Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/News/February 2026/Book reviews
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
As the title indicates, this book covers the December 1941 Battle of Hong Kong, in which a Japanese force swiftly defeated the colony's British, Canadian, Indian and local defenders. The author is an amateur historian who has lived in Hong Kong for 30 years and runs the very detailed Battle for Hong Kong blog which hosts articles on his research and field visits to sites of the fighting.
|
Battle for Hong Kong - Philip Cracknell |
- By Nick-D
The book is essentially a detailed narrative of the battle, with little analysis or discussion. It does not provide much background on Hong Kong's pre-war history or defences, though there is a very generic chapter on the broader events that led to the Pacific War. The fighting starts in chapter 3 (page 30 of 289), and Cracknell provides a very detailed account of most phases of the battle. A particular strength of the book is that he is clearly intimately familiar with the key battlefields and draws on this to offer some interesting insights - for instance, he has identified areas where fighting appears to have been particularly fierce by using a metal detector to find bullet casings and other remnants of the battle. Impressively, the book is illustrated by 33 maps which it appears Cracknell drew himself - these are generally simple, but very useful.
I was interested in Cracknell's descriptions of the fighting. By frequently describing actions at platoon and even squad levels, he illustrates how ferocious the short battle was. The Allied defenders generally fought with incredible bravery, though often not much skill, and the Japanese were highly experienced and effective but also suffered heavy casualties. The descriptions of the atrocities the Japanese force almost routinely conducted are detailed and often very disturbing.
For all that, I found the book frustrating due to the lack of analysis. For instance, Cracknell never really describes the British defensive plans, and I was confused as to why there were networks of pillboxes and other defences in the centre of Hong Kong island that dated from well before the war; from consulting other sources, the reason is that the British planned a defence in depth. Cracknell notes that Hong Kong was considered indefensible by the British Government, but doesn't describe the debates over this that led to a large force being used to garrison it, or whether those units could have been used to better effect in more defensible areas, and especially Malaya. Whether the soldiers understood that the battle was always a lost cause is also unclear. Furthermore, the book doesn't discuss why the response to the Japanese landings on Hong Kong island was such a mess, with the garrison being destroyed in a few days after much of its strength was thrown away through poorly planned and coordinated counter attacks that typically involved company-sized forces attacking Japanese battalions - as the goal was to prolong the fighting for as long as possible, it is unclear why the Allies did this rather than hunker down in their defences.
Another weakness is that the book is largely focused on the experiences of the British and Canadian troops. There is not much material on local civilians or the Indian and Chinese members of the garrison. There is also no attempt to critique colonial perspectives; for instance, it is noted that most white women and children were evacuated from Hong Kong in 1941, but there's no discussion of why this wasn't extended to other civilians. In the final chapters of the book Cracknell also seems to focus on areas in the south of Hong Kong island that he's familiar with and pays much less attention to the fighting in the north of the island.
Overall, this book is a good read and provides a useful account of the Battle of Hong Kong. However, it could have been a much stronger work.
Publishing details: Cracknell, Philip (2021). Battle for Hong Kong, December 1941. Stroud, United Kingdom: Amberley Publishing. ISBN 9781398109117.
Roland Perry - Oliphant: The Australian Genius Who Developed Radar and Showed Oppenheimer How to Build the Bomb |
- By Hawkeye7
The recent film Oppenheimer prompted the creation of this book on the Australian physicist Mark Oliphant. Oliphant is a worthy biographical subject; he was the spark plug that initiated two of the most celebrated scientific achievements of the Second World War: microwave radar and the atomic bomb. It was Oliphant who sponsored the Frisch–Peierls memorandum that calculated the feasibility of nuclear weapons that led to the creation of the MAUD Committee. Oliphant then took the committee's report to Ernest Lawrence in the United States and got the American nuclear weapons effort, which evolved into the Manhattan Project, under way. While at Berkeley with Lawrence in September 1941, Oliphant discussed the British findings with Oppenheimer, unaware that he had not yet been brought into the atomic bomb project (this would happen officially in 1942).
Oliphant already has two biographies. The main one is Oliphant: The Life and Times of Sir Mark Oliphant (1981 - published to mark his 80th birthday) by Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard. More recently, there has been Brett Mason's Wizards of Oz : How Oliphant and Florey Helped Win the War and Shape the Modern World (2022), Oliphant sharing the book with the Australian Nobel laureate Howard Florey. Despite his discovery of tritium and nuclear fusion, Oliphant never won a Nobel prize (although he was nominated in 1956). This book is by Roland Perry, a noted journalist and author. In addition to the two published biographies, Perry draws upon documents in the Public Record Office in the UK, and interviews with Oliphant that Perry conducted back in 1995. So there was the prospect of new insights.
Unfortunately, Perry is completely out of his depth. There is no understanding of the scientific or technical aspects of Oliphant's work. There are major howlers: plutonium is not the 239 isotope of uranium (p. 132) but a chemical element in its own right; Klaus Fuchs was not Jewish (p. 69, repeated on p. 216); the Venona decrypts are not tapes (p. 227); Oliphant was not the only scientist nominated for the Medal of Freedom with palm; and cold fusion is not a real thing (p. 322). Misunderstanding the physics and jumbling the chronology makes Oliphant sound more prescient than he actually was. The subtitle is completely wrong; Oliphant did not show Robert Oppenheimer how to build a bomb. What he did was convince Oppenheimer and (more importantly) Ernest Lawrence that it was possible, based on the Frisch–Peierls memorandum and the MAUD Committee report. The reader is told that Enrico Fermi rejected Oliphant's advocacy (p. 103) but is not told why; in fact it was because Fermi was not yet convinced of Bohr's assertion that it was the uranium-235 isotope that was fissile, on which Robert Frisch and Rudolf Peierls had based their conclusions. Perry mentions Site X (the Clinton Engineer Works at Oak Ridge) but does not tell the reader where or what it was. (One suspects he does not know.)
Oliphant's role in the creation of the electromagnetic isotope separation process (the calutron) before and during the war (drawing on his research going all the way back to his doctoral thesis) is left out, as is his unsuccessful post-war advocacy of the electromagnetic process. (Both the British and the Americans favoured the gaseous diffusion process instead.) Perry freely admits that he did not always understand what Oliphant was telling him and concedes that at times Oliphant pulled the wool over his eyes. Occasionally, Perry stumbles across the themes that are of interest to scholars. There is no notice taken of Oliphant's role in the creation of Big Science. The book does discuss the allegations of espionage surrounding Oliphant. He promoted the careers and vouched for Klaus Fuchs and Alan Nunn May who turned out to be spies, and also Eric Burhop, Rudolf Peierls and Maurice Wilkins, around whom there have been allegations. Did Oliphant turn a blind eye to espionage? There is material here on Oliphant supplying information on Tube Alloys and the Manhattan Project to the Australian government, but it is not explored. Nor is Oliphant's role in the instigation of the post-war nuclear weapons project in UK (which became High Explosive Research). The contrast between Oliphant's apparent support for nuclear non-proliferation and persistent advocacy of nuclear weapons is discussed at length, but somehow leaves the reader no wiser. That probably sums up the whole book.
Publishing details: Perry, Roland (2025). Oliphant: The Australian Genius Who Developed Radar and Showed Oppenheimer How to Build the Bomb. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 978-1-76147-219-0. OCLC 1537947334.
Gareth Williams - The Impossible Bomb: The Hidden History of British Scientists and the Race to Create an Atomic Weapon |
- By Hawkeye7
Gareth Williams is emeritus professor and former dean of medicine at the University of Bristol. He is the author of more than 200 medical papers and twenty books, including Angel of Death: The Story of Smallpox (2010) and Unravelling the Double Helix: The Lost Heroes of DNA (2019). In his research, he came across references to Tube Alloys, which he had not heard of, and decided to write this book to correct what he rightly considers an American narrative of the Manhattan Project being an American story. (Up the back there is a fine historiography.) The result is a very readable account.
There are some notable errors: the calutrons used uranium tetrachloride, not uranium hexafluoride, and neither was produced in situ (p. 200) (see Manhattan Project feed materials program for details); Site W was the Hanford Engineer Works, not district (p. 199); Camp Dustbin was in Germany, not France (p. 273); Klaus Fuchs and his family were Lutherans, not Quakers (p. 143); Otto Hahn did continue his research into nuclear fission during the war (p. 310); becoming governor of South Australia is not going into politics (p. 338); and the Ernest Titterton taught at the Australian National University, not the University of Canberra (ouch!) (p. 333). Also, Mark Oliphant is misidentified in this image; Oliphant is in the picture, but he is up the back, near Hilde Levy, with his hand on his chin (Plate 7). Some of the portrayals are too broad-brush for me. For example, the characterisation of Oliphant as an opponent of nuclear weapons overlooks his post-war advocacy of the UK and Australia acquiring them. Similarly, that of Hahn as anti-Nazi overlooks his post-war "whitewashing" of former Nazis.
The big problem with this book is its failure to hew to its premise. The author argues, quite correctly, that the British mission punched above its weight and was critical to the completion of the project in time to affect the outcome of the war. However, much more could be said about this. James Chadwick had to fight hard to obtain key scientists and technicians from other wartime projects of great import, and not everybody was on board with his push to support the Manhattan Project to Britain's utmost, even within Tube Alloys. The closing off of access to the British (even things that worked on and papers they had written) with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the reasons for this are not well covered.
It's unfortunate that the electromagnetic process is poorly covered because it was the only aspect of the Manhattan Project that the British had complete access to. Margaret Gowing handled this much better in her official history account, but it is a bit dry and dusty for most general readers. Williams mistakenly attributes the calutron concept to Ernest Lawrence instead of Oliphant, who had electromagnetically separated isotopes before the war. We know this because Oppenheimer credited and cited Oliphant in his papers on the calutrons. (Like the other enrichment processes, scaling it up from laboratory to industrial scale was the challenge.) On the other hand, Williams attributes the decision to use silver instead of copper (in short supply in wartime America) in the calutrons to Oliphant, which I very much doubt.
Given the premise of highlighting the British contribution, it seems churlish not to note the nationalities of many of the British mission. Oliphant being an Australian is belatedly acknowledged, but fellow Australians Harrie Massey and Eric Burhop are not; Maurice Wilkins was a New Zealander and Carson Mark a Canadian. All were considered British subjects during the war, something that should have been mentioned, as this will likely be lost on the present-day British reader.
Being written for the general reader, this work draws largely on book sources, although considerable use is made of the Chadwick papers. The highlight is the way it covers Churchill's handling of whether or not to merge the British and American projects. For the most part, though, it falls short of its objective.
Publishing details: Williams, Gareth (2025). The Impossible Bomb: The Hidden History of British Scientists and the Race to Create an Atomic Weapon. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-28488-1. OCLC 1506830956.
The Devil's Own Purgatory - Robert Gudmestad |
- By Hog Farm
Robert M. Browning has written single-volume works about the West Gulf Blockading Squadron (Lincoln's Trident), the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (Success is All that Was Expected), and the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (From Cape Charles to Cape Fear), and my understanding is that the East Gulf Blockading Squadron is covered by George E. Buker's Blockaders, Refugees, and Contrabands. Gudmestad has now contributed a comprehensive work of the Mississippi River Squadron, which operated on the inland rivers of the Western and Trans-Mississippi theaters. (Farragut's capture of New Orleans and his riverine operations up to his temporarily joining forces with Davis's ships for the 1862 operations against Vicksburg are outside the scope of Gudmestad's book).
The story of the Mississippi River Squadron (originally known as the Western Gunboat Flotilla) began with the City-class ironclads and the timberclads of late 1861 and early 1862. These were the vessels which won the Battle of Fort Henry and played major roles at Fort Donelson and Island No. 10, all of which were fought largely against land-based Confederate defenses. Some weaknesses in the City-class ironclads became apparent at Fort Donelson, and the fleet took a bloody nose from Confederate ships at the Battle of Plum Point Bend, but strengthened by the United States Ram Fleet, the Western Gunboat Flotilla shattered Confederate waterborne strength at the First Battle of Memphis in 1862. Plum Point Bend and Memphis were the only real fleet engagements of the Western Gunboat Flotilla/Mississippi River Squadron. In the Vicksburg campaign (late 1862 through July 1863), the fleet played a major role in supporting river crossings, bombarding Confederate fortifications, and operating in narrow rivers and bayous; the famous stories of the CSS Arkansas's running the gauntlet of the Union fleet and the cruise of the Black Terror are discussed. After Vicksburg, with the Mississippi River under Union control, the Mississippi River Squadron's purpose focused on escort and counter-insurgency roles, with the exception of its near-disastrous participation in the Red River campaign.
What makes Gudmestad's study particularly unique is his use of large-scale data. Gudmestad collected data (largely from US wartime reports) regarding combat between the Mississippi River Squadron and Confederate irregular units (along with regular units using guerrilla or hit-and-run tactics) and mapped these results using GIS to draw conclusions about the sort of irregular combat that the squadron participated in. Along with a team of researchers, he also produced a database of demographic information of over 14,000 sailors of the Western Gunboat Flotilla/Mississippi River Squadron using military records. This dataset allowed him to draw fresh conclusions regarding demographic trends over time within the fleet (such as varying rates of enlistment of former slaves) and their effects on the operations of the squadron. Gudmestad connects a series of later-war reverses, particularly the debacle which took place at the Battle of Johnsonville, to expiration of the enlistments of large numbers of experienced sailors and their replacement by inexperienced recruits. In another incident, the commanding officer of the tinclad USS Rattler attempted to sell his vessel to the Confederates.
The writing style is engaging, if somewhat nonstandard for an academic work (With that fight he established his reputation as a badass among fellow sailors from p. 37 representing what I believe to be the only use of "badass" I have encountered in an academic work regarding the Civil War). Gudmestad's heavy reliance on Union/US sources for the fighting at Plum Point Bend and Memphis is less than ideal given that these were chaotic combat situations which Gudmestad compares to a demolition derby; it seems unlikely to me that a good idea of which vessels were fighting each other can be drawn from the primary sources Gudmestad is principally using. The author's lower degree of familiarity with land operations stands out in a few places (The capture of Fort Hindman was a rarity: federal gunboats stood up to a Confederate fort without the army's help and forced a surrender from p. 129 is particularly jarring since the army forces suffered over 1,000 casualties and directly assaulted the Confederate works during the Battle of Arkansas Post) but do not significantly detract from the book. This is the best overall treatment of this subject that I have read.
Publishing details: Gudmestad, Robert (2025). The Devil's Own Purgatory: The United States Mississippi River Squadron in the Civil War. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press. ISBN 978-0-8071-8491-2.
Recent external reviews |
Brescia, Maurizio; Zaio, Paola (2025). Mussolini’s Navy: A Reference Guide to the Regia Marina 1930-1945 (Paperback ed.). Barnsley, United Kingdom: Seaforth Publishing. ISBN 9781036150259.
- Melly, R.G. (20 January 2026). "Mussolini's Navy: A Reference Guide to the Regia Marina 1930-1945". The Naval Review.
Thomas, Charles G. (2024). Ujamaa's Army: The Creation and Evolution of the Tanzania People's Defence Force, 1964–1979. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. ISBN 9780821425596.
- Watts, Carl (January 2026). "Review of Thomas, Charles G.. Ujamaa's Army: The Creation and Evolution of the Tanzania People's Defence Force, 1964–1979". H-War, H-Net Reviews.
Haygood, Wil (2026). The War Within a War: The Black Struggle in Vietnam and at Home. New York City: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. ISBN 9780593537695.
- Staples, Brent (9 February 2026). "How Vietnam Inflamed the Civil Rights Movement". The New York Times.
Ponomarenko, Illia (2024). I Will Show You How it Was : The Story of Wartime Kyiv. New York City: Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 9781639733873.
- Nash, John (5 February 2026). "Land Power Library - I Will Show You How it Was". Land Power Forum. Australian Army Research Centre.
|
