Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/News/December 2025/Book reviews

This is the most recent entry in Texas A&M University Press' Williams-Ford Military History Series. Lees' preface notes that he first became involved in battlefield archaeology during a 1972 University of Tulsa project at the site of the Battle of Honey Springs. Modern battlefield archaeology, at least as it is practiced in the United States, owes heavily to work Douglas D. Scott did with metal detectors in the mid-1980s at what is now known as Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument. In 1989, Lees participated in a metal detector survey at the Mine Creek Battlefield State Historic Site in Kansas, before leading metal detector survey work in the 1990s at the Honey Springs battlefield (on both publicly owned Oklahoma Historical Society and on some neighboring privately owned land). This 2025 work represents the eventual publication of the results of the 1990s studies, after re-examination of most of the artifacts found and some additional mapping/GIS work. The extreme southern portion of the field, around the Confederate headquarters and supply depot at Honey Springs, was not surveyed due to heavy post-battle metal deposition.

Your military history newsletter – Issue 236, December 2025 Front page • Project news • Article news • Book reviews • This month in military history

By Hog Farm

The equivalent work for Scott's 1980s Little Bighorn work is the multi-author Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Lees' work is far less technical than the Scott-led work. Detailed artifact descriptions only take up about 30 pages of this book; Archaeological Perspectives contains a 3.5-page table detailing all of the nails found during the study and devotes roughly 6 pages to the topic of tin cans. In what will be a relief to some potential readers and a disappointment to others, Lees' study generally did not collect the post-battle artifacts located, and does not describe the finds, whereas Scott et al. provide the reader with a general inventory of all such items. Lees provides more of a social history of the battle, which included organized units composed of White, Black, and Native American troops, Whites and Native American units being present in both armies along with the Union 1st Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment. Lees includes a land acknowledgement early in the book (which I believe is the first I've seen in an American Civil War book published in the United States) and devotes discussion to the possible ways that various cultural customs would have affected combat behavior.

As is expected with a metal detector survey of a battlefield from this time period, most artifacts found were small arms or artillery ammunition. The Union enjoyed a sizable artillery advantage at Honey Springs, and certain shell fragments can be assigned to Union cannons, as the only 6-pounder guns present were operated by the Union. The small arms ammunition situation is much more uncertain. One Confederate unit was largely armed with Enfield rifled muskets; most of the other White Confederate troops were armed with shotguns. The non-Native Union troops present were armed with a variety of early repeating firearms, .54 and .58 caliber infantry weapons, along with a few other weapons. The Native American troops on both sides with armed with a rather nonstandard assortment of small arms, which included civilian hunting rifles in a variety of calibers. Lees also found evidence of bows and arrows. The use of civilian weapons on the battlefield and the heavy use of shotguns muddies the archaeological picture somewhat. Despite this, Lees is able to use the archeological picture to clarify combat stages poorly documented in the written record, and finds evidence of fighting in locations where the written records did not clearly indicate it.

Lees touches on the relationship between amateur metal detecting and true archaeological work (an amateur detectorist donated some collected items to the study and advised on past artifact find locations). Although the effects of varying levels of amateur artifact collection on different parts of the field is discussed, I would have liked to see more on the effects of varying levels of pre-study collection across artifact type - modern metal detectors produce differing signals dependent upon metal type, which I suspect would cause heavier collection of brass or similar artifacts and lower collection of iron ones, especially smaller iron artifacts. Though Lees makes some claims of greater significance for Honey Springs and the study as viewed as part of the Greater Reconstruction than the battle's minor effect on the Civil War, I'm not particularly convinced by the stronger claims. This is a niche study on a smaller battle and will only really interest a specific audience.

Publishing details: Lees, William B. (2025). Honey Springs, Oklahoma: Historical Archaeology of a Civil War Battlefield. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 978-1-64843-293-4.

By Hawkeye7

This book is about the development of the amphibious warfare in the European and Mediterranean theatres in World War II. It is restricted to the United States forces, and does not cover the British contribution. Much of what has been written about amphibious warfare in World War II has focused on the marines and war in the Pacific. (And indeed, the author is a retired US Marine Corps colonel.) Even when it comes to the US Navy, the admirals of the Pacific War are better known; most naval history buffs can tell you Chester Nimitz commanded the Pacific Fleet, but who commanded the Atlantic Fleet? (Don't ask Google - it gets it wrong.)

Curatola covers multiple aspects of amphibious warfare. First, there is doctrine, which was first formulated by the Marine Corps before the war and then adopted by the Navy and finally the Army. The author then goes on to discuss training, organisation, naval gunfire support, air support, airborne operations, over-the-shore logistics and communications. The role of Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, the commander of the Eighth Fleet is highlighted. Indeed, the development of doctrine, organisation and procedures in the theatre, largely as a result of combat experience, is one of the themes of the book. He also notes that the Navy did not send its best personnel into the amphibious forces.

The operations covered are the major landings in the Mediterranean theatre, North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and Southern France, plus Normandy. Far more space is devoted to the earlier operations than the later ones. Curatola makes a good point that, given the performance of the amphibious forces in North Africa, the proposed Operation Sledgehammer would most likely have been a disaster. Although the book is very detailed, I could wish for more details. Training installations are mention, but more detail could have been supplied on what training was carried out. The engineer shore battalions and regiments and naval beach battalions are mentioned, but the book never spells out exactly what their organisation, roles and missions were. More focus on them and less on the operational units' activities would have improved the book. So too, would have been more detail about how supplies were moved ashore. There is a discussion of the different radios, resulting in a plethora of SCR numbers, but the reader is not informed about exactly what they were. That said, the role of signals in military operations all is too often overlooked. Similarly, the capabilities of the different landing ships could have been more comprehensive.

I have criticised the proof reading of other books, but this one hits an all-time low. The proof reading, if indeed any was done at all, is appalling, with a profusion of typos and gaffes. The book could also have used a list of abbreviations.

You can hear the author discuss the topic in a podcast.

Publishing details: Curatola, John M. (2025). Armies Afloat: How the Development of Amphibious Operations in Europe Helped Win World War II. Modern War Studies. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. doi:10.2307/jj.27976061. ISBN 978-0-7006-3861-1. OCLC 1473699410.

By Hawkeye7

This book is an attempt to rehabilitate the reputation of Sir Thomas Blamey, the only Australian to reach the rank of field marshal. The author draws on recent works on the Australian effort during the Second World War (including my own), relying mainly on books rather than conducting his own research in the archives. Blamey has some biographies, notably John Hetherington's Blamey: The Controversial Soldier (1973) and David Horner's Blamey: The Commander in Chief (1998), both of which are quite old but still much better than this book.

Taylor's effort to re-evaluate Blamey is stymied by the author's complete lack of understanding of Douglas MacArthur, which spoils everything with a lot of half-baked allegations. Blamey and MacArthur are unusual examples of men who were generals in both world wars. Blamey mainly served as a staff officer with the 1st and 2nd Divisions, and later as the Australian Corps Brigadier General General Staff under John Monash in the last half of 1918. He did lead a daring raid behind enemy lines at Gallipoli and briefly commanded a brigade on the Western Front, but BEF regulations decreed that staff college graduates like Blamey should not be wasted in commanding troops unless they were incompetent, which Blamey clearly was not.

MacArthur also led a daring raid, in his case during the occupation of Veracruz, for which he was nominated for (but not awarded) the Medal of Honor. Like Blamey, he served on the staff of a division on the Western Front (in his case, the 42nd Division), and he then led a brigade in action, for which he was nominated for (but not awarded) the Medal of Honor a second time. He also led troops in action in the Philippines, so the characterisation of MacArthur as less experienced than Blamey demands some qualification at least.

The interaction between Blamey and the British, and later between MacArthur and Blamey, was a difficult one, but the book correctly points out that the Australians were accustomed to being a junior partner in a coalition, and were willing to give way to MacArthur. Some Australian historians have argued that the Australians could have been more assertive but, in the end, the alliance ran more smoothly than the one between the US and the UK. When Blamey put his foot down, he more often than not won the argument. Both Blamey and MacArthur struggled to implement the Australian government's policies, but the inexperience and incompetence of the Prime Minister, John Curtin, and his cabinet in military matters made this quite difficult at times to understand what they were.

So what made Blamey a great general? The book could have made a better case than it does, although the appendix contains some interesting calculations. The following come to mind:

• With the arguable exception of the Battle of Greece (where he warned that the operation was hazardous and prudently provided for a subsequent evacuation), he won every battle he fought.
• An inspired choice of personnel. Blamey had a talent for finding good people to fill positions, and he was able to utilise people with unusual qualifications effectively. His civil affairs unit in particular was staffed with people with diverse civilian backgrounds.
• Care for the welfare of the diggers. Again, the book mentions this, but could have provided examples. For example, his orders to provide Christmas fare. Even patrol officers in the New Guinea highlands? Commandos behind enemy lines? Radar crews on remote island outposts? Especially them!
• An understanding of technology and a willingness to embrace new and novel ideas. The book mentions the promotion of the periscope rifle at Gallipoli, and there is a sketchy bit about the employment of tanks at Hamel, but the Second World War is passed over, even though it was more technological in nature. Blamey promoted the use of DUKWs and LVTs, and had a long-running battle with the RAAF to obtain helicopters. The article mentions his defence of khaki clothing, but not the steps he then took to obtain green dyes. Fittingly, his statue has him atop a jeep instead of a horse.

A re-evaluation of Blamey is long overdue, but this book falls short.

Publishing details: Taylor, Brent D. (2025). Blamey. Sydney: ABC Books. ISBN 978-0-7333-4373-5. OCLC 1517607670.

By Hawkeye7

Duncan Weldon is a British journalist who is the economics correspondent at The Economist. He used to be a blogger back when blogs were a thing, and this book is rather blog-like. It consists of a series of seventeen essays arranged chronologically and ranging in time, as the subtitle says, from the Vikings to the war in Ukraine. The essays are arranged around the central theme of examining warfare through the lens of economics, with particular reference to the importance of incentives and institutions.

For those of you who didn't have to take Economics 101 (lucky you), economics is, like history, more of a humanity than a social science. Economics requires a certain way of thinking that does not come naturally to everybody. Like military history, it can be used to make predictions and set policy. Today economists deploy sophisticated mathematical models, so economics can be nearly as reliable as the weather forecast.

Weldon does not shy away from this. There is a chapter in this book titled "Economists Are Not Always Right", which uses the case of Walt Rostow, the American economist and political theorist who served as US National Security Advisor from 1966 to 1969. During World War II, Rostow mis-identified oil as the Achilles heel of the German economy, and pressed for the "Oil Plan" over the rival "Transportation Plan". The consensus of historians is that he was incorrect; the German economy ran on coal, not oil. Rostow went on to advocate a bombing campaign as the means of winning the Vietnam War. Once again, his advice was based on faulty assumptions. Weldon quotes Charles King's observation:

In the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, nearly every strategic move Rostow advocated turned out to be wrong, from escalating the commitment of U.S. combat troops for South Vietnam to rejecting peace talks with the North Vietnamese. Since he continued to defend those positions after most other people had concluded they were mistakes, his name became a byword for a specific kind of Washington virtue: offering terrible advice but at least doing so consistently."^[1]

This book is an easy read and written in a fun and engaging style eminently suitable for summer reading by the pool. No knowledge of military history or economics is assumed, but the author makes a series of interesting points, driving home his thesis.

Publishing details: Weldon, Duncan (2025). Blood & Treasure: The Economics of Conflict from the Vikings to Ukraine. London: Abacus. ISBN 978-0-349-14540-2. OCLC 1381059699.

By Hawkeye7

Few would disagree with the contention that David Horner is Australia's pre-eminent living military historian. This book is a celebration of his life and work. Although the quality of the essays is generally very high, the subject matter is all over the place. There is a biography of Horner by Garth Pratten and many of the essayists recall their personal experience with the subject before plunging into a dissertation on whatever happens to be the subject of their latest interest. In many ways this does reflect how prolific Horner is. I would point out though that Horner writes about the Australian Army, and tends to focus on high command, intelligence and peacekeeping. Peter Stanley's essay on Sir Charles James Napier therefore seems out of place despite his efforts to cast it as a "Hornerian" analysis. One theme running through the book that might be galling to Horner is that after decades of work and so many books, his most influential one remains his early High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy, 1939–1945 (1982).

Since many of the essays are about the writer's latest project, there is a diverse selection of cutting-edge works. These include essays on Australia's military efforts in space, coalition warfare in Afghanistan, the current state of the alliance with the United States, and the treatment of war dead. (Kate Ariotti's essay on the treatment of the war dead in the Vietnam War is the highlight of the book for me.) Along with a good summary of Horner's work on intelligence, John Blaxland discusses the difficulties of dealing with intelligence sources: the need for the historian to hold an appropriate security clearance (for which Horner once quipped that all you have to do is serve in the Army for twenty years); the problem of murky information; and the occasional conspiracy theory such as the possibility the Soviet Union passed information to Japan to prolong the Pacific War. (Starting to believe this one myself.)

Joan Beaumont's essay on the psychology of strategic decision making and the Battle of Ambon (the subject of her latest book, which I have not read) struck a particularly discordant note for me. Evidently, she has recently read Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011). The problem Kahneman was grappling with was that economists assume that consumers make rational decisions but psychologists are fairly confident they don't, at least much of the time. It is not clear that Kahneman's model helps at all here. While psychological factors clearly played a part in the decision making, psychoanalysing the dead (or even the living for that matter) is always fraught with peril. A proper analysis of the decision making would have been much better.

It is hard to recommend this book except as a primer on a particular area of interest, but the good news is that you can download it for free.

Publishing details: Beaumont, Joan; Pratten, Garth, eds. (2025). Military History Supremo: Essays in Honour of David Horner AM FASSA. Canberra: Australian National University Press. doi:10.22459/MHS.2025. ISBN 978-1-76046-683-1. OCLC 1506274586.

Kim, Yuhan (2025). Hansando and Busan 1592: Admiral Yi Sun-Sin’s First Victories Against Japan. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781472868862.

• Bosbotinis, James (5 December 2025). "Hansando and Busan 1592: Admiral Yi Sun-Sin's First Victories Against Japan". The Naval Review.

Henshaw, John (2025). Too Many Ships, Too Late: The Emergency Fleet Corporation and Its Redundant Armada. McFarland. ISBN 9781476694115.

• Coyle, Tim (11 November 2025). "Too Many Ships Too Late". Australian Naval Institute.

Simmons, Rona (2024). No Average Day: The 24 Hours of October 24, 1944. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press. ISBN 9780826223173.

• Reader, Darrell (December 2025). "Review of Simmons, Rona. No Average Day: The 24 Hours of October 24, 1944". H-War, H-Net Reviews.

Sullivan, John P.; Jones, Nathan P.; Weisz Argomedo, Daniel, eds. (2024). Urban Operations: War, Crime, and Conflict. Boulder, Colorado: KeyPoint Press. ISBN 9798990915831.

• MacBeth, Steve (2 December 2025). "Book Review - Urban Operations: War, Crime, and Conflict - John P. Sullivan, Nathan P. Jones and Daniel Weisz Argomedo". Canadian Army Journal.

Various works

• "The 2025 War on the Rocks Holiday Reading List". War on the Rocks. 28 November 2025.

Various works

• "The AARC Summer Reading List 2025". Australian Army Research Centre. 18 December 2025.

About The Bugle First published in 2006, the Bugle is the monthly newsletter of the English Wikipedia's Military history WikiProject. » About the project » Visit the Newsroom » Subscribe to the Bugle » Browse the Archives + Add a commentDiscuss this story These comments are automatically transcluded from this article's talk page. To follow comments, add the page to your watchlist. If your comment has not appeared here, you can try purging the cache. @Hog Farm: I had some experience with battlefield archaeology in Europe, where we examined parts of the Anzac battlefield in Turkey and Battle of Bullecourt battlefield in France. Metal detectors were hardly required in France, as the battlefield was strewn with millions of lead-antimony shrapnel balls. Little effort was required to retrieve spent cartridges, bayonets and unexploded ordnance. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 20:36, 1 January 2026 (UTC)