Talk:War of 1812/Archive 29

This article states more often than not that the cause of the war was British actions. The historians quoted supporting this view, however, are all American and their objectivity is obviously questionable.

Needs a discussion as to whether this is an American-centric article and should be more neutral as per Wikipedia guidelines. Sheppey Red (talk) 18:43, 20 January 2023 (UTC)

Provide examples, because I don't see a real problem.

There is a wide variety of opinions in the United States on the War of 1812. U.S. historians Ronald Drez and Troy Bickham clearly don't share the same opinion of this war. Same with U.S. historians Donald Hickey and George Daughan.

I would like to know why Benn and Lambert are still quoted on the main article. Lambert is just a Royal Naval enthusiast with very heavy anti-American rhetoric who failed to research the land campaign. Benn's information is better but very outdated; the book is not nearly as informative as Taylor or Toll.

American-centric would be that the United States won. The main article is far from that perspective. I would argue that the article gives too much emphasis to the Canadas based on modern popular perception. Ironic Luck (talk) 00:44, 22 January 2023 (UTC)

It is often screamed that this article is tilted. One gentleman took it as a personal crusade to have the article state that the British won for 13 years. Throughout the report, we took pains to present the facts and only the facts without commentary of any sort. While a small war, it is a complex one. Some Canadians would swear on a stack of bibles that American greed was the only reason the war started. Some Americans insist that since we kept the country whole, we won. However, there is ample documentation on both the American Government of the time and the British that maritime trade was the issue.

The object of contention over the last 15 years that I have been involved as an editor on this article has been the outcome section. There are and remain wars that do not lend themselves as a won/lost outcome. This war was one of them. Having read through the letters and memorandum of both governments, it becomes apparent that both sides wanted out of a war that had no chance of ever ending outside of a settlement.

As with the American Revolutionary War, trying to supply and equip an army for continuous operations from across the Atlantic Ocean was all but impossible in the age of sail. Moreover, the lack of a good transportation network crippled any offensive operation from either side of the US/Canadian border. Further, the one edge the British enjoyed in land operations, a professional military, had disappeared when American professional military formations began appearing.

British proponents will point with pride the accomplishments of the Royal Navy. Rightly so. But, America didn't need trade as anything but a profit center. As I have repeatedly stated, neither side ever concluded a successful offensive campaign.

From the long view, the America of 1812 was unwilling to change society to field a large professional army and build a road network to enable a successful Canadian campaign. That same lack kept the British from accomplishing attempts to move forward with such ended in disasters. The two sides were like drunken boxers able to hurt one another but never force a conclusion.Tirronan (talk) 18:24, 24 January 2023 (UTC)

Side, or off-track, comment about professional militaries: I think that the main reason that Great Britain could field a significant professional military force in 1812 was that she was fighting Napoleon at the same time. Otherwise, from what I've read, the British have also (for broadly the same anti-authoritarian and thrifty motives as their American cousins) generally preferred a small full-time professional army in peacetime (preferably serving overseas) but the strongest Royal Navy possible. (As far back as the Middle Ages, England tried to keep a body of seasoned seamen by measures such as the Cinque Ports and meatless post-Reformation "political Fridays" to maintain a market for fish and work for fishermen.) Rudyard Kipling was a strenuous critic of popular (and he felt undeserved) disdain for the common soldier in works such as Tommy Atkins. In the first part of The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius ("England your England") George Orwell wrote that the Englishman's "dislike of standing armies is a perfectly sound instinct. A navy employs comparatively few people, and it is an external weapon which cannot affect home politics directly. Military dictatorships exist everywhere, but there is no such thing as a naval dictatorship." ^[1]—— Shakescene (talk) —— Shakescene (talk) 00:49, 26 March 2023 (UTC)

While I agree the article is a mess with a pro-American slant (e.g Britain's successful use of blockade & maritime power to strong-arm the United States' out of her demands over impressment/maritime belligerent rights- the casus belli for war to begin with- is largely glossed over), is it the quality of the arguments that matter and not the nationality of the historian. Would you accept the blithe dismissal, by an American moderator, of any analysis by British historians purely because the argument in question was/is being advanced by scholars from the UK, regardless of said argument's merit? No.

As an aside, there seems to be a sort of consensus (particularly after the bicentennial) on both sides of the Atlantic on certain issues: A. The attempt by the U.S. government to force concessions over maritime belligerent rights from the British was a failure B. Britain contained the American challenge by land and sea without shortchanging her successful military & diplomatic in Europe, the latter being the Liverpool Government's priority during this period. C. Naval Blockade & amphibious operations were the main weapon in Britain's arsenal, something which the US was woefully unprepared to deal with. The consequences can be deen during peace negotiations (the destruction of American economic power and therefore her ability to wage war, the large degree of impunity with which the RN and British Army pillaged the American coast). These have been mentioned in the article- but their consequence are underrepresented.

Instead, space is dedicated to the position that the war was a "draw" (per se) because Britain didn't obtain a peace on the basis of Uti Possidetis. There are three key flaws with this position, which go largely or totally ignored in the article: 1. Uti Possidetis was NOT a British sine qua non (i.e a key war aim) for peace. 2. The above is evidenced by the fact that the British Government was fully prepared to forego the prospect of serious strategic gain in North America if a peace could be secured which guaranteed their key war aims (defence of the Canadas, de facto control over Maritime belligerent rights). That is why the British government signed the Treaty of Ghent fully expecting the expedition against New Orleans to succeed. 3. The British government's priorities in Europe, at Vienna, were just as significant as American military success at Plattsburgh in making a Uti Possidetis peace impossible.

I've used British, Canadian and US sources to reach this conclusion (Donald Hickey, the US Naval War College, Brian Arthur, Donald Graves, Jon Latimer and Andrew Lambert). F.M. Sir D.H (talk) 16:42, 27 January 2023 (UTC)

The British were forced to compromise with a fledgling nation.

There was no consensus during the bicentennial. There was a lot of propaganda pushed by the Canadian government (and their popular historians like Ron Dale who promoted annexation theory) during the bicentennial and the British historians pushed out books that lacked proper research (i.e. Lambert). Lambert was criticized by Hickey for his lack of research done.

The United States did not put much (if any) promoting material into the War of 1812 because it was not an interesting war. The American Civil War and World War II were still in the general public’s minds and were (to be blunt) more popular.

The British lost all influence within the United States boarders. All supporters of the British were defeated (i.e. Tecumseh’s Confederacy, Red Stick Creeks, Spanish Florida) and reputations ruined and even chased out of states (i.e. A Federalist sheriff who smuggled for the British was chased out of Maine in post-War of 1812).

Madison was informed that the British stopped impressing sailors and dropped the demand. Why did he need to “spike the football” and demand the British place it in writing when they (in practice) were not doing this? The United States did not need to force concessions because the British actively avoided impressing American sailors in the post-War of 1812 era and during the Hundred Days War. The fact that this is lost on you is concerning . . .

Territory claimed. Impressment ended. Should the Americans claim victory? I see the British tried to salvage from embarrassments that hurt their reputation due to the early American naval successes in the war, but the British left the War of 1812 as a humiliated nation. The British publications of that era did not rejoice in celebration as the United States did.

This was not a war that I would call a “great success” for the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy failed in the early half of the war on the Atlantic Ocean and (as a world power compared to the United States). As for sea, Lake Erie or Champlain were certainly not British successes.

The British failed to contain the American “challenge” by land as they still held territory by the end and only relinquished it when the glorified cease-fire at Ghent commenced. Dudley’s Raid occurred in November 1814 and plans to build more ships were put in place until the Treaty of Ghent was signed (and ratified).

As for “impunity,” I find it interesting you say that when the British lost more Major Generals and (overall) higher ranked figures in this war than the Americans did. The Duke of Wellington lost his brother-in-law over this war and Cochrane’s reputation was soiled. And I agree on Hickey in that the peace was won (something you forget) as the British were forced to pay for compensation for the losses of the free slaves as cited from Alan Taylor.

Lambert has been disingenuous as he lied about the British not paying for the escaped slaves in television documentaries and Arthur (the latter that has acted as “Lambert Jr.,”) were both from the same think-tank that promotes British nationalism. Arthur was very critical of historian Wade Dudley and (to a much lesser extent) Ian Toll. Arthur wrote on Dudley’s book (within his own), “Dudley’s conclusion that the British blockades of the United States were comparatively unsuccessful neither appraises their consequences nor bears close examination.” Arthur claimed that since the United States didn’t “force” the blockade off of them and that it caused a net income loss that they would lose – and ergo “lost” the war.

Lambert and Arthur are in a minority view that the “British won the war.” I keep seeing the British repeat the “strong-arm” stance against the United States from a handful of loud British nationalists, but the British wanted out of this war and abandoned all demands (many of which were very desirable or arguably needed) and hit a net-negative when nearly all of their allies whom remained within the United States boarders were left to the wolves.

You have not read Alan Taylor, Ian Toll, George Daughan, Ronald Drez, or any other historian? This would explain a lot. I am curious as to whom (in the US Naval War College) were the researchers at the time? Ironic Luck (talk) 02:16, 16 March 2023 (UTC)

American "special operation" slant. Moxy- 00:59, 26 March 2023 (UTC)

It's extremely convenient that Anglo-Canadian historians are "nationalists" in the minority view for suggesting a war that left the US financially exhausted and with no concessions without short-changing Britain's war effort in Europe was a success for London... while American-based historians who advance the blatantly nationalistic "plucky, fledgling country standing up to the nasty Empire" view are not? The fact that America was left vulnerable by her inadequately sized navy and run ragged by British naval might is an argument that dates back to Roosevelt and Mahan, and the navalist party in late 19th century America. You know, those notorious British "nationalists" Mahan and Roosevelt? Or, that the US didn't go "toe to toe" with Britain considering the latter's major entanglements in Europe at the time (without which Madison wouldn't have led the nation into the conflict in the first place?)

"The British were forced to compromise with a fledgling nation" - In what way? Certainly not over the maritime issues which were the at the very centre of the conflict between the two countries.

"Madison was informed that the British stopped impressing sailors and dropped the demand. Why did he need to “spike the football” and demand the British place it in writing when they (in practice) were not doing this? The United States did not need to force concessions because the British actively avoided impressing American sailors in the post-War of 1812 era and during the Hundred Days War. The fact that this is lost on you is concerning . . .

Territory claimed. Impressment ended. Should the Americans claim victory?"

None of this is true. This is either disingenuous on your part or plain ignorance. Albert Gallatin informed the US Government in mid-1814 that;

'America cannot by a continuance of the war compel Great Britain to yield any of the maritime points in dispute, and particularly to agree to any satisfactory agreement on the subject of impressment...the most favourable terms that can be expected [that is, despite the US starting the war] are the status ante bellum'

The United States was forced to drop all its demands over impressment and maritime belligerent rights at the outset of negotiations because...

A) The British would simply refuse to negotiate over the issue, and

B) Because the US had no bargaining chips with which to make demands as alluded to in Gallatin's letter [e.g military failure in the Canadas, running out of credit and cash to wage war due to the blockade etc].

The hiatus in the Napoleonic Wars did not render Britain's future right to these issues any less important. The reason no one was impressed after 1814 was the same reason Britain stopped interfering with neutral trade (not just American trade) - the Napoleonic Wars were over. The Hundred Days did not see a major economic blockade of mainland Europe by the Royal Navy, meaning pre-1814 maritime restrictions were not necessary. Therein lies the end of impressment: the defeat of Napoleon's France, which was also its root cause. To imply it was American belligerence that ended it is post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy.

In 1815 John Quincy Adams told Lord Castlereagh that Madison had recommended the exclusion of "non-native" sailors from the American merchant marine, a friendly gesture to help American trade avoid falling foul of British impressment laws. Evidently, America felt vulnerable to the unchanged system of trade regulation & impressment that continued to exist after Ghent. The claim the War of 1812 obtained any de facto or du jure concession on impressment is rubbish.

"I see the British tried to salvage from embarrassments that hurt their reputation due to the early American naval successes in the war, but the British left the War of 1812 as a humiliated nation. The British publications of that era did not rejoice in celebration as the United States did."

A smattering of America frigate victories against weaker opponents in 1812 (the nature of which the American press glossed over or outright lied about at the time) did not change the overall picture at sea, which was one of overwhelming British superiority. When British reinforcements arrived, the US Navy spent most of the war blockaded in port. Single ship actions were mainly contests for national honour and from the American side yielded no clear strategic benefit (as American naval messiah Alfred Mahan will also tell you). They did not assist a favourable outcome to the war save in terms of propaganda. The British also had the brilliant Shannon-Chesapeake action and the capture of the "super frigate" USS President to their laurels. So what? The deciding matter was maritime superiority, and the British demonstrated this when they crippled the US through economic blockade. British publications did welcome the peace, as did Lord Liverpool himself. The only deflated publications were hawkish ones such as Times and Morning Post. Not because Britain "lost" but because they thought America was let off too lightly by the peace.

"The Royal Navy failed in the early half of the war on the Atlantic Ocean..." No, it didn't. The RN detained the USN in port, instituted a devastating economic blockade which exhausted America's ability to wage war and could conduct amphibious operations along the coast almost at will. This was a cost-effective way to victory. It is utter nonsense to say the RN failed in its Atlantic campaign.

" Lake Erie or Champlain were certainly not British successes." American control of Lake Erie, negated as it was by British control of Huron and eventual dominance in the arms race on Ontario, did not translate into any serious inroads into Canada - the only way America could obtain a favourable outcome to the war.

"Arthur claimed that since the United States didn’t “force” the blockade off of them and that it caused a net income loss that they would lose – and ergo “lost” the war." Arthur's argument is that maritime economic warfare of the kind used against French-controlled Europe exhausted the USA's ability to wage war, denied her bargaining chips, and forced her to drop her demands over maritime rights or threaten Canada. He comprehensively refuted Dudley's claim the blockade was ineffective. His book has been lauded on both sides of the Atlantic.

"The British failed to contain the American “challenge” by land as they still held territory by the end and only relinquished it when the glorified cease-fire at Ghent commenced. Dudley’s Raid..."

Despite Canada being defended by a smattering of regulars, militia and Native warriors, two years of war had left the Americans with nothing to show for it save a toehold around Amhertsburg on the Detroit frontier. The British occupied Mackinac Island, large chunks of the old North West (Praire du Chein), forts on the American side of the Niagara Frontier and parts of Maine. The notion the British didn't utterly defeat the American land campaign- punctuated by battles such as Queenston Heights, Chateauguay, Chrysler's Farm and Lundy's Lane (strategic victory)- is nonsense. It's a position literally any half decent scholar would find mystifying.

"Hickey in that the peace was won (something you forget) as the British were forced to pay for compensation for the losses of the free slaves" Ummm. Hickey's view, in print and spoken word, is that the war was a military and political failure for the US (particularly regards impressment) and a defeat. We cannot pretend that the British compensating American slave owners, or the defeat of Native Confederacies which were beating beaten before the war with Britain, is a fig leaf to hide behind. F.M. Sir D.H (talk) 15:04, 11 April 2023 (UTC)

The War of 1812 was a favorable outcome. It led to the "Era of Good Feelings" and unified the nation. Personally, I think a “draw” or even “inconclusive” is a fair assessment. And you never answer whom (in the US Naval War College) were the researchers at the time? It’s a bold and strange claim to throw the institution out there but not cite a name (or names) behind the research. It’s clear that British "historians" from the same think-tank (Lambert, Arthur) would rather wave the Union Jack than accept their own shortcomings. You've created multiple straw man fallacies to create your own argument and demonstrated hypocrisy from it.

Impressment was kept on paper but ended in practice. The British avoided impressment as it was made clear that they did not wish to resume war. The only plausible chance of this was during the Hundred Days War and they never risked resuming war with the United States. Not to mention:

- Avoidance of the separate treaty over the legality of the Louisiana Purchase. There was even territory claimed by the United States from Spain. (The Surprising Strategic Consequences of the War of 1812 by Walter McDougall @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ooUrBTRxl0o )

- Indian buffer state was clearly dropped and risked the end to negotiations if this hadn't been done.

- New Ireland was totally abandoned and many of the Federalists whom associated with the British were treated with shame for their involvement.

The vote to annex the Canadas never passed and had Florida at the title of discussion. It's even more telling in the following Seminole Wars when Jackson was willing to incite war with the British when he attacked the Colonial Marines (in Spanish Florida) and later executed two British citizens. The United States was still engaging in provocative actions for a (supposedly) “defeated” nation, despite Lambert’s and Arthur’s claims.

The Canadas were still under potential threat until the peace agreement was signed and ratified. Ships were still being built in preparation for further conflict (U.S.S. New Orleans and U.S.S. Chippawa) until the treaty was signed and ratified. It was from Admiral Sir David Milne (to a correspondent in 1817) that wrote, "we cannot keep Canada if the Americans declare war against us again"

You're completely engulfed in the Union Jack waving nonsense . . . I am aware that the reason the British stopped impressment was due to the initial defeat of Napoleon. I mentioned this about Napoleon in the past archives and the British never resumed this practice, but you continue to create a multitude of excuses as to why. My entire point was that it never resumed once the treaty was ratified and that the British refused to take risk in instigating a war with the United States over the maritime issue.

Madison dropped the demand of impressment when he was informed that the British were no longer acting on this practice. There was no need to fight over a maritime issue that resolved itself and could lead to a compromise. And unless you believe the United States would annex Canada (which it voted twice against doing so), this was a positive outcome for all parties involved, especially if the British were concerned of another war.

I've written this in the past archives, but I'll repeat here that this was a case of what was signed on paper (Hickey) versus what happened in actions (Daughan). The actions of the British demonstrated that they could not hold onto any of their gains without risk of significant loss. The British still suffered losses, some short-term but more long-term, with the chosen outcome of a compromise.

The British forfeited “Uti possidetis” for “Status quo ante bellum” because they hadn’t cleared their own territory. I would safely presume you’re aware of Wellington’s response to Lord Liverpool. They weren’t even capable in keeping the gains for themselves or their (supposed) allies in this conflict. The United States were the only party to actually claim territory in this war.

Arthur's opinion is in the significant minority. He had problems with Dudley's point system and Arthur didn't research enough on the land campaign compared to Alan Taylor. Arthur cites from a Federalist complaint about the bankruptcy that you brought up, but never detailed Massachusetts exceptionalism (which is partially behind the political divide) or the vandalism caused by Federalists thugs onto the Jeffersonians. I don’t even remember if he specified the exact name of the Federalist who made this claim. Arthur claims the blockade led to bankruptcy for the United States on pg.186, “By this time, however, the government has reached the point of actual bankruptcy,” which was disputed between RJensen and Coppit in earlier archives. Federalists (at state level) declared bankruptcy, but the Federal court did not make a proclamation of "insolvency." The Federalists' tactics to delay payments was grossly overlooked by Arthur. Arthur grudgingly admits that the British couldn't financially afford to help the Federalists with their secession movement (pg. 201), “However, had the Ghent treaty not been ratified it seems doubtful whether Britain would have been able to sponsor the separation of New England from the Union,” which also means New Ireland would have eventually failed according to Arthur.

Arthur failed to make a pressing argument that the United States lost the war as the damage was much more self-inflicted by Jefferson's incompetence than the British blockade. Some of the claims in Arthur’s book start with “if” and “should have been” opinions instead of concrete facts. Arthur treats Lambert’s word as as gospel and has only written this one book as a historian. The United States only needed shipments as a profit center (check Tirronan's post). Meanwhile, the United States permanently claimed territory from British allies (which the the British failed to prevent) and still kept the Canadas fearful in the coming years.

My point was that once ratification was set forth (February 1815) and the war was over, the British were forced to respect the United States on impressing American citizens when no respect existed prior to engaging in this war. The early half of the war was embarrassing for the British, even in the Atlantic. The Americans held no real Navy and won multiple single-duel ship engagements with a much larger military power. That was my entire point, but you got offended over the fact that the British weren't as dominate on the ocean (or at sea) as you perceive. The America press capitalized on the successes on the ocean. The British press were not optimistic about the outcome . . . The Dublin Evening Post (citation from Ronald Drez) wrote:

“The American War has closed with unmitigated dishonor for England.”

The Edinburgh Review wrote (citation from George Daughan),

“the British government had embarked on a war of conquest, after the American government had dropped its maritime demands, and the British had lost. It was folly to attempt to invade and conquer the United States. To do so would result in the same tragedy as the first war against them, and with the same result.”

You’ve misinterpreted my initial response to discuss the fact that the British had . . . more ships in the ocean? Thanks, I am aware. I said the British embarrassed themselves in the early half, but I never claimed that the British didn't make up for some of the embarrassment. The blockade was strong on the eastern coast, but (accordingly to Dudley on pg.183) never approached a span portrayed by Mahan. “In truth, by the measures of that day it is proved less than fully effective when compared to the blockades of France, and it certainly placed Britain in a more precarious seat at Ghents bargaining table than the chair that country enjoyed in Paris and, later at Vienna.” It would have also proved expensive to maintain that blockade and the British were very war-weary themselves from Napoleonic France. That being said, the United States continued to fight well into 1815. The United States even won naval battles when the war was over. You're totally incapable of giving credit to any American success, but it is not surprising.

Hickey has noted that the argument is debatable. I made mention of this before, but Hickey's opinion is still in the minority in that it was an American defeat. Donald Hickey on the "200 Years of American War" (in 2021) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmPrmglyYho) mentions this, but the video was VERY recently set to “private” sometime after you made your response. Personally, I find the timing of this rather curious . . . And there is no pretending, Hickey's opinion is that the Americans lost the war but the British lost the peace. No self-respecting historian would claim that the British “never paid for the slaves” like Lambert. The British certainly didn't benefit from third party arbitration from Russia. The Native tribes were still in conflict with the United States in the War of 1812 and (despite your claims) Tecumseh' Confederacy and the Red Stick Creeks were defeated during the war effort.

The British embarrassed themselves with the Guerriere, Java, and various other single-ship duels that allowed the American press to focus ON those battles in the Atlantic. When everyone was shocked that the British were losing battles on the ocean, it is an embarrassment. It does not mean "toe to toe" as there was a clear power imbalance between the two nations. On page 107 (Dudley), “Wellington had developed a low opinion of the Admiralty by the end of 1813, and he certainly knew the cause of his problem: an unblockaded United States and the horde of privateers harrying his supply line.” The British knew to address this in the latter half of the war. And there is no “negating” American success at Lake Erie as it was in American control til the end of the war. There was a clear American resistance against the British offensive and was ongoing into mid-1815 due to slow communication. The United States maintained resistance and even captured the Cyane in February of 1815. The British should have easily captured the USS Constitution if they were as dominating in naval waters as you've claimed . . .

What historians have you read? I noticed you never disputed that you didn't read the historians "Alan Taylor, Ian Toll, George Daughan, Ronald Drez, or any other historian" of whom I listed as examples? Again, it would explain a lot. Ironic Luck (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 12:04, 18 April 2023 (UTC)

What is ironic here, aside from your user name, are your accusations of flag waving, while your attempts to denigrate British historians such as Lambert and Arthur by claiming they are liars, anti-American and promoters of British nationalism, is the sort of behaviour I associate with a child. For the record, Andrew Lambert is a naval historian and Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies at King's College, who previously taught at the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich, and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. He is a fellow of the Royal Historical Society and director of the Laughton Naval Unit. Toll, whose book has been used extensively in this article, could more rightly be described as a naval enthusiast.

I think it's pretty much universally accepted that Lord Liverpool's government was forced to back away from harsh peace terms, and instead settle the war on the basis of the status quo, because continuing the war was threatening the delicate negotiations at the Congress of Vienna and the British electorate opposed the high costs, and not because of any great American victory. --Ykraps (talk) 07:52, 22 April 2023 (UTC)

"is the sort of behaviour I associate with a child."

Ykraps, I don't (and will never) expect an unbiased perspective from you. You are one of the most blatant flag wavers on this topic. I asked in an earlier archive to clarify your support for a “British victory” outcome change which was not a neutral point of view. You claimed that it was a "school of thought," but it seems to be a Lambert-Arthur school of thought? Or maybe it's a "Fellow of the Royal Historical Society" school of thought as Troy Bickham is also a member of their community? I can still find American sources whom counter the "British-Canadian victory" myth. Arthur and Lambert have needlessly thrown stones at their American readers and other historians related to this topic. Speaking of which . . . Glass houses, Ykraps, your screen name is a punch line for any plumber. The lack of citation is noted from you.

"For the record, Andrew Lambert is a naval historian and . . ."

I expected sources for clarification, but you gave me a resume from Mr. Lambert? Lambert expressed extreme exaggerations as facts and leaves himself among a significant minority on the "outcome" of this war.

"and not because of any great American victory."

Rubbish. Perhaps you're getting old, but you should recall that Plattsburgh directly influenced negotiations. What has Toll written or stated that would discredit him to be seen as a "naval enthusiast"? Ironic Luck (talk) 11:22, 24 April 2023 (UTC)

You really need to reign in the unwarranted accusations and mud-slinging if you wish to be taken seriously. I don’t recall ever having advanced the case for a British victory or a victory for any of the belligerents for that matter On the contrary, I’ve made it quite clear that I believe everyone lost and that there’s no agreement on the outcome. [] [] []

Whereas you (as I now realise) was using the term naval enthusiast as an insult, I was using it to differentiate Toll from a naval historian such as Lambert

Blithely dismissing (as User:F.M. Sir D.H puts it) British historians while claiming others are flag waving and non-neutral is laughable. --Ykraps (talk) 19:52, 24 April 2023 (UTC)

You've failed to communicate your position with me in the past, so you'll have to forgive me if I don't take your position seriously now. I asked you to clarify how a "British victory - Stalemate" was an unbiased perspective and you refused to respond back to me in Archive 24. You took more issue with the "stalemate" than the "British victory" from my experience with you.

I'm not sure if we can have a civil discussion, but it is good that you’re linking to earlier posts you made now. Ironic Luck (talk) 15:03, 26 April 2023 (UTC)

The war allowed the Republican Party of the era to unite America behind a new nationalistic consensus and emerging identity away from Europe, defeating the Administration’s domestic political opponents (Federalists) in the aftermath. Does this also mean the war was a success against the British, in pursuit of the core reasons it was originally declared? No. Contemporary Federalists were particularly fierce in making the latter point.

RE the US Naval War College and Mahan et al: you will have to forgive me. It was the Naval Institute ( https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1990/april/naval-historians-and-war-1812). As for Lambert and Arthur, you haven’t dealt with their arguments, rather just slighted their objectivity and claimed they must be biased by virtue of being British. Nor dealt with the fact the US government could neither raise adequate funds for the war and was without credit by 1815 as per Brian Arthur.

“The British avoided impressment as it was made clear that they did not wish to resume war. The only plausible chance of this was during the Hundred Days War and they never risked resuming war with the United States… the British refused to take risk in instigating a war with the United States over the maritime issue… Madison dropped the demand of impressment when he was informed that the British were no longer acting on this practice”

And my point, is that this is conjecture and falsehood. I'll outline it one final time. The British interfered with no foreign trade, and impressed no sailors from foreign ships whatsoever during the Hundred Days (American or otherwise) because they weren’t blockading Europe. Not because they were scared of “resuming a war” with a country they’d just …

A.     Coerced into a diplomatic climb-down over those very same issues.

B.     Who wasn’t in any position to prosecute further hostilities against Britain

The British deliberately refused to discuss the issues of impressment, irregular blockade or compensation for seizure of vessels under the Orders in Council from the outset of negotiations in 1814. The Americans dropped the issue (one they were still trying to rectify in the aftermath of Ghent) after advice from Albert Gallatin (quoted previously) that they had no bargaining chips to demand its end. Not because Madison was informed the British weren’t doing it or some other invented crock.

Blockade and the impressment needed to run it were a wartime measure: a form of economic warfare against the French Empire. French domination of Europe did not return during the Hundred Days. If it had, America would’ve been vulnerable - hence the aforementioned discussions in 1815/1816 between Quincy Adams and Lord Castlereagh vis a vis impressment. As they realised the British would not yield the matter, they change tac from requesting an outright end to impressment- to suggesting its termination only in the present hostilities, to eventually abandoning any pretence of negotiating over it at all (see particularly Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812-1823 & The Negotiations at Ghent https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1832365.pdf).

“the British were forced to respect the United States on impressing American citizens” This is why both the US President and American ambassador to the Court of St James was fretting over the matter in 1815 to the British Foreign Secretary? At least try to be a good faith actor and understand this. Between 1815 and the next major European war involving a British blockade (1914) the British found alternative methods of crewing the RN. But blockade measures remained and this was again a source of friction with the neutral United States. These measures were key to British warfare and therefore Britain’s safety. The idea she allowed the US to lecture her over them in 1814 – or that the US “scared” her out of the key facets of her maritime strategy after the fact – just isn’t true.

“The vote to annex the Canadas never passed” Why was the cession of part, if not all of Canada, contained in Monroe’s initial instructions to American negotiators before Ghent?

Canada was safe in 1814. The American offensives into it had utterly failed, and by that time it was sufficiently reinforced with British troops from Europe. Milne’s comments don’t contradict that. They are a reflection on the reality to all British strategists that the far more populated USA had a decided advantage in any ground war over British North America (one she failed to press in 1812-1815). Edward Brenton RN later pointed out in his naval history of the period that the key to protecting Canada was naval supremacy of the type wielded in 1812-1815 - Milne was following this line.

“The British forfeited “Uti possidetis”…” ..and this also had a great deal to do with Britain’s preoccupations in Europe and the fact it wasn’t a sine qua non, as much as American success at Plattsburgh. I know Wellington’s letter, as I know the tendency of partisan players to selectively quote it- almost always ignoring the passages referring to Britain’s “undoubted superiority” in the ground war; everything from Queenston Heights to Lundy’s Lane, control of Lakes Huron and Ontario by war’s end, which is why Canada was safe. Control of Lake Erie, indeed Harrison’s splendid campaign of 1813 served to retake much territory lost in 1812 (although not all by a long chalk). It did nothing to really further the main war against Canada in any significant way.

“You’ve misinterpreted my initial response to discuss the fact that the British had . . . more ships in the ocean? Thanks, I am aware. I said the British embarrassed themselves in the early half”

You said the Royal Navy “failed” in the first half of the war based purely on some single ship actions. Indicative of someone engrossed in a nationalist retelling of the war (that’s the power of books such as Six Frigates). It did not. The RN’s American squadron’s main task in 1812, before Warren’s squadron was strong enough to see a blockade implemented, was ensuring the conveyance of commerce and troops from the West Indies and Canada to Britain and back. This she did. The USN signally failed to attack British trade. Again, winning some single ship actions did not change the overall strategic picture at sea. The fact the British had more ships became material to the US in 1813 when a proper blockade was instituted. The RN’s numerical might decided the war at sea. It is rank stupidity to suggest because the USS Constitution (a ship that spent much time trapped in port) fled a British squadron in 1815 the British weren’t really dominant here.

To infer the war was a failure you’ve quoted two British newspapers; The Dublin Evening Post, an anti-government, reformist newspaper established by radical & serial libeller John Magee (the government in 1815 was Tory) and The Edinburgh Review. Also pro-Whig. This is a deliberately selective sample. You may as well claim Cobbett’s Political Register as representative, or only use Federalist Newspapers to portray contemporary American reactions to the peace.

Fortunately, I’ve got independent research on this matter from years ago:

The Morning Post recorded reactions from publications across the country, reporting how the Staffordshire Advertiser regarded the terms as ‘honourable to our country’. In Lewes peace was welcomed with ‘lively expressions of joy’, the Exeter Gazette recorded the ringing of church bells, and the Nottingham Journal related how the peace had not only proven ‘more auspicious and desirable to the manufacturing interests of this place’ than any event in recent memory-but had ‘gladdened all hearts’ in that ‘populous district’. [‘THE PEACE WITH AMERICA’, Morning Post, 4th January 1815]

‘The hand that had plucked down the French Eagles in their flight, now set fire to the American capitol in the metropolis of the United States. Terror and submission followed the appearance of our expeditions; and though partial misfortunes on the Canadian Lakes, threw a slight shade over the splendour of our triumphs, yet the apprehensions and unpopularity of the PRESIDENT and Executive led them at last to think seriously of peace’ . [‘London, January 02, 1815’, Morning Post, 2nd January 1815]

The Leeds Intelligencer was similarly glowing: 'The Americans are understood to have waived any stipulation on the subject of maritime rights...and what has America gained by this war? Nothing. What has she lost? Ask the merchant, ask the farmer' [‘Peace with America’, Leeds Intelligencer, 2nd January 1815, p. 2]

And the typically muted Examiner thought it sufficient to cast doubt on unduly negative analysis from the hawkish press represented by The Times [‘Untitled’, Examiner, 1st January 1815, pp. 6-7]

These resources can be searched and found via BRITISH LIBRARY NEWSPAPERS at https://galeapps.gale.com/apps/auth?userGroupName=&origURL=https%3A%2F%2Fgo.gale.com%2Fps%2Fstart.do%3Fp%3DBNCN%26u%3D&prodId=BNCN

“Hickey's opinion is that the Americans lost the war but the British lost the peace”

Is it? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qk_tkpX2TeU&t=3097s at 50:23. He makes no case for the British “losing the peace” here or in Forgotten Conflict. America “won the peace” in terms of creating a unified identity around the experience of the war- not by winning concessions, real or imagined, from Britain at or after Ghent. How did Britain "lose the peace" on that basis?

It is always those eager to make accusations of bias who are themselves the worst culprits. Did I ever deny the Americans “credit” for Plattsburgh and its influence on negotiations, the defeat of Tecumseh or the initial successes in single ship actions? No. I only advanced the evidence that collectively these did not make the war against Britain a success. I think the spirit of your comments is why this article will forever remain a half-baked mess. F.M. Sir D.H (talk) 11:25, 25 April 2023 (UTC)

:: “Does this also mean the war was a success against the British, in pursuit of the core reasons it was originally declared? No. Contemporary Federalists were particularly fierce in making the latter point.”

The Federalists were the fiercest critics and in total opposition to the war effort. This reached the point of smuggling through Maine (as you may be aware of) and possible secession. The irony in this war is that the successful defenses did unite the United States. You’ve created an oddly specific set of parameters to your question, but when a country gains a great deal out of this outcome and it’s war aims are met (directly or indirectly) – that is quite arguably a victory. The reasons were related to maritime trade and impressment. Both war aims ended with Napoleon’s defeat; this result eventually benefited the United States. The outcome of winner and loser is not clear in this conflict. There was no changing the Orders in Council, but the United States was able to make the British re-consider it’s use on them. Daughan has mentioned related to the British concessions (pg.415), “Castlereagh was alive to the danger, and he moved quickly to prevent neutral trade and impressment from reemerging to disrupt his rapprochement with the United States.”

:: “As for Lambert and Arthur, you haven’t dealt with their arguments”

Utter nonsense. I've previously bought up the issue of Lambert's lie related to slave compensation.

Lambert states in the YouTube video, "Blacks In The War of 1812" at (03:41), "At the end of the war, the United States government asked to be compensated because these are property. And the British don't pay. They don't give the slaves back, they don't pay up. They’re already moving towards the abolition of slavery and they’re not interested in the property rights of American planters."

Here’s the problem: The British paid for compensation of the lost slaves; Lambert’s retelling is a misleading fabrication or (at best) a half-truth.

Arthur claims the United States couldn't commit to the war effort, but the U.S. planned construction of ships proceeded onward until the Treaty of Ghent was signed. The economic affects that he's claimed would "end the war effort" only ended when both countries agreed to sign the glorified ceasefire. I mentioned this in an earlier archive, but J.C.A. Stagg who summarized this with the following quote in an interview: "In terms of military outcomes, “stalemate from mutual exhaustion” is the phrase to use. By 1815 it became extremely difficult to see how either side could have carried on the war for another year. In that sense nobody won." https://www.historynet.com/interview-with-war-of-1812-historian-j-c-a-stagg.htm Stagg noted that it was difficult for both sides to continue war. That being said, it’s just hypothetical on how it could have turned out pending if the war just played out and negotiations failed. The reality (and history) is that none of it played out and the outcome of the war benefited the United States in the long run.

:: “The British interfered with no foreign trade, and impressed no sailors from foreign ships whatsoever during the Hundred Days (American or otherwise) because they weren’t blockading Europe. Not because they were scared of “resuming a war” with a country they’d just … A. Coerced into a diplomatic climb-down over those very same issues. B. Who wasn’t in any position to prosecute further hostilities against Britain”

My entire point was that impressment ended and that's what the United States wanted. You're fixated on coercion to achieve a war aim, but the British were still cautious of waging another war. The British dropped their own territorial demands and even planned for a separate treaty related to the Louisiana Purchase. The latter (planned) treaty was abandoned when the British failed at New Orleans. As for prosecuting further hostilities, the United States went straight after the Colonial Marines and Red Stick Creeks once the Treaty of Ghent was signed and ratified. The Red Stick Creeks were even under the impression they were defended from potential invasion (Treaty of Nicholls' Outpost) and this invasion led into the Seminole Wars. The United States seemed willing enough to prosecute further hostilities against the British allies in the south, west, and (later) the British themselves. Andrew Jackson infamously hanged two British citizens in the "Arbuthnot and Ambrister incident" in 1818 in the midst of the First Seminole War. It's clear to me that the Treaty of Ghent was a glorified ceasefire and Florida was the more desired territory.

:: “The idea she allowed the US to lecture her over them in 1814 –“

You've created another straw man fallacy. I never claimed Madison (or other officials) lectured the British. It was a dead issue when the British stopped impressing American citizens.

:: “or that the US “scared” her out of the key facets of her maritime strategy after the fact – just isn’t true.”

You're creating hyperbole to make that argument, but as Daughan noted (pg.415), "Instead of a callous disregard of American rights on the high seas, there came a sensitivity from London that avoided conflict.” Both sides were cautious of engaging in another full-scale war, but the United States was a growing economic and military power and if impressment resumed, then war would have likely resumed. Jackson didn't even care about British nationality during the Seminole Wars . . . It's hypothetical and (at that point) alternative history if the British attempted to impress (on accident) Americans again. The hard evidence is that it never resumed. That was the public perception and the British government never pushed to change that perception.

:: “The American offensives into it had utterly failed, and by that time it was sufficiently reinforced with British troops from Europe.”

The Canadas were not "safe" until the Treaty of Ghent was signed and ratified. As for the demand of part (or all) of the Canadas? America – even with the idea that they could have a successful offensive into the Canadas in mid-1812 – could not agree on what to do with the Canadas if they were successful. The Democratic Republicans only offered it as a bargaining chip to the Federalist party. The Federalists didn't accept this proposal; the idea that the land could just be handed back to the British upon a successful invasion soured them on the idea. The annexation of the Canadas never passed and the Federalists benefited more with trade with the British than taking over. As for the Democratic-Republications, even being a majority, there were issues concerning the Canadas becoming a swing state for the Federalists (if annexed) and French Catholics who were deemed undesirables of American citizenship.

:: “I know the tendency of partisan players to selectively quote it- almost always ignoring the passages referring to Britain’s “undoubted superiority” in the ground war.”

It’s “partisan players” when it is someone you don’t agree with. You put emphasis on “undoubted superiority,” but that certainly didn’t reflect the battles in Baltimore or New Orleans - or even Dudley's Raid!

“It is rank stupidity to suggest because the USS Constitution (a ship that spent much time trapped in port) fled a British squadron in 1815 the British weren’t really dominant here.”

And if the British offensive was as strong as you claim, they should have burned the Constitution when it was trapped in port. The fact that there was still resistance on the seas against a much larger power in 1815 is conveniently forgotten about. The British lost more naval battles than they ever should have for a global power.

:: “The British deliberately refused to discuss the issues of impressment, irregular blockade or compensation for seizure of vessels under the Orders in Council from the outset of negotiations in 1814.”

The fact is that the British physically stopped impressing the Americans. You can justify with the end of Napoleon's reign and the refusal of the British to discuss the matter, but at the end of the day, they were no longer doing a practice that the American public felt threatened by.

::“This is a deliberately selective sample. You may as well claim Cobbett’s Political Register as representative, or only use Federalist Newspapers to portray contemporary American reactions to the peace.”

You've cited from the Federalist-perspective when it is convenient for you, but now raise issue when the opposing political party raises their own opinion against the residing parties' narrative? It’s hypocritical to say the least.

:: “It is always those eager to make accusations of bias who are themselves the worst culprits.”

It's good to see that you're addressing the points of Erie and Plattsburgh, both of which you downplayed before in your earlier response. Unfortunately you claim "lies" from historians whom you disagree with. It is hypocritical when you're clearly upset with my stance on Lambert and Arthur . . . And you've avoided other topics such as New Orleans and the lecture I linked by Walter McDougall.

And it took some time but I was able to find some of my old notes related to the (now private) video that I linked earlier, but I have them now. The slideshow from Hickey notes on the screen had the words, “Outcome: Debatable” on the War of 1812. And here is a transcript of the lecture that I typed up from Hickey: “The outcome of this war is debatable, conventional wisdom is that it ended in a draw because that was the way the battlefields looked at the end of the war. There were no major conquest by either side during the war. We certainly didn’t conqueror Canada and although the British occupied certain portions of the United States, they were mostly on the periphery. And the Treaty of Ghent which ended the war appeared to ratify that by providing for the status quo ante bellum, which simply means the two nations restored any territory they held – that had belonged to the other and the war in that sense ended in a draw. There are scholars however who’ve argued that because in a broad sense we vindicated American sovereignty and got better treatment from the British and more respect from the great powers of Europe thereafter that we really did win the war. My own position is that we lost it because the Orders in Council and Impressment were not even mentioned in the peace treaty and no one thought and this was going to be the last Anglo-American War and no one thought this is going to be the last war between France and Great Britain and therefore it was just a matter of time before the British resumed the practices that caused this war.” Hickey acknowledged that he is among the minority that the “United States lost the war,” but he did write that the United States “won the peace” and he stressed that it was vital to keep the republic happy in spite of their own (British) interests and was the principle strategy to defend the Canadas. You’ll have to forgive me, but I erred when I recollected it as “British lost the peace” due to the willingness to sacrifice their own interests.

It is clear the British government had some opportunist intent in mind. The British wouldn't have asked for the Indian buffer state, created New Ireland, or questioned the legality of the Louisiana Purchase if they didn't have some offensive intents in mind. The result of 1812? The British failed to harshly punish the United States and lost all of their allies in the process; many of whom suffered loss of land or prestige. Major-Generals were lost (which affected battle strategy) and the Duke of Wellington even lost his brother-in-law. Cochrane's reputation (among others) was soiled from this conflict. Alan Taylor notes, "The Americans forced the British to choose between alliance with the Indians and peace with the republic. By choosing peace, the British accepted the Americans’ continental power.” Ironic Luck (talk) 15:03, 26 April 2023 (UTC)

"..but when a country gains a great deal out of this outcome and it’s war aims are met (directly or indirectly) – that is quite arguably a victory...Both war aims ended with Napoleon’s defeat"

In the case of maritime belligerent rights the demands of American negotiators were not met, directly or indirectly. Considering impressment ended with the termination of the French Empire, the US may as well have never declared war over the issue, and simply waited for European peace instead. The end of the Napoleonic Wars did not render Britain's future right to impressment any less important in another future conflict- and the American's abandonment of their demands left them vulnerable post-Ghent. This is why American diplomats approached the British informally and formally to try and reach an agreement on impressment in the years following the Treaty of Ghent, and the British (jealously guarding the cornerstones of their maritime strategy) rebuffed them. The climb down over maritime rights cannot be construed as some sort of success save by mental gymnastics.

"(pg.415), “Castlereagh was alive to the danger, and he moved quickly to prevent neutral trade and impressment from reemerging to disrupt his rapprochement with the United States.”"

What does Daughan claim Castlereagh actually did to "prevent neutral trade and impressment" from disrupting an Anglo-American reapproachment? He did not allow stipulations on the subject during the Rush-Bagot negotiations or the Treaty of 1818 negotiations. Richard Rush thought Castlereagh might be willing to negotiate some kind of agreement on impressment in 1818, but Castlereagh left for a conference at Aix-Chapelle and handed responsibility to Lord Bathurst, who promptly sank any possibility of this whatsoever. Clearly, satisfying American unresolved concerns over impressment after the War of 1812 was not a priority for Castlereagh, & not even a possibility for Bathurst. The US government instead considered reviving measures on their own side, if another European war started, to accommodate Britain (not vice-versa) such as the exclusion of non-native sailors from the American merchant marine. (Castlereagh by John Bew, and Castlereagh and Adams by Bradford Perkins)

"It's hypothetical and (at that point) alternative history if the British attempted to impress (on accident) Americans again. The hard evidence is that it never resumed"

The hard evidence is that American negotiators had to abandon their demands over the issue at Ghent when the war effort awarded them no bargaining chips, and after 1814 tried and failed for years to get an agreement on the matter from Britain, while making provision to avoid falling foul of British impressment laws if another major war in Europe resumed. No sailors were impressed on the high seas because there wasn't another major war in Europe. Your implication that the British were so concerned about fighting America they didn't impress anyone (aside from ignoring the reasons for impressment in the first place), is a clear allusion to the idea that Britain was scared to protect her maritime belligerent rights regime from a country she had just militarily contained and put in financial disarray. The actual diplomatic history after 1814 says otherwise.

"Arthur claims the United States couldn't commit to the war effort" Arthur argues that the blockade ruined American finances to the point that the United States' credit was shot meaning she could not obtain loans to continue the war (e.g from the Netherlands), and critical sources of government revenue (customs duties- at this time a major form of direct governmental income- and shrinking tax revenues from industries crippled by the blockade) made the continuation of the war unfeasible. As recognised by the US government. It was difficult and unpopular (in terms of wartime taxes from the British point of view) for both sides to continue fighting, but the British had the cash and credit to do so if necessary while the Americans did not. This is why the Americans were on the defensive during negotiations, commenced talks by dropping their demands over maritime issues and keener to terminate hostilities than the British. E.g During the war, the US spent $86.7 million on the war while only collecting $35.1 million in taxes. A shortfall of $51.6 million. "Comparison of the British government's unimpaired ability to borrow with their own inability to raise any appreciable loans at home or in Europe had renewed the American Peace Commissioner's search for a negotiated settlement" pp.206-207. The war on land had petering out may support Stagg's contention of "mutual exhaustion" (or rather the inherent problems of reducing a country as large and sparsely populated as America while still busy in Europe). But, the blockade and amphibious operations had not, and this was the main weapon in Britain's arsenal.

"My entire point was that impressment ended and that's what the United States wanted. You're fixated on coercion to achieve a war aim...but at the end of the day, they were no longer doing a practice that the American public felt threatened by."

...and the termination of impressment had nothing to do with the demands made by the US, which Britain forced the US to abandon. If the US hadn't declared war, impressment would've still ended in 1814 anyway. The US did not "achieve" anything by coercion or otherwise over maritime belligerent rights. To claim the US "got what it wanted" or suggest the war indirectly successful is simply fallacious.

"The United States seemed willing enough to prosecute further hostilities against the British allies in the south, west, and (later) the British themselves. Andrew Jackson infamously hanged two British citizens"

I sincerely hope you aren't trying to imply the murder of two British subjects by Andrew Jackson after the war was over suggests the US was in a position to actually fight Britain again.

"At the end of the war, the United States government asked to be compensated because these are property. And the British don't pay. They don't give the slaves back, they don't pay up. ......Well, "at the end of the war" (if that's a refence to negotiations at Ghent), the British rejected American requests to return escaped slaves and they didn't pay compensation. It was 8 years later in 1822, after a separate arbitration carried out by the Tsar, that restitution was paid. While a victory for American slaveholders, the Tsar essentially sided with the British interpretation of who was eligible for compensation (James Oakes, The Scorpion's Sting ,pp.141-142). This seems exceptionally thin ground for rubbishing the whole works of Professor Andrew Lambert.

"The Canadas were not "safe" until the Treaty of Ghent was signed and ratified"

There were over 30,000 British soldiers in Canada by December 1814. The last major American offensive was turned back at Lundy's Lane. If you cannot accept that the war against British North America was a qualified failure, then what's the point? Canada was a means to an end for the administration. The most direct way of attacking Britain and to use, if conquered, as a bargaining chip in exchange for British concessions elsewhere. However, American thinking on this was clearly fluid. As well as Monroe's initial instructions in 1814, American negotiators allowed themselves to dream of conquest - albeit temporarily- in the aftermath of William Henry Harrison's successful campaign in Spring of 1813. Before more failures over the next year, it was considered "worth while" to suggest the transfer of "the upper part and even the whole of Canada to the United States" (Monroe to Gallatin, Adams and Bayard, June 23 1813)

"And if the British offensive was as strong as you claim, they should have burned the Constitution when it was trapped in port"

This is about as foolish as claiming the British didn't really dominate the French at sea during the Napoleonic Wars, because they "only" kept the French fleet trapped in Brest for nearly the whole war rather, than going in and burning it. Total non-argument.

You've cited from the Federalist-perspective when it is convenient for you

I said the Federalists seized the opportunity to critique the Madison Government over its failure to win concessions on impressment. I didn't, for instance, selectively quote two Federalist newspapers and imply this was indicative of America's general reaction to the peace.

It's good to see that you're addressing the points of Erie and Plattsburgh, both of which you downplayed before in your earlier response

I never downplayed either. Erie was part of the successful 1813 campaign in the Old Northwest which helped the Americans recover much of their losses in the 1812 campaign, and I've already addressed Plattsburgh's role in helping convince London to abandon Uti Possidetis but qualified it with the proviso that, as well as not being a key British war aim (it only emerged in late 1814 after America conceded over impressment),..."The British government's priorities in Europe, at Vienna, were just as significant as American military success at Plattsburgh in making a Uti Possidetis peace impossible"...which likely elicited your displeasure. Here's your favourite historian Brian Arthur on the topic:

"Despite the British occupation of parts of Northern Maine in September 1814, news of American successes reaching London in October had caused British Peace Commissioners to relinquish earlier territorial claims. The status quo ante bellum was to be resumed. This reflected the abandoned British attempt to invade the United States from Canada, unrealistic without naval control of the lakes, although costing the hoped-for overland route between Halifax and Quebec. British concern over disagreements between the victorious Allies meeting at Vienna, and the real possibility of renewed fighting in Europe, with the implied need for heavy taxation and borrowing in Britain, had moderated attitudes on anything less vital than the retention of British maritime rights" (How Britain won the War of 1812), p.207

Unfortunately you claim "lies" from historians whom you disagree with

I have never claimed the historians you've cited are lying. This is a stunning lack of self-awareness and indicative of why (between this baseless accusation & mental gymnastics over impressment and the war against Canada) the discussion is essentially pointless. I hope other editors might find the sources useful. F.M. Sir D.H (talk) 23:46, 1 May 2023 (UTC)

Pot, meet kettle, Moxy.

The Canadian (and perhaps the Commonwealth) popular perception is slanted. The last time I saw you was in Archive 26 and you refrained from further commentary when asked for clarification from Tirronan and David Kinge. You’ve previously cited from Jim Guy, a professor of political science (not a historian) and based your opinion on his column in a Cape Brenton piece which failed to meet reliable research.

I can personally cite from more authors than what I’ve listed on Wikipedia, plus I can cite from online lectures that question the “British victory” myth. There was too much internal conflict within the United States to ever annex the Canadas. Hickey was right when he said that this was the most divisive war in the United States history and begrudgingly admitted (in a lecture a few years ago) that his argument can be flipped on it’s head for an American victory. He doesn’t agree with the “American victory” perspective, but he acknowledges that other historians have this viewpoint.

You’ve demonstrated hypocritical behavior; present reliable sources and I’ll continue to do the same. Thanks. Ironic Luck (talk) 14:26, 31 March 2023 (UTC)

It's too bad or academic editors have given up on the article . Its also to bad Hickey did not have access to Canadian and British publications in the late 80s .Moxy- 20:04, 4 April 2023 (UTC)

Hickey is only one example, Moxy. The British sources still wave the Union Jack. David Mills's book is a good read when dealing with the Canadian perspective; many modern myths are still promoted by Canadian jingoism. Ironic Luck (talk)

• Comment The OP has essentially made a drive-by comment but not otherwise contributed to the discussion. Wiki articles should be written in a way that is detached from the subject (at arms-length) and which does not appear to be partisan in a Wiki voice. Partisan views should be attributed and given due weight. Where this might be better done has not been evidenced, so there is little to glean from the OP. The discussion has then digressed to a question of the result in the infobox. It is quite clear from the article and the sources taken as a whole, there was no conclusive result - everybody got a bloody nose but made their point. There is no consensus in sources by which one might reasonably assert one side was conclusively the victor. The result was inconclusive. The body of the article quite clearly supports this. The present result of "inconclusive" is quite appropriate. If there is a substantial change in the consensus of sources, the body of the article should be changed to reflect this. Only then, would it be appropriate to revisit the question of the result parameter. Since this discussion is focussed on the parameter and not the body of the article, I don't see that it is going anywhere productive. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:23, 7 April 2023 (UTC)

  This, understandably, has been hashed out for many years, with extensive citations on all sides, to reach the current inconclusive/status quo ante bellum result in the InfoBox. See for example (as the head of this page once suggested), /Archive 8, /Archive 9, /Who Won?, Wikipedia:Mediation Cabal/Cases/2009-11-11/War of 1812 and /Archive 14 —— Shakescene (talk) 18:51, 7 April 2023 (UTC)

If anyone's interested, there is a book called The Idea of Loyalty in Upper Canada, 1784-1850 (David MIlls, McGill-Queen's University Press 1988) that explains how the provincial government interpreted the war as a victory by loyal militia. The main target of the idea was the new emigrants who had served in the Napoleonic wars and settled in Upper Canada. While it had a unifying effect, it relied on a distortion of actual history. OTOH, even though school history books long abandoned this view, it remains part of popular folklore. TFD (talk) 19:01, 11 April 2023 (UTC)