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The Battle of Mount Belvedere also known as the Battle of Riva Ridge (18-25 February 1945) was a battle of the Second World War between Allied units from the United States and Brazil and the German Wehrmacht. The first stage of Operation Encore, a limited offensive, the goal of the Allied soldiers was to capture a string of summits of the Northern Apennines, which controlled passage along Strada statale 64 Porrettana [it], the all-weather link between Pistoia and Bologna. Once held, possession of these summits would provide the Allies an advantageous position from which the western portion of the Allied spring offensive could start.

Date18-25 February 1945 (8 days)
Location
Northern Italy
44°12′N 10°53′E
Quick facts Battle of Mount Belvedere, Date ...
Battle of Mount Belvedere
Date18-25 February 1945 (8 days)
Location
Northern Italy
44°12′N 10°53′E
Belligerents
  Germany
Commanders and leaders
Major General George Price Hays General Eccard Freiherr von Gablenz
Units involved
Casualties and losses
US: 900 casualties, 203 killed[1]
Brazilian: 22 dead, 137 wounded[2]		 over 200 killed,
400+ taken prisoner[3]
Llywrch/sandbox4 is located in Northern Italy
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Location of the Battle of Mt. Belvedere
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The primary height along Highway 64 was Mount Belvedere [it], which controlled access to the highway. It had been the goal of several earlier Allied attacks November 1944 by the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF). However, heavy German artillery barrages prevented the BEF from holding Belvedere; these barrages had been aided by spotters on Riva Ridge, the name the Americans gave to the Pizzo di Campiano [it]–Mt. Mancinello [it] range of mountains to the west of Belvedere. (The Germans referred to this range as Monte Cappel Buso.) Therefore, to capture Mount Belvedere Riva Ridge must needs be secured first. To accomplish this, however, the attackers would need to ascend a series of exposed, steep slopes, at times cliffs; one tactical study estimated that over 90% of any attackers would become casualties should an advance up these slopes be attempted in daylight. Therefore General George Price Hays decided the First battalion, 86th Infantry Regiment of the 10th Mountain Division would ascend those slopes at night. Riva Ridge was seized the night of 18/19 February, and held despite repeated counterattacks by units of the 1044th Grenadier regiment of the German 232nd Infantry Division. The other two regiments of the 10th Mountain — the 85th and 87th — began their own frontal assault on Mount Belvedere the following night, and succeeded in capturing Belvedere then advancing on several neighboring heights, including Mount Gorgolesco. Fighting for control of the towns between Riva Ridge and Mt. Belvedere continued for a few more days.

Units of the German 232nd Infantry Division, assisted by the 114th Jäger Division, attempted to push the Americans off Mount Belvedere and Mount Gorgolesco 21 February, but failed. Once these counterattacks were beaten back, the Division continued along the mountain crests to Mount della Torraccia [it]. The BEF seized Mount Castello [it] in support of this advance. The Germans were fierce in their defense of Mount della Torraccia; in their advance on that objective (22 February) the Second battalion of the 85th Regiment suffered heavy losses which amounted to half of the total casualties the Division experienced in this battle, and failed to advance. The Third battalion of the 86th regiment, which had not participated in the capture of Riva Ridge, moved through them and succeeded in capturing the mountain 24 February. After a fierce assault with fresh units that night, German counterattacks ceased.

Background

Following the capture of Rome 4 June 1944, the Allied forces proceeded north in a two pronged attack: the British Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese) advancing along the coastal plain of the Adriatic, and the U.S. Fifth Army (Lieutenant General Mark Clark) to the west through the central Apennine Mountains.[4] In the Apennine Mountains were the carefully prepared German defenses of the Gothic Line.

General Clark's plan had initially been to drive through the Apennines at two points: the main body of II Corps would advance north along the Strada statale 65 della Futa [it], the highway that connects Florence to Bologna by way of the Futa Pass. When these troops encountered the expected enemy resistance, the 34th Division would launch a strong diversionary attack west of the Futa Pass, while the rest of II Corps would bypass the Futa Pass to the east and attack the lightly defended Il Giogo Pass on Route 6524 near the boundary of the German Fourteenth and Tenth Armies. This attack began 10 September 1944.[5]

However, the Apennines were a formidable terrain and despite reduced numbers and limited supplies the Germans proved to be stubborn foes in their well-prepared defensive positions. While the American divisions managed to advance past both the Futa and Il Giogo passes, it was at a high cost. Between 10 September and 26 October, II Corps' four divisions had suffered over 15,000 casualties. On 27 October General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, ordered a halt to these offensives.[6] Further handicapping the Allied advance was the decision to withdraw from the Eighth Army a corps headquarters and three divisions to Greece, and the 1st Canadian Corps with its two divisions to northern Europe. The British advance was effectively halted.[7]

The Allies made one last attempt to break through the Apennines, using the division-sized Brazilian Expeditionary Force, which had recently arrived in Italy, as well as a collection of units known as Task Force 45. To the west of Futa Pass Highway 64 passed Mount Belvedere on its route to Bologna; the BEF was tasked with capturing this prominence, which would allow a breakthrough into the Po Valley. From 24 November through 12 December the Brazilians made three unsuccessful assaults to capture the mountain, but despite their bravery each time they secured the peak of the mountain, German artillery drove them off the heights.[8] A few weeks later the US 10th Mountain Division, the only American mountain infantry unit, which had been stateside impatiently waiting to participate in the fighting, arrived in Italy.

The 10th arrived at Naples piecemeal starting 22 December 1944, with the last units reaching Naples 13 January 1945.[9] From Naples they made their way by ship or by rail in forty-and-eights to Livorno, then by trucks to Pisa. First to arrive was the 86th Infantry Regiment in December.[10] The 85th and 87th Regiments landed in Naples 13 January 1945, then proceeded to Pisa.[11]

It was at Pisa that the men of the division discovered their specialized mountaineering equipment had not followed them to Italy; their skis, mountain boots, parkas and the rest of their equipment got no closer to them than a warehouse in Boston.[12] Once in the mountains, the men would most miss their sleeping bags that had kept them warm through the winter nights in the Rocky Mountains; in response to their complaints, the standard issue of two blankets was supplemented with another two.[13] The officers would miss the mountain boots the division spent years developing. One officer wrote, "We have spent three years developing this clothing and equipment. We may now be denied the use of it at a time when we really need it."[14] After the battle, at least two enlisted men made due by appropriating mountain boots from the feet of captured Germans.[3] The men improvised, borrowing skis from local Italian alpine clubs for their patrols in the snow; they could not obtain crampons from the local clubs, so they fixed knotted ropes to the soles of their leather and rubber shoepacs to improve their footing on icy slopes.[15]

From Pisa the 86th Mountain Infantry proceeded to the front, arriving at Vidiciantico [it] 8 January.[16] Once there, the men immediately began patrolling, seeking information about the German positions. The rest of the division joined them by 20 January.[17]

Task Force 45, originally at milhist.net

History of Task Force 45 (29 July 1944 to 28 January 1945)

Planning

Whether out defence now took the form of a delaying action or of a retreat it was at least secured by prepared sectors and positions manned against surprise. This forbade the acceptance of a decisive battle south of the Po. -- Albert Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, 1953 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970) p. 266

Disposition of forces

On the Allied side:

  • US 10th Mountain Division

The MOUNTAIN tab put the 10th in the same league with other elite outfits, the ones who wore RANGER or AIRBORNE above their division pataches[18]

Because of specialized mountain training and comparatively light organic artillery -- there were only three battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers as contrasted with the three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers and one of 155-mm. howitzers in the standard infantry division -- commanders in other theaters had declined the division's services, but the specialized training enhanced the division's attractiveness to an army engaged in mountain warfare.[19]

In late April, Minnie Dole went to see General Marshall to plead for a combat-zone assignment ... it didn't make sense to send the 10th to one theatre of war if the need might subsequently prove greater in some other theatre of war. The 10th would just have to wait in reserve until the right opportunity presented itself[20]

Attached to the division: (Brooks, in Baumgardner, p. 29)
  • US 175th Field Artillery Battalion (Had been part of Task Force 45)[21]
  • US 1125th Armored Field Artillery (Created from several inactivated AAA units, re-equipping them with self-propelled 105 mm howitzers [Fisher, pp. 397f])
  • US 84th Chemical Mortar Battalion (Had been part of Task Force 45)[21]
  • US 751st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Had been part of Task Force 45)[21]
  • US 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Had been part of Task Force 45)[21]
  • 27th Quartermaster War Dog Platoon (Earle, pp. 17f)
  • Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF)
  • Italian partisans

On the German side:

  • 232nd Infantry Division
    • 1043rd Infantry Regiment
    • 1044th Infantry Regiment
    • 1045th Infantry Regiment
    • 232nd Fusilier Battalion
    • 232nd Artillery Regiment
    • Panzerjäger Battalion
Attached to the division:
  • 4th Mountain Battalion (Hampton memorandum)
  • Mountain Training battalion Mittenwald
  • 1 bn from the Italian San Marco Division

Terrain

The northern Apennines stretch 140 miles across Italy, and as much as 50 miles across; some peaks were as high as 7,000 feet. In 1944 only a few all-weather roads offered access through this range. The Germans had supplemented this broken terrain the Gothic Line, with prepared positions, mine fields, and artillery.

When the 10th Mountain began to deploy in Vidiciatico, the officers were not optimistic about its location. "Lieutenant Colonel Hampton likened the 1st Battalion's position in and around Vidiciatico to sitting 'in the bottom of a bowl with the enemy sitting on two-thirds of the rim looking down upon you. There was about as much concealment as a goldfish would have in a bowl.'"[22]

To the west of the town of Vidiciatico and running generally southwest was a very precipitous and rugged escarpment called the Mancinello-C[a]mpiano Ridge. This chain of summits rose from the very steep canyon of the Dardagna River to various heights. Rising abruptly from the fortified town of Rocca Corneta, it extended to M. Spigolino, a distance of about seven miles. The summits from north to south were Pizzo di C[a]mpiano (3175 ft.), M. Cappel Buso (3800 ft.), M. Serrasiccia (4600 ft.), M. Riva (4672 ft.), Le Piagge (4900 ft.), Serra [d]ei Barchetti (4350 ft.), Cingular Sermidiano (5400 ft.), and M. Spigolino (6030 ft.). The elevation of the Dardagna canyon varied from 1600 feet at the north end to some 2500 feet at the south end.

There were no sharp breaks of passes. On the east side it is generally very steep, broken, with cliffs, steep ravines and shoulders. The west side is by comparison very mild, ranging from broken and steep through rolling to nearly a plateau west of M. Riva. The watershed on the east side is abrupt, characterized by fast flowing waterfalls. They empty into a stream which flows parallel to the base of the ridge, whose banks range from steep to a gorge, One of the important factors to be considered was the gradient of the east side of the escarpment which would have to be scaled to take this ridge held by the enemy. At the shortest place, the average gradient to M. Cappel Buso is about 40 degrees. (The average gradient of the Hornlike ridge of Hira Herborn is 45 degrees). The average gradient to M. Serrasiccia was 30 degrees. [Dusenberry believes that the gradients to Cappel Buso & Serrasiccia are reversed.] -- Lt. Col. Henry Hampton, cited in Dusenberry p. 179

General Hays saw an important detail that had escaped previous planners. "Not only was Belvedere itself well defended, but the existence of a tall, unusually steep, perpendicular ridge to the west made it all but impregnable. Hays figured that the Germans atop what came to be known as Riva Ridge had been the real culprits in the previous failures on Belvedere. They not only had a perfect stadium-like view of Allied comings and goings, they could direct devastating fire in behind any approach to Belvedere's south slope."[23]

Prelude

Upon reaching Vidiciatico the night of 8/9 January, the 86th Mountain relieved the 900th AA Battalion, one of the units that comprised the improvised Task Force 45.[24] Over the following weeks men of the 10th Mountain conducted the only patrols where Americans used skis, borrowed from local sport clubs.[25] At 0300 the morning of 25 January the regiment had its first firefight with the enemy when German soldiers had infiltrated positions around the village of Querciola; the enemy was driven back by an artillery barrage.[26]

At the end of the month, most of the 86th Mountain Infantry withdrawn from the line to Bagni di Lucca. Since nearly a third of the men had joined the division after its departure from Camp Hale, & lacked the specialized training, there they underwent rigorous training in rock climbing at a local marble quarry.[27]

  • Importance of Riva Ridge to holding Mt. Belvedere "This ridgeline offered German artillery observers a clear line of sight on anyone approaching the treeless flanks of Belvedere, and since the face of Riva Ridge was so steep, there was nothing the Fifth Army could do to knock the observers off." (Jenkins, p. 136)
    • It was Gen. Hays who realized the importance of Riva Ridge: it enabled German forward observers to call artillery strikes on the south & SW slopes of Mt. Belvedere. (citation needed)
    • Gen. Hays ordered commander of 86th regiment Col. Tommy Tomlinson, to have his men scout out possible routes up the face of Riva Ridge. Tomlinson, a regular army soldier w/o rock climbing experience, said it couldn't be done. Hays: "This is a mountain division. Surely they can find how to climb up that ridge. It will be a lot cheaper to capture the ridge in the first place than to suffer the casualties from hostile fire directed from there." (Isserman, p. 148f; Jenkins, p. 152 (full quotation); Shelton, p. 127 (slightly different quotation))
    • Over the following weeks, patrols went out. "Early patrols noticed, at first, very little activity along the ridge." "Early on, American patrols were restricted to nighttime. But with the Germans on top of the ridge apparently oblivious to -- or unconcerned about -- the increasing activity, patrols were slowly allowed to pick up, like water slowly beginning to boil around lobsters in a pot." (Jenkins, p. 154)
    • Discarded plans: attack north from Mt Spigolino, due to supply problems; one ascent from the middle, too unwieldy & too attractive to an artillery barrage (Jenkins, pp. 153f)
  • Five routes -- called trails -- were identified up the face of Riva Ridge. Although in the end only 4 were used. (cite Lt. Col. Henry Hampton's report; Dusenbery, pp. 181-187)
  • By 12 February the snow had mostly melted away or packed down by patrols. Skis were no longer needed. (Jenkins, p. 161)
  • General Hays' "always forward" speech to the troops, 16 February (Shelton, p. 129; Jenkins, pp. 164f -- has the most extensive quotation; Boucsein, p. 78) After discussing the plans for the upcoming battle, Hays concluded:

Continue to move forward. Never stop. Always forward. Always forward. Always forward. If your buddy is wounded, don't stop to help him. Continue to move forward. Always forward. Don't get pinned down. Never stop. When the assault comes, you must get into the enemy's position as quickly as possible. You must move fast. Don't give the enemy time to recover. Shoot him. You must take his position.

In the days to come, those of you who survive must learn to relax and enjoy yourself. You will be given time out of the line when you can rest and see the sights. You should go to all the historical places that you can in Italy, because remember you may not get back this way again. To the victors go the spoils. Take trophies, souvenirs, cameras, guns, pistols, and watches, ship them home. Someday you can show them to your grandchildren.

Good luck.

    • German commentary by Boucsein: "The Germans were to have their skulls broken open!" ("Den Deutschen soll der Schädel eingeschlagen werden!") (Boucsein, p. 78)
  • German morale during battle:
    • A POW from the Mittenwald battalion reported every man in his company "would desert when the chance came. When his absence was discovered, either the unit would be pulled out of the line or else the entire company would soon be over to desert. Actually, the Battalion was pulled out within the next few days." (Earle, p. 48)
    • Boucsein reports that when one German soldier, captured after the fighting on Mount Soprasso, when asked by interpreter Vernon A. Walters "'whether he knew if the post was surrounded' answered yes, that he was perfectly aware of it and added "One stays faithful to ones comrades, is it not so Herr Major?' ("Man bleibt seinen Kameraden doch treu, nicht wahr, Herr Major".) Here, Walters explains: "This answer was typical of the attitude that made the Germans fearsome to their opponents". (Boucsein, p. 89)

The attack

Map of the Battle of Mount Belvedere
Map of the Battle of Mount Belvedere

The plan: 1st bn 86th would climb & secure Riva ridge; 3rd bn 85th reg wd assault the summit of Mt Belvedere; 1st bn 85th reg Mount Gorgolesco east of Belvedere on right; 3rd bn 87th reg move along the lower slopes in support of the 85th reg; 1st bn 87th reg capture Valpiana Ridge to NW on left; 2nd bn the area between Corona & Florio. (Jenkins, p. 165) The B.E.F. wd capture Mt Castello

  • Two different accounts of the German positions on Riva Ridge:
    • American intelligence: Enemy strength had been estimated at 40-50 men on Riva Ridge, with several hundred in close reserve on the gentler reverse slope, supported by artillery & mortars. (Isserman, p. 150) These were from 4th (Edelweiss) Mountain battalion & a battalion of the 232d Infantry division (Shelton, p. 126; Isserman, p. 151)
    • German: Two companies of 2nd battalion, 1044th Grenadier Infantry regiment, & a platoon from the machine-gun company; the 7th company of the 1044th Grenadier Infantry was held in reserve (Boucsein, p. 78)
  • Enemy strength on Mt Belvedere 1045 reg, 232d Division (Isserman, p. 165); 114th Jaeger Division, & 4th Mountain bn (Jenkins, p. 180)
    • At the time men of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment on Riva Ridge were being relieved by the 232nd Fusilier Battalion (Isserman, p. 154; Fisher, p. 429) (Lt. Col. Hampton: "7th company of the 1044th regiment of the 232nd Fusiliers" was being relieved by 2 companies of the 4th Mountain bn [Dusenbery, p. 198])
  • German Gen. Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin was concerned about the complacency of his own troops. (Jenkins, pp. 154f)
  • German positions on Belvedere:
  • Germans aware of the presence of the 10th Mountain Division: when 3rd bn, 86th Mountain Infantry entered Vidiciatico, a German loudspeaker from Riva Ridge blared in English, "Welcome, men of the 10th Mountain Division" (Shelton, p. 123)

Riva Ridge

On the night of February 18, 1945, at 1930 hours, the first battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry crossed the Dardagna River and began their ascent of Riva Ridge, the soldiers heavily loaded with equipment.[28] Because once they were on top of the ridge the men would be isolated for an extended time, each soldier was issued an additional 48 rounds of ammunition, bringing their total to 96 rounds.[29] Although five trails had been identified, only four were ultimately used to reach the summit, as each company was assigned to a specific mountain and trail. Companies B, C, and F were assigned different peaks, while Company A, minus one platoon, was tasked with a technical climb of Pizzo di Campiano. [30]

Each company was assigned its own route, or "trail" to climb to its objective. Although 5 had been identified, in the event only four were used. Company B was assigned to climb Mt. Cappel Buso (1151 meters), Company C focused on Mt. Serrasiccia (1395 meters), Company F targeted Mt. Cingio del Bure (1424 meters), and Company A, less one platoon, was to scale Mt. Mancinello (1452 meters).[31] Each company was assigned additional men, who included litter squads, and a forward observer with his party. In addition, companies B and C were each assigned a machine gun platoon, and artillery sections with 81 mm mortars from company D. Italian Alpini would assist by transporting heavy weaponry, including a howitzer tube, up the slopes of Trail 2, the only route accessible by mules or vehicles. Such heavy loads strained the small mules used by the Alpini. "One mule carried a howitzer tube to the top and immediately dropped dead from exhaustion." [32][33]

Command expected that if the element of surprise was lost, up to 90% of the men could become casualties. [34] As a precaution, despite the overwhelming odds, the soldiers pressed on, motivated by the importance of securing Riva Ridge.

Upon reaching their designated positions, some American forces began to encounter German soldiers. Lieutenant Loose’s platoon from Company A, which had ascended the slopes of Pizzo di Campiano, found a well-prepared German defensive position abandoned for the night. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the platoon launched an assault, resulting in the capture of three Germans, the killing of three others, and the seizure of valuable materials, including a briefcase containing documents. [35] The platoon reached its target at 0545.

The other companies had reached their objectives earlier that night. Company B reached the summit of Mt. Cappel Buso at 0117 on February 19, followed by Company A at 0258, Company C at 0305, and Company F at 0407.[35] American artillery played a pivotal role in disrupting the German command and communication lines. By severing telephone wires to and between German positions on Riva Ridge, the artillery delayed German reinforcements from reaching the battlefield. Further complicating the German response was the absence of the regimental adjutant and intelligence officer at Castel d'Aiano, where the officers of the 1045th Grenadier regiment and the second battalion 1043rd regiment were meeting to discuss a counterattack similar to the one in the Serchio valley. [36]

The entire battalion managed to reach their objectives without losing the life of a single man to hostile action; one was wounded. (source?) For the most part, the Germans were oblivious that the Americans were now in possession of the top of the ridge, presenting almost no resistance to the American advance. There were two exceptions. One involved Company B, which, after encountering German machine gun fire, held their fire in response. Unable to see much of anything in the fog, the Germans withdrew, probably assuming the American force was a lone patrol; their action allowed the Americans to reach their objective without further incident. [37] The other was Company A's brief firefight on Mt. Mancinello, with the Germans again misjudging the situation and returning to their base. Later, the same group of Americans discovered more Germans sleeping in their foxholes, who were either killed or driven off. [38]

This was the point where the Germans awoke to find their enemy in possession of the ridgeline of Riva Ridge. As the day unfolded, the Germans began their counterattacks, though the Americans held their positions with determination. Men of the 7th Company of the 1044th Regiment and the 232nd Fusilier Battalion, launched attacks from the left and center, respectively. [39] Sgt. Torger Tokle and Company A's forces managed to seize a German bunker, killing four and capturing eight in the process.[40]

At the same time, a platoon led by Lt. Boudoures, while inspecting the communication lines between Company B and Pizzo di Campiano, was attacked by German soldiers who had infiltrated the American positions, but the Americans drove them away.[41]

While securing Ridge X (a knife-edge running west of Mt Cappel Buso and perpendicular to the ridgeline), C company twice engaged the enemy. One involved a group of Germans pretending to surrender.[42] Hampton mentions two assaults by the Germans, 40 men at 1300, then 40 more at 1530.[43] Boucsein identifies these as men of the Eichwalder Co., 4th Alpine Jaeger battalion [44]

Despite their failure to dislodge the Americans from the crest of Riva Ridge, the Germans believed they prevented the Americans from advancing beyond the ridge tops, not knowing this was as far as they intended to advance [45] The Germans must have forced the men of the 86th Mountain Infantry out of one position: Boucsein mentions the Hochgebirgsjäger occupied an American position to find "ammunition, clothes, spades, provisions, coffee, cooking pots, gasoline stoves, Chesterfield brand cigarettes, cinnamon-flavored chewing gums and much more."[44]

Pizzo di Campiano

However, the most intense fighting occurred around Pizzo di Campiano, where Lt. Loose’s platoon was stationed. Lt. Col. Hampton's later wrote, "This position was the hot spot, and the Kraut fought hard for it." The first German counterattack commenced 19 February 1820 hours,[41] by the 7th company of the 1044th Grenadier regiment, who were later assisted by a company of the 4th Hochgebirgsjäger battalion (delayed from joining the attack by the thick, icy snow) and men of the 232nd Fusilier battalion.[44]

The platoon was subjected to constant pressure by the Germans. The unit requested an artillery fire mission at 2110 hours, then followed that five minutes later requesting an additional platoon to help hold their position. Half an hour after that, the unit reported to battalion headquarters that they are surrounded by "a 40 man enemy patrol." Radio communications with the platoon was lost for some hours the morning of 20 February, but when restored the unit reported they are under intense fire, and at 0646 urgently called for help. At 0733 they reported to battalion headquarters that they were running short of food and ammunition.[46] At this point the platoon was out of hand grenades and had only six rounds for their machine gun. The men were forced to eat snow in place of water.[47] In a desperate move, Lt. Loose requested artillery gunners to bring their fire in tight, first targeting within 25 yards then 5 yards of their position. When the executive officer of the 604th Artillery, Colonel Albert H. Jackson, pointed out, "Do you realize that you are asking for fire exactly on your position?" Lt. Loose replied, "I do, but if we don't get artillery support, you'll have nothing to support!"[48] Fortunately, reinforcements under Lt. Col. Hampton arrived at 1600 hours on February 20, relieving the beleaguered platoon and stabilizing the situation.[49]

Over the previous 18 hours the platoon had only lost two killed and six wounded; they had captured seven German soldiers and counted the bodies of 26 around their position.[49][50] One of the German dead was an officer, Captain Knoblauch, who led the assault.[51] Lt. Col. Hampton, Lt. Loose, Pvts. Frank Gorham, and Frank Fairweather were awarded Silver Stars, the rest of the platoon were awarded Bronze Stars for their heroism.[52]

Although the Germans launched several counterattacks on the American positions on Riva Ridge over the next few days, their efforts proved unsuccessful. Their forces were dwindling in strength, and by February 23, the American forces were firmly in control of Riva Ridge. Despite the Germans’ attempts to regroup, their forces were decimated, with the 7th Company of the 1044th Regiment suffering significant casualties.[53]

The Germans counter-attacked the position on Pizzo di Campiano one more time, on the early morning of 21 February. The American position was attacked from two sides by 70 Germans, who were driven off with heavy losses. Lt. Col. Hampton remarked with cold humor, "The .50-caliber MGs at Plinardo had great sport picking off the ambitious Krauts attempting to work up the northeast slope of Campiano."[54]

In the end, the Americans sustained 17 killed, 38 wounded, and 3 missing, while the Germans suffered at least 66 killed.[55] The 86th Mountain Regiment's success at Riva Ridge marked a pivotal moment in the Italian campaign, blocking German ability to direct file on the southern and eastern slopes of Mount Belvedere. On February 24, the Germans replaced their forces on the ridge with a unit from the 114th Jäger Division.[44] At the same time the men of the 86th Mountain were rotated out and replaced by the 10th Mountain Anti-Tank battalion.[55]

Supply

A problem facing the battalion was resupply. Of the five trails, only one (Trail 2 between Ca di Julio and Mt. Cappel Buso) could be used by pack mules; the other trails required men to use their mountaineering skills.[56] It could take stretcher bearers six to twelve hours to haul a wounded man safely down the from Riva Ridge to the aid stations below, and just as long to bring ammunition, food and water to the men at the top of the ridge. This problem was solved by Company D, 126th Mountain Engineer Battalion, who constructed an aerial tramway that covered two-third of the vertical to Mt. Cappel Buso. It was a jig-back tram: one car went up while the opposite car came down. [57] The wounded could be brought down from the ridge in a matter of minutes instead of hours; 30 were evacuated on the first day of operation. Five tons of supplies were carried up the steep slopes of Riva Ridge while it was in operation, supporting the Americans efforts to withstand the German counterattacks.[58][59]

Mount Belvedere

Men of the 85th Mountain Regiment work their way up the face of Mt. Belvedere (SC 52306582936)

Although the Germans continued their counter attacks on Riva Ridge, American attention now turned to Mount Belvedere. At 2300 hours on 19 February at exactly 2300 hours, the 85th and 87th Mountain Regiments began their assault on Mount Belvedere.

Americans advance

The American advance on Mount Belvedere began at 2300 19 February, with the 85th and 87th Mountain Regiments leaving their lines of departure. The 1st battalion, 87th Mountain would pass thru Corona, then turn right to seize the summit of Mt. Belvedere;[60] The 2nd battalion would secure the towns of Polla and Florio, then prepare to seize Rocca Corneta on Division orders.[60] Attached to the 87th Mountain was the 37th Quartermaster War Dog Platoon under 1st Lt. Archer D. Akers. Their purpose was to help with night patrols and carrying messages from battalion HQ to forward companies.[61] To the 85th Mountain was assigned the task of first securing Mount Belvedere, then advance along the ridgeline to Mount Gorgolesco, and the summits beyond.

The night was cold and clear, with a half moon rising; searchlights from the valley behind them shone on the mountaintops.[62] The men advanced with fixed bayonets and their rifles unloaded.[63] According to orders, the aim was to slip past the German positions in silence, gaining the high ground behind them.[64] Upon hearing these orders, one soldier commented, "Man alive. We are to make an assault with five battalions against the strongest German positions in Italy and not a goddam loaded gun in the entire outfit. That's a large order, Sarge. I hope the general knows what he's doing."[65] Amongst those advancing 2nd Lt. George J. Hays (B Co. 87th Reg.), son of the commanding general.[66]

The slopes of Mounts Belvedere and Gorgolesco were covered with fields of land mines. The men could not wait for the engineers to disarm them "when speed and surprise were paramount."[67] The Americans believed facing them were companies of the German 1044th Regiment of the 232nd Division. From east to west the companies were 6th, 8th, 5th, & 7th, reinforced by elements of 10th Anti-tank Company, also of the 232nd.[68] Within 5 minutes of entering the combat zone, Company B of the 87th Mountain came under enemy fire.[69] Company C reached Corona at 0300; they bypassed this village and with Company B advanced up the northwestern slopes of Mount Belvedere.[70]

Meanwhile Company B of the 85th Mountain engaged the enemy at 0040 20 February between S. Filomena & La Valle.[71] The 3rd battalion met resistance below the summit of Mount Belvedere at 0100; the 1st battalion engaged the Germans on Mount Gorgolesco at 0300.[72] The Americans discovered that except for the mine fields and artillery fire (the latter crippled due to lack of spotters on Riva Ridge), the only defenders the Germans had left on Mount Belvedere were two groups of Grenadiers, a mortar detachment, an observation post, and a radio-telegraph station. [73] Outnumbered, the Germans fought tenaciously. Their last words to their headquarters were: "We continue to defend ourselves ... six of us are left..." ("Wir verteidigen uns weiter, wir sind noch sechs Mann.") Then the connection was lost. [71] The summit of Mount Belvedere was taken between 0330 and 0530 20 February;[74] Earle puts the time the summit was captured at 0430 [70]

The capture of Mount Gorgolesco posed more of a challenge. Around 0700, Sergeant Hugh Evans and his squad found his friend critically wounded and died before his eyes; he was the first man Evans had seen die. Enraged, Sergeant Evans called to his men to follow him and with the two who followed charged the German positions. Clearing the first trench, he fired his machine pistol and threw grenades until the last German surviving surrendered. The summit of Gorgolesco was in American hands.[75] Sergeant Evans was afterwards awarded the Silver Star for his heroism.[76]

By 0430, 1st battalion of the 87th Mountain had made progress. Companies B and C were lodged on Valpiano Ridge while Company A was engaged in fighting for the village of Corona.[77] In the battle for the village, Private 1st Class Lee H. Chew (A Co. 87th), one of the few Chinese-American members of the 10th, was killed while charging a machine-gun nest outside Corona. He was awarded Silver Star posthumously.[78] Company C was "given the task of mopping-up Corona"; the Company reached Corona at 0615.[70] The Germans in Polla, numbering 39 men,[71] offered stiff resistance, and four Italian partisans assisting Co. G killed. Polla was not secured until after daybreak.[70] Company F also found the going hard and was pinned down by enemy fire at 0220 in front of Florio.[79] Companies F and G captured Polla and the surrounding area by 1035.[77]

With daylight P-47 fighter-bombers and British Spitfires (both RAF & South A.) entered the battle and strafed German positions in support [80] The ground observers for these planes were known as "Rover Joe" to the troops,[69] and were called Jobos by the Germans. The entire sector assigned to the German 1044 Grenadier Infantry was subjected to artillery bombardment and attack from Allied airplanes.[81] These aerial attacks delayed the arrival of the 114th Jaeger division. Only advanced 300-400 meters between aerial sorties.[82]

Third battalion, 87th Mountain advanced from Vidiciatico (where they'd been in reserve) to occupy Valpiano, North of Corona. [83] However, the battalion needed the roadway cleared by the engineers, who used bangalore torpedos.[84]

Soldiers of the 85th Mountain found the remains of almost 70 civilians in the village of Ronchidoso [it], killed by SS the previous September in retaliation for local partisan activity.[85]

At completion of this assault (morning of 20 February), over 100 enemy dead lay before 87th Mountain; they had taken 115 prisoners [68] The second battalion of the 1044 Grenadier reg was substantially destroyed. Its commander was killed & replaced by the commander of the 5th company. [81] Despite all of this, the Germans manage to re-establish a coherent line of defense. A regiment of participants of a continuing education course, named "Kampfgruppe Hose", is assembled on the slopes of a mountain north of Castelluccio. (p. 83)

Germans counter-attack

  • Germans counter-attacked, per their rulebook.
    • A hasty counter-attack is prepared for elements of the 1044th Grenadiers & 741st Jäger Regiment. To be led by the commander of the 741st Jäger, advised by Lt. Col. Winkelmann (Doucsein, p.84)
    • However, the men of the 741st Jäger are exhausted from their forced march, unable to usefully participate in the assault. (Doucsein, p.84)
    • Further, at the time the attack began, many of the 741st Jäger were still moving from Monfestino to the front. (Doucsein, p. 84)
    • 1st bn, 87th Reg. attacked on top of Belvedere 21 February at 0610 Despite support with mortars & 88s, the attack failed with 6 German dead, 2 US wounded. (Earle, p. 26)
    • Co. C attacked by 70-80 Germans. Bitter after the ruse pulled the morning before, they waited until the enemy was within 100 yards to open fire. 25 killed, none taken prisoner (Earle, pp. 26f)
    • The Germans manage to advance halfway up the northern slopes of Mt Belvedere, only to be attacked from the rear. Over 100 men are POWs (Doucsein, p.85)
    • 3rd Co, 741st Jäger arrives, is unsuccessful; 29 men captured. (Doucsein, p. 85)
    • 2nd bn, 87th Reg. put artillery on Germans advancing from Polla towards Cos. G & F, which broke up the advances (Earle, p. 27)
    • 3rd bn, 87th Reg. suffered considerable shelling before daybreak, some of it friendly. Lack of communications (Earle, p. 27)
    • Co. K drove off a 12-man patrol, killing 4, wounding 1, taking 1 POW (Earle, p. 27)
    • Co. I at Valpiano engaged the Germans, taking 31 POWs who were from the 741st Mountain Infantry. (Earle, pp. 27f)
    • In the fighting, regimental commander Col. David M. Fowler was wounded by a shell fragment, but not seriously. Until his return, Lt. Col. John F. Schmelzer was in command. (Earle, pp. 28f)
    • The men of the 1044th Grenadiers manage to recapture Corona.(Doucsein, p.85)
  • 22 February Rocca Corneta occupied by a party of 27 Italian partisans & Pfc. Ed Paley, an intelligence scout. (Earle, p. 30)
  • 24 February German counter attack to recover positions on Mt Belvedere by 1st bn, 1044th Grenadiers (Doucsein, p. 86)
    • Attacking force comprised the 1st bn/1044th Grenadiers against Mt. Belvedere; 2nd bn, with elements of the 741st Jäger reg., attack to the east; 140 men from cos. 6 & 8 of 1044th Grenadiers with 3 light & 1 heavy MG attack hill 902 near I Frati (Doucsein, p. 86)
    • Counter attack almost succeeds in recovering former positions on the mountain, however it is driven back by American artillery
    • Losses "are heavy" 1 officer, 3 NCOs, & 27 Grenadiers taken prisoners

February 20, 1945 Yesterday we fired some shells into Poretta. This must have made the enemy feel very uncomfortable, as shortly thereafter he began a mighty show of fireworks on Pietra Colora.

On the right, the Americans are again reported to have penetrated our positions. Since seven o'clock this morning, their fighter bombers are continually humming in the sky above us, and their machine guns are hammering without letup.

The other side knows as well as we just how much the wheat fields of the Po Valley mean to us. Gertrude writes that Prisdorf has suffered heavily. She would rather wait a little longer before getting married. Woman are funny. One will not wait for your because it takes too long, and another wants to wait longer. Well, I won't talk about that anymore.

— Diary of a German Officer

B.E.F.

  • Communications between the 10th Mt. & the BEF was in Italian; neither side knew the other's language (Brower, p. 14)
  • Assigned to capture Mt. Castello (Isserman, p. 151)
  • Attack launched 5:30a 21 February (de Moraes, p. 114)
    • Brazilians advanced with more than 4 bns against one German company. (Doucsein, p. 88)
    • 1st battalion attacked from NE just beyond the "castle-shaped" farmhouse at Mazzancana (Brooks, in Baumgardner p. 31; Brower, p. 16)
    • 3rd battalion struck north (Brooks, in Baumgardner p. 31)
    • East of Mt Castello 11th Infantry captured Abetaia (Brooks, in Baumgardner p. 31)
  • Mt Castello captured 21 February (Isserman, p. 176)
    • de Moraes claims they found the unburied dead Brazilians from the earlier Battle of Monte Castello on the top of the mountain (p. 93 n.36)
  • Significance of the capture of Mt. Castello (de Moraes, p. 116)
    • Capture of Mt. Castello "represented a symbol and a landmark in the lives of our troops in a land across the sea."
    • "A sewer that served as a trap for hundreds of our fellow countrymen, its capture by our forces constituted a duty of conscience and an imperative of military dignity."
  • However, Americans were unable to capture Mt. della Torraccia, one Brazilian bn was assigned to support the 86th Mountain Infantry in its assault (Doucsein, p. 88)
  • While the Germans continued to hold Mt. della Torraccia, they shelled the Brazilians on Monte Castello. (de Moraes, p. 115 n. 33)
  • Following the capture of Monte Castillo, 11th Infantry continued towards Abetaia; first III/1st Infantry subjugated the enemy at Fornello. (de Moraes, p. 115)
  • On 23 February II/1st Infantry launched from the Malandrone-Bella Vista line to capture La Serra, east of Mt. della Torraccia; it was captured 2300. (de Moraes, p. 118)
  • Following the consolidation of territory, units of the BEF were redeployed along the line from Pizzo Campiano, Monte Belvedere up to Mount della Torraccia (Doucsein, p. 89 for this & following points)
    • General Zenóbio da Costa is assigned command.
    • 1st Recon Squadron, AT Gun Co./1st Infantry reg, AT Co./6th Infantry reg. assigned to Riva Ridge
    • 450 Italian partisans occupy Mt. Belvedere
    • Rest of 1st reg. assigned to Mt della Torraccia
    • 2nd Battalion of the 11th Infantry regiment and the remainder of 6th Infantry Regiment commanded by Colonel Nelson de Melo assigned to right of 10th Mt.

Mount della Torraccia

The final objective of the 10th Mountain was Monte della Torraccia [it], at the northeastern end of the range. This objective was assigned to the second battalion, 85th Regiment, under Lt. Colonel John Stone. Advancing from the southwest, the battalion crossed the saddle linking Mounts Gorgolesco and della Torraccia. (Shelton, p. 153)

    • Germans reinforced by men from 741st Infantry Regiment, 114th Jäger Division, attacking night 21-22 February (Isserman, p. 177)
    • 2nd bn unable to advance due to artillery fire from the enemy 88s (Shelton, p. 153)
    • By evening of 22 February, 2nd bn was down to 400 men (Isserman, p. 178)
    • 2nd battalion suffered heavy casualties & was unable to capture the objective. Lt Colonel Stone was relieved (Isserman, p. 178; Shelton, p. 153) Suffered half the total casualties the division had in this battle (Isserman, p. 180)
    • Despite their failure to advance, five men of the battalion were awarded Silver Stars, one posthumously (Isserman, p. 178)
  • 3rd bn 86th Regiment replaced them night 23-24 February, under the command of Major John Hay Jr. After a 10-minute barrage attack started 0700 24 February, seized the summit shortly before 0900 (Isserman, p. 179)
    • US line of departure 400 yards from the summit of della Torraccia, 200 from advanced German lines (Isserman, p. 179)
    • Advanced with Co. I on right supported by a platoon of LMG, Co. K on left supported by another platoon HMG (Brower, p. 30)
    • Major Hay later claimed it took 4 hours to secure della Torraccia (Brower, p. 30)
    • For neutralizing a machine gun nest that was blocking the advance of the battalion, Bob Foster was awarded the Silver Star (John W. Dewey, reprinted in Feuer, p. 38)
  • German counterattacks by Mittenwald Mountain Training Battalion late afternoon & into the night (Isserman, p. 179)
    • Commanded by the one-armed Major Ruchti. (Doucsein, p. 86; more details there)
    • Mittenwald line of departure was at Le Tane (933m) NW of della Torraccia (Doucsein, p. 86)
  • Morning of 25 February the 40 surviving men of one German company surrendered (Isserman p. 179)

February 23, 1945 It's 8 P.M. The entire area is alive with explosions. The bunker is shaking. Carbide lamps are blown out, and pressure is exerted on our ears. I hope nothing has happened to our food truck.

Last night, I was out scouting until five in the morning. I now have more details on the enemy's penetration. Mount Belvedere, Mount della Torraccia, and Mount Castello are now in American hands. One of our regiments is almost completely destroyed. Two companies have gone over to the enemy

— Diary of a German Officer

Aftermath

Reaction to the victory

  • Battle of Mt Belvedere same day as Iwo Jima, thus immediately not as well publicized to the general public.
  • News of the battle initially did not mention the 10th Mountain because its presence in Italy was still a secret. (Isserman, p. 180) But when their presence could be revealed, their credit was given wide circulation. "This kind of news was seldom heard from the 'forgotten front' in Italy, where there had been no significant Allied progress over the past four months." (Isserman, p. 181)
  • "The fall of Monte Belvedere -- indeed the capture of all the hills from Riva on the left to della Torraccia on the right -- had surprised not only the Germans but the Allied command as well. The untested 10th had exceeded even General Hays's expectations, and a critical salient, or wedge, had been driven into the Nazi defenses." (Shelton, p. 158)
  • "Original plans for the offensive, perhaps influenced by grim memories of the prolonged campaign to capture Cassino, had envisioned it could take as long as two weeks to drive the Germans off Belvedere and adjoining peaks; instead it took the 10th five days." (Isserman, p. 180; cf. Jenkins, p. 196)
  • "Neither the 10th's espirit de corps nor its ability to attract favorable publicity exactly endeared the division to other American soldiers in Italy who had been fighting there far longer." (Isserman, p. 182) Incident in the army theater (Shelton, pp. 171f)

Operation Encore

  • Operation Encore had a second part.
  • Five days of relative peace followed the capture of Mt della Torraccia (Isserman, p. 185)
  • Action to kick off from Mts della Torraccia & della Casellina started 3 March (Isserman, p. 185)
  • High ground NE of these summits for 5 miles to Castel d'Aiano. "those heights, overlooking another important road junction at Vergato on the far side, would cut the German line of supply and communication to the Po Valley and provide an ideal jump-off for a breakout from the North Apennines." (Isserman, p. 185)
  • Kesselring sent in his reserve, 29th Panzer Grenadier Division to aid in the defense. (Isserman, p. 191) Over the March fighting Kesselring admitted that (quote from his memoir) the division has "suffered such serious losses that they lost their value as a strategic reserve." (Isserman, p. 194)

See also

Notes

  • Task Force 45 was a brigade-sized unit based on the 45th AAA Brigade, which had been converted to an infantry unit 24 July 1944. Over its lifetime a variety of units were swapped in and out of it; by January 1945 the only original units still part of the task force were the 434th AA battalion, the 435th AA battalion, and the 900th AA battalion; the first two were incorporated into the 473rd Infantry Regiment. The task force was disbanded 13 February 1945.("History of Task Force 45 (29 July 1944 to 28 January 1945)") At least two units from this task force -- the 751st Tank and the 84th Chemical Mortar battalions -- were subsequently attached to the 10th Mountain Division.
  • At least two soldiers reported they replaced their issued combat boots with mountain boots taken from the Germans. (Bob Frauson from a dead German[86] (Bob Parker from a POW -- Shelton p. 157)
  • Men of the 86th Mountain Infantry executed several patrols on skis;[87] men of the 87th Mountain Infantry executed at least one patrols on skis.[88] These were the only recorded combat patrols performed on skis by American troops in World War II.
  • Dusenbery: "In battalion headquarters companies, a unit peculiar to the 10th Mountain Division. It used light 37 and 75 mm guns and was not equipped for anti-tank work." [89]
  • Prior to the battle this Italian battalion had been stationed along the line stretching from the Radici Pass [it] to Cima Tauffi [it]. Except for Heinrich Douscein's order of battle [90], no authority mentions the presence of Italian soldiers on the German side in this battle. This unit may have remained in its originally assigned location, west of this battle.
  • Isserman admits that "German casualties are unknown" [91] Any estimate of number of German casualties would be based on compilation of incidental mentions of Germans killed in the various sources, having different degrees of reliability. For example, in Hampton's official report the number of Germans killed in their assaults on Monte Pizzo di Campiano he provides a total of 30 KIA & 3 captured; however Doucsein in his book states the Germans suffered 35 casualties, an additional 26 killed and a total of 10 captured. [92] Another example by the morning of 21 February following the assault of the 87th Reg. on the west slopes of Mt. Belvedere, "over one hundred enemy dead lay among our positions." [68]
  • Lt Col. Hampton's report was completed 15 June 1945, after hostilities in Italy had concluded. Harris Dusenbery, company clerk for Co C 1st battalion, included it as an appendix in his The North Apennines and Beyond (Portland, 1998)
  • Diary of a German Officer. First printed in the 18 March 1945 issue of Stars and Stripes; this translation has been reprinted several times. (Or was it first published in the division's own newspaper, The Blizzard, 15 March 1945?) According to John Dewey who recovered the diary, "This German officer was captured during our recent attack northeast of Mount della Torraccia. Filled with bitterness and despair, the diary is typical of the mood that prevailed at this time among German soldiers fighting on the Italian front." (Feuer, Packs On!, p. 141) On the other hand, Wilbur Vaughan states the diary was found "on the corpse of a German officer following a push by the 10th Mountain Division north of Mt. Della Torracia on 4 March 1945" [93]

References

Bibliography

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