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Discrete mathematics

The discrete mathematics paragraph of this article was misleading. All the areas mentioned include both discrete and continuous mathematics.

Information theory isn't only discrete mathematics, information theory also applies to analog signals. See Differential entropy.

Analog signal processing is also a form of computation.

Theoretical computer science considers both discrete and continuous computational processes, and both discrete and continuous input/output:

Including the question of P!=NP over Real numbers

For now, I've added the above information to the article, but the whole section on discrete mathematics should be deleted, and its content redistributed to elsewhere in the article. Bethnim (talk) 13:37, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

I've moved combinatorics to the structure section, and that just leaves Theoretical computer science so the discrete section is renamed to Theoretical computer science. Bethnim (talk) 13:54, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

Maths not part of logic?

User Keifer Wolfowitz seems to be claiming completely without any references of [or? Kiefer.Wolfowitz (talk) 19:57, 23 March 2010 (UTC) ]

My edit noted that logic includes the study of fallacies, etc. and cited Peirce, so editor Wolfkeeper's statement is false. C.S. Peirce observed that logic relied on mathematics, which is the science of necessary reasoning according to his father B. Peirce, who is quoted in this article. Kiefer.Wolfowitz (talk) 19:58, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

proof that Maths is not part of logic. Note that logic includes the study of inconsistent systems and many other things, and it does not seem that there is any part of mathematics that is not part of logic in the broad sense. But there are clearly parts of logic which are not usually considered mathematical.- Wolfkeeper 19:43, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

He also seems to be maintaining a claim that maths is actually not logical in the article; with an apparent oblique reference to Gödel's incompleteness; this is frankly a bizarre non sequitor and completely unreferenced.- Wolfkeeper 19:43, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

My understanding is that logic is a branch of mathematics. Stephen B Streater (talk) 19:47, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead proved in Principia Mathematica that all of mathematics can be broken down into a simple and small set of logical propositions ("axioms"). Godel's Incompleteness was an extension of that work. It shows that as a logical system the system of mathematics we use contains statements that cannot be proven to be true or false. and if you add axioms to try to fix this gap, it will contradict itself.
So if you are representing his views correctly, then he is misunderstanding godel's proof and it's relation to bertrand and whiteheads: namely, that which could be deduced from the simple and elementary fact that in math there are no contradictions: and that is that they don't contradict each other. That's how it is that we have computers; as alan turing's essay "computable numbers (see computable number) was in turn an extension of godel's work, and led to the digital computer - a machine that theoretically can do any and every mathematical operation. Kevin Baastalk 19:52, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
(ec)No, I think you've got a few misunderstandings in there. First of all the system of Principia Mathematica is no longer used in any serious way; its importance is historical. Its notation is bizarre and the system as a whole is Baroque, to the point that almost no one really studies it in detail anymore. Certainly I have not, which makes it hard for me to say exactly what part of mathematics can or cannot be formalized in the system of PM, but it is definitely not "all mathematics".
More seriously, you're missing the fact that Goedel was at the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum from Russell and Whitehead, and his work is in large part a demonstration that what Russell and Whitehead sought was unachievable. Russell and Whitehead were part of the logicist school, that sought to reduce all of mathematics to logic (that is, to tautology), to show that mathematical statements were analytic propositions. Goedel on the other hand was a realist/Platonist, at least in his later years.
Goedel's theorems do not strictly speaking refute the claim that mathematical propositions are analytic; that claim is not mathematical enough to be subject to mathematical refutation. However they definitely put severe roadblocks in the way of the most expansive logicist dreams.
There are other errors in your comments but this is not the place to discuss them. The point relevant to editing the article is that we must not make claims such as "mathematics is part of logic" or "logic is part of mathematics", because there is no consensus among workers in the field that either of these statements is true. We can, however, attribute such claims to various thinkers, giving due weight according to their recognition and importance. --Trovatore (talk) 20:15, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
"First of all the system of Principia Mathematica is no longer used in any serious way..." you seem to be misunderstanding the entire point of principia mathematica. it is not supposed to be pedagogical in any way, it was meant as one big proof and it's generally accepted among mathemticians to be a formally rigorous and successful one. All the stuff about it being barouqe, use a bizarre notation, etc. is all non-sequitor. and please don't bring up "russel's paradox", we both know that has nothing to do with this.
"More seriously, you're missing the fact that Goedel was at the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum" - actually, far from being "serious", that is utterly irrelevant.
RE: "Goedel's theorems do not strictly speaking refute...'": Who are you talking to? I'm not sure that's really pertinent at all to the discussion. and i have no idea where you're going with that or why it matters.
RE: "There are other errors in your comments..." all your "errors" have so far been your errors in interpretation and/or simply non-sequitors and straw men. so far it is yet to be demonstrated that there are any errors in what i actually said, and your tangents have left me completely unpersuaded. Kevin Baastalk 21:41, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
You can have contradictions in maths of course; proof by reaching a contradiction is considered part of mathematics (albeit somewhat controversial sometimes). Contradictions are certainly generated and studied.- Wolfkeeper 20:07, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
I mean that the formal system we call mathematics does not itself contain contradictions. I am saying something different here. I am saying that the formal system we call "mathematics" is consistent. Kevin Baastalk 21:41, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
::: Please provide a reference to a reliable source (unlike Principia Mathematica) that logic covers mathematics. Until then, I won't condescend to discuss your original research. Then strive for consensus before ignoring the warning hidden in the opening sentence. Thanks. Kiefer.Wolfowitz (talk) 20:05, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
It's usually understood that the foundations of maths are in philosophy and logic. And the claim of the article right now is that maths isn't logic at all!!!- Wolfkeeper 20:07, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
RE "At all" Not only the scholarship but the italicized clichés of Dan Brown.Kiefer.Wolfowitz (talk) 20:10, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
Funny. Try the thing that 's staring you right in the face. it's all 1's and 0's and digital (i.e. logical) circuitry. everybody knows that. and i just explained it in the above paragraph. look up turing machine. in addition to the references, both internal and external, that i gave you in the above paragraph. if you can't understand what i wrote or what the references say, that's your problem, not mine. And those papers and articles i referenced are not my research. But that's utterly obvious. As regards "I won't condescend to..." clearly you don't know what "condescend" means. Let me enlighten you: it's exactly what you were doing in the sentence that you started out with "I won't condescend...". Oh the irony! I'll try to recuse myself from this discussion as, judging from these things, seems like something i'm going to have a particular difficult time avoiding, myself. Kevin Baastalk 20:15, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

There's no need for personal attacks or displays of emotion in our discussion about logic - it's illogical, Captain ;-) What we should do is, as was pointed out above, report what good sources have claimed, after reaching consensus here. These ideas were not born fully formed, and it is not surprising that there is some inconsistency in their use. But the subject is big, and it is important to keep it concisely worded. Stephen B Streater (talk) 20:37, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

someone brought up the dichotomy: "mathematics is part of logic" or "logic is part of mathematics". it's a false dichotomy. logic is a branch of mathematics AND mathematics is a formal system. simple. Kevin Baastalk 21:23, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

Tutorial websites

http://www.mathscentre.ac.uk/students.php http://www.mathtutor.ac.uk/ I would add them to the article but it is locked. Please could someone add it when it is unlocked, as I may not return here for years. Thanks 89.240.44.159 (talk) 12:42, 19 April 2010 (UTC)

It's locked for a reason. If not already on Wikipedia, useful information about the subject should ideally be added into the relevant articles here. But Wikipedia is not a tutorial, or a directory of tutorials - see WP:NOT. Stephen B Streater (talk) 20:42, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

Definition of mathematics

In my humble opinion, more attention should be paid to the definition of mathematics. The first line of the article - as far as I know - is not a recognised definition, more a sketchy impression what mathematics is roughly like.

In a true "mathematical" spirit, the question must be answered first whether the concept "mathematics" can be defined at all. A mathematician told me that it is fundamentally impossible to give such a definition, at least to mathematicians (but I did not fully understand his reasoning).

Is mathematics perhaps just a term culturally attached to a rather arbitrary choice of some forms of logical reasoning? Perhaps a definition can only be given if a purpose is decided first (e.g. there are "ontological" and "teleological" definitions: the former try to grasp the essence of a concept, the latter are a choice that can be practical or unpractical, but is never correct or incorrect).

On reason to be strict in the definition of mathematics is the continuing debate about the patentability of mathematical algorithms. Some argue that all algorithms are inherently mathematical, I am inclined to believe that none of them is: only the proof of an algorithm is - perhaps - mathematics. Is all mathematics inherently so fundamental knowledge that it should never be withdrawn from the public domain? But many mechanical inventions basically are geometric, and geometry is a branch of mathematics.

Is there a fundamental difference between philosophy and mathematics? Or is it just cultural: mathematicans prove, philosophers cite. Both are disciplines that do not depend on observations (which is afaik a reason not to consider them "science" at all, in some perceptions - which must be a deception for a PhD in maths!). Maths often deal with quantities, but e.g. boolean algebra doesn't. Math's use shorthands - formulas - but the Pythagoras theorem in plain language is still mathematics.

Who responds to the challenge? Rbakels (talk) 19:54, 12 August 2010 (UTC)

No one, I hope.
Before you step in this one, please look back in the archives of this page. --Trovatore (talk) 19:56, 12 August 2010 (UTC)
Please explain. I don't want to consult an archive of a discussion page to find the very definition of the topic of a lemma! Rbakels (talk) 20:05, 12 August 2010 (UTC)
The current definition is the result of a very long discussion over several years, with many editors taking a lot of people points of view into account. Every word has been discussed and a near consensus arrived at. Most alternatives have been discussed somewhere and you will find a reluctance to repeat arguments which have already been had. As you yourself point out there is not one universally agreed definition so it would not be right for us to give one, the sketchy impression is perhaps the best which can be achieved.--Salix (talk): 22:12, 12 August 2010 (UTC)
Ah, I see. But that perhaps confirms that mathematics can not be defined at all - is it just a loose designation of some forms of logic? Or is it characterized by the methodology? Mathematicians let logic speak for themselves - logicians from a philosophical tradition cite authorities, in as many footnotes as possible. I think there is a need for a (non-)existence proof of the concept "mathematics". This may not be too interesting to mathematicians themselves, but I guess the prime purpose of an encyclopedia is to define the topics of its lemmas, and, as I said, it has practical relevance, like in the political and legal field. Perhaps a summary of the (failed) debate you refer to does the job. If only to prevent other nasty people to ask the same nasty questions I asked again ;) Rbakels (talk) 04:35, 13 August 2010 (UTC)
Have you seen the page Definitions of mathematics that might be a more appropriate venue for this discussion. It seems that there are a number of different schools of thought about the definition with Realists, Intuitionist, and Formalist. As such the question of the definition becomes a philosophical rather than a mathematical problem.--Salix (talk): 06:37, 13 August 2010 (UTC)
Thanks, very helpful. Would it perhaps make sense to link the "mathematics" article to the "definitions of mathematics" article. Other people like me may expect a Wikipedia lemma on topic "X" to contain the definition of "X" itself????? Rbakels (talk) 09:31, 13 August 2010 (UTC)
There is a link - Definitions of mathematics is top of the "See also" list. Gandalf61 (talk) 12:54, 13 August 2010 (UTC)


It does have a definition. Not a completely precise definition, not a definition in the mathematical sense, but a definition along the lines of one you might expect at articles like dog or apple. That's what's appropriate to this sort of article. In articles about a mathematical object, say an ultrafilter, you expect a precise definition. But mathematics is not a mathematical object.
(Just by the way, I recognize your use of the word lemma, but not everyone will; it's not a terribly common usage in English, outside of specialized works on linguistics.) --Trovatore (talk) 20:51, 14 August 2010 (UTC)

In Our Time

The BBC programme In Our Time presented by Melvyn Bragg has an episode which may be about this subject (if not moving this note to the appropriate talk page earns cookies). You can add it to "External links" by pasting * {{In Our Time|Mathematics|p00545hk}}. Rich Farmbrough, 03:17, 16 September 2010 (UTC).

Infinity picture

An image displaying the infinity symbol eight times seems unnecessary to me, and I think that removing it would greatly improve the article's aesthetic quality. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 131.104.240.36 (talk) 10:28, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

Proof of Pythagoras' theorem
It doesn't do much for me either. How about replacing it with this featured picture (right) of a proof of Pythagoras' theorem? --Avenue (talk) 13:18, 20 October 2010 (UTC)
The infinity does match the text better, which is on notation, and there's already a diagram demonstrating Pythagoras's theorem further down. I can't immediately think of something to replace the current image though.--JohnBlackburnewordsdeeds 13:29, 20 October 2010 (UTC)
At least on the small screen I'm using, the infinity image appears opposite a paragraph about proof, and is at least a paragraph away from our text about notation. I don't think it's a great illustration of notation either - why does it really matter that the infinity symbol can be drawn slightly differently in various typefaces? I do take your point about Pythagoras' theorem appearing further down, though. --Avenue (talk) 15:17, 20 October 2010 (UTC)
The parallel postulate is the fifth axiom underlying Euclidean geometry, and the most controversial.
How about this image depicting the parallel postulate? This would tie in with the discussion of axiomatic systems in that section's final paragraph. --Avenue (talk) 15:42, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

That doesn't really work either, as it doesn't illustrate the parallel postulate, or at least not without far more explanation (and it's not controversial in modern mathematics). But it's on history, not mathematical theory, so detailed explanation is just distracting. What about something from commons:Category:History_of_mathematics ? A few things stand out as historic and interesting to me, such as file:Yanghui_triangle.PNG, or one of these commons:Category:Geometria by Augustin Hirschvogel.--JohnBlackburnewordsdeeds 22:48, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

Most fundamental concepts already have an illustration of some sort, and the section aready has a picture of Euler. Perhaps the image should just be removed? Jeffrey Daniel (talk) 18:05, 21 October 2010 (UTC)

Main image

Though I have nothing but respect for Euclid, I'm not sure that Raphael's painting of him is the best lead image for this article. It seems to me that something more lively or visually interesting might be preferable, similar to the approach used by the biology and chemistry articles.

I would suggest a pair of images, similar to the layout on the chemistry article. My pick would be the two images on the right. The first image illustrates geometry (specifically Desargues' theorem), and was obtained from Portal:Mathematics/Featured picture archive. The second is a picture of the Mandelbrot set, and is a mathematics-related featured picture on Wikipedia (see Wikipedia:Featured pictures/Sciences/Mathematics). Jim.belk (talk) 00:16, 16 November 2010 (UTC)

I propose that we add www.onlinemathcircle.com to the external links section. A good explanation of what it is would be: "A Community Dedicated to Making Mathematics More Open" —Preceding unsigned comment added by Shrig94 (talkcontribs) 02:14, 21 November 2010 (UTC)

No, as there's nothing there: it's a new site with no content, and even if it were a large, active site it's not clear it should be included or which if any articles it's relevant to (maths competitions or particular topics for example).--JohnBlackburnewordsdeeds 12:18, 21 November 2010 (UTC)

Awards section

It seems inappropriate to me to advertise prizes in this article. The article is about mathematics, not mathematicians. There are no such sections in the articles about politics or economics, for instance. The insertion appears to have been placed arbitrarily into a section in which it does not belong, in any case. 131.111.184.95 (talk) 08:37, 15 December 2010 (UTC)

The point of the brief mention of the Fields Medal is in the context of the question of whether or not mathematics is a science. If mathematics is a science, why are mathematicians awarded a Fields Medal rather than a Nobel Prize? Your reason for not mentioning the Fields Medal, that the article is about mathematics, not mathematicians, seems odd. Every article on an academic subject mentions major contributers to that subject. Would you mention calculus but not mention Newton? Rick Norwood (talk) 13:32, 15 December 2010 (UTC)
The existence or non-existence of the Fields Medal (or any other award) has no relevance to the question of whether mathematics is a science. Your reasoning about the Nobel Prize does not seem to make any sense. Is peace or literature a science because they have Nobel Prizes? Does computer science or geology fail to be a science because they lack Nobel Prizes? Again, the existence of an award has no relevance to the question of whether a subject is considered a science. Hence, the mention of awards certainly does not belong in that section of the article. As for the article more generally, it may be the case that articles on academic subjects mention major contributors to the subject. This, however, is not relevant to the issue being discussed. The issue is whether a particular prize or prizes should be mentioned; this has nothing to do with mentioning contributors. Euler is an example of a contributor; the Fields Medal (or any other award) is not. Newton was awarded a slew of honors for his work; should the article on calculus list all of them? 131.111.184.95 (talk) 19:28, 16 December 2010 (UTC)

Let's agree to disagree. Rick Norwood (talk) 14:19, 17 December 2010 (UTC)

I agree with 131.111.184.95's argument that whether there is a Nobel Prize has nothing to do with whether mathematics is a science. And the material on Hilbert's 23 problems seems irrelevant. On the other hand, I agree with Rick Norwood that it's reasonable to have a brief discussion of the mathematical profession(s) in this article --- especially since the public seems to have many misconceptions about what mathematicians do --- with a link to the full article at Mathematician. So I vote that we refactor this material. Mgnbar (talk) 17:50, 18 December 2010 (UTC)
I've made a new section and dumped the material there, for lack of a better place. It clearly needs some work to integrate into the article. LJosil (talk) 22:54, 30 December 2010 (UTC)

Goedel and logicism

In reference to the disputed claim that

However, in the 1930s important work in mathematical logic showed that mathematics cannot be reduced to logic

I have to say that I agree that this assertion should not appear without qualification, because not everyone agrees (for example Torkel Franzen did not agree). However it is a serious and widely held point of view, likely the majority view, and ought to be represented. I suspect that Wolfkeeper and Kevin Bass don't understand the argument for how Goedel's theorems might be said to refute logicism, and this is a bit subtle and I'm not going to go into it right now. It is strictly speaking beside the point anyway for purposes of editing the encyclopedia the challenge is to source the statement, and to correctly attribute it, not to a single thinker because it's a widely held view, but to a current of mathematical thought. --Trovatore (talk) 21:24, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

If that line is refering to godel's work it is totally nothing like anything godel showed. Kevin Baastalk 22:05, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
as to it being a "serious and widely held point of view", quite the opposite is true, as Axiomatic_set_theory#Applications spells out in no uncertain terms:

Nearly all mathematical concepts are now defined formally in terms of sets and set theoretic concepts. For example, mathematical structures as diverse as graphs, manifolds, rings, and vector spaces are all defined as sets having various (axiomatic) properties. Equivalence and order relations are ubiquitous in mathematics, and the theory of relations is entirely grounded in set theory.

Set theory is also a promising foundational system for much of mathematics. Since the publication of the first volume of Principia Mathematica, it has been claimed that most or even all mathematical theorems can be derived using an aptly designed set of axioms for set theory, augmented with many definitions, using first or second order logic. For example, properties of the natural and real numbers can be derived within set theory, as each number system can be identified with a set of equivalence classes under a suitable equivalence relation whose field is some infinite set.

Set theory as a foundation for mathematical analysis, topology, abstract algebra, and discrete mathematics is likewise uncontroversial; mathematicians accept that (in principle) theorems in these areas can be derived from the relevant definitions and the axioms of set theory. Few full derivations of complex mathematical theorems from set theory have been formally verified, however, because such formal derivations are often much longer than the natural language proofs mathematicians commonly present. One verification project, Metamath, includes derivations of more than 10,000 theorems starting from the ZFC axioms and using first order logic.

Kevin Baastalk 22:08, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
You seem to be taking the position that set theory is a part of logic, which is a controversial claim and not generally accepted.
(Here by logic I'm talking about logic in the strict sense, not "mathematical logic" of course everyone agrees that set theory is part of mathematical logic. But mathematical logic is not logic; it's mathematical logic.)
The logical character of first-order logic is not (much) in dispute. The logical character of the ZFC axioms, on the other hand, is very much in dispute. I think it is fair to say that most workers in the field consider the ZFC axioms to be, depending on their philosophical school, either formal assertions or substantive claims, but in either case not mere logical necessities. --Trovatore (talk) 22:20, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
You're not making any sense to me. for instance, "think it is fair to say that most workers in the field consider the ZFC axioms to be, depending on their philosophical school, either formal assertions or substantive claims, but in either case not mere logical necessities." - your speaking of axioms as "substantive claims" and questioning whether they are "logical neccessities". that doesn't make any sense to me. a "susbstantive claim" might be a premise perse, but then axioms are things that act on premises. a logical neccesity is something that follows from the use of axioms, not something that precedes (or constitutes!) them. if there are really philosophers that are conflating these things, as you claim, then they are seriously confused. you also seem to have contradicted yourself regarding logic and set theory. that doesn't make any sense to me. we seem to be talking past each other. In any case I quoted directly from an article there so it's not me talking past you there but wikipedia. and then i add in contradiction of the dichotormy "math part of logic or logic part of math: "logic is a branch of mathematics and mathematics is a formal system". and you can read the intor to the formal syatem article to see what relation i am saying math has to logic in that sense. so there it is in either case wikipedia speaking, and i stand by wikipedia's interpretation and if you're ever confused about what i mean i mean what wikipedia means. Kevin Baastalk 12:57, 24 March 2010 (UTC)
And regarding logic and sets, -- as you should already know from reading the material i cited from Axiomatic set theory#Applications -- see first-order logic and second-order logic. Kevin Baastalk
I do think we're talking past each other. Let me explain about "reducing mathematics to logic", in the sense that the logicists wanted to do it, what that would mean if it could be done.
The idea was that the truths of mathematics should be purely logical truths; that is, understood correctly, they should not require any assumptions at all, but should simply be expressions of making valid inferences. So if you need axioms, then you have not reduced mathematics to logic at best, you've reduced it to logic plus those axioms. Unless of course the axioms themselves are logically necessary.
To take an example, consider the equation 0+0=0. Arguably I can rephrase this as saying if I have two buckets, and there's nothing in either bucket, and there's nothing that's in both buckets, then there's nothing in that's in either bucket. Replacing sets by predicates, I could express this as follows:
Now, the above statement is a logical truth, in the sense that it doesn't matter how you interpret the predicate symbols P and Q. You can prove it (say, using Gentzen-style sequent calculus) without using any axioms whatsoever. And arguably it captures the meaning of the equation 0+0=0.
The logicists wanted to do something like that for all of mathematics. Whether the Goedel theorems proved that this is impossible is a matter of debate, and depends considerably on what you consider to be "logic". --Trovatore (talk) 18:24, 24 March 2010 (UTC)
Ok, so what i'm getting is that the "purely logical" is like "non-tautological tautology" or "premises based solely on axioms that have no premises" - and in any case a self-contradicting mental fixation for the loosely grounded. now while axiomatic systems can be well grounded an their interpretations pretty smooth, and one can argue that they are natural expressions of nature insofar as they come from us and we are part of nature, and clearly my computer here can do just fine with them so there must be something physically innate about them. but arguably that's nonlinear dynamics and emergence that makes the analog parts of a computer operate digitally. so you're (i mean said philosophers, not you) trying to ground the physical application of logic in a neccessary discrete process, but what actually gives rise to it is emergent nonlinear analog processes. and you're bending the term "logic" to refer to those analog processes when you know deep down inside that there's something innately different about them, and then conflating the bent definition w/the original one.
so ya, that "logic" (pun intended) is transparently dubious. and maybe it was part of some of the more "religious" mathemeticians of old (e.g. Pythagoros), and might make for a good historical note and an interesting insight into insanity. but we definitely shouldn't write it in any way that makes it sound like the idea that math is not a formal system or any absurd proposition like that is at all credible, which is what it sounded like to me. Kevin Baastalk 19:39, 24 March 2010 (UTC)
also be it said that the idea "So if you need axioms, then you have not reduced mathematics to logic at best, you've reduced it to logic plus those axioms. Unless of course the axioms themselves are logically necessary." - the axioms are somewhat arbitrary, actually, the real restriction is their topological (for lack of a better word) relation to each other. i.e. a computer's "operations" or "instructions" can be called "axioms", thus in the original turing machine you can have a set of axioms. but turing also showed that there are quite an innumerable set of turing machines w/different "axioms" which are all equivalent to the universal turing machine. (and to cite some real world practical examples: IBM compatible, apple, cray, DEC Alpha.) that is, they can all emulate each other. so the only thing really "unique" or non-arbitrary about them is that they can emulate each other. i.e., roughly, their place in the Chomsky_hierarchy (namely, Turing_completeness), quite irrespective of the grammar and axioms they use. I might be a little off-topic on this, but that's what it reminds me of, in any case. Kevin Baastalk 19:50, 24 March 2010 (UTC)
okay, now reading logicism i see more what you mean: that the traditional set of "logic" rules apparently need to be augmented with a few more rules (whcih can be expressed in terms of the original set) in order to be, as it were, turing complete. and then this is a weaker sense of "logical" in that the set of rules needs to be augmented so. i never meant to imply that they didn't and i actually think it rather insignificant that they do. whose to say that the original set of "logic" rules isn't any more arbitrary than the "augmentations"? us?! talk about arbitrary! Kevin Baastalk 20:48, 24 March 2010 (UTC)
These are terribly complicated issues and there is no general agreement on them. The talk page for the mathematics article is not the right forum to talk about them. If you are interested I strongly recommend the work of Harvard's Peter Koellner. He has a brilliant article in the current issue of the Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. You might also be interested in his On the question of absolute undecidability, which you can find online. --Trovatore (talk) 20:54, 24 March 2010 (UTC)

(unindent)they seem rather straightforward to me, but yes, yes, i shall digress. the issue is the phrase "...important work in mathematical logic showed that mathematics cannot be reduced to logic." , with which i still take issue with, if for slightly altered reasons. by "reduced to logic" i read something like "proofs of theorems be expressible in a reduced formal grammar", and I maintain that they can, e.g. a turing machine or a ZFS+AOC system. and i contend that the subtler point that you need a few axioms beyond the basic and,or, in, not operations, which are noentheless expressible with those operations, and that some egregious purists might balk at that is a bit trivial and a bit to fine to be stated so boldly, apart from the phrasing as worded being -- as we have just witnessed -- misleading. Kevin Baastalk 21:02, 24 March 2010 (UTC)

as it's worded now "logic alone" it's a little better but i still thinks it's ambiguous on a point this is, ultimatley, rather subtle. Kevin Baastalk 21:10, 24 March 2010 (UTC)
I changed mathematicians to non-mathematicians, as the sources only include beliefs of non-mathematicians. Roger (talk) 02:48, 8 January 2011 (UTC)

There's a lot of nonsense said above (on both sides of the argument, if there is one) that I will not comment about. However there is a simple issue that needs no technical arguments. The current version, which Trovatore keeps reverting to, starts: "Many philosophers believe that mathematics is not experimentally falsifiable, and thus not a science according to the definition of Karl Popper." I think all mathematicians would agree that mathematics is not experimentally falsifiable; it is hard to imagine how an experiment could falsify mathematics. It is quite conceivable that mathematics, or some part of it, will one day be found to be inconsistent (remember Russell's paradox?), but if it happens, it will have nothing to do with experiment. The universe has been found to not be a Euclidean space, but that does not affect the work of Euclid (which is not entirely rigorous anyway, but that is another issue) any more than it affects hyperbolic geometry (which does not model the universe either). I'm unsure what Popper actually though about mathematics (his WP article does not mention mathematics as subject at all), but I think falsifiability can only be taken to characterize empirical science, which mathematics simply isn't. As an aside, it would be more interesting to know if many philosophers believe that philosophical theories are experimentally falsifiable. But I digress.

Next sentence: "However, in the 1930s Gödel's incompleteness theorems convinced many mathematicians that mathematics cannot be reduced to logic alone, and Karl Popper concluded that 'most mathematical theories are, like those of physics and biology, hypothetico-deductive: pure mathematics therefore turns out to be much closer to the natural sciences whose hypotheses are conjectures, than it seemed even recently.'". OK, so (if I understand this correctly) Popper believes (around 1995, presumably a bit before his death in 1994) that mathematical hypotheses are conjectures that could be experimentally falsified, which just shows he doesn't understand what a hypothesis is in mathematics. But in any case there is no relation with Gödel's findings of the 1930's; I think this sentence makes a completely unjustified link between them and Popper's quote (in which "even recently" is unlikely to mean "before 1930"). And I would like to know what kind of non-logical element "many mathematicians" would like to invoke to resolve statements that according to the incompleteness theorem cannot be decided by logic alone.

So to get to the point I really wanted to make, there are two issues mixed up in this sentence which in fact are totally unrelated: (1) the question of whether mathematical axioms are assumptions about reality that could be experimentally falsified, and (2) the question whether in principle all mathematical statements can be proved or disproved in an appropriate formal logical system. Gödel's incompleteness theorem shows that (under mild assumptions on what "mathematical statement" and "formal system" mean) the answer to (2) has to be "no". So there will be in every theory some statements that cannot be decided from the axioms of the theory by pure logic. But that is miles away from anything involved in question (1). First of all such a statement is not an axiom of the theory, or a hypothesis of any particular theorem, which are simply assumed to be true in order for the theory/theorem to be applicable; it is a statement whose truth or falsehood one might think to be deducible from the (assumed) truth of the axioms, but in fact is not. And second, axioms have long since ended being considered to be "self-evident truths", they are just starting points of a theory that implicitly determine what the theory is about; they are meaningless in reality, or in any other theory. Take the axioms of your favorite theory: groups, probability, topology, mathematical analysis, (and yes) geometry, set theory, even mathematical logic itself. Which means that the answer to (1) is also "no", but with no relation whatsoever to Gödel's work.

And logicism in all this? It certainly never assumed that mathematics needs no axioms. It is inconceivable to base say geometry on pure logic without some axioms telling what geometric notions like "point" and "line" mean. It also does not affirm that all mathematical statements can be decided by pure logic (from a given set of axioms). What it probably does affirm (I'm in no way an expert on this) is that apart from the rules of logic and the axioms, mathematics needs no vague kind or reasoning based on things that are "obvious" without being able to be formalized. It definitely rejects the idea that there are mathematical statements whose truth is open to experimental verification or falsification, but that does not distinguish it from other schools of thought (Popper notwithstanding). Marc van Leeuwen (talk) 14:03, 10 January 2011 (UTC)

I agree that Trovatore keeps reverting to statements that are not true, and not commonly believed by mathematicians. At best, the statements are confusing and misleading. If some mathematicians do believe these statements, then there should be a citation to a source, so the interested reader can learn just what the mathematician is really saying. As it is, the whole section is confusing. Roger (talk) 21:14, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
Roger, to be honest, I don't think you understand these issues well enough to comment on them. Evidence for this would be your change to the claim that Goedel showed that "some mathematical statements are undecidable". That's completely wrong. Goedel did not show that any individual statement was "undecidable". He did show that certain foundational theories as a whole were undecidable in the sense of a decision problem, but that's different. He also showed that, for any given formal theory satisfying certain conditions, there are statements that are undecidable in a different sense in that theory (that is, that they are independent of it), but not that they are undecidable full stop.
Marc van Leeuwen's claims are more subtle and I will need time to evaluate and respond. --Trovatore (talk) 21:54, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
Trovatore, I said that Goedel showed that some mathematical statements are undecidable. Your gripe seems to be that I did not refer to a particular formal system and add the qualification "in that theory" to that sentence. There is of course a whole article explaining the matter in detail. Please address the substance of what I said, and skip the ad hominem attacks. Roger (talk) 22:57, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
It's a total misrepresentation to say he showed certain statements were undecidable. That's the kind of nonsense you read in the popularizations. The Goedel sentence of PA is undecidable in PA, for example, but it is not "undecidable"; it's true. --Trovatore (talk) 23:03, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
Yes, of course "undecidable" means undecidable in a formal theory. See Decidability (logic). I see that you used the term "question of absolute undecidability" above to refer to whether a statement could be undecidable in any reasonable theory. I did not say anything about absolute undecidability. Roger (talk) 23:28, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
OK, let me just respond to a couple of things in Marc's comments. I may well not respond to everything (it's kind of long and I'm sitting here in an airport). First, absolutely some mathematicians take the view that mathematical statements can be experimentally falsifiable. The experiment in question is the discovery of a proof.
Take an example: Consider the claim that there is an absolute powerset of the set of all natural numbers. That is, that there exists, in whatever probably non-physical but nevertheless real sense, a set that has as elements all subsets of the naturals, so that none are left out.
This is a claim about the world. It says that the world has such an object in it.
Can it be falsified, in principle? Absolutely yes. The existence of such a set implies, for example, that the first-order theory called second-order arithmetic (slightly confusing maybe it's a theory of two-sorted first-order logic, with one sort for naturals and another sort for sets of naturals; the variables for sets of naturals is what makes us call it "second-order arithmetic") cannot prove the sentence 0=1. Attempts to prove 0=1 in second-order arithmetic are experiments, that attempt, among other things, to falsify the existence of P(N). If any such experiment ever succeeded, we would know that P(N) does not in fact exist.
Now, this may not be (probably is not) the majority view, but it is certainly not true that no mathematicians hold it.
On the other hand, the view that Goedel refuted logicism is, I think, the majority view, and therefore does not need to be attributed to individual mathematicians. I am on less sure ground in discussing what logicism actually claimed (past tense it's not really a viable current school, though there are "neo-logicists"), as I have not closely read Russell or Whitehead or Frege. However I think Marc is incorrect; I think it really did assert that you could do mathematics without assuming anything. You would still need definitions, but not axioms in the sense of actual synthetic assertions. --Trovatore (talk) 22:33, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
Trovatore, Russell, Whitehead, and Frege did not claim to be able to do mathematics without axioms. Please read up on the subject before claiming to represent the opinions of most mathematicians. If you are right about what most mathematicians believe, then you ought to be able to give a source that explains what those mathematicians believe. Roger (talk) 22:57, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
As I say, I'm not an expert on what the logicists thought in detail, but it is certainly now generally agreed that whatever it was, it was wrong. The turning point seems to have been Goedel, whether or not his theorems actually refuted logicism (Franzen thought not, which I do need to go back and figure out why he thought that). --Trovatore (talk) 07:41, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

Not to anyone particular, but to the attitude at the heart of this whole fight: please do not use philosophical waffle without being clear about the mathematics first, or you will be part of the grand scheme to reduce philosophy to random bits of pretentious babble about other subjects as spouted by those who have never actually studied the other subjects for their own sake.

The infinity sign

Dudes. Why is there a bunch of infinity signs in this article? They serve no purpose. I suggest we remove it, —Preceding unsigned comment added by 134.173.58.98 (talk) 04:07, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

I agree. What is the point of having the infinity sign in eight typefaces? If you really want something illustrating notation, an equation would do. Otherwise, this part of the article has enough illustrations; this one could simply be deleted. --seberle (talk) 18:05, 8 February 2011 (UTC)
I agree. Paul August 18:38, 8 February 2011 (UTC)

Mathematics by language

Some races, talk mathematics structure within their plain language, and have no written symbols to prove it. One example might be that according to a person who lives where there is no winter, he/she might only know snow and ice, but to a person who lives where it is winter for half the year, there are numerous kinds of snow definitions. There is granular, powdered, drifting, hard packed, just right to make an igloo, too hard even to leave tracks and I can go on and on, and another person will understand just what I am describing in exact detail. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 65.181.32.135 (talk) 16:58, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

If I understand correctly, your main point is that speakers of different languages speak mathematics differently. This is interesting but requires clarification and strong citations. Perhaps you also intended to express the idea that mathematics is a "language", separate from colloquial, natural languages. This is problematic. As an English speaker from the USA, I speak mathematics within my plain language. For example, I might say "Three plus eight is eleven." or "The antiderivative of x squared with respect to x is one third x cubed, plus C.". In writing I usually (but not always) abbreviate "three" as "3", "plus" as "+", etc. Mgnbar (talk) 17:15, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

Criticism of Definition of Mathematics, and General Remarks About the Article

This is a terrible article starting with a shit definition of maths justified by poor sources, and suitable only for children. How is this definition any different for an equivalent definition of physics by replacing the word mathematics for the word physics? Quantity, change and space, are physical concepts, mathematics deals with concepts that are patently not physical. That leaves structure. To say that algebraic topology, finite geometry, graph theory etc deals with structure is uninformative and misleading

The following are examples of awful sentences:

Mathematicians also engage in pure mathematics, or mathematics for its own sake, without having any application in mind, although practical applications for what began as pure mathematics are often discovered.[8]

Mathematics arises from many different kinds of problems.

Some mathematics is only relevant in the area that inspired it, and is applied to solve further problems in that area.

Number theory also holds two problems widely considered to be unsolved: the twin prime conjecture and Goldbach's conjecture.

Many mathematical objects, such as sets of numbers and functions, exhibit internal structure as a consequence of operations or relations that are defined on the set.

The study of space originates with geometry – in particular, Euclidean geometry.

Who the fuck writes this shit? Do they read what they wrote?

The only half-decent math entries on wikipedia, tend to be those that are too technical for idiots to fake, and even then they tend to be verbose, repetitious and awkwardly phrased. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.27.195.112 (talk) 13:42, 20 February 2011 (UTC)

In what way is this sentence (for example) awful? Are you upset by the content, or the writing, or what?
Mathematicians also engage in pure mathematics, or mathematics for its own sake, without having any application in mind, although practical applications for what began as pure mathematics are often discovered.[8]
It is difficult to write an article on a topic this big, with which so many people have experience at varying levels. Much of the article is the result of long argument to achieve near-consensus --- i.e. writing by committee --- which inevitably produces compromises. The definition of mathematics is a particularly sticky point. If you would sincerely like to improve Wikipedia, then propose your own text. Also, please keep in mind Wikipedia's policies on civility. Mgnbar (talk) 14:29, 20 February 2011 (UTC)

A bit presumptuous in the opening, and why can't I edit it?

"....establish truth by rigorous deduction from appropriately chosen axioms and definitions" This is not uncontroversial. It seems like what mathematicians wnat to believe about themselves, more than something factual. Also, why can't I edit this article? Sincerely, Mythirdself. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Mythirdself (talkcontribs) 19:10, 28 April 2011 (UTC)

The reason you can't edit it is that is was vandalised so much that we were forced to prevent unregistered and new users from editing it. You should be able to edit it now though (you need ten edits and that was your tenth). Hut 8.5 19:15, 28 April 2011 (UTC)
Before you edit anything in the opening, you should probably run it by the Talk Page first. The opening has had a very long history of edits and discussion (most of it in archives). Some of the opening is agreed compromise after long debate. --seberle (talk) 02:13, 29 April 2011 (UTC)
The metacomment there actually refers to the first sentence only. Tkuvho (talk) 04:28, 29 April 2011 (UTC)

The reference for the sentence I criticized isn't even comprehensible. It's (I assume) an author: "^ Jourdain". What's the work, page number, etc.? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Mythirdself (talkcontribs) 23:31, 29 April 2011 (UTC)

I agree the "Jourdain" reference is bizarre and that both the reference and the sentence need correcting. However, I also question the new statement "Since David Hilbert's time, it has become customary to view mathematical activity as establishing truth by rigorous deduction from appropriately chosen axioms and definitions." I'm a bit outside my area of expertise, but this is not my understanding of Hilbert's formalism. I thought Hilbert actually claimed the precise opposite -- that formal mathematics was arbitrary and in no way connected with real world "truth". Euclid, on the other hand, assumed his system to establish mathematical "truth", right? Is there a reference for this new statement? --seberle (talk) 00:53, 30 April 2011 (UTC)
Although I won't defend the sentence completely, I think I can put some nuance to the "precise opposite". As I see it, mathematical reasoning had been based for ages on an intuitive notion of what must be true in some Platonic mathematical universe, but Hilbert considered this too vague and open for philosophical debate (and no doubt things like non-Euclidean geometry had eroded the status of a Platonic universe). So he wanted to save the notion of truth by equating it to provability in a formal system; a notion sufficiently precise that no debate would be possible, and which itself is open to to mathematical study. In this point of view axioms are beyond discussion: playing the game means accepting the axioms (but one can choose to play different games). But I think that Hilbert still believed that the properties of an ideal mathematical universe in (say) number theory, analysis or algebra could be completely captured in a set of axioms; those that accept the truth of those axioms then cannot doubt the truth of theorems derived from them. So Hilbert is still out to capture "truth" in some world, not "real" but ideal, in a rigorous way. In some aspects Hilbert's project has been extremely successful, but 20th century developments in set theory and logic have led to a divorce between "truth" and "provability", which cannot be equated; the former necessarily remains outside our grasp, so we will have to settle for the latter. Marc van Leeuwen (talk) 06:22, 30 April 2011 (UTC)
The idea that Hilbert thought mathematics was an arbitrary system is one of the pernicious duds in the literature that does not stand up to scholarly scrutiny. Fortunately, there are quotes to disprove this. One of them is reproduced in the recent article
The way Hilbert thought mathematics was arbitrary may be an oversimplification, but I agree with Marc van Leeuwen that Hilbert divorced provability from truth and this continues to this day. Therefore the new statement in the opening that "Since David Hilbert's time, it has become customary to view mathematical activity as establishing truth" is still wrong, or at least misleading. Am I missing something? At the very least, we need support for such a statement. At best the sentence should be removed or modified for clarity. --seberle (talk) 03:26, 1 May 2011 (UTC)
I read the opening, out of curiosity, to see where I might assign presumption. The "Since David Hilbert's time ..." conjecture is where I find the most improvable arena. I hope Mythirdself, having started this thread, will return favor and enunciate their (the three of them) concerns as well as edit content where improvement can follow such collaboration. I recommend being bold in such endeavors, and for page watchers to exercise good faith in anticipation. Imagine how stifling it may be, asking a new editor to run their ideas through the talk page before editing. Seriously, that is contrary to many core principles. And good luck creating a better lead, a thing that seems quite doable. My76Strat (talk) 03:47, 1 May 2011 (UTC)
Hilbert as well as Peano introduced axiomatisations of geometry that created a new paradigm for doing mathematics, the one that dominates our thinking about mathematics today. A few decades later, Hilbert was involved in the project together with Bernays of providing a metamathematical finitistic basis for mathematics. As far as truth versus provability is concerned, there is certainly a large (though not universal) consensus today that they are different, so it is hard to see what to Blaim Hilbert for here. Tkuvho (talk) 03:58, 1 May 2011 (UTC)
The more I read this lead, the more I think the subject is Modern mathematics opposed to Mathematics. From the broad title, it is reasonably debatable that Hilbert is not a necessary element of the lead at all. I think much of the presumption derives from this possibility. This is not an indictment against Hilbert, but a critique of the lead summary for this article. My76Strat (talk) 05:11, 1 May 2011 (UTC)
I just wanted to add a quick comment concerning the problem of "truth" versus "provability". The simplest solution would be to sidestep this dichotomy altogether by replacing the mention of "truth" by "correctness". Also, while truth and provability aren't the same, certainly probability implies truth, so one could even leave "truth" in place. I don't see anything wrong with saying that mathematicians try to convince each other of the "truth" of their theorems. What I do see as problematic, and which was the original problem pointed out by editor Mythirdself, is the unqualified claim that mathematics can be defined as deriving theorems from axioms. Such a claim is simplistic and presumptuous, as originally pointed out by Mythirdself, and probably agreed to by 95% of wiki readers. Tkuvho (talk) 06:41, 1 May 2011 (UTC)
Just a few comments. @seberle, I did not say that Hilbert divorced provability from truth, quite to the contrary, I said he wanted to equate them. The divorce I would attribute more to such things as Gödel's incompleteness theorems. @Tkuvho, indeed when I said one needs to settle for provability if truth is beyond grasp, I meant "the whole truth" is beyond grasp, but provability still implies truth, so we are left with "nothing but the truth". That is, assuming our basic axiomatization (say ZF) is consistent, which we all believe, but which unfortunately is (if I understand correctly, not being a logician) also out of grasp for the kind of formal proof one can give within the axiomatization. In my opinion "Since David Hilbert's time, it has become customary to view mathematical activity as establishing truth" is acceptable, in particular since the rest of the sentence makes clear that truth is in fact obtained through proof; saying "establishing provability by [providing proof]" does not make for a nice statement, even if it is nominally more correct. Marc van Leeuwen (talk) 11:42, 1 May 2011 (UTC)
Sorry for my misrepresentation of what you said, Marc van Leeuwen. I sometimes write these comments too quickly! The latest edit of the opening is a slight improvement. Please keep in mind, everyone, that mathematicians' ideas about "truth" may not accord with popular ideas or philosophical ideas of truth. For example, Marc van Leeuwen wrote: "... so we are left with "nothing but the truth". That is, assuming our basic axiomatization (say ZF) ..." In other words, mathematical "truth" depends upon the axiomatic system chosen. Is the Axiom of Choice "true"? It all depends, and in the end it depends on the mathematician's (arbitrary) choice. This kind of truth has no bearing on what most people think of as "real world truth". I emphasize this only because we are writing an opening paragraph for the general public and the average person is likely to understand the opening now as saying that mathematicians use mathematics to find real-world truth. This contains some truth -- mathematicians do believe mathematics can be used to model the real world -- but it is also somewhat misleading because mathematical "truth" (e.g. Banach–Tarski or transfinite numbers) does not have quite the same meaning as real world "truth". That's my two cents worth. --seberle (talk) 16:52, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

Science

I removed this quote from the lede, because of undue weight:

Arnold wrote that mathematics is a branch of physics, among other entertaining absurdities.  Kiefer.Wolfowitz 08:51, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

I removed the following section, which seems to be far below the rest of this article in quality, and which also seems to give undue weight to speculations:

Many philosophers believe that mathematics is not experimentally falsifiable, and thus not a science according to the definition of Karl Popper.[1] However, in the 1930s Gödel's incompleteness theoremsconvinced many mathematicians[who?] that mathematics cannot be reduced to logic alone, and Karl Popper concluded that "most mathematical theories are, like those of physics and biology, hypothetico-deductive: pure mathematics therefore turns out to be much closer to the natural sciences whose hypotheses are conjectures, than it seemed even recently."[2] Other thinkers, notably Imre Lakatos, have applied a version of falsificationism to mathematics itself.

An alternative view is that certain scientific fields (such as theoretical physics) are mathematics with axioms that are intended to correspond to reality. In fact, the theoretical physicist, J. M. Ziman, proposed that science is public knowledge and thus includes mathematics.[3] In any case, mathematics shares much in common with many fields in the physical sciences, notably the exploration of the logical consequences of assumptions. Intuition and experimentation also play a role in the formulation of conjectures in both mathematics and the (other) sciences. Experimental mathematics continues to grow in importance within mathematics, and computation and simulation are playing an increasing role in both the sciences and mathematics, weakening the objection that mathematics does not use the scientific method.[citation needed]

The opinions of mathematicians on this matter are varied. Many mathematicians[who?] feel that to call their area a science is to downplay the importance of its aesthetic side, and its history in the traditional seven liberal arts; others[who?] feel that to ignore its connection to the sciences is to turn a blind eye to the fact that the interface between mathematics and its applications in science and engineering has driven much development in mathematics. One way this difference of viewpoint plays out is in the philosophical debate as to whether mathematics is created (as in art) or discovered (as in science). It is common to see universities divided into sections that include a division of Science and Mathematics, indicating that the fields are seen as being allied but that they do not coincide. In practice, mathematicians are typically grouped with scientists at the gross level but separated at finer levels. This is one of many issues considered in the philosophy of mathematics.[citation needed]

I have reverted this removal. I think this material is important and disagree that it's "lower quality". --Trovatore (talk) 08:58, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
A section littered with "citation needed" and "who?" tags has lower quality, obviously, than sections that don't. Sentences like "In practice, mathematicians are typically grouped with scientists at the gross level but separated at finer levels" need deletion, but others can do the excision. Your other edits don't seem to enjoy much support.  Kiefer.Wolfowitz 09:02, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
They are not "my edits" per se, not my original edits anyway. I learned quite a bit from those sections.  ::::The fundamental sociological problem here is that most mathematicians are exposed to formalist ideas when they begin to study mathematics seriously. Formalism is very attractive on a superficial level. If they never go into math logic (and most don't) they may never really think about it much, and just kind of drift along accepting a formalist narrative by default. That probably describes a large fraction of the editorship here, grosso modo, and leads to a constant danger of this article tilting towards a formalist POV without a realist or empiricist counterweight. I try to provide that counterweight. --Trovatore (talk) 09:08, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
What does your latest opinion have to do with improving the article?  Kiefer.Wolfowitz 09:12, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
My view is that, in removing the material you removed, you removed an important exploration of alternatives to formalism. Restoring it, therefore, improved the article. --Trovatore (talk) 09:15, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
Kiefer.Wolfowitz, when you describe mathematics from Euclid onwards as formal derivation of consequences from axioms, you are not expressing anyone's opinions but yours. The most productive mathematicians of the 18th and 19th centuries respectively were Euler and Cauchy. I challenge anyone to produce a single derivation of consequences from axioms in Euler and Cauchy. You are talking dead wood, you are not talking mathematics. Take it from a research mathematician. Tkuvho (talk) 09:17, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
I reduced the axiomatic-fixation of the lede---just check the history. I also noted something about mathematical models of reality.  Kiefer.Wolfowitz 09:22, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
When talking about research mathematicians of the caliber of Arnold, I would recommend a higher dose of reverence. He may have exaggerated when he called mathematics a branch of physics, but his sentiment that mathematics is also a kind of experiental science is shared by many research mathematicians, if not by zealous wikipedians. Tkuvho (talk) 09:19, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
This is an OR claim, that is a digression from improving the article. There are plenty of notable writings by Jon Borwein or Richard Varga about experimental mathematics that do not engage in absurdities, like claiming that mathematics is a branch of physics, or claiming that "mathematics is defined as an experimental science".  Kiefer.Wolfowitz 09:59, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
Editing this article is not cowboys and indians. Why are you smearing yourself with the war-paint of "research mathematician"?  Kiefer.Wolfowitz 09:24, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
Don't worry, I sided with the indians on that one ;) But you should realize that your view of mathematics as Euclid-style formal derivation is a very reductionist view. The Elements are a finished product of a long process of which we have no record. We don't even know if it was really written by Euclid. The process is what constitutes mathematics, not the finished product. At any rate, that's what everyone thought until the 20th century. Tkuvho (talk) 09:32, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
Let me repeat. I have toned down the logicist and foundationalist and ontological -crap aspects of this article---the ontological discussion is worse than the others. The weight on "philosophical" issues is undue. I added the sentence about mathematics and reality, not about the reality status of mathematics, in the lead paragraph. Please stop accusing me of having a Euclidean/formalist view of mathematics, when I have only indicated that axiomatic reasoning is thousands of years older than your heroes.
Secondly, you restored the statement that mathematics establishes truth by logical reasoning. On the contrary, I removed that statement because mathematicians rarely talk about truth. Mathematicians discuss properties of mathematical objects and consequences of hypotheses. Further, since the time of Peirce (with Fregean backsliding) competent logicians have known that there are many logics, with working mathematicians playing loosy-goosy with whatever logic suffices to resolve problems.  Kiefer.Wolfowitz 09:47, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
Not true that mathematicians rarely talk about truth. Really we mostly talk about truth. Proof is a means of establishing truth, but the main emphasis is generally on what the state of affairs is, not on how it is established.
I note that the "science" section seems to have been moved to the bottom of the article, where it has no connection with anything around it. It belongs together with discussion of foundations. --Trovatore (talk) 16:39, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

Lede

I made some edits.

  1. "formulate newconjectures, and develop arguments called proofs to convince their peers of their theorems. Since David Hilbert's time, it has become customary to view mathematical activity as establishing truth by rigorousdeduction from appropriately chosen axioms and definitions.[citation needed]" was replaced with "Mathematicians resolve the truth or falsity of conjectures by mathematical proofs, which are formal arguments sufficient to convince other mathematicians of their validity. The research required to solve mathematical problems can take years or even centuries of sustained inquiry. However, mathematical proofs are less formal and painstaking than proofs in mathematical logic. Since the late 1800s, it has become customary to view mathematical research as establishing truth by rigorous deduction from appropriately chosen axioms and definitions."
  2. "The mathematician Benjamin Peirce called mathematics "the science that draws necessary conclusions".[4] Albert Einstein, on the other hand, stated that "as far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality."[5]" was replaced by "Regardless of the ontology of mathematical objects, there is agreement that mathematics is a formal science rather than an empirical science." Then I removed that distraction, which doesn't belong in the lead.
  3. I corrected many misstatements about natural science, and I moved a long and poor-quality section on science below, following the description of mathematical fields.

IMHO, the article needs a discussion of the unity of mathematics, how the same objects appear in apparently disparate fields of inquiry, such as the role of groups in complex analysis (homotopy or homology), geometry, and polynomial equations. (Peirce referred to this as surprising to find the same _____ in an African jungle and the Alaskan Klondike!)


 Kiefer.Wolfowitz 12:26, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

Kudos to your efforts which have manifest a substantial improvement in the lead summary for this subject; IMO. My76Strat (talk) 02:23, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
Thanks!  Kiefer.Wolfowitz 08:37, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
The stuff in the lead is not bad but overemphasizes the axiomatic approach at the expense of the quasi-empirical or realistic one. I'll think about how that might be improved. The science section needs to be moved back together with foundations, where it belongs. --Trovatore (talk) 20:11, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

Mathematics and (Baconian) natural science

I moved that section to the bottom, because imho it still reads like an essay, rather than an encyclopedia article, and its weight may be undue. Editor Trovatore disagrees, so this is worth a discussion.  Kiefer.Wolfowitz 20:24, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

From the start, I think the link to "space" in the first line:

Mathematics is the study of quantity, structure, space, and change.

Is probably meant to link to the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_(mathematics) page instead, though neither of them come anywhere close to being explanations of "Space" that belongs in the definition of "Mathematics"...

Neither space is the boundless, three-dimensional extent in which objects and events occur and have relative position and direction. [6]

Nor http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_(mathematics) In mathematics, a space is a set with some added structure.

Seem to be relevant descriptions for the more abstract concept "space" of which Mathematics studies.

The intro / declaration from the Mathematics portal seems to be a more fundamental description: Mathematics, from the Greek: μαθηματικά or mathēmatiká, is the study of patterns. Such patterns include quantities (numbers) and their operations, interrelations, combinations and abstractions; and of space configurations and their structure, measurement, transformations, and generalizations. Mathematics evolved through the use of abstraction and logical reasoning, from counting, calculation, measurement, and the systematic study of positions, shapes and motions of abstract objects. Mathematicians explore such concepts, aiming to formulate new conjectures and establish their truth by rigorous deduction from appropriately chosen axioms and definitions.


There's a typo in the Applied Mathematics section. Looks like someone only half pasted a quote: 'formulation and study of mathematical models. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.195.50.242 (talk) 10:30, 30 May 2011 (UTC)

Lede

About this [| Edits]

About this [| Edit]

Etymology

Fields of mathematics

Edit request from 180.242.11.235, 27 July 2011

One-line definition

Edit request from Knwlgc, 13 September 2011

Unintended article misinformation? This perspective from field leadership.

mathematical science

Mathematical Symbols: Clickability,Hyperlinking, Own Pages

Quotations paragraph

Mathematosis?

Galileo's Death Year

"However, mathematical proofs are less formal and painstaking than proofs in mathematical logic."

Galileo in lead third paragraph, quote

See also section

Edit request on 20 January 2012

Definition

Verification failed

Edit request on 29 March 2012

Request For Comments on recent "awkward" changes

What is the ultimate goal of mathematics?

Math as a hobby

Benjamin Peirce a logicist?

Why mathematics is more important than physics and chemistry?

Group theory picture

system of equations

Lead paragraph (sorry)

Pure mathematics on top section

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