1985 Greek constitutional crisis

Early constitutional struggles

Since gaining independence in 1821, modern Greece has experienced persistent instability. Early governments were weak and burdened by debt from the independence struggle,^[13] while rivalries among elites and limited political cohesion^[i] led to conflict with Prime Minister Ioannis Kapodistrias, ending in his assassination.^[14] Soon after, foreign creditors and the European Great Powers imposed a foreign monarchy with absolute authority.^[ii][15] Throughout the 19th century, tensions deepened between citizens seeking broader political participation and elites aligned with the crown and external interests, contributing to repeated military interventions and a series of coups into the 20th century.^[16]

Early military movements secured reforms, notably the 3 September 1843 Revolution, which established a constitutional monarchy and the 1909 Goudi coup. The latter brought Eleftherios Venizelos to power, modernized the country and expanded its territory.^[17] However, his clash with King Constantine I over Greece's entry to World War I divided the Greek society and the armed forces, and became known as National Schism.^[18] This turmoil produced a short-lived republic (1924–1935) before the monarchy was restored, followed by further authoritarian rule under Ioannis Metaxas in 1936.^[19]

Conservative rule (1946–1963)

The Axis occupation of Greece in World War II and the 1944–49 civil war between the Communist-led uprising against the monarchist establishment caused severe economic damage and deep social divisions.^[20] After martial law ended, weak post-civil-war governments relied heavily on U.S. aid through the Marshall Plan and focused on containing communism during the Cold War.^[21] Political dialogue in the following decades revolved around shifting power from the right to the center, but reconciliation was slow.^[22] and to redefine control of the military between the king and elected officials. Shifting control of the military from the king to the elected government was another difficult subject.^[23]

The 1952 Constitution, though based on that of 1911, was effectively a new constitution. It established a parliamentary monarchy with the monarch as head of state and the army, based on the principle of the separation of powers.^[24] The king retained significant powers, including the power to dissolve parliament and to appoint and dismiss ministers.^[24][25] The latter led to confusion since two prime ministers in the 1950s asked whether the king or the prime minister governs the country, echoing the disagreements between Venizelos and Constantine I during the National Schism.^[26]

From 1955 to 1963, the governorship of Konstantinos Karamanlis brought relative stability and economic prosperity to Greece.^[27] He also sought to reduce the monarch's prerogatives but failed to gain sufficient political support to overcome the king's resistance.^[28] By the early 1960s, repressive postwar policies were increasingly questioned, especially after the death of left-wing Member of Parliament (MP) Grigoris Lambrakis, which implicated state officials in the assassination or in its cover-up.^[28] Although not blamed, Karamanlis resigned and went into self-exile in France.^[29]

Rise of center-left and friction with the king

Georgios Papandreou and his political party, Center Union, had a moderate reformist platform; it gained considerable traction and rose to power in parliamentary elections of 1963 and 1964.^[27][30] Papandreou advocated for the liberalization of Greek society, which was rapidly urbanizing, resulting in large salary increases for police, judges, and teachers. Papandreou's government also released all political prisoners as a first step toward reconciliation from the civil war.^[31] Resentment toward Papandreou from the military grew because they were excluded from salary increases.^[32] He also attempted to gain control of the military, which alarmed many officers without weakening them.^[33][34] Papandreou's move created friction with King Constantine II, who wanted the monarchy to retain command of the army.^[31]

At the same time, the son of Georgios Papandreou, Andreas Papandreou, who had joined Greek politics after a 23-year academic career in the United States,^[35] was campaigning on an anti-monarchy and anti-American platform, destabilizing the political equilibrium.^[36][37] Andreas Papandreou's uncompromising militant stance made him a target of conspiratorial accusations from ultra-rightists, who feared that following new elections, which the nearly 80-year-old Georgios Papandreou would likely win, his son would be the focus of power in the party.^[38] These incidents caused a dispute between Georgios Papandreou and King Constantine II, leading to the resignation of the former.^[39]

For the next twenty-two months, Greece had no elected government, and hundreds of demonstrations took place, with many being injured and killed in clashes with the police.^[40] The king, potentially^[iii] acting within his constitutional rights but politically dubious approach,^[39] tried to gain support from members of the Center Union party and form a government, leading to the Iouliana (July events) of 1965.^[41] Constantine temporarily succeeded in gaining the support of 45 members, including Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who were later were called "apostates" by supporters of the elder Papandreous.^[40][42] To end the political deadlock, Georgios Papandreou attempted a more-moderate approach with the king, but Andreas Papandreou publicly rejected his father's effort and attacked the whole establishment, attracting the support of 41 Center Union members in an effort to gain the party's leadership and prevent any compromise.^[36][43]

The prolonged political instability between the parliament and the monarchy led a military coup in which a junta of colonels seized power and ruled Greece for seven years. The junta expelled prominent political figures, including Andreas Papandreou, Mitsotakis, and King Constantine. The political world almost universally blamed Andreas Papandreou, and even his father disowned him,^[iv] as the person primarily responsible for the end of Greek democracy.^[37][44] In exile, the younger Papandreou, cut off from those working for the restoration of democracy in Greece, developed and disseminated an anti-American, conspiratorial^[v] narrative of events in which he was a victim of larger forces.^[45] Following the junta's collapse, caused by its failure to handle the Turkish invasion of Cyprus,^[46] the dominant political figure, Karamanlis, returned to restore democratic institutions in Greece.^[47]

Return of Karamanlis

With the return of civilian rule under Karamanlis, the new government issued a "Constituting Act" that voided the junta's Constitution of 1973.^[48] Pending a referendum on a new constitution, the 1952 constitution was temporarily restored, "except for the articles dealing with the form of the State"; the last phrase referred to whether the monarchy would be restored.^[48] In the meantime, the functions of the monarch were to be carried out by the incumbent President, Phaedon Gizikis, who the junta had appointed as a nominal figurehead.^[49]

Features of the new constitution and first objections

In the November 1974 parliamentary election, Karamanlis received 56% of the vote and a mandate to set the foundations of the new state. In the following month's republic referendum,^[vi] 76% of voters chose a parliamentary republic with a president as head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces,^[50] effectively ending 150 years of monarchical rule.^[51] This led to the foundation of the Third Hellenic Republic with the new Constitution of 1975, which reinforced the executive branch's power, represented by the prime minister, while the president would act as the head of state with sufficient reserve powers, the right to call elections, appoint a government, dissolve Parliament, and call referenda on important national questions. The president could also veto any legislation that did not reflect the popular will, and this veto could only be overturned by a three-fifths parliamentary majority.^[50][52] The presidential powers, which exceeded those of the monarch under the 1952 Constitution, were inspired by the recent Gaullism reforms in France.^[50]

Despite vocal resistance from leftist parties, which wanted a purely parliamentary system with a ceremonial president, Karamanlis insisted these powers would act as checks and balances to avoid an omnipotent prime minister who could accumulate executive and legislative powers with no restraint.^[53] Parliament adopted the new constitution and it was promulgated on 11 June 1975. Andreas Papandreou, along with the communists, boycotted the promulgation; he publicly described it as "totalitarian", advocating instead for a socialist constitution, without further elaborating.^[54][50]

Reforms by Karamanlis

From 1975 to 1980, Karamanlis and his close associate Konstantinos Tsatsos governed Greece as prime minister and president, respectively. The reconciliation of the civil war was becoming urgent; Karamanlis had legitimized the Communist Party of Greece (KKE),^[vii][55] which was outlawed since November 1947 during the civil war, re-ratified the European Convention on Human Rights,^[56] and allowed exiled Greeks who had fled the junta and civil war, including Melina Merkouri, Mikis Theodorakis, and Cornelius Castoriadis, to return home.^[57] Approximately 25,000 Greeks returned from 1974 to 1981.^[58] Karamanlis' governments, however, maintained country's anti-communist stance, i.e., it was challenging to get a civil-service job as a communist. Minister of Interior Konstantinos Stefanopoulos said: "Greeks would never forgive those who had taken up arms against the Nation".^[59]

EEC membership and rise of PASOK

Papandreou and his newly formed political party, PASOK, rose in popularity due to pressure from the 1973 and 1979 oil crises on the Greek economy, and Papandreou's radical, mostly anti-American and anti-EEC. In 1980, after Karamanlis secured the entry of Greece into European Economic Community (EEC), he became president and Georgios Rallis became prime minister, which created a power vacuum that contributed to Andreas Papandreou winning the 1981 Greek parliamentary election and becoming prime minister.^[60] In the views of Greece's allies, Karamanlis, as president, would act as a restraining factor on radical departures in foreign and domestic affairs if Papandreou realized his campaign promises.^[61][62]

Reforms by Papandreou

Papandreou took further steps toward social reconciliation by allowing the potential return of another 22,000 Greeks by ending security screening; the most notable was Markos Vafiadis at age 77.^[58] In 1985, Papandreou introduced a law allowing civil servants dismissed for political reasons to restore their pensions.^[58] All formal Civil War commemorations, including ceremonies commemorating Dekemvriana, were abolished.^[63] The first, 1949 law recognizing the Greek Resistance excluded left-leaning partisan groups that fought against the Greek State in the Civil War. On 20 September 1982, Papandreou's government abolished this exception, allowing EAM/ELAS members war-veteran status and pension rights.^[58]

Papandreou, unlike Karamanlis's inclusive approach, instrumentalized Greece's divided past by regularly invoking the memories of the civil war ("right the wrongs of the past") and "revenge of the losers [of the Civil War]" (Greek: "η ρεβάνς των ηττημένων") to maintain the support of left-leaning supporters by demonstrating to them PASOK's faithfulness to its campaign promises and left-wing roots.^[58][64] For Papandreou, polarization was necessary to distract his supporters from his mishandling of the chronic stagflation of the Greek economy, despite the country receiving economic aid from the EEC.^[65] Nevertheless, the cohabitation of the two men from 1981 to 1985 was successful because Papandreou governance was more pragmatic, compared to his radical polarizing rhetoric, and many of his campaign promises were reversed.^[66]

First stage

On 6 March 1985, New Democracy announced it would support Karamanlis' second Presidency term, while on the same day, the KKE party announced it would put forward its candidate. The press anticipated Papandreou would also support Karamanlis,^[67] because he had personally assured Karamanlis of his support.^[68] Papandreou, however, changed his mind at the last moment, siding with the left wing of PASOK, which did not want Karamanlis, and instead backed Christos Sartzetakis, a Supreme Court judge known for his principled handling of the 1963 murder of left-wing deputy Grigoris Lambrakis and favorably viewed by the left. Sartzetakis's investigation became the central plot in Costas Gavras' 1969 movie Z based on the novel of Vassilis Vassilikos.^[67][68] The announcement occurred at the Central Committee of PASOK on 9 March.^[67] This move surprised some of Papanderou's ministers, much of his party's rank-and-file, and Sartzetakis himself, who was not consulted in advance.^[67] Later, it was revealed the supposedly spontaneous change of mind was to camouflage Papandreou's long-held constitutional designs because Sartzetakis knew about it well in advance, and because two other judicial figures had rejected Papandreou's offer.^[69] At the same time, Papandreou announced plans for a constitutional reform, which restarted the debate about the form of the republic, and further polarized the political environment by damaging the consensus between the two dominant political parties, PASOK and New Democracy, that existed between 1981 and 1985.^[70]

Papandreou also argued it would be illogical for Karamanlis to preside over any constitutional reform because he had influenced much of the 1974 constitution.^[54] Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of creating a constitutional crisis to remove Karamanlis from office and establish a totalitarian constitution.^[71] Papandreou informed Karamanlis of his decision via his deputy, Antonios Livanis [el], because he could not bring himself to do so in person.^[72] In response, Karamanlis resigned from the Presidency on 10 March 1985, two weeks before the end of his term, and was replaced by PASOK's Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Ioannis Alevras, as acting president.^[54]

Vote eligibility of the acting president

The opposition questioned whether Alevras could participate in the parliamentary vote for his successor, requesting to be precluded from the presidential vote and his deputy rights while acting president.^[73] The Constitution of 1975 states the president's office is incompatible with any other office (Article 30). Constitutional scholars supported this view.^[73] Academic Nikolaos Saripolos said only the Constituent Assembly could determine whether Alevras could vote.^[73] PASOK said there was no explicit provision in the constitution, so this issue should be resolved in the Parliament; an opinion from Grigorios Kasimatis [el] and friend of Papandreou.^[73] Ultimately, the PASOK-dominated parliament decided to allow the vote, and New Democracy deputies vacated the chamber.^[74] PASOK deputy Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas later said in Parliament the issue raised by constitutional scholars on Alevras' ineligibility to vote due to Article 30 in the Constitution applies only to elected presidents, and therefore did not apply to Alevras.^[74]

Parliamentary votes for president and colored ballots

According to the Constitution of 1975, up to three rounds of a parliamentary vote were permitted for presidential candidates; the first two rounds required more than 200 votes out of 300 MPs, and in the third round, 180 votes out of 300.^[75] If all three rounds failed, new elections would be held. Papandreou, who since 1981 had expelled six PASOK MPs for criticizing him, could only rely upon approximately 164 MPs; 13 MPs from the KKE, and five independent MPs (about 182).^[3] The first two rounds, which took place on 17 and 23 March, failed to elect Sartzetakis as president. The elections were carried out in conditions of high political tension; at one point, a New Democracy deputy momentarily grabbed the ballot box.^[3]

As in the previous rounds, in the third round on 29 March, colored ballots in blue for Sartzetakis, and semi-transparent envelopes were used.^[2][3][76] New Democracy chairman Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of violating constitutional principle of secret ballot (Article 32),^[75] by forcing his deputies to cast their vote with colored ballots.^{[viii][3][77]} Mitsotakis' concern was dismissed because PASOK controlled the majority in the Parliament.^[3] Mitsotakis and Papandreou argued verbally; Mitsotakis said Papandreou had no respect for the Parliament, and Papandreou responded by invoking Mitsotakis' role in the Iouliana and said Mitsotakis was the last person entitled to speak about respect.^[ix][3] Despite vigorous protests from the opposition, PASOK members used colored ballots under strict surveillance to spot potential defectors.^[78][77] PASOK supporters chanted outside the Parliament building.^[78]

Sartzetakis was voted president with a decisive vote from Alevras because two MPs from Papandreou's party, who Papandreou accused of taking bribes from Mitsotakis' party, defected.^[78] Mitsotakis considered the vote illegal and said if New Democracy won the elections, Sartzetakis would not be president by bringing the legality of the process to Council of State (Greek: Συμβούλιο Επικρατείας), further deepening the constitutional crisis.^[4][77]

Foreign policy dimension

Foreign observers were worried Papandreou had taken a risk with potentially dire consequences for Greece and its allies. According to McDonald, a victory for Mitsotakis in the upcoming elections would destabilize Greece over the presidency question.^[79] Alternatively, an electorally-weakened Papandreou might lead to a collaboration with the communist party to form a government, which according to John C. Loulis, a conservative Greek political analyst, "raised a potential danger to the balance of power in the Mediterranean" due to the possibility of communists shaping Greece's foreign policy and disrupting the communications in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).^[80]

Constitutional proposals and debate

With Sartzetakis as president, Papandreou could formally submit the proposals for constitutional amendments by adding to the previous one the removal of a secret ballot for president.^[81] In contrast with constitution violations raised in Sartzetakis's election,^[82] PASOK's procedure for proposing constitutional amendments complied with the constitution.^[69] The surprising announcement of constitutional reform under already tense political conditions and limited input from constitutional scholars on the nature of amendments increased the possibility of the crisis becoming widespread.^[83] Papandreou's proposals were designed to ease future changes to the constitution's Article 110 to require the approval of amendments by a parliamentary majority in one rather than two successive parliaments, and reducing the powers of the President.^[84] The former proposal was eventually abandoned due to its controversial nature,^[84] but Papandreou was determined to eliminate the presidential powers. Papandreou cited the hypothetical case of an activist president, mimicking the tendency of monarchs to intervene in political life since the creation of the modern Greek state.^[85] PASOK minister Anastasios Peponis introduced the constitutional amendment package to the Parliament with the following argument:

Invoking the lack of use of some provisions, their lack of implementation is by no means an argument to keep them in the current constitution. The question is what is our guiding principle? When provisions directly or indirectly contradict the principle of popular sovereignty, we object to them. [...] We support that the president is neither directly appointed by nor elected by the people. We are not a presidential, we are a parliamentary democracy. It is not the president who resorts to the people, so that the people deliver a verdict by majority voting. It is the legitimate government. It is the political parties. If the president resorts to the people, then he inevitably either sides with one party against others or attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution. Nevertheless, as soon as he attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution, then he embarks upon the formation of his own decisions of governmental nature. Then the government, directly or indirectly, fully or partially, is abolished.^[86]

Scholars considered such constitutional changes unnecessary because no president had used these powers in the course of the Third Hellenic Republic until Papandreou raised the issue.^[87][85] Anna Benaki-Psarouda, New Democracy's rapporteur, presented in the parliament the following argument against the proposed reforms:

And this is the achievement of the 1975 Constitution: A miraculous balance between the Parliament, the Government and the President of the Republic, namely these state organs which express popular sovereignty and always pose the risk of de facto usurping it. [...] It is also interesting to see where these competencies of the President of the Republic are transferred. They are removed from him, but where do they go? To popular sovereignty and the Parliament, as the parliamentary majority claims? Dear colleagues, all of them go to the government, either directly or indirectly through the parliamentary majority controlled by it. Because the parliament is now subjugated to the parliamentary majority through party discipline. [...] Dear colleagues, the conclusion from the amendments suggested by the government or the parliamentary majority is the following: Power is transferred completely to the government. Hence, we have every reason to be afraid and suspect and mistrust about the future of Greece. [...] I want to stress the following, so that we, the Greek people, understand well: that with the suggested amendments you turn government and government majority into superpowers.^[88]

Psarouda-Benaki said this type of majoritarianism would damage Greek democracy.^[88] Scholars also noted the proposed changes would make the prime minister the most powerful position in the Greek state because there would no constitutional restraints.^[5][6]

Election campaign of 1985

The confrontation from the presidential election continued into the general election campaigns and increased the political polarization in Greek society.^[89][90] Papandreou invoked memories of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and Junta (1967–1974), associating New Democracy with the authoritarian right of the past, with the slogan: "Vote PASOK to prevent a return of the Right".^[91] The communists, persecuted by the right in the 1950s, protested against Papandreou's dwelling on the past, saying the 1980s were not the same as the 1950s.^[91] Papandreou further characterized the upcoming elections as a fight between light and darkness in his rallies, implying PASOK represented the "forces of light" because its logo was a rising sun.^[92] On the other side, Mitsotakis said: "In voting, the Greek people will also be voting for a president",^[81] and warned that there was a danger of moving toward an authoritarian, one-party state.^[93]

Two days before the elections, Karamanlis urged Greeks to be cautious with their votes, saying PASOK had brought "confusion and uncertainty".^[94] Karamanlis' statement was not broadcast on television or radio, which were controlled by the state and PASOK, the governing party.^[94]

In the election, PASOK was re-elected with 45.82% of the vote, losing approximately 2.3% of its support from 1981, while New Democracy increased its share of the vote by 4.98% to 40.84%.^[95] Papandreou's gamble worked to his benefit because he gained from far-left voting blocks, covering the losses from centrist voters, and appealed to socialist voters who rejected Karamanlis's perceived hindrance of PASOK's policies.^[96][69] Papandreou had an advantage over Mitsotakis in which he said a vote for Mitsotakis was a vote for a constitutional anomaly,^[97] convincing a significant fraction of Greek voters.^[69][97] Historian Richard Clogg said the large-scale rally by Mitsotakis on 2 June at Syntagma Square may have panicked communists to vote for PASOK;^[98] the communist parties lost a significant share of the vote.^[99]

Court ruling

The case reached the courts; the plenary session of the Council of State ruled the direct judicial review of the election of the President was inadmissible,^[102] and that the Athens One-member Magistrates' Court's ruling in passing that the election of the President was irregular and "amounted to an abrogation of popular sovereignty",^[x] while it considered the subsequent political legitimacy, following the victory of PASOK in the 1985 election, did not negate the unconstitutionality of the act.^[xi] Constitutional scholar Christos Papastylianos called the latter an example that displays the limits of judicial jurisdiction in Greece; the courts can deem an action as unconstitutional but are unable to prevent it.^[103]

Disillusionment and abuse of power

Papandreou began his second administration with a comfortable majority in parliament and increased powers granted by the amended constitution. Economic and social conditions in Greece, however, deteriorated. His premiership was interspersed with financial and corruption scandals, such as the Koskotas scandal, a money-laundering operation that threatened the PASOK government because it implicated Papandreou and many senior PASOK ministers.^[104] In 1985, Papandreou accepted a loan from the EEC and implemented austerity measures as a condition of the loan. After two years, Papandreou, shaken by PASOK's waning popularity, reversed the austerity measures, resulting in a further deterioration of the Greek economy.^[99][9][105] The repeal of anti-terrorism legislation in the early 1980s and controversial foreign policy decisions led to a significant rise in terrorist incidents in Greece.^[106][107]

Despite rising public frustration with the government, Papandreou abused his position to remain in power because there were no constitutional restraints. Notable actions include:

• Papandreou changed the electoral law shortly before the June 1989 general election, a move designed to prevent New Democracy from winning an absolute majority.^{[xii][108][109][110]}
• Bestowing public appointments to about 90,000 people to gain additional votes six months before the 1989 election; ^[111] the party Synaspismos called this a "recruitment orgy".^[112] Papandreou's blatant patronage, which had been burdening the economy throughout the 1980s,^[113] was exemplified by him, at one of his rallies, publicly commanding his Minister of Finance Dimitris Tsovolas to "give it all [to them]" (Greek: Τσοβόλα δώσ'τα όλα) and ordering, "Tsovolas, empty the coffers [of the state]", and the crowd chanted these back.^[8][9]
• During judicial inquiries of the Koskotas scandal, it was revealed Papandreou used the Junta's surveillance infrastructure, filing and wiretapping, against any Greek citizen who was not loyal to him.^{[105][114][115]} The list of "suspected terrorists", according to Papandreou, included prominent politicians across the political spectrum, his ministers, publishers, police chiefs, and PASOK's governmental spokesman.^[116]
• Judicial independence was damaged when Papandreou passed a law via emergency procedures despite opposition from lawyers, judges, and clerks, to prevent the judicial investigation of the Koskotas scandal from advancing to the Athens Appeals Court.^[7]

Catharsis

Papandreou lost the June 1989 election, mainly due to the Koskotas scandal.^[117] Mitsotakis' party won 43% of the vote, but it was insufficient to form a government because Papandreou's last-minute change of the electoral law required a party to win 50% of the vote to govern alone. Papandreou hoped that while PASOK might come second in voting, it could form a government with the support of the other leftist parties, but he was rejected.^[118] Instead, the right-wing New Democracy collaborated with the united leftist parties under Synaspismos, led by Charilaos Florakis, to form a government. The two parties, while belonging to opposite ideological camps, and having fought one other in the Greek Civil War, both sought a "catharsis", meaning an investigation into PASOK's corruption and a trial.^{[104][111][119]} The new government indicted Papandreou and four of his ministers. To avoid political exploitation by any future omnipotent prime minister, the new government dismantled some of the junta's surveillance infrastructure and, as a counterbalance to state media, granted the first private television broadcast license to publishers critical of PASOK.^[10][11]

In the election of April 1990, Mitsotakis received sufficient support to form a government, and Papandreou became the leader of the opposition,^[104] marking the end of PASOK's political dominance in its first era.^[120]

Social norms

Scholars examined Greek electoral preferences during the catharsis era and found that Greeks perceive political corruption differently from other Western countries, placing greater importance on personality and charisma over morality.^[121] One scholar noted: "This refusal to distinguish between party loyalty on the one hand, and political corruption and constitutional violence on the other, is another sad reflection of contemporary Greek life".^[121]

Manesis

In 1989, Ccontemporary constitutional scholar Aristovoulos Manesis [el] provided a detailed assessment of the constitutional crisis.^[122] While the 1985 constitutional revision was not the result of a violent confrontation, nor did i tlead to one, as happened in the revisions of 1911 with the Goudi coup, in 1952 after the Greek Civil War, and in 1975 after the military coup, all of these constitutional revisions were imposed by the governing political party without the participation or consent of the minority parties.^[xiii][123] He also said the manner in which the presidential election was announced and conducted, and the nature of the constitutional amendments, had the potential of political rupture, while the latter also decreased the Constitution's democratic character due to the concentration of power in the prime minister's position, along with the emerging statist bureaucracies and technologies aimed at controlling the popular will.^[xiv][122] At the end of his criticism, Manesis advocated for strengthening individual rights and institutions as a counter to the executive branch led by the prime minister.^[124]

Constitution legitimacy and populist democracy

Nikos Alivizatos, a constitutional scholar, considered the methods PASOK used to elect Sartzetakis in 1985 unacceptable; he did not blame the change in the presidency in 1985 for the "corruption and moral crisis" that became apparent in the following years, and said the removal of constitutional restraints caused PASOK "to neglect the rules of the parliamentary game",^[125] and that PASOK "would not hesitate to overcome any obstacle in its aim to retain power".^[126] The political scientist Stathis Kalyvas and the historian Richard Clogg note Papandreou's actions did not directly threaten the democratic form of the constitution, but they undermined its long-term legitimacy.^[77][100] The political scientist Dimitrios Katsoudas wrote that the constitutional revision was unnecessary and damaged the constitution's established legality,^[127] and said Papandreou had long-term constitutional designs to reinforce his government party against an impotent parliament.^[87]

Takis Pappas, a political scientist, stated PASOK's general strategy in the 1980s involved state grabbing, institution bending, and political polarization.^[128] According to Pappas, the constitutional reform was state grabbing, while the presidential election was bending or disregarding liberal institutions to the will of popular sovereignty^[128] that gradually changed Greece from a liberal democracy based on the Constitution of 1975 into a "populist democracy".^[129] Political polarization became most prominent during elections through political mobilization, which was aided by the press, and state-controlled television and radio, creating divisions in society.^[130]

Motivation

According to the historians John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis [el], the crisis was motivated by Papandreou's desire to divert the Greek electorate's attention from the worsening state of the Greek economy; unemployment increased under PASOK from 2.7% in 1980 to 7.8% in 1985,^[131] annual inflation of the order of 20%,^[132] widening trade deficits.^[133] According to a public-opinion survey by Eurobarometer, the number of Greeks who believed the economic situation worsened increased from 37.7% in 1983 to 70.2% in 1985, while those who believed the economy improved fall from 31.5% to 12.8% in the same period.^[134] Kevin Featherstone, a political scientist, also said Papandreou's actions were intended to divert public attention from his economic policies.^[135]

Papandreou said the removal of Karamanlis was necessary for the constitutional revision; according to Manesis, the reverse was true: the constitutional revision was a pretext to justify the removal of Karamanlis, which would remind left-leaning voters, as the elections were approaching, that PASOK remained faithful to its revolutionary left-wing origins.^[136] Manesis also noted PASOK's lack of preparation for the constitutional revision, saying frequent changes to the proposed amendments were made days before their submission, which he sees as a clear sign of partisan politics.^[137]

Proposed constitutional reforms

Greek constitutional reformers commonly include in their proposals the return of some prerogatives to the president to reduce the negative effects of majoritarian politics, i.e., "winner takes all", while avoiding conflicts between the president and prime minister in the executive branch.^[12] In a collaboration headed by former Finance Minister Stefanos Manos involving Alivizatos and others, it was proposed the president would have the right to dissolve Parliament to counterbalance the omnipotent prime minister.^[138] Under this plan, the president's term would be six years long and non-renewable.^[139]

Political norms

In the 1990 Greek presidential election, New Democracy, having a slim majority in the parliament, elected Karamanlis to a second term as president, after five rounds of votes. PASOK and Synaspismos supported their candidates.^[140] After this, there has been political consensus that the governing party should choose a presidential candidate who is acceptable to the opposition; the exception to this trend was with Konstantinos Tasoulas in the 2025 presidential election.^[141][142]