task of improving this article will first want to look at Creath's article mentioned above and Herbert Feigl's article "Positivism" (originally published in 1978), which has a section on logical positivism and logical empiricism, in the Encyclopædia Britannica. See also: Uebel, Thomas E. (January 2013). "'Logical positivism'—'logical empiricism': what's in a name?". Perspectives on Science. 21 (1): 58–99. doi:10.1162/POSC_a_00086. Also pay attention to the relationship between this article and other articles such as Positivism § Logical positivism and postpositivism, Postpositivism, Verificationism, and Epistemic theories of truth § Verificationist views. Biogeographist (talk) 15:54, 15 August 2020 (UTC)

Summarize Timeline Top Qs Fact Check

In the first two paragraphs of the Criticisms section, the claim that negative existential claims and positive universal claims are unverifiable is given without any source. Has any scholar actually made this criticism? Also, it is obviously false. Negative existential claims and positive universal claims can be verified to the extent that they are meaningful. Using the example given, it can be verified that all ravens are black. This can be done by systematically searching the entire universe and observing that all of the ravens found are black. Of course this is not practical, but the point of verificationism is not that there must be a practical way to verify the statement, but that it must be physically possible to verify the statement. Limitations of technology do not count as limitations on the possible verifiability of a statement. Rectipaedia (talk) 19:31, 30 July 2012 (UTC)

What makes you omniscient in knowing that "all ravens are black" if you lack the means of observing all ravens in the universe? The statement is false until such technology is used by two persons to verify. Generalization is a logical fallacy. Darwin made these errors in his genetic theory. Now consider "albinoism is known to affect all vertebrates". There are white ravens with red eyes. Danarothrock (talk) 07:52, 14 September 2012 (UTC)

I removed the offending material, not just because of the reasons mentioned above, but also because it had two ^{[citation needed]} tags which were three and five years old, respectively. Rectipaedia (talk) 17:37, 10 August 2012 (UTC)

I provided sources mentioning that they're pretty well known. You've got that backward, the stereotypical claim would be that they're meaningful only if they're verifiable (at least in principle). In principle, it's impossible to exhaustively search the entire universe and one might want to quantify over past and future ravens as well. See all ravens are black (and Russell's teapot). The second paragraph seemed like WP:OR, so I didn't restore it.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 20:56, 10 August 2012 (UTC)

You said that I "got that backward" but then repeated what I said in different words. Let proposition P be "universal claims can be verified" and let proposition Q be "universal claims are meaningful". I said that P ← Q. You said that Q → P. These two statements are equivalent.

I concede that universal claims which are not tautologies are unverifiable because this must include the past and future and also other possible worlds. However, it is physically possible to exhaustively search the entire universe. It is expensive and time-consuming, but that's irrelevant. It is still possible. Also, the implication that unverifiable statements about the past and future are meaningless is not a problem for the verification principle but rather a problem for those who try to accept it but do not like its implications. One simply has to accept that a direct consequence of combining the verification principle with a non-deterministic physical theory of the universe is the many-worlds interpretation. The source that you quoted does say that universal claims are unverifiable, but I don't see where it says that this causes a problem for the verification principle.

I don't understand why you referenced the raven paradox or Russell's teapot. The statement "all ravens are black" is indeed an example of a universal claim, but the paradox has nothing to do with verificationism. The relevance to this subject is contained entirely within those four words. Going to that wikipedia page provides no further insight whatsoever into the subject at hand.

The same can be said for Russell's teapot. Russell's teapot has no relevance to the subject. It does discuss unverifiable claims, but it is about burden of proof, not criteria for meaning. Russell's teapot is simply an analogy used to argue that the burden of proof lies with the one making the unverifiable claim rather than the one denying it. It is, of course, logically inconsistent because denying the claim that "there is a teapot between Earth and Mars" is equivalent to making the claim that "there is not a teapot between Earth and Mars". Both are unverifiable statements. Therefore, the principle must apply to both of them. This implies that the burden of proof lies with each and not the other which is a self-contradiction. The argument seems logical because it makes use of Occam's razor. Rectipaedia (talk) 01:18, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

No, the naive logical positivist is saying that's meaningless gibberish because the universal can't be verified; not that an attempt to verify might be warranted, to the extent that it can be understood. No, it is not physically possible to exhaustively search the entire universe. No, it is not merely expensive and time consuming. Correct, denial is irrelevant. No, the many-worlds interpretation is fully deterministic, but that has nothing whatsoever to do with it. Neither the article, nor the sources need to rehearse the well known problem of induction, 1) Putnum treats it as self-refutating and no one seriously entertains the verification principle any longer; 2) the SEP clearly says: "Everybody had noted that the Wittgensteinian verificationist criterion rendered universally quantified statements meaningless"; and Smith (1996) lays it to rest: 3) "The secondary and historical literature on logical positivism affords substantial grounds for concluding that logical positivism failed to solve many of the central problems it generated for itself. Prominent among the unsolved problems was the failure to find an acceptable statement of the verifiability (later confirmability) criterion of meaningfulness".

You "don't understand" why I linked to all ravens are black? It says: "A related issue is the problem of induction"... And if you find the Russell analogy uninformative, never mind the pale raven perched beyond your light cone.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 03:51, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

"No, the naive logical positivist is saying that's meaningless gibberish because the universal can't be verified;" Here, I can't figure out what you are saying "no" to and I don't know what "that" refers to. Perhaps you could elaborate. "not that an attempt to verify might be warranted, to the extent that it can be understood" Maybe, an understanding of the first sentence would provide some insight, but short of that, this sentence strikes me as a non sequitur. Also, I do not understand the relevance of the principle of charity. "Correct, denial is irrelevant." is another thing I did not understand. Some context would help. Also, what is the relevance of the problem of induction?

Since you insist that it is physically impossible to exhaustively search the entire universe, you should explain. If I were to build a robot that systematically explored every inch of space in an expanding sphere, avoiding objects that would destroy it (such as stars and black holes which need not be searched anyway because anything that would destroy the robot would also destroy any ravens), what physical laws would need to be violated in order for the robot to complete its task?

1) Yes, Putnam does treat the verification criterion as self-refutating. He makes this argument with the premises that the verification principle is both unverifiable and not analytic. And it is a weak argument because he does explain why he thinks it unverifiable or not analytic. He does not base this argument on the unverifiability of universal claims. 2) Yes, the SEP does say "Everybody had noted that the Wittgensteinian verificationist criterion rendered universally quantified statements meaningless." It does not say that this causes a problem for verificationism. 3) Smith (1986 not 1996) does not lay it to rest. In fact, he does not address the subject. He says that logical positivism had problems but he attributes none of them to the unverifiability of universal claims.

My point is twofold. First, I am not at all convinced that the unverifiability of universal claims causes any problems for logical positivism. Therefore, I do not think it can be considered an obvious fact. If it were obvious, it should be possible to construct a simple argument in favour of it. Second, I do not know of any sources that make this argument. Therefore, I do not think that the criticisms section should list the unverifiability of universal claims as a problem. Rectipaedia (talk) 17:00, 13 August 2012 (UTC)

WP:TENDENTIOUS—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:32, 14 August 2012 (UTC)

The statement under question is "Another problem was that universal claims ("all ravens are black") are problematic in terms of verification." As far as I can tell, (and I have read the source carefully) this opinion is not expressed in the source that you gave. If I have made a mistake, please reply with relevant quotations and clearly explain your interpretation. If the source does not explicitly state what you have written, you need to make it clear why you think that you have accurately represented the referenced material. Rectipaedia (talk) 20:41, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

Early critics of logical positivism said that its fundamental tenets could not themselves be formulated consistently. The [[verifiability theory of meaning|verifiability criterion of meaning]] did not seem verifiable; but neither was it simply a logical [[Tautology (logic)|tautology]], since it had implications for the practice of science and the empirical truth of other statements. This presented severe problems for the logical consistency of the theory.<ref name="Putnam1985">{{cite book |first=H. |last=Putnam |year=1985 |title=Philosophical Papers: Volume 3, Realism and Reason |series=Philosophical Papers |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9780521313940 |lccn=lc82012903 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=HAjfSA3ir3kC&pg=PA184 |page=184}}</ref>Another problem was that [[universal quantifier|universal]] claims ("[[all ravens are black]]") are problematic in terms of verification.<ref name="sep-vienna-circle">{{cite web |first=Thomas |last=Uebel |editor=Edward N. Zalta |year=2008 |title=Vienna Circle |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Fall 2008 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/vienna-circle/ |quote=What Carnap later called the “liberalization of empiricism” was underway and different camps became discernible within the Circle... In the first place, this liberalization meant the accomodation of universally quantified statements and the return, as it were, to salient aspects of Carnap's 1928 conception. Everybody had noted that the Wittgensteinian verificationist criterion rendered universally quantified statements meaningless. Schlick (1931) thus followed Wittgenstein's own suggestion to treat them instead as representing rules for the formation of verifiable singular statements. (His abandonment of conclusive verifiability is indicated only in Schlick 1936a.) A second element that began to do so soon was the recognition of the problem of the irreducibility of disposition terms to observation terms... A third element was that disagreement arose as to whether the in-principle verifiability or support turned on what was merely logically possible or on what was nomologically possible, as a matter of physical law etc. A fourth element, finally, was that differences emerged as to whether the criterion of significance was to apply to all languages or whether it was to apply primarily to constructed, formal languages. Schlick retained the focus on logical possibility and natural languages throughout, but Carnap had firmly settled his focus on nomological possibility and constructed languages by the mid-thirties. Concerned with natural language, Schlick (1932, 1936a) deemed all statements meaningful for which it was logically possible to conceive of a procedure of verification; concerned with constructed languages only, Carnap (1936-37) deemed meaningful only statements for whom it was nomologically possible to conceive of a procedure of confirmation of disconfirmation.
Many of these issues were openly discussed at the Paris congress in 1935. Already in 1932 Carnap had sought to sharpen his previous criterion by stipulating that those statements were meaningful that were syntactically well-formed and whose non-logical terms were reducible to terms occurring in the basic observational evidence statements of science. While Carnap's focus on the reduction of descriptive terms allows for the conclusive verification of some statements, his criterion also allowed universally quantified statements to be meaningful, provided they were syntactically and terminologically correct (1932a, §2). It was not until one of his Paris addresses, however, that Carnap officially declared the meaning criterion to be mere confirmability. Carnap's new criterion required neither verification nor falsification but only partial testability so as now to include not only universal statements but also the disposition statements of science... Though plausible initially, the device of introducing non-observational terms in this way gave rise to a number of difficulties which impugned the supposedly clear distinctions between logical and empirical matters and analytic and synthetic statements (Hempel 1951). Independently, Carnap himself (1939) soon gave up the hope that all theoretical terms of science could be related to an observational base by such reduction chains. This admission raised a serious problem for the formulation of a meaning criterion: how was one to rule out unwanted metaphysical claims while admitting as significant highly abstract scientific claims?}}</ref>

As far as I can tell, your relentless attempts to delete this extremely mild and sympathetic treatment of the very well-known criticism is presumably a WP:COMPETENCE issue.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 05:43, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

Thank you for fulfilling my first request in referring directly to the sentences in the source. However, none of the statements in red explicitly support your contribution. Let me remind you not to go beyond what is expressed in the sources. You must not interpret the material yourself. This is considered original research. If I am being thick, please provide some kind of explanation as to how what is written in the source explicitly supports your contribution. It is clear that there is no single statement in the source which has the same literal meaning as your contribution. Therefore, there must be some analysis required to come to your conclusion. If the analysis is simple and your conclusion obvious, please spell it out here.

I should point out that the two highlighted statements which mention "a series of difficulties" and "a serious problem" are not about universal claims. Also, while the statements that are about universal claims do say that they are meaningless given certain definitions of verifiability (such as the Wittgensteinian one), they do not say that this is a problem for verificationism. Rectipaedia (talk) 08:50, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

The source appears to say (or rather, to make a universal claim about others saying) that in at least one significant variety of verificationism, universal claims are meaningless. This seems equivalent to saying that in verificationism, universal claims are problematic.

Now, if I'm missing some subtlety, do explain it to me Rectipaedia. But otherwise I don't see your point now. If you're just nitpicking over the precise wording, please suggest a more refined wording rather than warring to remove entirely what now looks to be a properly sourced statement. Cesiumfrog (talk) 10:10, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

No, I am not nitpicking over the precise wording. I agree with your interpretation of the source, but I don't think you have read Machine Elf's statement carefully enough. It says "Another problem was that universal claims ("all ravens are black") are problematic in terms of verification." I am not disputing that universal claims are problematic in terms of verification. I am disputing that this fact itself is a problem for verificationism. In other words, Machine Elf is not simply saying that universal claims are meaningless. He is saying that the meaninglessness of universal claims is a problem for verificationism. I would simply reword his statement as "Universal claims ("all ravens are black") are problematic in terms of verification." or "The verification principle renders universal claims meaningless." if it weren't for the fact that these statements would not belong in the criticisms section because they are not criticisms. Rectipaedia (talk) 19:50, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

For future reference when you object to only one part of a compound statement, it is constructive to begin by breaking apart the statement instead of tendentiously warring to also erase the part you aren't even contesting.

Universal claims ("all ravens are black") are problematic in terms of verification.[1] This was widely considered another problem for verificationism.^{[dubious – discuss]}

Cesiumfrog (talk) 00:11, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

Apparently, we all agree it's properly sourced, but oddly enough, User:Rectipaedia is shopping at WP:No original research/Noticeboard#Logical Positivism Criticism.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 06:58, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

I think I've made it clear that I do not agree that it's properly sourced. Rectipaedia (talk) 20:29, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

Oh, quit moving the goalposts (let alone accusing others of naivete). You started by saying:

the claim that [..] universal claims are unverifiable is given without any source[.. and] is obviously false.

Well, obviously you've now conceded the claim was beyond reproach. If you still want to nitpick some fine distinction between "problematic" vs "problem", you should start by breaking up the compound statement and tagging only the part you consider dubious, so that your concern be communicated clearly and consensus can develop.

Your actions have been as if you were more concerned with defending your personal philosophy than with compromise; and haven't advanced positive reasons to persuade me it's an interpretive leap (from how the universal claims thing is associated with the discussion of "serious problem") to surmise the source described it as a criticism. Cesiumfrog (talk) 00:12, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Where did I nitpick between "problematic" vs "problem"? What do you mean by a "positive reason"? It is against Wikipedia policy to surmise anything. A surmise is original research. The source needs to explicitly describe it as a criticism. Even if you think the source has implicitly described it as a criticism, I would like you to explain how it has done so, because I do not see it. Rectipaedia (talk) 02:01, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Are you just trolling? You concede universal claims are "problematic" but argue at their description as a "problem". You give negative evidence (that Britannica didn't discuss the issue) but not positive evidence (no counter-source that actually contradicts the non-plagiarising summary of Elf's source). Anyway, since I never knew who out of you and Machine Elf was actually more correct about the content, I decided to google it for myself:

• The problem with verificationism (or so it is commonly thought) is that some statements are “universal” [..hence..] verification is impossible. Because of problems such as this falsification was proposed as a way to conduct scientific investigations.
• The problem with Verificationism, according to some, is that some statements are “universal” [..so..] To counter this, Karl Popper [..proposed..] Falsificationism
• The Problem of Induction:[....] The verifiability criterion of meaning was essential to logical positivism [..But..] was soon seen to be too strong; it counted as meaningless [universal claims] as well as statements that were at the time beyond the reach of experience for technical, and not conceptual, reasons[..] These difficulties led to modification...
• Verificationism, to put it quite pointedly, is a snare and a delusion. First, theism has nothing to worry about regarding the strong formulations of verificationism, as these principles are intrinsically implausible. A very large number of scientific and common sense statements would be meaningless if either of these principles were true, including many statements that logical positivists themselves accept as meaningful. This highlights a general problem with all versions of verificationism. [...] So we are really only left with the weak verificationist/falsificationist position.
• there were many criticisms of logical positivism [but the] central and most devastating one was that logical positivism claimed to be first and foremost a (indeed the) scientific view of the world, and yet its central tenet, the [famous-—or infamous-—] Verification Principle, wiped out the whole of science. This criticism, if clinched—and few people today would deny that Popper’s book pretty well clinched it—spelt total shipwreck for logical positivism. Popper’s argument can be summarized as follows. From Newton until the time of the logical positivists the central task of science had been seen as the search for natural laws, these being unrestrictedly general statements about the world that were known to be invariantly true. [..So..] from the Verification Principle it follows that [all] scientific laws are meaningless statements, and are empty of informational content.

How much must it take with you? It's great that I personally am being provoked to learn about the topic, but what I'm learning is that your proposed deletion will not directly improve the article.Cesiumfrog (talk) 04:51, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

I am not trolling. Since your third source can probably be considered reliable and since it does support the statement, I restored it, albeit with a bit of elaboration. Rectipaedia (talk) 07:03, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Now, that "total shipwreck" line might give the lead zest. Cesiumfrog (talk) 10:24, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

---

Much aside, it made me think about the black raven bit. The paradox, at least according to WP, is how it seems counter-intuitive that observations of one set of objects should provide evidence for a claim ostensibly not pertaining to objects in that set. It has been contested whether this article links to this paradox in an appropriate manner. This paradox is an interesting curiousity, to be sure. But is it relevant? In context, the article uses raven blackness purely as an example of what is meant by a universal statement. Examples are good, and this seems like a good one (regardless that in actual fact, blackness of ravens is as broken an example as whiteness of swans..). But it is pure coincidence that this example is the same example associated with the aforedescribed paradox. The paradox is not relevant to the local context, so if the example should link to something, it should link to Universal quantification and not the paradox. The paradox is separate from the problem of our inability to ever have tested all elements in some infinite sets (which is what the article is actually describing, Popper's criticism). I would go so far as to say just the potential confusion soils the example, so we should pick another.

Perhaps though the paradox is more broadly relevant to the article? If its counter-intuitiveness is an inevitable consequence from verificationism or logical positivism more broadly (perhaps even analytic philosophy), then maybe the paradox itself could be a separate criticism. But I do think such a synthesis would need to be sourced and made explicit.

Perhaps the problem of induction is also a criticism. (This is another thing inherently involving universal statements, but from which universal statements and that paradox are still separate topics.) Clearly reliable science is built upon something that resembles induction despite the fact that induction seems like it should be an unreliable method. It's a third problem. Have others directed it as a noteable criticism of logical positivism? I think currently the Popper section links to inductive reasoning, but not to the problem of it.

I also note that many sources present Popper's criticism as the single thing which basically killed logical positivism or at least verificationism. And yet, the article (and lead), and the verificationism article, give the impression that no such thing occured, and that the most serious criticisms were completely different ones (for example, that verificationism isn't itself verifiable, which to me seems like a silly criticism). I get the impression these articles have been written from a peculiar point of view?

Also, regards nit-picking of what is and isn't criticism, seems the big section on "A.J. Ayer's defense" is not criticism. Maybe the heading should be changed, or the views of logical positivism's proponents should be integrated elsewhere in the article. But this does seem to be one of the few articles that warrants having a criticism section, since it describes a school of philosophy most commonly noted now in the context of being an abandoned historical phase. (Actually, I'd rather title the section "abandonment".) And I do think the lead should emphasise Popper instead of unpteen other critics (source: just scan the chapter list of common philosophy of science texts). Cesiumfrog (talk) 02:03, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

I would just like to address the issue of the wiki-link to the raven paradox article. I agree that it is not relevant. I think, if Machine Elf cannot successfully argue its relevance, the link should be removed. Perhaps some others could provide some input and we can reach a consensus. Rectipaedia (talk) 04:33, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

It's a verbatim link to “all ravens are black”. Personally, I'd go with “all philosophers are mortal”. The consensus, so far, is petty trolling.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 13:01, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

Assuming good faith, I don't know how I can interpret that last sentence. Also, the implication in pointing out the link was verbatim seems disingenuous, since you know exactly what it redirects to (having created that redirect yourself subsequent to joining this discussion). And to clarify, it was on nobody's behalf that I opposed the conflating of Hempel's raven paradox with an example for explaining what universal claims are in the first place. Constructively, below it appears everyone can be satisfied if we make an additional but separate paragraph for the Hempel matter.Cesiumfrog (talk) 23:11, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

You mean failing to assume good faith. Disingenuous... subsequent to?? Get your facts straight. You're an expert now, or was that a confession? Please, "conflating of Hempel's raven paradox with an example for explaining what universal claims are in the first place"... you were wrong, deal with it.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 07:34, 31 August 2012 (UTC)

I mean I can't see any meaning that is compatible with the assumption of good faith, which then caused me to suspect that assumption, though I still acknowledge the possibility that the failing is of my own comprehension. If you weren't being disingenuous please disabuse me (but clearly is indeed subsequent to ). You present a diff exemplifying that I have substantially contributed to other articles (e.g. raven paradox); what is it which you perceive may be confessed by that? (On the other hand, if you were wanting a confession of the limits to my own familiarity with the topic at any point in time, you needn't have looked further than my explicit comments above. So..?) For the sake of improving my future contributions, please state plainly what it is that you think I am (or was) wrong about and why.

In general, Machine Elf, I find your brevity is impinging on your capacity to make yourself understood. Cesiumfrog (talk) 04:58, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

You were the one who accused Rectipaedia of trolling! Those edits were 2 minutes apart, over three weeks ago, when Rectipaedia was making his or her original claim, that precisely such a universal claim can, in fact, be verified... So if you're going to keep trying drudge up dirt to make me out to be the bad guy and poison the well for the RfC, (because I reverted you once), I have no need or interest in further communication with you.

Considering my lengthy responses to Rectipaedia at the top of this thread, prior to your "joining this discussion", I find your habit of making personal observations to be most unhelpful.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 05:39, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

I agree with Cesiumfrog that your responses tend to be short and hard to understand. If you were to explain, in detail and in your own words, why you think the link to the Raven paradox is relevant, we might make some progress in resolving this disagreement. I think the issue might be that you don't understand when it is appropriate to link to another article. For this reason, I suggest you read WP:Manual_of_Style/Linking. You seem to think that the link is appropriate because the subject is generally relevant to criticisms of logical positivism. I think that it would only be appropriate to link to another article if the article were directly relevant to the sentence containing the link. The article should help the reader understand the point being made by the sentence and its paragraph. The Raven paradox should only be linked to in a context where the problem of induction is being mentioned. It should not be linked to in a context in which the problem of induction is relevant but is not mentioned. Rectipaedia (talk) 20:14, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

No, not the problem of induction, this demonstrates my point. There's three (not 2) different problems here: i) that propositions about big sets can only be tested by induction, ii) that induction from positive instances isn't necessarily valid, iii) that induction from non-instances isn't necessarily invalid. Obviously all three are closely related (as Machine Elf emphasises) but that makes it easy to inadvertently confuse them. Hence, the one example (raven blackness) which is (as per Machine Elf) identified specifically to one of those three, is not the most suitable example to use (at least not without modification) in a sentence aimed only for explaining (terminology in) one of the two other problems (i & ii). As Rectipaedia says, we ought help the reader understand (and distinguish) things they may be unfamiliar with, with clarity instead of by using allusion to conflate (three) separate points unnecessarily. Myself and Rectipaedia have both expressed willingness for the raven paradox to be covered in the article, and I fail to understanding why Elf still insists it absolutely must always additionally be the example mentioned in sentences where it isn't directly-relevant and, to the contrary, likely promotes this confusion. Cesiumfrog (talk) 00:43, 3 September 2012 (UTC)

There were four issues that I dealt with in my edit. I've decided to deal with one issue at a time. I've removed the repeated link to universal quantifier. I doubt you will challenge that. The second issue is that I think the wiki-link should be removed because it is irrelevant. As Cesiumfrog pointed out, the statement "all ravens are black" is just an example of a universal statement. In order to merit a link, the paradox has to have some relevance to the local context. As the one who wants to include the link, MachineElf, please clearly explain the paradox's relevance. Rectipaedia (talk) 03:35, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

I had originally removed the second paragraph because it confusingly presented (apparent) falsificationism, as opposed to verificationism, and more generally, so as to concentrate on criticism of early logical positivism. It raises the question of post-positivist "logical empiricism" with Hempel's criticism of later, more sophisticated/pragmatic criteria of "cognitive significance" in terms of mere "confirmation" as opposed to "verfication".

The elegance of Hempel's study laid to rest any lingering aspirations for simple criteria of cognitive significance and signaled the demise of logical positivism as a philosophical movement.

Precisely what remained, however, was in doubt. Presumably, anyone who rejected one or more of the three principles defining positivism—the analytic/synthetic distinction, the observational/theoretical distinction, and the verifiability criterion of significance—was not a logical positivist. The precise outlines of its philosophical successor, which would be known as “logical empiricism”, were not entirely evident. Perhaps this study came the closest to defining its intellectual core. Those who accepted Hempel's four criteria and viewed cognitive significance as a matter of degree were members, at least in spirit. But some new problems were beginning to surface with respect to Hempel's covering-law explication of explanation and old problems remained from his studies of induction, the most remarkable of which was known as “the paradox of confirmation”.

I didn't mean to suggest that Hempel's ravens aren't directly related. I would have gone with a simpler example, but as we've had to expand the introduction considerably, we need a proper subsection to address Hempel's criticism's as well...—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 18:12, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

If you want to have a section on Hempel's criticism of logical positivism, that's fine and the raven paradox might be relevant to that. But it is not relevant to the discussion of the problem with the verification of universal claims. Rectipaedia (talk) 20:49, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

Stop edit warring already!—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 07:57, 31 August 2012 (UTC)

Elf, it takes two to edit war.

Your actions have been as if you were more concerned with defending your personal[personally-preferred] phrasing than with compromise; You do realise that everyone else has been expressing agreement with you that Hempel's paradox is relevant to the article, and are only objecting that linking from that particular sentence is not an appropriate place for it? Cesiumfrog (talk) 04:58, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

You're accusing me of edit warring. That's a joke. You're the one with the battleground mentality. It's not my personal phrasing. In fact, I'm objecting to you trying to use my personal phrasing. Obviously, I realize that it's relevant to the article and the introduction to the criticism section may as well use the relevant example of a universally quantified statement rather than a completely irrelevant one.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 05:15, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

To clarify, are you still opposed to using a different example (anything other than raven blackness) to explain what a universal statement is, even if a separate paragraph is (or can soon be) added which explicitly describes Hempel's criticism (including his raven blackness paradox)? Cesiumfrog (talk) 06:10, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

Clearly, I think the introduction was better using preexisting example, because it's more relevant. That's not a personal preference; your personal preference is, in fact, irrelevant.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 06:31, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

I have made a few edits intending to clarify the scope of 'verification' and 'meaningfulness', based on the link to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verificationism and my reading of the Encyclopaedia cited. Please can someone check. Based on this interpretation it seems to me that logical positivism was arguably correct in some technical sense but confused the philosophical debate of the time, and has confused me.--Djmarsay (talk) 10:57, 15 February 2021 (UTC)

Well I'm the exception to this rule. As Well, the rule that this proposal in almost every instance would be obsured! Please don't restrict my usage, for this is the first and last talking point. I encourage you to question my statment? Meagan Shadrick (talk) 08:04, 30 January 2022 (UTC)

1. both scientific-method empiricism and logical proofs are accepted
2. logic positivism is related but not necessarily tautological to logicalism = the claim that everything that can exist has logical foundations (they don’t have to be scientoempirically observed and be mathematically proven [at least all of them] because the possible substantialities are infinite). Logicalism isn't against proofs, but there cannot be infinite proofs and aren't trivially generalizable/ the omniuniversal axiomatics [omniaxiomatics] = the axiomatic system which includes all axiomatic systems isn't a finite theory (many axiomatic systems are mutually exclusive; but theoretically an infinite axiomatic program [axiomatic programs work better than axiomatic lists in complex systems] would be able to manage it; but existence is always local and never infinite [see: Hubble volume/ an infinite physical computer would face causality fragmentation]
3. the axiomatic prerequisites for common mathematics isn't tautological to the axiomatic prerequisites for physical foundations (which are tree-like axiomatic programs and not necessarily typical axiomatic systems)/ The foundations of mathematics have innate logical gaps because mathematics is a generic measuring-calculational-proof-scientific [not ontological in itself] axiomatic system. Any effort to complete the foundations of mathematics is either erroneous, or produces one of the infinite possible allomathematics (mathematics with different axioms). Infinite physics and universes are logically possible. The foundations of a universe have to be built on an axiomatic tree-program without logical gaps, but that produces only biased (one out of many) universe. There's no single universe.
4. overscientification: The erroneous claim that science has to focus only on our universe (without proof on why science is limited), usually claimed by mathematicians (like Sabine Hossenfelder) which cancel themselves, because mathematics is compatible (due to logic) but not tautological to physics (and to its foundations)
5. problems of axiomaticity/ axiomatic systems: incompleteness, inconsistency, uncalculability. The physical foundations don't have to be a closed system (open systems work better in axiomatic program trees which meet the criteria of physical foundations)
6. axiomatic workarounds/ ways of the physical foundations to workaround without to cancel the problems of axiomaticity/ axiomatic systems: Heisenberg's uncertainty principle isn't fundamental in quantum field theory (the overall wavefunction has one definition); but in the infinite series of Wigner's friends it becomes important (still though the overall wavefunction has one definition, but it's not trivially infinite)
7. Some people who work on physicalism are Christians, and others are simplistic. Physicalism = the claim that everything that can exist is physical (cyclic and hollow nondefinition), isn't tautological to logicalism = the claim that everything that can exist has logical foundations
8. logicalism/logicogony = cosmogony from logical foundations vs nihilogony = cosmogony due to the decay of the permanently nonexistent nothing[ness] into something/ universes
   • If you are a logicalist, you deem the logical foundations self-caused if they are rigorous (the physical foundations can have logical gaps as an open system, but these gaps have to be filled by tree-like axiomatics/ practically logical gaps aren't allowed on the physical foundations, but the logical completeness requires self-interactions and in some cases tree-like axiomatics = family tree of mathematically related universes. Most universes are mathematically nonparallelizable. Not all univeses belong in the same axiomatic tree = multiverse. There is no true omniverse/ the omnimultiverse isn't a true system; the full collection of universes is just a set; not all univeses are mathematically related.
   • nihilogony isn't compatible with logicogony — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:2149:8B27:5500:E8B1:EBBE:FDD:980D (talk) 06:27, 28 April 2023 (UTC)

It's in the 'see also' section. Is there something I'm missing?--Phil of rel (talk) 18:24, 19 January 2022 (UTC)

I came here to ask the exact same question. There’s no obvious relationship, and nobody ever replied to you, so I’ll remove it. Foxmilder (talk) 23:52, 29 December 2023 (UTC)

I’ve removed the link entirely, as it has no obvious relationship to the subject of the article. If, for some reason, another editor disagrees — if somebody believes the concept of a moral panic is, in fact, sufficiently relevant as to warrant inclusion here — please discuss this on the talk page first. Foxmilder (talk) 00:26, 30 December 2023 (UTC)

Logical positivists criticize "metaphysicians" in a similar way to Mao Zedong. Is there some overlap there? Was Mao influenced by the Vienna circle at all? Mao wrote his "On Contradiction" in 1937, just a year after the Vienna Circle stopped regularly meeting. Or was there perhaps just something in the general discourse of intellectuals at that time in terms of "metaphysics"?

Clearly Mao's work isn't the same as the verificationism of logical positivists but I perceive a similar sort of hewing to material reality in opposition to abstraction/rationalism/idealism. AslanFrench (talk) 01:06, 20 January 2024 (UTC)

In the Observation/theory gap section it says:

Early, most logical positivists proposed that all knowledge is based on...

Was this meant to be: "Early on, most logical positivists...

or maybe: Most early logical positivists...

or maybe I just need to understand what the sentence means?

פשוט pashute ♫ (talk) 13:22, 19 September 2024 (UTC)

The article doesn't mention the conundrum logical monism vs. logical pluralism (more common in modern thought; infinite different experimental logical foundations, not necessarily useful for proofs).

We don't even have the page of logical monism.

Don't redirect to logic, etc. Redirections KILL philosophy and the study of logic if they're fraudulent. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:2149:8BB7:F100:CCC4:7E7E:C4E:6F6F (talk) 01:09, 23 December 2024 (UTC)