Barton v Armstrong
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Barton v Armstrong | |
|---|---|
| Court | Privy Council |
| Full case name | Alexander Barton, Appellant v. Alexander Ewan Armstrong and Others, Respondents |
| Decided | December 5, 1973 |
| Citations | [1973] UKPC 27, [1976] AC 104 |
| Case history | |
| Prior action | Barton v Armstrong [1973] 2 NSWLR 598 |
| Appealed from | NSW Court of Appeal |
| Court membership | |
| Judges sitting | Lord Wilberforce, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Kilbrandon, Sir Garfield Barwick |
| Case opinions | |
| Decision by | Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Kilbrandon and Sir Garfield Barwick |
| Keywords | |
| Duress | |
Barton v Armstrong is a Privy Council decision heard on appeal from the Court of Appeal of New South Wales,[1] relating to duress and pertinent to case law under Australian and English contract law.
The Privy Council held that a person who agrees to a contract under physical duress may avoid the contract, even if the duress was not the main reason for agreeing to the bargain.
Alexander Barton was the managing director of a company, Landmark Corporation Ltd., whose main business was property development, its projects passing through "Paradise Waters (Sales) Pty Ltd". Barton executed a deed whereby the company would pay $140,000 to Alexander Armstrong, a NSW state politician, and buy his shares for $180,000. Armstrong was the chairman of the board.
Street J found Armstrong had indeed threatened to have Barton killed. But the NSW Court of Appeal said that Barton failed to discharge the onus that the threat had caused him to make the contract.[2]