1987 Aegean crisis
Geo-Political dispute between Greece and Turkey
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Aegean crisis (Greek: Κρίση στο Αιγαίο, romanized: Krísi sto Aigaío, Turkish: Ege kıta sahanlığı krizi) of March 1987 was a confrontation between Turkey and Greece arising from a miscommunication over Greek intentions to conduct oil exploration in the Aegean Sea, near the Greek island of Thasos.
| 1987 Aegean Crisis | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Aegean Dispute | |||
Map of the Aegean Sea | |||
| |||
| Parties involved in crisis | |||
 Greece |
 Turkey | ||
Greece sought to prevent oil companies from drilling beyond its territorial waters and declared the purchase of majority shares of these companies. Soon after, Denison Mines announced plans to drill east of Thasos beyond the Greek waters. However, Turkey misinterpreted these actions as an indication that Greece intended to expand its oil exploration beyond those waters. The tension was amplified by the absence of a direct channel of communication between the two governments. In response, a Turkish survey vessel was sent to the area with an escort of two Turkish warships, which led both nations to put their military forces on high alert. The situation alarmed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as both countries were members of the alliance.
Diplomats intervened and resolved the misunderstanding. Turkey withdrew its naval vessels under the condition that Greece would not establish oil drills in the north Aegean Sea beyond its territorial waters. While the crisis lasted for only a few days, it brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war and reignited the Aegean dispute.
Contemporary Greek–Turkish relations
Greek–Turkish relations have been marked by recurring internal and external tensions stemming from Turkey's revisionist strategy to challenge the status quo in the Aegean Sea as established by the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947). According to scholar Panayotis Tsakonas, Turkey's strategy relies on calibrated coercion, maintaining sustained political and military pressure below the threshold of war to redefine the regional balance of rights and influence in the Aegean Sea.[1]
The tensions between the two countries culminated in the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The invasion followed a coup backed by the Greek junta (1967–1974), which sought Enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece.[2] Turkey's military intervention led to the occupation of the northern 37% of the island, the displacement of a significant Cypriot population, and the enduring division of Cyprus.[3] This outcome created lasting friction between the two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. Diplomatic relations deteriorated sharply.[4] Additionally, the sharp rise in oil prices during the 1973 oil crisis created acute supply pressures in Turkey and increased interest in exploring the Aegean for hydrocarbons. At the same time, exaggerated claims by Greece's military government in 1973 that significant oil reserves had been discovered near Thasos and Lemnos led Turkish policymakers to believe that Greece was attempting to monopolize Aegean oil resources.[5]
Soon after the fall of the Greek military government due to the invasion of Cyprus and the establishment of the Third Hellenic Republic in 1974, another crisis took place in the Aegean Sea. In August 1976, Turkey conducted seismic surveys, escorted by a Turkish warship, west of the Greek island Lesbos in the Aegean Sea, considered by Greece as part of the "Greek continental shelf."[6] Tensions escalated when Turkish representatives stated that the islands in the eastern Aegean Sea should have been Turkish, prompting Greek statements that a forceful response is forthcoming and the Greek army was on full alert, potentially bringing the two countries to the brink of war.[6] Subsequently, Greece appealed to the UN Security Council (UNSC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ), giving sufficient time for the crisis to be defused through diplomatic efforts.[7] While the UNSC recommended restraint, the ICJ declared that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the Aegean continental shelf dispute. The Bern Agreement, signed later that year, aimed to freeze unilateral exploration activities. However, mutual suspicion persisted.[8][9][10]
Events
Pre-crisis
In 1981, Andreas Papandreou became Prime Minister of Greece and his government considered the November 1976 Bern Agreement's drilling ban east of Thasos void, since Aegean talks had stalled. However, his government was also entangled in legal disputes in an attempt to control oil firms that wanted to expand exploration beyond Greek waters.[11] The predominant Greek view at the time was that most of the Aegean continental shelf was Greek and so oil companies had to seek permission from the Greek state. Given these circumstances, exploration and extraction of oil beyond Greek waters was improbable.[12]
Miscommunication
Tensions started to rise on 19 February 1987, when Greece announced plans to purchase majority shares in foreign companies drilling near Thasos, citing the area's "strategic importance."[12][13] It was followed by an announcement by Denison Mines, a Canadian company, of plans to drill eight to ten miles[a] east of Thasos, that was beyond Greece's territorial sea (six miles), but within its claimed space (twelve miles),[b] angering the Greek government.[12][13] The Greek government faced a dilemma: allow exploration and risk a crisis with Turkey, or expropriate the company and take control itself. Although Greece believed it had a strong legal case, it feared a compromise ruling by the courts. Greek intelligence gathered in late 1986 also suggested that Turkey was planning to provoke a crisis to force Greece into bilateral negotiations. Papandreou decided to buy the shares of the company to control its activities.[13] However, Turkey viewed the company's public statement and Greek share purchase as confirmation of Greek intentions, and amid its own bid for European Economic Community membership, grew alarmed.[12]
Turkish ambassador Nazmi Akıman sought assurances from Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Kapsis that Greece had no intention of drilling beyond its territory. Kapsis, however, bluntly asserted Greece's sovereign right to drill anywhere on its continental shelf, even though it was not Greece's immediate plan.[12][13] Akıman interpreted this as an intent to drill beyond six miles, and Ankara warned that any activity in disputed areas would prompt a Turkish response. Greece refused to back down, announcing Aegean military exercises on 19 March.[12] On the same day, the Turkish survey vessel Piri Reis was sent to the area[c] with an escort of two Turkish warships, and both nations put their military forces on high alert.[11][14]
Crisis peaked
Tensions peaked following strong statements from both prime ministers. Papandreou ordered the armed forces to sink any Turkish ship if it was found in Greek waters.[14] In a similar tone, Turkish prime minister Turgut Özal said that Turkey would respond if Greece interfered with its vessels, and cautioned to wait for any Greek initiative.[15] With Özal abroad for heart surgery and no direct communication channel in place, hard-liners in Ankara drove Turkey's overreaction, undermining Özal's efforts to ease the strained relations.[12] On 26 March, the Turkish Council of Ministers, while Özal was still in the United States, scheduled the survey vessel RV MTA Sismik 1,[d] to go to disputed waters with the escort of another two[e] Turkish warships.[16] In the meantime, the Greek government ordered the mobilization of its naval vessels and personnel, and by March 27, a significant deployment of ships had been made in strategically important areas.[16] As the situation escalated, the US (particularly Robert V. Keeley, US ambassador in Athens) and Britain's Lord Carrington, the Secretary General of NATO, urged Greece and Turkey to avoid the use of force and offered to act as mediators.[17][18][15] Both of them met with Özal upon his return to Ankara via London.[17]
Papandreou wanted to hold NATO, and especially the United States, responsible for Turkey's adventurism.[19] He ordered the suspension of the operation of the NATO communication base in Nea Makri, and he sent the Greek Foreign Minister, Karolos Papoulias, to Bulgaria, a Warsaw Pact member, for consultations with President Zhivkov.[19][20]
Diplomatic solution
In the meantime, Yiannis Boutos, a former minister and a friend of Papandreou, learned of the escalating situation during a meeting with Turkish ambassador Akıman.[21] Boutos rushed to Papandreou's home to brief Papandreou, who was unaware of the Kapsis–Akıman exchange. Acting on the prime minister's behalf, Boutos assured Akıman that Greece's share purchase aimed to stop, not extend, drilling east of Thasos.[21] Reassured, Akıman confirmed this with Kapsis and informed his government. The crisis ended on 28 March 1987, when Özal declared that Turkey would withdraw its vessels as long as Greece refrained from drilling beyond its territorial waters.[21][22]
Aftermath
A day after the crisis ended, Papandreou communicated with Özal via their respective ambassadors over "secret talking points" diffusing the tense atmosphere.[21]
In January 1988, Papandreou and Özal met at the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, to improve the relations between their two countries. Papandreou described the meeting as "a great event for the two nations," and Özal described it as "a breakthrough". Part of the meeting was a "no-war agreement", establishing a hotline between the two governments, and joint committees were established to work towards closer political and economic relations.[23] Papandreou sought this agreement to improve his image as a man of peace,[24] while Özal wanted to improve Turkey's image abroad as his country was under evaluation for full membership of the European Community.[25] In a subsequent meeting held in Ankara on 6–9 September of the same year, a document was signed that provided an understanding of accident prevention in international waters.[26] Other meetings between the two sides focused on economic cooperation, in particular trade and tourism, and cultural exchanges.[27]
Internal pressure in both countries tarnished the Davos agreement. Özal faced resistance from the Turkish military-diplomatic establishment and from Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş.[28] Papandreou was criticized by the opposition for focusing on bilateral disputes and "shelving" the Cyprus dispute, forcing him later to denounce the Davos process and apologize from the podium of the parliament.[29] By the end of 1988, Greece reported 338 Turkish violations of the Greek airspace with 42 mock dogfights,[29] going against the "Davos spirit".[30]
Notes
- In this article, "miles" refers to nautical miles.
- According to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Greece has the right to expand its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles. However, Turkey has declared that such an extension would constitute a casus belli.[31]
- Staying in international waters of the Aegean.