Islamic extremism is traced back to the emergence of the Kharijites, whose break with other Muslims during early disputes over leadership helped produce doctrines of radical exclusion and violence.
During the First Fitna, the Kharijites broke away from both Sunnis and Shias and became known for a radical approach to takfīr, declaring other Muslims apostates and, in their view, liable to punishment.
Modern fundamentalist propagation of jihad is described as beginning in the late 19th century amid struggles against European colonialism, with conflicts in North Africa cited as part of the broader context.
A first “wave” of armed jihad associated with the Deobandi movement is described during the Indian Rebellion of 1857, including an attempt to establish an Islamic territory centered on Thana Bhawan before later defeat.
The writings of Rashid Rida are described as laying theological groundwork that influenced later Islamist and Salafi-jihadist currents, including calls to revive the model of early Muslim generations and resist Western influence.
Jihad is described as being propagated in modern revivalist and fundamentalist thought by mid-20th-century authors such as Sayyid Qutb and Abul A'la Maududi.
Sayyid Qutb develops ideas described as key “intellectual underpinnings” for later Salafi-jihadist doctrine, including the notion of an ideologically committed vanguard confronting secular rule.
Egyptian Muslim scholar Sayyid Qutb through his prison-writings constituted the ideological basis of the Salafi-jihadist movement(./Salafi_jihadism "Salafi jihadism").75
Post-colonial states in much of the Muslim world are described as taking over religious endowments (waqf), turning many jurists into state employees—an institutional shift argued to weaken independent religious authority and shape later ideological contestation.
Qutb is described as a major promoter of Pan-Islamism and a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, influencing later militant interpretations that emphasize revolutionary confrontation.
Sayyid Qutb is executed by the Egyptian government under Gamal Abdel Nasser; the article links this moment to subsequent militant organizing influenced by Qutb’s ideas.
Following Qutb’s execution, Ayman al-Zawahiri forms Egyptian Islamic Jihad, aiming to replace the government with an Islamic state aligned with Qutbist revivalist ideas.
The Pakistan–Afghan border becomes a center for a third “wave” of Deobandi jihadism, described as fueled by the Soviet–Afghan War and expanded via madrasas under the patronage of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.
The Iranian Revolution is presented as a pivotal example of revolutionary Shia political Islam associated with Ruhollah Khomeini, reshaping regional ideological competition and sectarian politics.
The Soviet–Afghan War is described as a major accelerator of jihadism, producing veterans, leadership networks, and organizational know-how that later dispersed to other conflicts.
Afghan mujahideen praying in the Kunar Province, Afghanistan (1987)
A key shift in modern jihadist practice is noted: the idea of “blowing oneself up for God” is described as previously unheard of before 1983, marking an important change in the evolution of jihadist violence narratives.
Maktab al-Khidamat (the “Services Office”) is founded in Peshawar by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam to fundraise and recruit foreign mujahideen for Afghanistan—later described as a precursor network to al-Qaeda.
Large-scale international propagation of conservative Sunni doctrine, linked in the article to Saudi-funded proselytizing associated with Wahhabism and Petro-Islam, is described as filling a vacuum of authority and reshaping debates over “orthodoxy.”
The term “jihadism” is described as being in use since the 1990s, initially appearing in Indian and Pakistani mass media and in French academic usage (often via “jihadist-Salafist”).
Jihadist groups are estimated in the article to have been involved in about 5% of civil wars in 1990, indicating a relatively limited footprint before later growth.
Gilles Kepel reports encountering European Salafis who shifted from being “totally apolitical” in the 1980s to endorsing violence and terrorism by the mid-1990s, framing a pathway toward Salafi-jihadism in Europe.
The Taliban forms in Afghanistan under Mullah Omar, described as emerging from Deobandi-educated networks and later becoming the most prominent example of Deobandi jihadism establishing Islamic rule.
A jihadist variation of the Black Standard becomes widely used by various Islamist organizations, visually signaling an emerging transnational iconography associated with militant movements.
Jihadist variation(./Jihadist_flag "Jihadist flag") of the Black Standard(./Black_Standard "Black Standard") as used by various Islamist organizations(./Islamism "Islamism") since the late 1990s, which consists of the Shahada(./Shahada "Shahada") in white script centered on a black background
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya wages an insurgency against the Egyptian government; the article reports at least 800 deaths among security forces, militants, and civilians during this period.
A notorious attack attributed to Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya occurs at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor (Luxor massacre), killing foreign tourists and cementing the group’s international notoriety.
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya declares a ceasefire, though the article notes continued activity later in other contexts.
The article notes that “jihadism” as a term arises in the 2000s to label contemporary movements, with their development traced retrospectively to Salafism’s evolution and to al-Qaeda’s origins in the Afghan war-era networks.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the term “jihadism” becomes more widely used in public discourse, especially in the United States and other Western contexts.
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda promoted the overthrow of secular governments.585960
Caucasian jihadists are depicted using a Black Standard variation in 2002, reflecting the spread of shared symbolism across distinct regional insurgencies.
Jihadist variation(./Jihadist_flag "Jihadist flag") of the Black Standard(./Black_Standard "Black Standard") as used by Caucasian jihadists(./Arab_Mujahideen_in_Chechnya "Arab Mujahideen in Chechnya") in 2002 displays the phrase al-jihād(./Jihad "Jihad") fī sabīlillāh(./Fi_sabilillah "Fi sabilillah") above the takbīr(./Takbir "Takbir") and two crossed swords(./Scimitar "Scimitar")
Gilles Kepel publishes Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (cited in the article’s notes), helping popularize and specify academic language around “jihadist-salafist” variants.
Marc Sageman describes Salafi jihadism as a revivalist social movement with roots in Egypt, influenced by ideologues such as Qutb and Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj.
The Battle of Baghdad (2003) and subsequent political changes in Iraq are described as contributing to the rise of jihadist networks, as resentment and marginalization fueled insurgent mobilization.
De-Ba'athification is described as contributing to increased support for jihadists and alliances between former Iraqi Ba'athists and al-Qaeda against the United States.
Salafia Jihadia is linked to the 2003 Casablanca bombings, in which suicide bombers killed and injured civilians, highlighting North African nodes in Salafi-jihadist militancy.
Mohamed Fizazi, ideologist of Salafia Jihadia
Mohammed Fizazi, described as spiritual leader/founder of Salafia Jihadia, is arrested and later sentenced in connection with radical statements and links to the Casablanca bombings.
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi founds Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah, described as an early organizational root of what later becomes the Islamic State lineage in Iraq.
A strategic text titled Management of Savagery (2004), attributed to Abu Bakr Naji, is described as influencing later jihadist organizations by outlining a route to a new caliphate via destabilization and coercive control.
Mohammed M. Hafez is cited describing two major jihadi Salafi factions in Iraq as of 2006: the Mujahidin Shura Council and Ansar al-Sunna.
The Caucasus Emirate exists as a self-declared proto-state in the North Caucasus, appearing in the article’s “See also” context for jihadist-linked conflicts and entities.
In Gaza, the leader of Jund Ansar Allah announces an “Islamic emirate,” after which Hamas forces attack the mosque complex; the article reports 24 killed and over 130 wounded in the fighting.
NPR is described as first reporting on “Jihad Cool,” a phenomenon framing militant jihadism as fashionable through media such as rap videos and social platforms to recruit youth in developed countries.
Swedish Security Police later cite about 200 jihadists in Sweden in 2010, used as a baseline for subsequent growth in the 2010s.
In Jordan, Salafist jihadists are described as being involved in protests against King Abdullah II, illustrating local political activity linked to the broader ideological current.
Estimates from Germany’s interior intelligence service put Salafism at about 3,800 members in 2011, as part of a documented rise over the following years.
Italian peace activist Vittorio Arrigoni is kidnapped and killed in Hamas-controlled Gaza; the article notes Salafist jihadists’ involvement in this case.
Al-Salafiya al-Jihadiya in the Sinai is established by Muhammad al-Zawahiri to fight Egyptian security forces and the Israel Defense Forces in Sinai and Gaza; the article notes ties with al-Qaeda.
Multiple Sinai Peninsula groups, including Al-Salafiya al-Jihadiya in the Sinai, are described as conducting terrorist attacks against civilians and Egyptian armed forces during these years.
A Sweden-focused social media analysis (cited in the article) notes an increase in jihadist activity or visibility in 2013, contributing to concerns about growth during the decade.
By one estimate cited, jihadist groups’ involvement in civil wars grows to more than 40% by 2014, reflecting the expanding global footprint of jihadist-linked conflicts.
The Islamic State gains global prominence after conquering large territories in northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria; it declares a worldwide caliphate and enforces its extremist interpretation of Islamic law in areas it controls.
With IS’s rise, large numbers of foreign fighters travel to Syria and Iraq to join militant causes; the article also notes that many jihadist groups opposed IS.
German intelligence estimates Salafism in Germany at about 7,500 members by 2015, alongside recruitment dynamics that include online and street-level propaganda aimed at youth.
The article reports that IS’s self-declared caliphate governed an area with roughly 12 million people and had an annual budget exceeding US$1 billion, with more than 30,000 fighters at that time.
French authorities close a Salafi-jihadist mosque in Marseille for preaching about violent jihad, reflecting a European security response to extremist preaching.
In Sweden, Swedish Security Police report that the number of jihadists has risen to thousands, up from about 200 in 2010, indicating significant growth over the decade.
After the European Court of Human Rights approves the decision, France deports Salafi-jihadist preacher Elhadi Doudi to Algeria due to radical messages spread in Marseille.
After sustained fighting, IS loses control of all its Middle Eastern territories by 2019 and reverts to insurgency while continuing propaganda and maintaining activity and influence in parts of Africa.
The article links the 2021 Taliban offensive and the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan to the Taliban as a Salafi-jihadist-linked outcome in its framing of post-conflict state formation.
The article states that the 2024 establishment of the post-Assad Syrian caretaker government grew out of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, presented in the article as part of Salafi-jihadist-linked developments.