Assyrian naming dispute

Church Formations

Ottoman Millet system

In the Ottoman Empire, the millet system divided non-Muslim groups based on religious affiliation, and provided these various groups with autonomous self-government for the purpose of maintaining responsibilities of tax payments and security.^[53] The system was closely linked to the tenets of Islamic law for non-Muslims living under Muslim authority. It served to make several religious minorities within the Empire represented within its space, albeit as second-class citizens;^[54] in the case of Assyrians, the millet system contributed to their status as a minority.^[55]

The Syriac Catholic Church received millet status in 1829.^[56] The Chaldean Catholic Church, which was formerly defined by its affiliation with the Church of the East, was granted millet status in 1844.^[57] The Church of the East applied for millet status in 1864, although this was rejected by Ottoman authorities; the church would not receive status as a unique millet until 1914.^[56] The Syriac Orthodox Church had previously been under the jurisdiction of the Armenian millet, linked by virtue of being non-Chalcedonian theologically. However, following various inner church conflicts, a series of petitions (often numbering into the thousands) would be made by the SOC under Ignatius Peter IV and its dioceses for a separate millet.^[58] After the Tanzimat reforms, the SOC was declared its own millet independent of the Armenians in 1882.^[54]

Assyrians predominated within the four millets corresponding to these churches.^[56] Although they were still considered to be the same ethnicity, the growing religious and geographic divides across churches greatly reduced kinship and encouraged animosity amongst them.^[59][60] Members of the Church of the East in Hakkari did not have as close of a connection with the Syriac Orthodox of Tur Abdin, and even within these churches, disputes between Syriac Catholic and Chaldean Catholic designations had arisen.^[61][a] For many of these millet's leaders, who were patriarchs of their respective churches, unity as a nation-millet would mean relinquishing the individual power they had as temporal and spiritual heads.^[63] Amplified by political pressures, the impacts of the Ottoman millet system have persisted in the political involvement of clergymen.^[64]

Assyrian genocide and nationalism

The Assyrian genocide (also known as Sayfo) was less systematic than the experience shared by the Armenians, indicating that local circumstances mitigated general anti-Christian views.^[65] However, Assyrians were still victim to the Turkish nationalist sentiments of the Committee of Union and Progress, which sought to homogenize the nation.^[66] Sayfo resulted in the deaths of at least a third of the Assyrian population at the time, which contributed to the division and weakening of traditional structures which by then were used to identify the community.^[67][66] Many found themselves in new/enlarged refugee communities in countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Armenia, and in the Americas/Europe.^[68][69]

From just before Sayfo, Assyrian nationalism began to develop, encompassing a uniting ideology under various Syriac-rite churches in the space of the Ottoman Empire.^[70][71] With the emergence of Protestant-sponsored education near Urmia and increased literacy, publications and political thought began to emerge, stressing the need to surpass denominational schisms under a uniting name.^[72][66][61] Alongside figures such as Freydun Atturaya,^[70] various Assyrians of the Syriac Orthodox Church had advocated for a nation state and unity under the Assyrian name. Ashur Yousif, who was Syriac Orthodox, was one of the first Assyrian nationalists to receive Western education and encompass a uniting ideology amongst Assyrians.^[73][70] Naum Faiq was also one of the earliest advocates for unity irrespective of millet,^[70][74] and advocated for the use of "Asuroye" over "Suryoye" or "Suroye".^[75]

Assyrians in Massachusetts, who were Syriac Orthodox, also expressed similar ideals for unity and hopes for an Assyrian nation state. The design of the original Assyrian flag was designed by Syriac Orthodox adherents, with three white stars representing the three main churches of the Assyrian people.^[76] These Assyrians also had joint events with members of the Church of the East and even intermarried alongside them, with their associations using the label to represent a secular identity.^[77] Members of the Syriac Orthodox diaspora formed various organizations and institutions encompassing Assyrian (Süryânî) identity, and translated "Süryânî kîlîsesî" as the "Assyrian (Apostolic) Church".^[78]

Former Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church Ignatius Aphrem I, who at the time was Archbishop, was one of the leaders of the Assyro-Chaldean delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, alongside Abraham K. Yoosef.^[79] Barsoum presented six requests on behalf of his people and Ignatius Elias III, whom he addressed as descendants of the Assyrian nation, and put a case for Assyrian autonomy.^[80] These cases defined the Assyrian people as including Nestorians, Chaldeans, Jacobites, Maronites, Assyrians in Russia, Persian Assyrians, Yazidis, and the Muslim Shekak tribe.^[81] Similarly, Yousef VI Emmanuel II Thomas, then patriarch of the CCC, advocated for the creation of an Assyrian homeland when he met with the American King-Crane Commission.^[82]

Among Chaldean Catholics and Syriac Orthodox, nationalism was not significant early on, and clergymen feared that embracing it would mean certain ruin.^[82] Most Jacobite villagers, especially in Tur Abdin,^[83] were rarely exposed to Assyrian nationalist sentiments,^[84] and amplified by Sayfo, greater Assyrian nationalism was unable to reach areas outside of Urmia and Hakkari, as many leaders had immigrated or were killed.^[85][66] At the same time, issues arose with the Paris Peace Conference and attempts for autonomy; Agha Petros, an Assyrian military leader who was Chaldean Catholic, had posed an umbrella approach that was rejected by religious leaders who feared losing power over their churches and favored British protection.^[86] He had previously made repeated demands for an autonomous Assyrian state to be created.^[87] The concept of Assyrian nationalism became more politicized and existed in stark contrast to the religious authority of the churches, particularly the Church of the East.^[88]

Barsoum would later reflect on his involvement, dismayed at the lack of compassion he felt from the Allied powers.^[89] By the end of the conference, Assyrians would be guaranteed minority rights and local autonomy in an independent Kurdistan under the Treaty of Sevres,^[90] but these were subdued by the Treaty of Lausanne and never put into effect.^[91]

Simele massacre

By the time the Ottoman Empire dissolved, and with the coming formation of several nation states tied to Arab identity, Assyrians were gradually collectivized in the minds of the majority-Muslim population as "Christians", owing to the legacy of the millet system.^[92] For Assyrians of the Church of the East, in contrast with the loyalty of the CCC, SCC and SOC,^[93] pushes for an independent nation-state or autonomy were still strong. Hopes for resettlement back to Hakkari were diminished following its inclusion to the Turkish state, and COE Patriarch Shimun XXIII Eshai expressed concerns about how the Assyrians would be treated following the end of the British Mandate.^[94][95] Faisal I attempted to dissuade Mar Shimun from pursuing the Assyrian question further, but this was to no avail.^[96] Arab nationalists and supporters of the Iraqi government quickly cast the Assyrians as British agents who were acting against the interests of the new state.^[97] Later conflicts in Dayrabun would cause Kurdish-Iraqi army general Bakr Sidqi to send forces upwards to the north, beginning the Simele massacre.^[96][98]

The Simele massacre is often cited as being the catalyst for the modern naming dispute, amplifying the denominational schisms that Assyrians would face.^[99] Following failed negotiations, the Iraqi government exiled Shimun to Cyprus and the COE would relocate its patriarchate to Chicago. At the same time, Chaldean patriarch Mar Yousef VI Emmanuel II Thomas as well as Priest Wadisho of Alqosh and Mor Athanasius Thoma Kassir of Mosul of the SOC, had sent letters under duress congratulating Iraqi authorities for suppressing the Assyrian "rebellion".American resident minister and eyewitness Paul Knabenshue related to the U.S. Secretary of State that these letters were most likely written under threat and duress: "The exaction of false testimonials from the various Christian dignitaries, virtually at the point of the pistol, is a sad testimonial to the integrity of the Iraq government".^[100][101] For Chaldean Catholics and the SOC, it was reason enough to be killed just by being Assyrian, so the perceived solution was to deny any affiliation with Assyrian identity and ethnicity.^{[100][102][103]}

Emergence in diaspora

Modern Chaldean identity first began to emerge in the Assyrian diaspora; as opposed to their identity as Christians within the Catholic Church, and the developments of Assyrian identity encompassing the various Syriac-rite churches, Chaldean Catholics drew upon their unique membership of the CCC, dialect of Neo-Aramaic, ties to Mesopotamia, and entrepreneurship to define themselves.^[115] Chaldean immigration to the United States heightened after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965^[116] and was rather homogenous, being mostly from a certain set of villages in northern Iraq (most prominently Tel Keppe^[117][118]) towards the cities of Detroit and San Diego.^[119]

Religion was a major basis for out-group formation for Chaldeans.^[120] Emphasis on the Chaldean Catholic Church was especially important for immigrants to differentiate themselves (namely from Arabs), ease acculturation^[121] and formulate their identity. It served as a central component that the community could universally identify with religiously, and fulfilled family-oriented and socio-religious obligations.^[122] By extension, emphasis was placed on the priests for solving the general problems of the population,^[123] to the point that no external organizations worked with Chaldean Catholics until the early 1970s^[124] (though secular organizations existed during this time, such as the "Chaldean Federation of America"^[125]).

In 1963, most members of the community predominantly identified themselves by their village ("Telkeffees") and objected to being labeled as Iraqis or Arabs, but eventually they began to shift away from a solely village identity.^[126] Around the 1970s and 1980s, many Chaldeans in Detroit regarded themselves as descendants of the Assyrians, and had not identified with Iraq as most had immigrated prior to the founding of the country.^[127] However, they were wrought with disagreements over how to identify themselves, complicated by inner subdivisions and Arabization.^[128] The discussion over the potential Arab identity of Chaldeans was a controversial one, and although it was growing amongst newer immigrants, Arab nationalist viewpoints were in the minority.^[129] Assyrian identity and nationalism was present amongst Chaldeans in Detroit, though it was comparatively small and did not have as significant of an influence as Chaldean/Telkeffee identity or Arab nationalism.^[130]

In contrast with the Detroit community, who centered on their religious heritage, Assyrian-American leaders in Turlock, California had a stronger linguistic-nationalistic orientation and attempted to deemphasize denominational differences.^[131] A similar position was eventually taken by the Chaldean patriarch Raphael I Bidawid, who clarified in an interview:

I personally think that these different names serve to add confusion. The original name of our Church was the 'Church of the East' ... When a portion of the Church of the East became Catholic, the name given was 'Chaldean' based on the Magi kings who came from the land of the Chaldean, to Bethlehem. The name 'Chaldean' does not represent an ethnicity... We have to separate what is ethnicity and what is religion... I myself, my sect is Chaldean, but ethnically, I am Assyrian.^{[132][133][134]}

Sarhad Yawsip Jammo, who was bishop for the Eastern US Diocese of the CCC, is credited as being the first person to create a larger push towards a separate Chaldean identity.^[135] Jammo had initially been supportive of Assyrian identity and advocated for unity across ecclesiastical lines, emphasizing that Chaldean and Assyrian were nomenclature from different perspectives that referenced the same people.^[136][137] According to Assyrian-American lawyer Robert Dekelaita, Jammo's primary goal was to reunite the CCC with the ACOE, and from Dekelaita's understanding, he wanted to eventually become the patriarch of the unified church. But when these plans failed, he became obsessively hostile to those that he felt thwarted his plans, namely Dinkha IV and a collectivization of Assyrian nationalists. Having felt that nationalists were hostile to his goals, Jammo became obsessively anti-Assyrian.^[138]

2000s and the Iraq War

It was with the turn of the Iraq War that activism for separate Chaldean political institutions and activism began to take shape. After the September 11 attacks, Chaldeans living in Michigan were subject to an identity crisis as they fell under increased scrutiny for their Middle Eastern background and could not really define being Chaldean as a unique identity. At the same time, with heightened violence after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, they felt a greater need for lobbying efforts to be made.^[139]

Internal divisions increased after the Fall of the Saddam regime; by the time he was appointed bishop, Jammo, alongside Bishop Ibrahim Namo Ibrahim of Michigan, both began to assert a separate Chaldean identity in their respective diaspora centers.^[140] In early 2003, Jammo announced the formation of the Chaldean National Congress, and recognized the Chaldean Democratic Union Party as the sole representative of Chaldeans in Iraq.^[30] Separatist sentiments among Chaldean Catholics began to gradually widen; later that year in May, both bishops prepared a memorandum that officially asserted a separate Chaldean identity and rejected any common political or nationalist purpose with Assyrians, while a letter sent to Paul Bremer highlighted that "Chaldeans comprise 75% of the Christian Community in Iraq and constitute a distinct ethnicity from Assyrians".^[141] By that point, Jammo had begun to use the phrase "Chaldean Renaissance" in public speeches, tying his role as a church leader to diasporic activism.^[142] The memorandum called for the declaration of Chaldeans and Assyrians as being separate groups in the Constitution of Iraq based on religious demographics, but it was not endorsed by other bishops nor the then Patriarch Bidawid.^[143]

Separation between Chaldean and Assyrian identity would continue with the leadership of Emmanuel III Delly, who stated in a 2006 interview "Any Chaldean who calls himself an Assyrian is a traitor and any Assyrian who calls himself Chaldean is a traitor."^[134] Delly is purported to have made this statement in Arabic to an Arab crowd.^[144]

Recent years

During his years of leadership, the former patriarch of the CCC, Louis Raphaël I Sako, took differing and often opposing positions regarding Chaldean identity. In 2015, Sako suggested that Assyrians and Chaldeans would be represented as Arameans in the Kurdish constitution, suggesting emphasis on Christian universalism rather than ethnic identity.^[145] In 2017, Sako released an official statement rejecting the use of the tri-name label "Chaldean Syriac Assyrian", stating that it distorted the Chaldean identity contrary to what was established in the Iraqi constitution.^[146] In a 2018 interview with Rudaw Media Network, Sako stated that the three different names of the tri-name label represented one group.^[147]

In 2024, Sako called for unity between the CCC, the ACOE, the Ancient COE, and the Evangelical Protestant Church.^[148] He had previously outlined a plan for unity with the ACOE in a 2015 statement.^[149] In 2026, Sako released a letter that was strongly criticized by Assyrians cross-denominationally, describing it as "divisive rhetoric". Rather than dividing the community further, the letter generated near universal pushback against Sako.^[150]

Growing identity in diaspora

Syriac Orthodox immigration to European countries began in the 1960s, mostly from Tur Abdin.^[175] However, following the outbreak of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict, immigration was heightened as Assyrians had no protection from the violence, alongside growing Muslim-Christian tensions and persecution as a result of the Cyprus problem.^{[176][177][178]} Additional opportunities for immigration and conflicts in other countries prompted increased flights to Europe. Most left for Germany and Sweden, though smaller numbers arrived in the Netherlands^[179] and Austria, primarily as guest workers.^[180][181] After Germany adopted a more restrictive asylum and visa policy around 1980, many settled in Sweden as a "last stop".^[180]

For many immigrants, political recognition was important to help other Suryoye living in Tur Abdin to maintain their rights. However, what challenged this was the emphasis on Christianity, previously enough to distinguish themselves in the Middle East but not in Europe.^[182] Similarly to Chaldeans, Syriac Orthodox were forced to change their relationship with identity from solely religion after arriving in majority Christian countries,^[183] although the church had played an important role in fulfilling religious and social obligations.^[74] The ideology of Assyrianism was initially for many immigrants a way to build a growing and distinct identity that would differentiate them from other Middle Eastern and European Christians.^[184] For them, it was also considered a breath of fresh air for ethnic expression that was stifled by discrimination in Turkey, in which they would commonly hide their identity.^[185]

After attaining asylum in Sweden, Assyrians began using newly accessible resources to establish organizations, the first of which being the Assyrian Association in Sodertalje (Swedish: Assyriska föreningen i Södertälje) in 1971.^[186][187]

Increasing naming conflict

According to oral history, naming conflicts began in 1960s Germany when religious leaders in the SOC protested the use of "Assyrian" in their churches, and insisted on the use of "Aramaic" on the basis of linguistic continuity.^[188] After initial success in unifying initiatives among Syriac Orthodox youth, particularly with the establishment of the Assyrian Democratic Organization, clergymen once again adopted a confrontational attitude to the idea of Assyrianism and secular thought.^[189][190] This time period was the first time a clear Aramean identity was unquestionably promoted by social and cultural groups.^[191]

Although there was a period of hegemonic use of "Assyrian" (Swedish: Assyrier) in the 60s and 70s,^[192] by the mid-1970s the naming conflict became increasingly more apparent in Sweden. During this time, the neologism "Syrianer" developed in opposition to Assyrian identity.^[193] On the one hand, several claimed an ancient Assyrian past and were more secular; by default, Swedish authorities used Assyrier due to their previous contacts with the Church of the East.^[194] On the other hand, a separate faction ('Syriac') felt that the Assyrian name held connections to paganism which they wanted no part of, and reduced the importance of the Syriac Orthodox Church in their thousands-year long history. Simultaneously, the Syriac group upheld an ancestry that was inherently religious, finding it hard to accept an Assyrian designation after suddenly arriving in the country.^[187]

In the course of the naming conflict, there were various instances of switching sides between one identity to another. The Syriac network of organizations was younger compared to the Assyrian one, was closer with the Syriac Orthodox Church, and activities were considered reactionary to Assyrian initiatives.^[195] The Assyrian Association was split in 1976 by former members to create the Syriac Association (Swedish: Syrianska föreningen i Södertälje).^[187] Various Aramean/Syriac groups were founded by former members of Assyrian groups; for example, Syrianska FC was founded by former members of Assyriska FF in 1977 due to the heightened disagreements caused by the conflict.^[191] Similarly, in Vienna, Austria, many former Assyrian activists eventually embraced Aramean identity and switched sides,^[196] and an association was formed after attempts to create a youth organization under the church umbrella failed because of refusal to use "Assyrian" in its legal registration document.^[197]

The "Aramean" name would seldom play a role in the early diaspora naming dispute, although Ignatius Aphrem I initially cited "Aramean" or "Syrian-Aramean" as more accurate names for the Church.^[198] Early Syriac Orthodox writers in North America, such as Naum Faiq, writing in Syriac and Arabic, used the words Assyrian, Syrian, and Aramean interchangeably,^[199] a trend that was also seen in the works of the Archbishop of Mardin, Philoxenos Yuhanon Dolabani^[200] and even the Patriarch Ignatius Ya'qub III himself, then Archbishop of Lebanon and Damascus, stating "we are the Assyrians and Arameans who during the early ages were the forerunners of the civilized nations who gave humanity education and knowledge".^[201] It was in Europe, following the rise of secular Assyrian and Aramean associations, where parishes were divided on using whether to identify as either Assyrian or Aramean, with many clergymen such as Julius Yeshu Çiçek supporting a strictly Aramean identity.

Protests and street brawls began in Sweden between supporters of Assyrian and Aramean associations,^[202] leading to the murder of a prominent Assyrian activist.^[188] Over the course of the conflict, certain clergymen in the church emphasized the denominational differences by associating Assyrian identity with the Nestorian doctrine, fueling antagonism to the identity.^[203] The same issues of identity were hotly debated in the Netherlands, namely in the towns of Enschede and Hengelo.^[202] Swedish authorities were ultimately surprised by the rising naming conflict in the country, prompting scientific investigations to explain the differing claims. These investigations researched dialects of Neo-Aramaic, theological differences, and the names "Syrian"/"Assyrian". Ultimately, they settled on "Syrian" or the hyphenated "Assyr/Syrian".^[204] The policies that the Swedish government applied to the naming conflict is said to have contributed to the division, rather than overcome it, as they adopted harsh policies towards immigrants and understood little about the Assyrian community's internal dynamics.^[205]

The Church's official response to the clashes in Sweden was to oppose secular associations on both sides, viewing them as sources of division.^[188] To clarify the Church's identity amidst this dispute, the Holy Synod under Ignatius Zakka I stated that since St. Peter "Head of the Apostles, established its See in Antioch-Syria until this day", the church is known as the "Syrian Orthodox Church" (ʿIto Suryoyto Orthodoxoytho), its language the "Syriac language" (Leshono Suryoyo), and its people the "Syrian people" (ʿAmo Suryoyo). While the Synod did not explicitly condemn the usage of such names alongside acceptance of "Suryoyo", Ignatius Zakka I and the Syrian Orthodox Church's board in Sweden would continue to take a strict stance against both secular "Assyrian" and "Aramean" associations.^[189] The name "Assyrian Orthodox Church" would continue to see usage in the United States parish of Paramus, New Jersey, and following a dispute among the Syriac Orthodox community of Los Angeles, made up of Arabic-speaking immigrants from Palestine (who preferred "Aramaic") and from Syria (who preferred "Syrian"), a compromise was made where the signage on the church building would read "Syrian Orthodox Church according to the Aramaic rite.".^[206]

By the 1980s, Aramean identity developed into a fully-fledged rival to Assyrian identity by certain clergymen,^[189] who began a campaign to discredit anyone who associated themselves with Assyrian nationalism. In one instance, Julius Yeshu Çiçek began removing any mentions of Assyrians in his writings despite formerly being a member of an Assyrian association in Berlin.^[207] It was at this point that the lay elite identifying as Aramean gained hegemony in competition with the Assyrian lay elite, and had actively boycotted reintegration of community members identifying as Assyrians.^[208][192] In Sweden, the two SOC parishes were split along secular Assyrian and Aramean ideologies, and remain in place to this day.^[208][192]

In April 2000, the Holy Synod changed the church's official name from "Syrian" to "Syriac" in order to avoid confusion with the Syrian nationality.^[40] Since then, scholars and church officials began increasingly using "Syriac" in place of "Syrian", although this has been accused of having a subtle Aramean element.^[209] The film The Hidden Pearl which was commissioned by multiple committees of prominent individuals within the Syriac Orthodox community,^[210] including then Patriarch of Antioch, Ignatius Zakka I, was also cited as a point of contention for the naming dispute, with statements that the authors spoke from an unequivocally Aramean perspective that was challenged by others in the Assyrian community.^[211]

Recent years

Under the leadership of Ignatius Aphrem II, the naming dispute within the SOC has largely toned down, with the Patriarch insisting on using the label "Suryoye" to unite the community outside of the Assyrian and Aramean designations currently used.^[212] However, Mor Aphrem II's stance on the dispute provoked discord from organizations who espoused Aramean identity, namely the World Council of Arameans, who questioned his calls for unity.^[213] In 2017, he addressed a letter to the WCA, in which he criticized the organization for attempting to examine the convictions of the church in regards to the naming dispute, and statements indicating that the church did not take a clear stance on Aramean identity.^[214]

In 2025, a small controversy began during a visit to Sweden by Ignatius Aphrem II, when he was accompanied by a parade of church adherents waving the Aramean flag. The move was criticized by Nemrod Barkarmo in the Swedish-Assyrian magazine Huyada, who remarked Aphrem's 2015 interview with Assyria TV stating the church's neutrality to the conflict.^[215] Barkarmo's criticism was itself subsequently criticized by Bahro Suryoyo of Syrianska Riksförbundet.^[216]

Chaldo-Assyrian

"Chaldo-Assyrian" was a suggested compromise for Chaldean and Assyrian designations around the drafting of the Constitution of Iraq. The term began a modern resurgence in the 1970s and in 1996, the Communist Party of Kurdistan - Iraq became the first political party to use the term.^[225] In 2003, several political parties opted to adopt the name "Chaldo-Assyrian" for the people and "Syriac" for the language;^[226] most notably, the Assyrian Democratic Movement adopted the name^[1] in October after a meeting with Bishop Ibrahim.^[225] The name was adopted by a majority of votes in October 2003,^[227] with the chief objective being to legally adopt it as the best way to avoid external influence into the naming dispute.^[228]

The name was recognized for a short period of time by the Chaldean Catholic Patriarchate of Baghdad.^[225] Initially, the designation saw some favorable acknowledgement among Iraqi Assyrians cross-denominationally, but in the diaspora, the term was not unanimously accepted.^[229] According to an opinion article by Wilfred Bet-Alkhas, who was editor of Zinda Magazine, religious feuds between the two churches and the lack of movement of the term amongst Chaldean groups in Detroit resulted in it never moving forward substantially.^[230] Hanish, on the other hand, states that when the Chaldean church saw lack of movement of the term among Assyrian groups and political use of the term by the ADM, they rejected the term and insisted on Chaldean identity.^[231] Church leaders feared that the ADM would use the name to push for an autonomous region, favoring intergroup coexistence in the post-Saddam Iraq.^[232] A similar rejection was met by Chaldean political parties, and ultimately, the name was never adopted.^[231] The Transitional Administrative Law eventually settled on "Chaldeans and Assyrians", dividing the community into two sect-based communities and playing into divide and conquer strategies between Baghdad and Erbil.^[232][233]

Tri-name designation

Tri-name designations have been suggested and implemented as compromises to the naming dispute in the past. From the late 2000s, the use of the designation became more popular, and was used in the 2000 U.S. Census as well.^[1] Hanish stated that the use of the term was the better option for the time, stating that it included all three identities without leaving out a particular group.^[234] Organizations affiliated with the Dawronoye, such as Suroyo TV and the European Syriac Union, have also utilized the tri-name designation to position itself in the middle of the dispute.^[195]

The tri-name designation has previously been rejected by Cardinal Sako of the Chaldean Catholic Church.^[146] He has also on more than one occasion called for political candidates to unite under a "Christian" list, which was unpopular among secular groups.^[235]

Use of endonyms

Previous attempts have been made to come to a compromise on the dispute by emphasizing the use of the endonym "Suraye/Suroye" and/or "Suryaye/Suryoye". During the naming conflict in Sweden, Ignatius Yaq'ub III encouraged church adherents to use the term "Suryoyo" as the name was used in traditional SOC environments, but it had not developed long-term currency in Sweden.^[188] Ignatius Aphrem II also insisted on the use of the term "Suryoye" as a unifying term.^[212] Certain studies, particularly in the Swedish context, have also relied on endonyms as neutral terms to describe the community.^[236] In addition, the term has also been used as a neutral terminology by Dutch journalists in Enschede and Hengelo.^[237]

Over time, controversies have arisen with the endonym as disputes over its meaning and what the word represents continue to arise from time to time.^{[238][156][239]} Certain issues with the endonym's legibility on a larger scale have also added to the term's controversy. Sarah Kellogg, in a 2019 article on the Dutch Assyrian/Syriac community, noted that while research participants had no issues with the endonyms, controversies still persisted (namely for a meeting in the Netherlands) as there was no clear line between religion and ethnicity with how people used the label.^[240] She further stated under local conditions in the Netherlands, the term "Suryoyo" became increasingly legible as an ethnic term, but loses its legibility as the political ladder scales higher.^[241] Atto observed during research for her dissertation that some individuals objected to the use of the term, believing it would make the naming dispute more confusing for outsiders to understand.^[242] Meanwhile, some Assyrians (namely Chaldeans^[243]) use the word to designate a Christian background rather than ethnicity.^[244][18][b]

Patterns of identity

Assyrian and Aramean identities differ by the amount of emphasis that is placed on politics or religion. Generally, those who identify as Assyrian are much more likely to be secular and political, whereas Aramean identity is emphasized by those who follow Christian traditions.^[246][247] However, religion is still observed to be playing a role in both secular Assyrian and Aramean identities, with differing views over its larger importance of maintenance.^[248] Generally, while Assyrian identity is present across all respective denominations, Aramean and Chaldean identities are limited to membership within the Syriac Orthodox^[249][250] and Chaldean Catholic^[81] churches, respectively. As of 2017, the majority of Syriac Orthodox Assyrians identified with Syriac/Aramean identity and traditions.^[189]

Donabed states that Chaldean identity is today mostly an Iraqi phenomenon and lacks saturation among the larger Chaldean Catholic community, including church members from Bohtan and Urmia.^[81] Expressions of the development of Chaldean identity have previously shown skepticism over its origins as a religious identity, which were shared by Ghassan Hanna of the CNC. Hanna stated in a personal interview that the party's failure to achieve notability reflected the sectarian nature and religious foundation of the identity, despite being formed to promote it, and to that end, it would never properly emerge as an ethnic one.^[251]

Disputes about identity predominately originated in the Western diaspora.^[192] Assyrians may identify under a certain label that is more common to a specific place in the diaspora. For instance, while members of the Chaldean church are more likely to identify as Assyrian in Chicago, they substantially identify under the Chaldean designation in Detroit and San Diego.^[252] In Sweden, Assyrians are observed using different identity labels depending on the context and purpose.^[253] Among proponents of Aramean identity, while some may argue for a complete separation of identities from the Assyrian one, it is not the case for the majority.^[254] Though some advocates may argue for inclusion of the Maronites as part of Aramean identity, others found efforts in a joint Aramean-Assyrian collaboration and identity.^[250][c] In some cases, Assyrians just emphasize their religion as opposed to ethnicity, linked to the impacts of the naming dispute.^[257]

A digital survey prepared by Marta Wozniak-Bobinska in 2008 was completed by 300 participants. 10% stressed the need for unity and cooperation, while 5% wished for the restriction of churches in their involvement with politics. All interviewees noticed the conflict surrounding the naming dispute.^[258] Wozniak-Bobinska later followed up on a survey studying those of the Aramean faction, which was completed by 306 participants.^[259] 2% of respondents mentioned disunity and the naming dispute as the biggest threat to Aramean identity, while 2.5% considered "the Assyrians" to be the greatest threat.^[260] In 2026, results of a community ethnic identity survey from three years prior were published by the Seyfo Center. The survey gathered 213 responses, and results were cross-tabulated based on variables such as location, identity, and church affiliation.^[261] Among participants, 47.8% believed that "Assyrian" was the most unifying identity name among six total choices, with "Suraye/Suroye" being listed by 29.6%.^[262] 85% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac, and Aramean represented the same ethnic group.^[263]

External causes and church involvement

David Gaunt states that in one aspect, the naming dispute represents individual power struggles continued from the homeland, and a similar conflict likely would've existed in its place if not about identity.^[264] Part of the conflict is represented by preserving existing social structures from countries such as Turkey and Syria, and in itself represents a tension between tradition and modernity, primarily represented by church hierarchy.^[250] Heleen Murre-van den Berg identifies that other parts of the dispute have focused on tribalist clan conflicts, which play a role in choices between identities.^[265] Aryo Makko follows up on Gaunt's points, stating that for Arameanism, what originally resulted in opposition to Assyrian identity due to clerical power interests has since evolved into ongoing divisions, as well as the emergence of secular Aramean nationalism among younger advocates.^[189]

Discussions and criticisms of the dispute often focus on clergymen and the role that religious figures play in it. In the context of the dispute between Assyrian and Aramean identities, Atto and Schmoller observe that the Syriac Orthodox Church and its patriarch become the closest to an interconnecting figure between the rival factions.^[266][267] She states that Suryoye lay elite identifying as Assyrian elaborate better arguments for secular leadership than the Aramean faction, but in general, the lay elite are highly critical of the unquestioned authority given to clergymen.^[268] Sarah Kellogg noted how organizations such as the World Council of Arameans reaffirmed the stance of the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch in controlling the ethnic boundary placed on labels.^[269]

Additional criticisms are levied towards the churches and clergymen for fanning the flames of the naming dispute for personal interests. Dekelaita noted that the advocacy started by Jammo was inherited by Chaldean clergymen, including Sako, who despite saying that Chaldeans and Assyrians had no differences, began creating separate Chaldean political parties in an interest of power.^[270] Dekelaita stated that for Jammo and Ibrahim, the statement of representation was a budget issue; by stating that they had represented 80% of Iraq's Christians, dealings proceeded through the Chaldean clergy as opposed to the Assyrian Democratic Movement, the latter representing Assyrians cross-denominationally.^[63] He also implied that Ibrahim and Delly were aware of the unity between the two nomenclatures before they began making separatist remarks.^[144] Önver Cetrez states that in Europe and Sweden, the role of the churches has become increasingly problematic due to organizational structures inherited from the Middle East, which is based on, among other things, "contribution to ethnic-political division within the community."^[205]

Mark Tomass, a professor originally from the Assyrian/Syriac quarter of Aleppo, argues the identity conflict is not due to arguments of ethnic origin, but is instead the product of social and economic dynamics faced as a result of mounting persecution.^[271] He cites emphasis on religious identity over ethnicity (a common occurrence in the Middle East),^[272] as well as the Simele massacre,^[273] as examples of circumstantial events that demarcated self-identification among Assyrians from the 20th century. He states that from the 1980s, the Syriac Orthodox Church began to emphasize "Syriac" identity as a response to pressure from interrogations and harassment that community members faced by secret police in Iraq and Syria;^[174] simultaneously, clergymen offered Aramean identity as a means to protect the community from harassment and massacre in the Middle East.^[274]

Political marginalization

The naming dispute has been cited as a cause for hindered aspirations for forms of Assyrian autonomy or statehood, and is part of the failure of Assyrian nationalism to mobilize the community on a larger scale.^{[275][276][277]} The impacts of the naming dispute have reframed the aims of modern Assyrian activists to preserve identity and maintain a sense of being one people, especially as threats of assimilation continue to increase.^[278] Gregory Kruczek highlights the formation of the Nineveh Plain Protection Units as a means to supersede intragroup cleavages and the naming dispute without completely disregarding them;^[29] the ADM thus shifted its recruitment strategy to deemphasizing the issue.^[279] Meanwhile, certain plans for Assyrian autonomy were hindered by the impacts of the naming dispute, with differences in denomination^[280] and linguistics having so far hindered Assyrians at a political level while paralyzing the community with frequent arguments.^[281][282]

The naming dispute has also been noted as being exploited in order to further divide the community and attain certain political benefits.^[232][283] In Iraq, Assyrian identity began to become more associated with the Church of the East (and later the Assyrian Church of the East) in religious and ethnic terms, while "Chaldean" and "Syriac" for their respective churches, thus continuing to urge their respective spiritual leaders to be the sole representatives of their adherents while fitting within the framework of Arabization.^[284] The vagueness of terms created by the separation of churches has been noted by Harald Suermann [de] as opening the door to political instrumentalization,^[285] and Ba'athist policies of Arabization are cited as "casual and contributory factors in the hardening of otherwise ecclesiastical designations."^[286]

In a 2018 report by the Assyrian Policy Institute, the group noted several Assyrian parties that expressed sentiments of separatism and sectarianism, while receiving little to no support from Assyrians themselves, that had formed in the previous decade.^[287] Before the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary election, candidates that were part of the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council were imposed on locals in towns that had a majority Chaldean Catholic, Syriac Catholic, and Syriac Orthodox population, encouraging them to vote for "one of their own".^[287] The report also noted that after 2003, several political parties (Chaldean Democratic Union Party, Syriac Assembly Movement,^[287] Chaldean League, etc.) only won elections via support through the Kurdistan Democratic Party, while church leaders such as Sako and those in the SCC supported or funneled the creation of separatist political parties to run in the 2018 elections.^[288][289] Chaldean separatism was also promoted by Rayan al-Kildani of the Babylon Movement, despite having no tangible relationship with Iraq's Assyrian community.^[290] The group wrote that the continued religious-based classification of Assyrians to define them in a political context was reminiscent of the legacy of Arabization under Ba'athist Iraq, and was deliberately imposed to dilute their ethnic identity.^[291]

Community fragmentation

The issue of the naming dispute continues to remain deeply morally charged, centering around loyalty or disloyalty to a family, village, community, or Christianity.^[196] It has contributed to a deeper level of fragmentation often on a visibly social level, expanding into choices of church attendance, media to consume, names to use in reference to language,^[292] and overall identity crises.^[195] Organizations formed in diaspora that aimed to advocate for separate identities were founded with a lack of central authority that could compel belonging across denominations, and have since continuously contested the various ideologies of the naming dispute.^{[293][187][7]} In some cases, the dispute has even divided families,^[294] with members of the same family in Sweden differing between identifying as Assyrian or Aramean.^[295]

Often in attempts to distinguish themselves from each other, Assyrian vs Chaldean vs Aramean arguments introduce distinct and unique national heroes, days, symbols, and rituals to express collective identity, as well as differing views on culture, language, and music.^[296] Conflicts between names have carried over to online spaces since the rise of the Internet, often being a solidarity of denominational members with each other (ACOE with ACOE, Chaldeans with Chaldeans). Such conflicts have since become more widespread,^[282] as differing perceptions on the concept of identity have dominated the Assyrian community's internal discourse over several decades, with online communications making the dispute more visible and volatile than before.^[9][297] The conflict has routinely distracted from participation in cultural activities and has diverted the energy of community members into bitter internal strife.^[277]

In Sweden, the debate between Assyriska FF and Syrianska FC is often reflective of the naming dispute and the collectivization of modern Assyrian/Syriac identity as played out through football.^[298] The most notorious instance of dispute was in 1989, when during a local derby, fans of Syrianska ran onto the field and began attacking Assyriska players.^[299] Divisions have also been observed as forums for the two teams had also devolved into arguments over the naming dispute rather than about the actual teams themselves, alongside other mundane divisions^[300][301] and arguments over a potential merger.^[302] An incident of heightened criticism took place in 2009 when it was alleged that clergymen in the Syriac Orthodox Church rung a church bell in celebration of Syrianska's victory in a match.^[238]

Representation

The lack of representation in academic fields has often resulted in inaccurate or deliberately divisive information online (parallel to issues of repression), as long lasting effects of repression have fueled the naming dispute and its presence in diaspora and academia.^[314] In the case of the Syriac Orthodox, academic discourse has influenced the development of a cohesive identity among the community,^[315] though trends in scholarship as of 2009 were to dismiss Assyrian claims entirely, especially in Syriac studies.^[211] In a 2012 article, Donabed wrote how in various instances, writers discussing Iraqi Assyrian history compounded the issue of the naming dispute by misrepresenting and inaccurately tackling the identities and origins of Assyrians living in the country.^[316] He discussed these moves, alongside others, as part of the means of excluding Assyrians from academia and denying their continuity/identity.^[317]

In a research review of sources regarding Assyrian identity construction, Cetrez highlights that studies in Sweden have used different identity designations in different ways. He highlights that the choice of identity label in research contexts reflects a power-discourse of right or wrong, and that such choices may add to the division within the community.^[318] Cetrez, alongside Donabed and Mako, have criticized the definitions of Assyrians by their religious labels as a "reductionist fallacy", limiting Assyrian history to a religious dimension.^[319] Gaunt has stated that articles and publications that aim to support Assyrian or Aramean identities often become list of citations without cohesion, attracting little attention beyond those who already support either side of the naming dispute.^[320] Tomass highlights that community members across the different arguments for identity feel threatened by the various references to these identities, with this becoming a source of mental strain for clergymen, intellectuals, and ordinary laymen alike.^[9]

Continuous recognition of previous Assyrian history with different nomenclature has contributed to the hindrance of larger global awareness of it and the people, namely in the case of the Assyrian genocide. The impact of the ongoing naming dispute has hampered public recognition of the genocide, with confusion over who was actually killed and maintaining the historical divisions of the Ottoman millet system by compounding the various names used.^[321] Labeling Assyrians by their religious affiliation continued in order to diminish ethnic identity, and by extension, has resulted in a lack of scholarship/recognition of the Assyrian experience compared to the Armenian genocide until very recently.^[322]

Conflicts over how to recognize Seyfo have also permeated discussions of the genocide and the building of monuments.^[264] A monument in Sweden was unveiled in 2015 that memorialized the 100th anniversary of the Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek genocides as the "Centenary of the Genocides of the Armenians, Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans and Hellenes.", while the "Oecumenical Memorial" in Berlin identified the victims as "Armenians, Hellenes of Asia Minor, Pontus and eastern Thrace, and Arameans (Syriacs, Assyrians, Chaldeans)."^[321][323] In 2023, the Enschede municipality stopped construction of a Seyfo monument after protests from the Dutch Turkish community, with the situation exacerbated by conflict over what names should appear on the monument.^[324]