Talk:Stepan Bandera/Archive 2

I tend to agree with the removal of this text. The fact that Ukrainian antisemitism has deep roots in nationalism is well known, and an opinion of a single scholar cannot be presented as a universally accepted fact. In reality, during the civil war in Ukraine (1918-20), 'all parties except Red Army engaged in massive pogroms and other forms of anti-Jew violence. I think this statement is controversial, and if someone wants it to stay, it should be balanced with opinia of other scholars who thinks otherwise. However, I am not sure this article is a proper place for detailed discussion of the roots of Ukrainian antisemitism.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:56, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

The same source and author are also used to describe Bandera's role in anti-Jewish maassacres such as here: and may very well be the foremost expert on Ukrainian nationalism and anti-semitism. It's a reliable source and the statement is accurate. The reality is that Ukrainian nationalism's relationship with anti-semitism has been rather complex. In Western Ukraine, nationalists and Jews cooperated against Poles prior to and after World War I (such as here: ). The infamous Kiev pogrom was btw committed by anti-Ukrainian Russian nationalists. So there is nothing inaccurate or strange about the statement "Unlike competing Polish, Russian, Hungarian or Romanian nationalisms in late imperial Austria, imperial Russia, interwar Poland and Romania, Ukrainian nationalism did not include antisemitism as a core aspect of its program and saw Russians as well as Poles as the chief enemy with Jews playing a secondary role. Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalism was not immune to the influence of the antisemitic climate in the Eastern and Central Europethat had already become highly racialized in the late 19th century, and had developed an elaborate anti-Jewish discourse" unless one takes for granted the anti-Ukrainian ideas that Ukrainian nationalist = antisemite. Please review what is written before deleting. Faustian (talk) 03:45, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

This was the original text "Ukrainian nationalism incorporated little modern anti- Semitic ideology. (32) The main thrust of the Ukrainian struggle was directed against Russians and Poles; the Jews were merely adjunct. Ukrainian nationalism never developed the fully articulated anti-Semitism that existed in Polish, Russian, Hungarian or Romanian nationalisms. (33) Ukrainians and Ukrainian nationalists may have disliked Jews, but they did so on traditional or on real-political grounds; rarely would they demonize Jews or place them at the center of some conspiracy. None the less, in the era of nationalism anti-Semitic ideology was widespread in Eastern Europe, and certainly the Ukrainians were frequently exposed to it, even if they did not incorporate it into their own nationalist discourse. In some cases, anti- Semitism was a major component of the ideology of nationalist movements with which the Ukrainian national movement engaged in intense conflict, such as Polish National Democracy in Austrian Galicia and interwar Poland and the Russian Black Hundreds in tsarist Ukraine. In certain states within which the Ukrainians found themselves, anti-Semitism suffused the political culture (late imperial Austria, imperial Russia, interwar Poland, interwar Romania). This constant exposure to anti-Semitic ideology probably facilitated its acceptance when it was also espoused, in a more lethal form, by the German occupation authorities.".Faustian (talk) 04:07, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

I know Himka, and I saw this source. Nevertheless, I find this statement very questionable, at least because Russian nationalism have much less reasons to see Jews as primary enemies than Ukrainian one. At least, as far as I know, the most enthusiastically the Black Hundreds was supported in a Ukrainian part of Russian empire.

A possible explanation of this controversy is that Himka, probably, means some specific nationalistic movement, because Ukraine was (and still is) highly inhomogeneous in this aspect.

Anyway, if you think this statement should stay, it should be attributed to Himka, and I'll add other sources that say otherwise, because this statement looks very odd: it looks like Ukraine, which was a center of anti-Jewish pogroms during the Civil war, and which was one of the main centers of the Holocaust (where locals enthusiastically participated), was not antisemitic initially, and that Ukrainians became antisemits due to malicious neighbours.

However, I don't think it is correct, because this article is about Bandera (whose antisemitism is well known), and we don't need to discuss these details here.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:26, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

Russian nationalism proposed that Jews were the center of a global conspiracy to destroy Russia It produced the The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Polish nationalism at that time felt that because Poland had the most Jews in Europe, Jews were conspiring to take over Poland and turn it into their homeland with Poles as servants. Ukrainian nationalists at that time saw Poles and Russians as their main enemies, and Jews at worst merely as henchmen of one of those two groups. As such, they were willing to cooperate withj Jews against Poles. See here: . While there were many pogroms in Ukraine, the Black Hundreds were Russian, not Ukrainian, nationalists who also assaulted Ukrainian nationalists. Ascribing Black Hundreds crimes to Ukrainian nationalists is just very inaccurate. Even Petliura's was a complex case. His forces massacred many Jews, but he was close to some Zionists, and his money was printed in Hebrew as well as Ukrainian.

This is all irrelevant for this article, but the stuff taken from Himka is accurate and shouldn't be removed. The reason to keep it is to avoid presenting the simplistic view that Ukrainian nationalism was simply antisemitic when the issue was more complex.Faustian (talk) 04:43, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

First of all, we need to specify what we are talking about. The meaning of the terms "Russian", "Ukrainian", "nationalism" etc change, and they meant something different in late XIX - early XX century. Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality, the slogan proposed during Nicolas I times, used the term "nationality" in the same sense as that term was used in Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicae, where Nationis meant "native to Germany", or "population of Germany". That means "Nationality" (narodnost) referred to population (narod as whole), not to some ethnic group. Accordingly, "Russian" was a synonym of "An orthodox Christian who is Russian Emperor's subject" (close but not identical to the modern Western term "nationality"). That means, "Russian" and "Ukrainian" were not mutually exclusive terms, because the first one referred to citizenship, and the second one to the ethnicity: in Russian Empire passports, Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians were denoted as "orthodox", and nonone cared which language, Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussioan they speak. In a rare case when one needed to specify ethnicity of some Russian person, the word "Velikoross" was used for a Russian, and the word "Maloross" or "Ukrainian" for a Ukrainian. (If you believe "Maloross", literally, "Little Russian" is a derogatory term, let me remind you that Małopolska ("Lesser Poland") is a core of historical Polish land, whereas the southern part of Italian peninsular was called Great Greece during ancient times, in contrast to old historical Greece).

Since the term "Russian" was not associated with Russian ethnicity (in a modern sense), XIX century Ukrainians who lived in the Russian Empire identified themselves as Russians, although they did not consider themselves Velikorosses. In connection to that, you should keep in mind that "Black hundreds" (Union of the Russian People, etc) were open to all Russians (not only velikoross) population, and it was especially popular among ethnic Ukrainians in Southern Ukraine.

In connection to the Protocols, you should keep in mind that they were written by an Swiss emigrant and published by a Moldavian. The Jewish conspiracy Protocols are telling about was a conspiracy against Russians in the old meaning of this word: the conspiracy against Orthodox subjects of Russian Emperor, and against Russian empire as whole, not against Velikorosses specifically. Ethnic Russian nationalism, as well as ethnic Ukrainian nationalism, are very recent phenomena, and we should not be mislead by the terms whose meaning dramatically changed since late XIX century.

I am almost sure Ukrainian nationalism Himka is talking about is an early ethnic nationalism as it appears in early works of Ukrainian intellectual nationalists, it has nothing in common with an attitude of regular Ukrainians towards Jews. In a current form, this statement looks odd and apologetic, and it should be removed (preferably) or significantly modified.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:59, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

About Black Hundreds - correct, but the Black Hundreds ideology was really opposed to those Ukrainians who considered themselves to be Ukrainian nationalists. Ukrainian nationalism was fundamentally opposed to Russian nationalism. Ukrainian nationalism was condemned by the Black Hundreds for splitting up the Orthodox all-Russian people. So while Black hundreds were not opposed to people whom we would not call Ukrainians, it was bitterly and brutally opposed to Ukrainian nationalists, who were beaten by Black Hundreds members. About Black Hundreds and Ukrainian nationalists: "To fight the revolution the Russian government and reactionaries stirred up an extreme Russian nationalism that was antisocialist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Ukrainian. The nationalists, known as Black Hundreds, organized pogroms against Jews and against supporters of the revolution. Moderate Ukrainian politicians condemned the anti-Jewish pogroms in their organ Ukrainskii vestnik (Saint Petersburg); revolutionary Ukrainian activists, especially members of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' party, organized self-defense units to combat the pogromists.".

About Himka - he was referring to traditional Ukrainian nationalism which indeed did not place Jews at the center of some conspiracy and which hated Russians and Poles more. This is even true of Bandera and his movement. See here: . Bandera henchman Stetsko's statement: "Although I consider Moscow, which in fact held Ukraine in captivity, and not Jewry, to be the main and decisive enemy, I nonetheless fully appreciate the undeniably harmful and hostile role of the Jews, who are helping Moscow to enslave Ukraine. I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation and the like". Another Banderist manifesto: "The OUN combats the Jews as the prop of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime and simultaneously it renders the masses conscious of the fact that the principal foe is Moscow." This distinction is notable enough that a sentence stating it belongs in this article. I think it is very unfortunate that some guy just removes referenced information to a reliable source, that provides some piece of information that is otherwise lacking, because it sounds wrong to him. Faustian (talk) 22:24, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

Glad to see that you understand that Black Hundreds had nothing in common with Russian nationalism. In reality, any nationalism (as it was seen in late XIX - early XX century) was in opposition to any estate society: in Russian Empire, people were divided not by ethnic, but by estate and confessional criteria, there were no Russians, Ukrainians or Jews ("yevrey"), but just Cristian orthodox peasants (or nobility), or Jewish ("iudey") borgeous. In that sense, Black Hundreds were not nationalists, but monarchist movement, and that meant all nationalist movements, including Russian (Velikorussian) were in opposition to them.

In connection to that, my argument is mostly not about a description of Ukrainian nationalism, but about a comparison with other nationalisms. This is a comparison between apples and oranges. If you speak about Petliura, you should compare him not with some odious monarchists like Purishkevich, but with Kerensky or Miliukov in Russia or Pilsudsky in Poland. Was anti-semitism so important to them? Definitely, not. They were pretty westernised leaders, and they were not antisemits at all.

Of course, if you compare Ukrainian socialists, who got majority in the Ukrainian republic in 1919, and who were real Ukrainian nationalists, with "Russian nationalists" like Krushevan or de Katsman, you can came to a conclusion that anti-semitism played a key role in Russian nationalism, however, these were really marginal figures, and this comparison is totally illegitimate.

In other words, I trust Himka when he speaks about the subject where he is an expert, but I do not trust him when he speaks about other nations. By the way, Himka found that UPA extensively edited its documents after the war to conceal their crimes, and many statements found in their post-war archives were made purely pro forma, so I am not sure the primary source you cited is a good evidence. It would be better to find a good secondary source on that subject.

Finally, I see you keep restoring the fragment that has been contested. I am not sure it is correct. Let's wait until tour discussion come to some logical end.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:58, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

I think you misunderstood. Russian nationalism holds that Ukrainians are Russians - but that if they deny being Russians than they are Russian traitors (or, at best, confused). So Black Hundreds were Russian nationalists even though many of them could be considered to be of Ukrainian ethnicity. There is no contradiction being Russian nationalism and being of what we would call Ukrainian ethnicity, if one refuses to call it Ukrainian. As a Ukrainian, if you renounce being Ukrainian and claim to be a Russian you get accepted as one by Russian nationalists. In Russian nationalist discourse a Ukrainian identity is sometimes called a Polish or even Jewish plot to break up the one Russian people. You are correct that conservatism opposed nationalisms but the Black Hundreds were not conservative by those standards. A conservative would prefer the right of the Polish nobleman over the Russian Orthodox peasant but the Russian nationalist would not. The wiki article is correct when it states the Black Hundreds "was an ultra-nationalist movement in Russia in the early 20th century." About Poland - Pilsudski, like his ally Petliura, was a socialist nationalist and was not antisemitic. But Poland was largely dominated by his rival Dmowski, a "pure" Polish nationalist who was intensely antisemitic. The Polish nationalism of Dmowski and the Russian nationalism of the Black Hundreds and their heirs in the White movement were indeed more antisemitic than Ukrainian nationalists.

The OUN quote was taken from Himka himself so it was not a doctored one; Himka knows what he is doing. OUN did indeed view Jews as a secondary rather than primary enemy (to be sure, to be destroyed as well), with the main enemies being Poland and Russia. This detail is notable. It should not be removed. As a reflection of this, Himka notes - "According to the Germans, to finance their activities, the Banderites raised some of their contributions from Jews, whom they often blackmailed. (42) On the other hand, the Bandera movement provided some Jews with false papers. (43) The impression created by the German documentation is that the extreme Ukrainian nationalists were so indifferent to the fate of the Jews (44) that they would either kill them or help them, whichever was more appropriate to their political goals. Morality (Sheptytsky's "obligation of Divine law") did not enter into the calculation. ".

That having been said, as a compromise and in light of the fact that Himka's expertise is focused d on OUN and Jews, I don't object to taking out the comparative parts while leaving in the fact that Ukrainian nationalists considered Russians and Poles to be greater enemies than Jews.Faustian (talk) 23:37, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

No, it is you who misunderstands that. The claim "Russian nationalism holds that Ukrainians are Russians" is totally ahistorical in the context of our discussion, because it uses the words in its present meaning and applies it to the past. Yes, some modern Russian nationalists claim Ukrainians are Russians (although only part of them think so; as far as I know, most modern Russian nationalists do not consider West Ukrainians as Russians), thereby denying that some separate Ukrainian ethnicity exists. However, the same statement had a totally different meaning one hundred years ago. "Russian" meant not Velikoross, but any Orthodox subject of the Russian emperor, which means every Ukrainian who lived in Russian Empire would agree with the statement: "You are Russian". At the same time, he considered himself a maloross, or Ukrainian, and there was no contradiction with that, because "Russian" did not refer to ethnicity, but "Ukrainian" did. Therefore, in late XIX early XX century, the statement "Ukrainians are Russians" sounded either as a universally accepted truth (if it was applied to Ukrainians who lived in Russian Empire) or as a universally accepted nonsense (when it was applied to the Ukrainians who lived in Galicia, because they were not subjects of Russian emperor, and, therefore, were not Russians byu definition).

One hundred years ago, the slogan "Ukrainians are Russians" would sound like "Malorosses are Velikorosses". However, that is the claim that was an obvious nonsense, and I don't know if any Russian nationalist really believed in that. We have no opportunity to see how would modern Russian nationalists deal with Ukrainian question (a Provisional government was too shorl living to develop any specific policy on that subject), but the attitude of White movement leaders towards Ukrainians was close to that of the Poles, and, had Whites been victorious, the situation of Ukrainians in Russia under the rule of Whites would be similar to that in the Second Polish Republic.

Re "The Polish nationalism of Dmowski and the Russian nationalism of the Black Hundreds and their heirs in the White movement were indeed more antisemitic than Ukrainian nationalists." Again, you compare total marginals ("black hundreds") with moderate and reasonable, although weak, politicians (Petliura). A Russian analog of Petliura was Kerensky or Milyukov, and they were absolutely not antisemitic. If you want more close analogy with "black hundreds", their Ukrainian twins were hrygorievtsy, who killed more than 50% of all Jews during the Civil war.

To summarise, Himka compares the worst and extreme representatives of Russian nationalism with Ukrainian nationalism as whole and concludes that Ukrainian neighbours were more antisemitic. This claim is outstanding, and it needs in an oudstanding proof. Therefore, it would be correct if you self-reverted, and we discussed the correct wording on the talk page.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:40, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

"One hundred years ago, the slogan "Ukrainians are Russians" would sound like "Malorosses are Velikorosses." This was probably correct 200 years ago. 100 years ago there was already a Ukrainian national movement. In opposition was not a Great Russian national movement but simply a Russian national movement that considered Ukrainian to be Little Russians and as such a subset of Russians. "Ukrainians" were seen as treasonous Little Russians. So the Russian census of 1897 had a category "Russians", and within this category were three types of Russians: Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarussians. The Great Russians played a primary role, and Russian nationalists of the time of the Black Hundreds promoted the Great Russian language in Ukraine (Russification) and subservience to the Russian Tsar and Russian Church by the Little Russian people. They actively opposed Ukrainian nationalism: . It was a Russian nationalist movement. And it was linked to the Russian state and was hardly marginal. Vladimir Purishkevich was a major Black Hundreds leader. How was he not a Russian nationalist? And he certainly was not marginal. "Therefore, in late XIX early XX century, the statement "Ukrainians are Russians" sounded either as a universally accepted truth (if it was applied to Ukrainians who lived in Russian Empire) or as a universally accepted nonsense (when it was applied to the Ukrainians who lived in Galicia, because they were not subjects of Russian emperor, and, therefore, were not Russians byu definition)". his is simply not true. Russian nationalists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries certainly considered Galicians to be Russians. My grandmother's older brothers, Galician Russophiles, studied in St. Petersburg on a scholarship for Galician Russians. When Brusilov captured Galicia during World War I, he proclaimed "We are entering Galicia, which despite its being a constituent part of Austria-Hungary, is a Russian land from time immemorial, populated, after all, by Russian people (russkim zhe narodom)." (source: Mark Von Hagen. (2007). War in a European borderland: occupations and occupation plans in Galicia. Seattle: University of Washington Press ISBN 0-295-98753-7. pg. 19)

That being said, this issue of comparing antisemitisms is not the most important one from Himka's source. I don't mind removing for the sake of compromise. It is rather this, taken right from Himka who as we both agree is an expert on OUN and antisemitism: "Ukrainian nationalism did not include antisemitism as a core aspect of its program and saw Russians as well as Poles as the chief enemy with Jews playing a secondary role.[66] Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalism was not immune to the influence of the antisemitic climate in the Eastern and Central Europe,[66] that had already become highly racialized in the late 19th century, and had developed an elaborate anti-Jewish discourse." I will add "historically" to the sentence. Do you think it is okay?Faustian (talk) 02:34, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

Re "within this category were three types of Russians: Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarussians" You continue to misunderstand that. This old "Russian" was equivalent to modern "Rossiyanin" (a citizen of Russia). According to modern views Tatars or Ossetins are "Rossiyanin", but not "Russian". In other words, the old equivalent of modern "Rossiyanin" was "Russian", and old equivalent of modern "Russian" was "Velikoross". Applying modern terminology to old phenomenae is misleading and causes various mistakes.

Re ""Ukrainians" were seen as treasonous Little Russians." Seen by whom? Russian monarchists saw all democratic movements (including Russian and Ukrainian nationalists) as treasonous, Russian (and Ukrainian) Bolsheviks saw Ukrainian and Russian nationalists as counter-revolutionary elements (and Russian nationalism was much more suppressed in 1920-30s than other nationalist movements).

Re "Russian nationalists of the time of the Black Hundreds promoted the Great Russian language in Ukraine (Russification)" I think that was because of the attempt of bureaucratic unification of the Empire: the central government was trying to suppress any democratic movement, and suppression of Russian (Velikorussian) democratic movement had different forms, because they used the official language of the Empire. However, the central authorities were equally hostile to any liberals or democrats, no matter which language they were speaking. Again, if you will call Black Hundreds "Russian nationalists", I will use the term "Ukrainian nationalists" only for some marginals like hrigorievtsy or banderovsy. "Black hundreds" were not Russian nationalists, they were Monarchists, and Russian monarchy (like many other European monarchies) was not a national phenomenon.

Re Galicia. Yes, there was still a terminological confusion between "Russian" and "Velikoross", and that is because Russian ethnic nationalism (as well as Ukrainian one) are very recent phenomenae. Indeed, if at some period of history the word "Russian" meant "East Slav" and the word "Velikoross" meant "Russian", and the meaning started to change, that means during this transition period these terms were being used interchangeably. Yes, when the Russian army came to Galicia, it was the army of Russians, not Velikorosses, and it would be natural to expect it representatives would speak on behalf of all "Russians" (a.k.a. East Slavs). And yes, they didn't claim Galicia was populated by Velikorosses, it was populated by "Russians" (which was an umbrella term for what we currently know as Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians).

I perfectly understand that the modern Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes this subject a very sensitive, however, you should have understood that those participants of that conflict who are acting in a good faith make a big mistake when they apply modern terminology to old events and facts, because that just increases mutual misunderstanding. Modern Ukraine and modern Russia are significantly different from old Velikorossiya and Malorossiya+Galicia, and modern Russians and Ukrainians are significantly different from the ethnic groups that lived there 100 years ago, and it is a big mistake to project the current events to the past, and to try to find superficial analogies between the old and recent events.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:10, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

What you are saying is absolutely correct, however you seem to be off by about 50 years. By the end of the 19th century, partially in response to the Polish uprising, the Russian monarchy had appropriated and adopted what we would now consider to be modern Russian nationalism; Ukrainian nationalists of those times had adopted what is basically modern Ukrainian nationalist ideas. The conflict between Russian monarchism and Russian nationalism was an early to mid 19th century phenomenon. While there were Russian nationalist extremists opposed to the monarchy, most supported the Russian monarchy. This is why various sources correctly describe the Black Hundreds as Russian nationalists. Here is Britannica : "black Hundreds, Russian Chernosotentsy, reactionary, antirevolutionary, and anti-Semitic groups formed in Russia during and after the Russian Revolution of 1905. The most important of these groups were the League of the Russian People (Soyuz Russkogo Naroda), League of the Archangel Michael (Soyuz Mikhaila Arkhangela), and Council of United Nobility (Soviet Obedinennogo Dvoryanstva). The Black Hundreds were composed primarily of landowners, rich peasants, bureaucrats, merchants, police officials, and clergymen, who supported the principles of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and Russian nationalism." Modern Russian nationalists, like those of the late 19th century, continue to view the Great Russians and Little Russians as one Russian people who ought to be I one state and who ought to all speak the proper Great Russian language. They are more likely to accept that Galicians are not redeemable but the premise is identical.

What do you think of the latest edit I made?Faustian (talk) 15:02, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

I think your latest edits are the steps in a right direction.

Regarding "Black Hundreds". Your view of ethnic anti-semirtism is irrational: according to you, Russian nationalists were intrinsically antisemitic, whereas Ukrainians were not. This claim is supposed to have some rational ground, and I don't see it here. Indeed, for Russians to see a major threat in Jews, these two ethnic groups were supposed at least to interact extensively. In reality, due to Pale of Settlement, Russians had no opportunity to interact with Jews. In reality, The Union of the Russian People was not popular in the parts of the Empire with ethnically homogeneous population, but it was extremely popular in Moldavia, Belorussia, Ukraine. Just read the statistics (unfortunately, these data are not easy to find, I saw them some time ago, I can find them again, but it may require some special efforts). As you correctly noted, "Black Hundreds" formed as a responce to the First Russian revolution, which means it was not a reaction on some ethnic tensions, but the attempt to preserve the regime. It was primarily a counter-revolutionary and monarchist organisation, not nationalistic one. In addition, although it proclaimed it was an organisation of a Russian nation, and it strictly prohibited membership of all non-Russians, it defined the term "Russian" exactly as I did (the Orthodox nation that combines Velikorosses, Malorosses, and Bielorosses). Since this organisation saw its primary goal in preservation of the monarchy, the major enemies were revolutionaries, and in particular those national minorities who were the most active opponents of the regime. In other words, Black Hindreds saw Jews, Poles, and intellectuals (lyahi, zhudy i skubenty, derogatory and mangled "Poles, Jews, and students") as primary enemies, because they were the enemies of the monarchy. By no means that was a real nationalism, with, in XIX century, was a progressive and democtratic movement that was an antithesis to any monarchy (I am speaking about old nationalism; modern ethnic nationalism is always a regressive phenomenon).

In connection to that, you should read this article DAVID G. ROWLEY. Imperial versus national discourse: the case of Russia. Nations and Nationalism, 6 (I), 2000, 23-42.

One of the observations the author makes is that the Imperial officials treated Russian nationalist movements with the same (if not greater) suspect than other ethnic national movements.

With regard to Ukrainian nationalism, we actually should speak about two different nationalisms, because Ukrainians were a divided ethnic group. Western Ukrainian nationalism formed in Austro-Hungary, and it was seen (correctly) as a threat by the Russian government. Regarding the domestic Ukrainian nationalism, the suppression of Ukrainian printed language was seen as persecution of Ukrainians, but suppression of narodniki movement by the Imperial government was not seen as a suppression of Russians. Meanwhile, I find it incorrect when the actions of the central government against progressive political or cultural movement in provinces populated by non-Russians (in a modern sense) were considered as suppression of national movement, but the samem actions against Russians were not. When Russian authorities banned Kolokol it was not considered a suppression of the Russian liberation movement, but had Kolokol been being printed in Ukrainian, we would speak about persecution of Ukrainians. I find that deeply illogical. --Paul Siebert (talk) 19:02, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

"Regarding "Black Hundreds". Your view of ethnic anti-semitism is irrational: according to you, Russian nationalists were intrinsically antisemitic, whereas Ukrainians were not." - Not exactly, and it was from Himka not me. Himka claimed antisemitism played a central role in Russian nationalism but not a central role in Ukrainian nationalism, which was focused instead on Poles and Russians as enemies. Since Himka is an expert on Ukrainian but not Russian nationalism, I removed this from the article. The Russian government was a Russian state with ethnic Russians as the dominant nationality and the Russian language as the dominant language - so I see no reason why Russian nationalists would not also support the Russian state that promoted Russification and Russian power. " Indeed, for Russians to see a major threat in Jews, these two ethnic groups were supposed at least to interact extensively. In reality, due to Pale of Settlement, Russians had no opportunity to interact with Jews. In reality, The Union of the Russian People was not popular in the parts of the Empire with ethnically homogeneous population, but it was extremely popular in Moldavia, Belorussia, Ukraine. " Again, Russian nationalists considered Ukrainians to be Russians (they still do). Russian nationalism like all nationalism seems to be strongest when the nation perceives itself to be under threat. And so it is no surprise that Russian nationalism, by people who considered themselves to be Russians, was stronger in Ukraine than in Russia itself. The Russian government did not merely ban Ukrainian newspapers, it banned thew use of the Ukrainian language itself (Ems Ukaz). "With regard to Ukrainian nationalism, we actually should speak about two different nationalisms, because Ukrainians were a divided ethnic group. Western Ukrainian nationalism formed in Austro-Hungary, and it was seen (correctly) as a threat by the Russian government.". This is mistaken. The nationalism developed in Galicia was developed largely by exiles from Russian-ruled Ukraine, Galician natives tended to initially be Russian nationalists (there was a funny observation by one of the exiles from Russian-ruled Ukraine - that the Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia, being from Russia, knew more about Russian culture than the local Galician Russian nationalists). The most famous of these was of course Mykhailo Hrushevsky. This is why Ukrainian nationalism eventually adopted in Galicia focused so strongly on Cossack culture in its mythology. Even the ideologue who inspired Banderist-style fascist- nationalism, Dmytro Dontsov, was from the Russian Empire and had studied in St. Petersburg before eventually moving to Lviv. Note that all of these people were from the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, a time when modern nationalism supposedly did not exist.

I was unable to access the article you posted, only the abstract. I also have a recommendation on this topic, it is a book rather than article - Children of Rus, Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation, Cornell University Press. It clearly describes these people as Russian nationalists and traces how modern Russian nationalism began in what is now Ukraine, in the late 19th century. A description - "Right-bank Ukraine would seem unlikely terrain to nourish a Russian nationalist imagination. It was among the empire’s most diverse corners, with few of its residents speaking Russian as their native language or identifying with the culture of the Great Russian interior. Nevertheless, as Hillis shows, by the late nineteenth century, Russian nationalists had established a strong foothold in the southwest’s culture and educated society; in the first decade of the twentieth, they secured a leading role in local mass politics. By 1910, with help from sympathetic officials in St. Petersburg, right-bank activists expanded their sights beyond the borderlands, hoping to spread their nationalizing agenda across the empire. Exploring why and how the empire’s southwestern borderlands produced its most organized and politically successful Russian nationalist movement, Hillis puts forth a bold new interpretation of state-society relations under tsarism as she reconstructs the role that a peripheral region played in attempting to define the essential characteristics of the Russian people and their state." A lot of it can be read online through googlebooks.Faustian (talk) 00:24, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Just an example from Children of Rus (pg. - a Russian nationalist from Ukraine condemned Ukrainian nationalists such as Hrushevsky and wrote that the Orthodox people of Little Russia were "creators of the Russian national idea and the heralds of Russian ethnic unity. (my emphasis). I found the entire book on pdf here: .Faustian (talk) 00:51, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Re "The Russian government was a Russian state with ethnic Russians as the dominant nationality and the Russian language as the dominant language". Which version of "Russian" do you use? Modern "Russian" (former Velikorosses) or old "Russian" (a.k.a. East Slav)? Assuming that you mean "modern Russian", your statement should be "The government of the Russian Empire was a state where Velikorosses were a dominant ethnic group, the Russian language was the dominant language." The last statement is correct (it was strictly enforced that Russian was the only official language of the Empire). The second is wrong. There were more velokorosses in the Russian government, but they were represented proportionally: it was quite logical to expect that the most numerous ethnic group would be more represented. In reality, ethnicity had absolutely no influence, one has to be an Orthodox, and that was sufficient in majority cases (except for Jews: there were some additional limitations, although not significant). I would say, the only group that was really overrepresented in the Russian government was ethnic Germans. Anyway, all what you say is correct if we agree that the term "Russian" has its old meaning (Galician Ukrainians, obviously, are not included in the "Russian" category).

Regarding the article, try this link, I can open it from my home IP, so it should work fine. An interesting conclusion of the author is that no Russian nationalism existed until after WWII, and that is because Russian mentality was more imperial than national. The author define the term "Empire" quite neutrally ("an empire is a state that administers a number of different nations"), so the word "Imperial" has neither negative nor positive connotation in that case.

The author argues that the Imperial government was equally hostile to any nationalist movements

"the Russian state kept at arm's length all individuals and groups that expressed Russian national sentimental or patriotic themes. Slavophiles, Pan-Slavs, Pochvenniks and others were all viewed by the tsar with great suspicion precisely because they implied that the purpose of the autocracy might serve the interests of Russia ± rather than the other way around. The Russian autocracy could not accept any ideology that did not ®rst and foremost serve the interests of the state."

He also argues that it was Lenin who gave a start to nationalism:

"Since the rise of nationalism within the Soviet Union has been widely considered to be the product of Lenin's nationalities policy, perhaps Lenin should really be considered Russia's ®rst `nationalist' ± in function if not intention. (For discussions of how this occurred see Motyl 1990, Suny 1993, and Kaiser 1994.)"

I strongly recommend you to read this article, the new link should work.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:21, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Thank you! Will do so, and comment when finished!Faustian (talk) 01:41, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Okay, read the article. The author makes the interesting and very bold claim that there was no Russian nationalism prior to the end of the 20th century. This, of course, goes against general consensus. His reasoning seems to be based on the flawed premise that nationalism and imperialism are mutually exclusive and that movements that support imperialism or include imperialism cannot also be nationalistic. But why wouldn't a nationalist be an imperialist also, if his nation is the one in charge of the empire and if the empire is used as a vehicle to increase his nation's power? Most Russian nationalists were, of course, very happy with the Russian Empire which Russified the Little Russians and made Russia a world power. German nationalists loved the German Empire; they did not want it to lose its colonies or to give up Polish-inhabited lands, on the contrary they wanted it to expand. According to the author, the Nazis would not be considered German (or Aryan) nationalists because they wanted to rule all of Europe. He also makes some mistakes, such as stating that there was no effort to Russify the Baltic Germans. This was true 200 years ago but not by the late 19th or early 20th centuries. The not uncommon habit of Russifying German names (a prominent example: the linguist George Shevelov) reflects this. The article does make one good and correct point: that nationalism wasn't widespread among the general Russian population. Nationalism does depend on literacy. It is why those parts of Russia outside urban areas that had higher literacy rates (typically southern Russia and Cossack lands) were more likely to support the Whites during the civil war. Two excellent papers about literacy and nationalism by Keith Darden. In Western Ukraine and Banderism: and in formerly Russian-ruled Ukraine: . Faustian (talk) 18:07, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

First of all, majority of statements in this article belong not to the author, Rawley cites to other authors (most of whom are renown scholars), and majority of facts and statements in this article seem to reflect scholarly consensus. Second, this article has been cited by many other scholars, which means the opinion expressed by Rawley is not marginal, and there is not in a direct contradiction to a scholarly consensus.

However, I agree that some of author's own ideas are not completely correct. First, the definition of the term "Empire" is somewhat primordialist. Indeed, the very phenomenon of nation is pretty new, and majority of empires existed before nations had formed. It would be more correct to see empires as predecessors of nation-states, not as rivals. Second, the idea that an empire is above nations is not fully correct. I would say, all empires can be subdivided on Roman and British types. In a Roman empire (after 212), almost all urban population had equal civil rights, and there was no ethnic group that politically dominated over others, and there were no colonies of metropole. Even earlier, Plutarch considered himself a Greek, but he was a Roman citizen. In contrast, in Britain empire population of the metropole and colonies had very different rights and a legal status. Obviously, when Rawley speaks about an empire, he means a Roman type empire (and Russian empire was closer to the late Roman type, an empire without a metropole and colonies, if we forget about Central Asia, which was more a protectorate than a colony).

In general, old feudal empires were the empires of an old estate society, and there were no nations during that time. The word "nation" had a totally different meaning (thus, in Prague, "Czech nation" and "German nation" were the names of Czech and German student communities in the Prague university). During Husite wars, Czech saw absolutely no problem with their formal leader, who was a German, and after his death, they selected a Polish prince as their king, instead of selecting some ethnic Czech as a leader. The Second Empire (German) united a population of different states, who considered themselves as different peoples, although belonging to the same ethnic group (Germans), which didn't prevent them from constantly fighting against each other. During late XIX century, they combined into a single entity that is now known as a German nation, and the empire became de facto a nation-state. However, as the examples of Austria and Switzerland demonstrate, a different scenario could be possible, when several German speaking nation-states would form, and now we would be discussing differences between Prussian and Bavarian nations. The opposite scenario, when all German-speaking Europeans would be united in one big German state, and we would see that absolutely logical. Indeed, nations are a very recent phenomenon, and their formation is a rather arbitrary process, which is not necessarily governed by ethnicity. The same ethnic group may produce two or more different nations (Serbia and Croatia is a good example), and different ethnic groups may form a single nation. Britain or Germany are good examples, and if you think that the difference between Bavarian and Frisian dialects is smaller that the difference between Russian and Ukrainian languages, you should probably explain me why do Germans have to use Hochdeutcsh as lingua franka.

In connection to that, Rawley's generalisations about empires can be considered a redundant oversimplification. However, that doesn't mean his conclusions about the absence of Russians nationalism are incorrect or fringe: the article provided an explanation for the phenomenon that is universally recognised. Thus, Martin's The Affirmative Action Empire, which was cited 1,471 times is a demonstration that this view is by no means fringe.

Regarding literacy and nationalism, there is also a positive correlation between literacy and internationalism. For example, if you look at statistics of Russian Constituent Assembly elections, you will see that Bolsheviks were supported by most literate regions of the empire (although this dependence was not strict). In general, nationalism can emerge only in the society where (i) the interactions of people with their compatriots are intense and diverse (so they recognize them as "us"), and (ii) the influence of some foreign nations on their life is significant (so people recognise other nations as "them"). In other words, no matter how literate some society is, if the population is living in some isolated communes that do not interact with other communes economically and culturally, and there is no direct contacts with representatives of other nations, no nationalism can form, because the very concept of "us" and "them" is purely abstract to these people. That means, a nation can emerge only in an industrial society with well developed trade, mass-media and transportation. Before that, people cannot (and have no reasons to) feel themselves as a part of any entity which is not an estate or a local community. It is not a surprise that more advanced society with well developed trade, transportation and mass media is more literate, however, correlation does not mean causation.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:55, 10 December 2018 (UTC)

The characterisation of the British Empire as "metropole and colonies" with unequal rights doesn't stand up if you consider that prior to 1946, people of the former colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, etc, had equal status as British subjects. Also, around 40% of the population of Ancient Rome were slaves with no civil rights what so ever. --Nug (talk) 21:29, 10 December 2018 (UTC)

"...the former colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, etc" And India too? And Burma? And Nigeria? And South Africa? Was the famous episode with Gandhi in South Africa (I believe you saw that film) a total fake?

"...around 40% of the population of Ancient Rome were slaves" Slavery was a normal practice even in some modern nation-states, such as North American United States. In addition, you will be surprised to learn that in XVII century, a lion share of wheat was imported to Europe from Poland (a.k.a. The Respublica), were so called demesne-robot farming system existed, and "robot" meant not a cybernetic machine, but a serf who was working 5 days in a week at his souveren's land. It was de facto slavery, the same slavery as in America or Caribean plantations.

Please, no ahistorisms and anachronisms.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:54, 10 December 2018 (UTC)

An IP persistently adds category Category:Ukrainian revolutionaries and edit-wars against the removal. May I please remark that adding this category contrasdicts Wikipedia policies, since (i) in the article, there are no sources calling Bandera a revolutionary; (ii) I highly doubt that non-partisan sources calling him revolutionary exist. Unless the sources have been forthcoming and added to the article within several days, I will be removing the category.--Ymblanter (talk) 08:05, 30 August 2020 (UTC)

For example -

"Bandera remains a highly controversial figure in Ukraine, ... while others consider him to be a Nazi collaborationist (and source here - BBC Ukrainian | For Polish – bandit, for Ukrainians – hero".

So, "controversial in Ukraine", but reference says "For Polish (aka in Poland)". Just one example of multiple manipulations over this article. "178.92.184.117 (talk) 16:51, 29 December 2018 (UTC)

This exactly means there is no controversy about Bandera in Poland - basically everybody considers him Nazi collaborator, Nazi theorist, and organizer of crimes against civil population.--Ymblanter (talk) 18:53, 29 December 2018 (UTC)

"Basically everybody considers in Poland" is a very scientific argument. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 195.200.245.20 (talk) 20:21, 1 January 2021 (UTC)

The information in this section is pre-war (2009) and is therefore obsolete. It should be mentioned in this section that the attitudes of many Ukrainians changed, sometimes dramatically and radically, after the Russian invasion to Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea. Since 2014, a lot of Ukrainians have been critical and not too sympathetic of the Russian viewpoints on WWII and other historical events and figures, often rejecting Kremlin cliches and versions:

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukrainians-reject-modern-russias-wwii-victory-cult-as-geopolitical-divide-deepens/

Therefore, the popular attitude to Bandera may be quite different at present contrasted to 2009, and this information is kind of irrelevant for the time being. While it does not have to be removed, the above remarks and reference should be added for a clearer picture, as one gets the wrong impression from reading this as few foreigners realize the before and after 2014 thing. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Igorvkalinin (talk • contribs) 10:27, 2 January 2021 (UTC) Igorvkalinin (talk) 10:29, 2 January 2021 (UTC)

Bander being a terrorist is a very bold statement. Even Russian and Polish wiki articles don’t call him that.

There are no acts of terror mentioned in this article. Markiyanv (talk) 22:53, 1 January 2021 (UTC)<--- — Markiyanv (talk • contribs) has made few or no other edits outside this topic. See also ArbCom Motion (May 2020) - - GizzyCatBella🍁 08:07, 9 January 2021 (UTC)

Ref. 1 is a reliable source and calls him "head of terrorist activities". I have not checked other references, or, in fact, did not go beyond the abstract,--Ymblanter (talk) 23:29, 1 January 2021 (UTC)

To say that a person, who is one of the heroes of Ukrainian culture is a terrorist you can't base it on a single source, even if it is reliable. Please delete this definition.--Andriy.v (talk) 09:35, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

Agree that ref. 1 is reliable source, it is correct to maintain the term.--Mhorg (talk) 09:50, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

If all others reliable sourses do not mention that Bandera was a terrorist, you of course chose one that mention this, right? I think it's uncorrect and do not response to the WP:NPV politic.--Andriy.v (talk) 10:56, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

The CIA talked about Bandera's OUN "terrorist activities" and also the OSCE. For example also many historians such as Timothy D. Snyder.--Mhorg (talk) 11:16, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

And all this sources do not defines him as a terrorist. It is so hard to write "according to ... he participated on terrorist acts..."? It is the most neutral and close to wikipedia politics way to define a controverse character as Bandera. Instead you want to define him in first instance as terrorist. All the sources defines him as leader of OUN-UPA in first instance than politician with right-wing ideas (nationalist or ultranationalist), but no one defines him as terrorist, expecialy in first instance. This character known oviously not for his terrorists acts (according the sourse). People, reading this article, see this definiscion: "Stepan Andriyovych Bandera was a Ukrainian terrorist" which is clearly uncorrect way to define this character.--Andriy.v (talk) 11:51, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

To be honest, there is nothing controversial about him outside of Ukraine: He is universally defined as terrorist, ultranationalist, Nazi collaborator, and Holocaust theorist. Concerning specifically a terrorist, the above sources plainly call them one. There are many more sources available.--Ymblanter (talk) 12:00, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

I agree, that he known to be ultranationalist, maybe Nazi collaborator (during Nazi inviasion of the Soviet Union), but he certanly do not known to be terrorist. And again, in the sources he not defined as terrorist, so please delete this definition. If you have some reliable sources that clearly define him as terrorists show it, if not you can not define him in first instance as terrorist.--Andriy.v (talk) 12:49, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

But you have got sources above. For example, Timothy Snyder writes "Young terrorists such as Stepan Bandera..."--Ymblanter (talk) 13:32, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

The first and most reliable source i found Britannica. Is Britannica defines him as terrorist? I see "Stepan Bandera Ukrainian political leader", so why Wikipedia may define him as terrorist in first instance? Or Britannica wrong and should define him as terrorist too?--Andriy.v (talk) 13:37, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

Britannica does not have an article on Bandera, so I do not quite see your point.--Ymblanter (talk) 13:50, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Stepan-Bandera and this what is it? Is wikipedia need an article to be used as source? Brittannica is one of most reliable sources and she define him not as terrorist. I think this is enough to understand that the definition "Bandera was a terrorist" is wrong.--Andriy.v (talk) 13:58, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

If we just mirror what EB says, why Wikipedia is needed? EB describes Bandera as a political leader, and this article says the same, so there is no contradiction with EB. However, in addition to that, this article includes a notion that he was a terrorist also. In general, this article contains a lot of information about Bandera that is not found in Encyclopaedia Britannica. If your argument against the word "terrorist" is based only upon the fact that EB doesn't say so, then let's remove all information that is not found in EB. Is it what you propose? --Paul Siebert (talk) 14:51, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

This is a notification that there in no article on Bandera in Britannica, and information on him can be found in another article.--Ymblanter (talk) 15:51, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

It is actually an analog of our short description, which is Far-right Ukrainian politician--Ymblanter (talk) 15:58, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

• @Ymblanter: Could you provide a more detailed explanation for this edit? My nationality is not a great argument. What is the evidence from reliable sources that "terrorist" is Bandera's most important characteristic? I do see evidence that reliable sources call him a terrorist; what I don't see is the evidence that he is mainly known for this trait. --Aced (talk) 23:36, 8 January 2021 (UTC)

  The attack on the page is clearly externally coordinated, all users participating in the current disruption have relatively low edit count and are native Ukrainian speakers. I know that in the Ukrainian Wikipedia such flash mobs are considered quite normal, but we are not going to tolerate this here.--Ymblanter (talk) 07:32, 9 January 2021 (UTC)

  There is currently a discussion related to this on Ukrainian Wikipedia Village Pump, uk:Вікіпедія:Кнайпа_(різне)#Сумна_знахідка_в_Англовікі, with a call for editors who specialise in history to find additional neutral reliable sources on the topic. That is not too different from e.g. a message to relevant Wikiproject. Although I agree it would be more graceful if it was one, I would kindly ask you not to single out fellow Wikipedians who are Ukrainian speakers and who are here to contribute, and call this an attack and a disruption. --Base (talk) 23:29, 10 January 2021 (UTC)

  You're missing a big anti-terrorist operation. AS ^sa 23:45, 10 January 2021 (UTC)

  Indeed, we are now a couple of steps further.--Ymblanter (talk) 16:59, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

• And, more to the point: You probably know that Bandera was sentenced to death in 1933 by a Polish court (and the sentence was commuted to life imprisonmenmt). Have you ever checked what the charges were?--Ymblanter (talk) 07:43, 9 January 2021 (UTC)

  @Ymblanter: I have. It seems that you are trying to imply that I deny Bandera's involvement in terrorism. As I had already pointed out both in the edit summary and in my comment on the talk page, I don't deny it; I'm talking about a weight of different characteristics here. --Aced (talk) 11:04, 9 January 2021 (UTC)

The most terroristic terrorist Osama bin Laden doesn't have "terrorist" in the definition. It would be ambiguous, as Andriy.v correctly mentioned; it just suggests wrong level of involvement. AS ^sa 02:25, 9 January 2021 (UTC)

He does, though, "founder of the terrorist group".--Ymblanter (talk) 07:30, 9 January 2021 (UTC)

I think the mention "terrorist" is appropriate for Bandera, as from the Marples and Snyder sources. So I think it should be kept on the page. Darkcloud2222 (talk) 10:41, 9 January 2021 (UTC)

There's a reason why these statements sound differently :) One suggests direct involvement, and one suggests high-level organizational involvement. I think, without such distinction I could put confusing "terrorist" occupation to all leaders of, say, ISIS. AS ^sa 14:33, 9 January 2021 (UTC)

• Now, as I said at ANI, I am in principle fine with this version, but I am absolutely not fine with how this version was pushed through to the article. We need to fine consensus here before reinstating it.--Ymblanter (talk) 16:58, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

Ymblanter, frankly, your comment is equally applicable to both sides of this edit war. Thus, this your edit summary is hardly acceptable. Our policy does not prohibit to be a Ukrainian editor, and we even don't know if Aced is Ukrainian. In reality, Aced's edit converted our amateurish style to a true ecyclopedic: his arguments are umpeccable, I checked, and even ben Laden is not characterised as a terrorist in the article about him. In addition, there is no reason to put "terrorist" to the beginning, because Bandera was famous not for his terrorist activity, but for being an ideological leader of far-right (fascist) Ukrainian nationalism. Therefore, that should be his primary descriptor, whereas his terrorist activity should not be emphasized too much. In addition, I don't see how Aced's edit fits edit war criteria: he made just one edit, and that edit was not a revert but an improvement of the text. He provided a convincing ratio0nale, and I see absolutely no reason to call it an edit war.

I totally realised that after being involved in hot debates and edit wars with true nationalists it is easy to lose patience. However, in that case, it seems we are not dealing with nationalism and edit warring here. I think, the best way would be if you (or I, if you prefer that) restored Aced's version, and after that the incident can be considered resolved.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:25, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

It was not me who made the last reverts, and I do not feel I should be encouraging further edit-warring by making more reverts. Concerning the attack, it was indeed coordinated at the Ukrainian Wikipedia, as Base pointed out here (and as it was also pointed out to me at ANI). Note that this was coming soon after Kiev/Kyiv disaster, where users en masse came here from the Ukrainian Wikipedia, started massive disruption in disregard of all our policies, and some had to be blocked to stop the disruption. I am happy that the participants this time are willing to negotiate and do not blind-revert everything, but externally coordinated reverts are still a not acceptable dispute resolution avenue here. Concerning the terrorist activities, there is an argument which I made above - Bandera was actually tried and was condemned to death on charges of terrorism, so I do not view his involvement in terrorist activities as insignificant for his career. I myself do not have a strong opinion on whether the lede should say "terrorist" or "organizer of terrorist activity", but I do not think saying he has no relation to terrorism is valid.--Ymblanter (talk) 17:37, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

It is really curious how these Ukrainian Wikipedia editors come to the English Wikipedia claiming that "yes, Bandera is known for terrorist activities, but it is not right to insert it in the opening words", when this is not mentioned on the Ukrainian page of Bandera. Indeed, that page describes a fundamentally different character, as a positive character, there are no traces of his terrorist activities against the Polish civilians, no reference to the enormous similarities with the fascist ideology. From the Ukrainian page, highlighted: "Fighter for the independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century", "creates the Ukrainian Legion and organizes the liberation struggle with other peoples enslaved by Moscow." "By the decision of the Board of the Organization on June 30, 1941 the restoration of the Ukrainian State in Lviv was proclaimed. This event was an attempt to" confront the leadership of the Third Reich "and force it to recognize the Ukrainian struggle." And goes on: "The Nazis tried to join the OUN-B and UPA as allies against Moscow. [...] Stepan Bandera rejected Hitler's proposal." So according to the Ukrainian version, which uses terminologies more suited to political propaganda, rather than those of an encyclopedia, Bandera was not even a Nazi collaborator. How can we not define this as a coordinated attack to "soften" the figure of Bandera also on the English Wikipedia? Why don't these Ukrainian Wikipedia editors also take care of their own Bandera page?--Mhorg (talk) 18:01, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

Ymblanter, being a user who added the word "terrorist" for the first time, I agree that it persistent removal was unacceptable. However, since Aced's version is definitely more neutrally formulated, it may be the best solution.

regarding your notion that Bandera was actually tried and was condemned to death on charges of terrorism, you just reiterate what I myself wrote in my edit summary. However, ask yourself: had Bandera been executed for his terrorism, could he be as famous as he is currently? I think he would be totally forgotten (maybe a couple of ultranationalist friks would remember him). Clearly, the reason why this article exists is not his terrorist activity, but his ideological role in 1939-50s.

Actually, it was not a good idea to combine really disruptive edits that removed the word "terrorist" with good faith Aced's edits, and it would be correct if we restored that version by ourselves. Do you agree?--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:03, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

By the way, Paul Siebert, you wrote "we even don't know if Aced is Ukrainian": go to his user page, he is Ukrainian too. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Mhorg (talk • contribs) 18:09, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

...which is a good demonstration that Ukrainian users are good Wikipedians too.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:13, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

Specifically, it seems to prove the opposite, as terrorist acts were never committed on the Ukrainian page of Bandera. Please read my previous comment. It is clearly better for the "Ukrainian point of view" to have written that he is "known for his involvement in terrorist activities" than to simply define him as "terrorist". I repeat, why don't these Ukrainian Wikipedia editors also take care of their own Bandera page that states the opposite of the English version?--Mhorg (talk) 18:21, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

Yes, as I said, I am fine with that version. I am pretty sure the Ukrainian Wikipedia contains a lot of systemic bias (for example, the article on Dmytro Klyachkivsky does not even mention what he is best known for), but I am to be honest not interested in correcting it, and I do not see how it is related to the English Wikipedia. If the Unrainian Wikipedia editors behave here disruptively, they must be warned and eventually blocked, and this should happen to any editor here irrespectively of the origin.--Ymblanter (talk) 18:59, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

Guys, one has to recognize that Bandera is viewed in Ukraine a little differently. He is to many there considered a hero who took radical steps in his struggle for Ukrainian independence, including mass murder of civilians (see Massacres of Poles). However, I would encourage you to present Bandera neutrally despite that, and yes, the article should clearly affirm Banderas's participation in terrorist activities. Thanks. - GizzyCatBella🍁 20:09, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

• Ukrainian article on Bandera is far from perfect, but this fact, as well as my national origins, are ad hominem arguments which should not be used in a good discussion. I'm sorry if my edit was too rushed (though, as I've detailed elsewhere, I definitely didn't engage in an edit war or a coordinated attack), but I'm yet to see my argument refuted. Using "terrorist" as the first word to define Bandera implies that he is known *primarily and predominantly* for terrorism. But in fact, according to reliable sources, being involved in terrorist activity is not Bandera's primary role he is known *best* for. So, I agree with Paul Siebert that we should restore my edit, which better reflects consensus in reliable sources. --Aced (talk) 23:28, 11 January 2021 (UTC)

Word terrorist certainly belongs on the page (and in the lede) but absolutely does not belong in the first sentence.Faustian (talk) 05:02, 12 January 2021 (UTC)

Of course I know that this does not concern the English Wikipedia, however I wanted to inform you all that I just tried to insert the part about the "terrorist actions" on the Ukrainian page of Bandera and they reverted the changes for "vandalism". They answered that Bandera also wasn't a Nazi collaborator because: "He was not a citizen of the USSR. therefore, it is impossible to consider him a collaborator" (???). For their community I'm vandalizing the Dmytro Klyachkivsky page, because I specified that "He was responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Poles from Volhynia". Therefore I would ask for help from our absolutely not coordinated Ukrainian colleagues who have intervened in this debate (I counted at least 6 accounts), given that you have agreed with that statement about the "terrorist activities", to intervene as soon as possible to re-establish the historical truth about this character also on the Ukrainian Wikipedia.--Mhorg (talk) 16:10, 12 January 2021 (UTC)

Yes, that does not belong to English Wikipedia. I believe everybody knows that the content of Ukrainian Wikipedia is of poor quality, however, that fact has no relation to that dispute. What is important here is that: (i) Bandera was a terrorist during the early years of his political life, and (ii) he was famous as an ideological and political leader of Ukrainian far-right movement, and during that time the activity of OUN cannot be described as terrorism (in the same sense as Nazi war crimes were not terrorism either). Obviously, the second aspect is more important. In connection to that, I am wondering why, instead of complaining about Ukrainian nationalist editors, you haven't proposed a neutral and mutually acceptable version? Since Aced's version seems to be the most close to optimal, I suggest you to take it as a starting point and modify it slightly, to emphasize that Bandera was not just a leader of a terrorist activity, but a terrorist (at the eve of its political carrier).--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:34, 12 January 2021 (UTC)

I have already answered: Timothy Snyder, a reliable source, just calls him a "terrorist", and his terrorist activities were even known to the CIA. I would say there is enough data to call him also "terrorist" in the lede, togheter with "radical politician and theorist of OUN". However, I always want to find a mutually acceptable version, perhaps with users who are not part of a coordinated attack where, in their discussion, they write "Meanwhile I edited at least so, let's see how they react".--Mhorg (talk) 19:43, 12 January 2021 (UTC)

If you mean these two CIA documents, they are primary sources that had not been verified by CIA. The question, however, is not in whether Bandera was a terrorist or not (of course, he was), but what wording is the most appropriate. In my opinion, Aced's wording is better, although I would make more clear that he not only an organiser of the terrorist activity, but also was involved in terrorist activity directly.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:00, 12 January 2021 (UTC)

I would like to point out that even Yasser Arafat does not list "terrorist" in the first sentence and does so only in a qualified way at the end of the lede. [Ahmed Yassin]], founder of Hamas, doesn't have this word in the lede at all. Nor does Boris Savinkov, whose very autobiography was called Memoirs of a Terrorist. To reiterate, reliable sources do note that Bandera was a terrorist (as they do for Arafat) but this does not mean that this word belongs in the first sentence.Faustian (talk) 05:29, 16 January 2021 (UTC)

Quote

In December 2018, the Ukrainian parliament has moved to again confer the award on Bandera.[21]

Unquote

Might want to add that the very same source (link below) states clearly that the bill was rejected in August 2019.

http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=65070

 Done--Ymblanter (talk) 19:46, 28 February 2022 (UTC)

lol whut? The article literally says that Bandera was never a citizen of Ukraine. There was in fact no "Ukraine" during WWII, only the Ukrainian SSR...and Bandera obviously had no allegiance to it. 184.147.89.192 (talk) 20:57, 8 March 2022 (UTC)

Changed "Ukraine" to "Ukrainian National Government (1941)" as I agree that the distinction is not clear; there was no Ukrainian state during the Nazi occupation. CentreLeftRight ✉ 22:07, 8 March 2022 (UTC)