Allied Concrete Ltd v Meltzer

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Full case name Allied Concrete Limited V Jeffrey Philip Meltzer And Lloyd James Hayward As Liquidators Of Window Holdings Limited (In Liquidation)
Decided18 February 2015
Citation[2015] NZSC 7; [2016] 1 NZLR 141
Allied Concrete Ltd v Meltzer
CourtSupreme Court of New Zealand
Full case name Allied Concrete Limited V Jeffrey Philip Meltzer And Lloyd James Hayward As Liquidators Of Window Holdings Limited (In Liquidation)
Decided18 February 2015
Citation[2015] NZSC 7; [2016] 1 NZLR 141
TranscriptAvailable here
Case history
Prior actionMeltzer v Allied Concrete Ltd [2013] NZHC 977; Allied Concrete Ltd v Meltzer [2013] NZSC 102; Farrell v Fences & Kerbs Ltd [2013] NZCA 91; Farrell v Fences & Kerbs Ltd [2013] NZCA 329.
Court membership
Judges sittingElias CJ, McGrath, William Young J, Glazebrook and Arnold JJ.
Keywords
Voidable transactions, Insolvency

Allied Concrete Ltd v Meltzer was a landmark Supreme Court decision on the defence to a court order allowing a liquidator to claw back value from an insolvent transaction. The matter in contention concerned whether repaying an old debt satisfied the words "gave value" in section 296(3)(c) of the Companies Act 1993. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that "gave value" includes value given when a debt was initially incurred by the now insolvent debtor company.

Section 292(1) of the Companies Act 1993 says that an insolvent transaction entered into within two years of a company commencing liquidation can be voided by the liquidator. Section 292(2) of that Act defines an insolvent transaction as one that,

(a) is entered into at a time when the company is unable to pay its due debts; and

(b) enables another person to receive more towards satisfaction of a debt owed by the company than the person would receive, or would be likely to receive, in the company's liquidation.

Section 295 of the Act allows a court to make a range of orders to set an insolvent transaction aside on the application of the liquidator. As Justice Arnold in the Supreme Court noted, "The court may, for example, order a person to pay the company an amount that fairly represents some or all of the benefits received because of the transaction."[1] Section 296(3) of the Act provides a defence to the s 295 orders:

(3) A court must not order the recovery of property of a company (or its equivalent value) by a liquidator, whether under this Act, any other enactment, or in law or in equity, if the person from whom recovery is sought (A) proves that when A received the property—

(a) A acted in good faith; and

(b) a reasonable person in A's position would not have suspected, and A did not have reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the company was, or would become, insolvent; and

(c) A gave value for the property or altered A's position in the reasonably held belief that the transfer of the property to A was valid and would not be set aside.

The question before the Supreme Court was "whether the value referred to [in 296(3)(c)] must be given at or after the time of payment, or may precede it".[2]

Judgment

Significance

References

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