User:VAcharon/Clearance

Authority

The authority for classifying information and granting security clearances to access that information is found in executive orders (EOs) and Federal law. National Security Information (NSI) is classified under EO 13526. Information may be classified under this Order if a classification authority determines its unauthorized release could cause damage to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States. Information concerning nuclear weapons and fissile material may be classified under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA). These clearances are only granted by the Department of Energy. The clearance process for access to NSI or AEA information is substantially aligned. Under EO 12968, the investigative and adjudicative guidelines for NSI and AEA clearances are identical. This enables reciprocity between NSI and AEA clearances, although some exceptions exist.

Executive Order 12968's standards are binding on all government agencies that handle classified information, but it allows certain agency heads to establish Special Access Programs (SAPs) with additional, but not duplicative, investigative and adjudicative requirements. The Intelligence Community's Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) control systems are a family of SAPs, and SCI eligibility must be granted prior to accessing any particular control system or compartment (which may require additional investigation or adjudication). SCI eligibility policy is described in Intelligence Community Directive 704 and its implementing policy guidance. Any additional clearance measures used by SAPs must be approved by the Office of Management and Budget, which has generally limited such measures to polygraphs, exclusion of persons with non-US immediate family members, requiring more frequent reinvestigations, and requiring annual updates to security questionnaires.^[2]

Hierarchy

A security clearance is granted to an individual and generally recognizes a maximum level of clearance. Each level provides the holder access to information for which he or she has a need to know at that level and all lower levels. "Compartmented" information, such as SAPs and SCI, may require additional investigation and adjudication, and always requires a formal determination of need-to-know.

Jobs that require a clearance

Anyone with access to classified data requires a clearance at or higher than the level at which the data is classified. For this reason, security clearances are required for a wide range of jobs, from senior management to janitorial. According to a 2010 Washington Post article,^[7] 854,000 Americans had top-secret clearances; almost one-third of them worked for private companies, rather than for the U.S. government.^[7]

Jobs that require a security clearance can be found either as positions working directly for the federal government or as authorized federal contractors. Over time, more clearance jobs are being outsourced to contractors.^[8] Due to an overall shortage in security-cleared candidates and a long time frame to obtain the credentials for an uncleared worker, those with clearance are often paid more than their non-cleared equivalent counterparts.^[9][10][11] According to one 2010 estimate, "people with security clearances are in the top 10 percent of wage earners in the country".^[7]

Requirements for a clearance

The vetting process for a security clearance is usually undertaken only when someone is hired or transferred into a position that requires access to classified information. The employee is typically fingerprinted and asked to provide information about themselves. This becomes a starting point for an investigation into the candidate's suitability. The process has been streamlined and now requires the person who needs clearance to input the information online using E-qip. 10 days are allowed, during which data must be input. Having the older paper form can be helpful for collecting and organizing the information in advance. The information on an investigation and its status is stored in either JPAS or Scattered Castles.

Investigative work is usually at least one of the following types:

• National Agency Check with Local Agency Check and Credit Check (NACLC). An NACLC is required for a Secret, L, and CONFIDENTIAL access. (See: Background check)
• Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI). An SSBI is required for Top Secret, Q, and SCI access, and involves agents contacting employers, coworkers and other individuals. Standard elements include checks of employment; education; organization affiliations; local agencies; where the subject has lived, worked, or gone to school; and interviews with persons who know the individual. The investigation may include an NACLC on the candidate’s spouse or cohabitant and any immediate family members who are U.S. citizens other than by birth or who are not U.S. citizens.
• Polygraph. Some agencies may require polygraph examinations. The most common examinations are Counter Intelligence (CI) and Full-Scope (Lifestyle) polygraphs. While a positive SSBI is sufficient for access to SCI-level information, polygraphs are routinely administered for "staff-like" access to particular agencies.^{[citation needed]}

If issues of concern surface during any phase of security processing, coverage is expanded to resolve those issues. At lower levels, interim clearances may be issued to individuals who are presently under investigation, but who have passed some preliminary, automatic process. Such automatic processes include things such as credit checks, felony checks, and so on. An interim clearance may be denied (although the final clearance may still be granted) for having a large amount of debt, having a foreign spouse, for having admitted to seeing a doctor for a mental health condition, or for having admitted to other items of security concern (such as a criminal record or a history of drug use.)

Investigations conducted by one federal agency are no longer supposed to be duplicated by another federal agency when those investigations are current within 5 years and meet the scope and standards for the level of clearance required.^{[citation needed]} The high-level clearance process can be lengthy, sometimes taking a year or more. The long time needed for new appointees to be cleared has been cited as hindering U.S. presidential transitions.

Security briefings

In the U.S., once the clearance is granted, the candidate is briefed on "the proper safeguarding of classified information and on the criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions that may be imposed on an individual who fails to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure." He or she is also required to sign an approved non-disclosure agreement (e.g., form SF-312). High-level clearances are reviewed periodically and any "adverse information" reports received at any time can trigger a review. When a cleared person leaves their job, they are often "debriefed" — reminded of their ongoing obligations to protect the information they were allowed to see.^{[citation needed]} According to NISPOM Chapter 3, newly cleared employees are required to receive an initial security briefing before having access to classified information. This training helps them understand the threat, risks to classified information, how to protect the classified information, security procedures and duties as they apply to their job. This training is followed up by refresher training that reinforces the initial security briefing.

Dual citizenship

Dual citizenship is associated with two categories of security concerns: foreign influence and foreign preference. Dual citizenship in itself is not the major problem in obtaining or retaining security clearance in the United States. If a security clearance applicant's dual citizenship is "based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country", that can be a mitigating condition.^[12] However, exercising (taking advantage of the entitlements of) a non-U.S. citizenship can cause problems. For example, possession and/or use of a foreign passport is a condition disqualifying from security clearance and "... is not mitigated by reasons of personal convenience, safety, requirements of foreign law, or the identity of the foreign country" as is explicitly clarified in a Department of Defense policy memorandum which defines a guideline requiring that "... any clearance be denied or revoked unless the applicant surrenders the foreign passport or obtains official permission for its use from the appropriate agency of the United States Government".^[13] This guideline has been followed in administrative rulings by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) office of Industrial Security Clearance Review (ISCR), which decides cases involving security clearances for Contractor personnel doing classified work for all DoD components. In one such case, an administrative judge ruled that it is not clearly consistent with U.S. national interest to grant a request for a security clearance to an applicant who was a dual national of the U.S. and Ireland.^[14]

Individuals who have had security clearances revoked

In the post World War II era there have been several highly publicized, and often controversial, cases of officials or scientists having their security clearances revoked, including:

• Sandy Berger
• John M. Deutch
• Abdel-Moniem El-Ganayni
• Wen Ho Lee
• Robert Oppenheimer
• Alan Turing (UK)