Deep strike campaign
Ukrainian long-range attacks on Russia
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The deep strike campaign,[5][6][7][8][9] deep-strike campaign[10][11] or long-range strike campaign[12][8][13] is a military campaign conducted by the Defence Forces of Ukraine[a] against the logistics of the Russian Federation and the Russian Armed Forces, in order to undermine their economic ability to continue waging the Russo–Ukrainian war (2022–present).[b]
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| Deep strike campaign | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Russo-Ukrainian War | |||||||
Fire at the Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya, photographed from Moscow's Brateevo district on 18 June 2026, following a Ukrainian strike[1] | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Ukraine |
 Russia | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Commander-in-Chief) Oleksandr Syrskyi (Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces of Ukraine) Robert "Madyar" Brovdi (Commander, Unmanned Systems Forces)[2] |
Vladimir Putin (Commander-in-Chief) Andrei Belousov (Minister of Defence) | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
|
| ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
~200–300 long-range drones launched per night (June 2026) 2,359 deep-strike missions in June 2026, targeting sites 500–2,000 km behind the front line[4] | |||||||
Overview
"Deep strike" refers to the range of 200 to 1500+ kilometres, for which specialised deep-strike or long-range one-way attack drones have been developed by Ukraine, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as:
- AN-196 Liutyi – Ukrainian long-range UAV[15]
- Fire Point FP-1 – Ukrainian long-range one-way attack drone[16]
- UJ-25 Skyline – Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle
- UJ-26 Bober (drone) – Ukrainian long-range UAV
- Peklo – Ukrainian loitering munition
Certain cruise missiles built by Ukraine or supplied by Ukraine's allies also take part in the deep strike campaign. Although these tend to be much more expensive, and easier to intercept, they carry larger warheads and thus present a greater threat to potential Russian targets:
- FP-5 Flamingo – Ukrainian cruise missile
- R-360 Neptune – Ukrainian family of cruise missiles
- Storm Shadow – Franco-British cruise missile
There are also several types of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) deployed by the Ukrainian Navy and Ukrainian Marine Corps on the Black Sea against Russia's Black Sea Fleet:[c]
Objectives
The primary targets of Ukraine's deep strike campaign have been the petroleum industry in Russia and military assets of the Russian Armed Forces,[5][6][18] as well as ports and airports.[11][19] The export of hydrocarbons, mostly oil and gas, has been the Russian government's main source of revenue used for military spending on the war.[20] A secondary objective has been to put pressure on the civilian population of Russia (also called "bringing the war back to Russia"), which through a mixture of acquiescence and participation keeps enabling the Kremlin's military aggression against Ukraine.[21]
History
Summary of 2022–2026
The deep strike campaign began in early 2024, with a few dozen pilotless aircraft per month.[15] By June 2026, Ukraine was launching an average of 200 to 300 drones against targets in the Russian Federation every night, divided in several groups per strike.[15]
| War year | Number of strikes on Russia's oil facilities[22] | |
|---|---|---|
| In year | Cumulative | |
| 1st | 3 | 3 |
| 2nd | 13 | 16 |
| 3rd | 92 | 108 |
| 4th | 138 | 246 |
| Feb '26– Jun '26 |
59 | 305 |
According to a 25 June 2026 analysis by CNN, Ukraine had struck Russian oil facilities over 300 times since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022.[22] Only 3 strikes were performed in the first year of the war (February 2022 to February 2023), with an additional 13 in the second year. Ukraine's attacks on Russia's oil infrastructure only really took off in 2024, with a cumulative total of 108 hits after three years of war, 246 after four years, and a total of 305 strikes when including 24 February 2022 to 25 June 2026.[22]
In 2025
A substantial increase in targeted attacks by Ukraine on Russian energy infrastructure began in the second half of 2025. According to media reports, Ukraine carried out over a dozen drone attacks on Russian oil infrastructure between 2 and 24 August, the majority of them striking facilities in Ryazan Oblast and Volgograd Oblast in southwestern Russia. On 27 August, Ukrainian media reported that the Ryazan refinery, one of the main fuel arteries to Moscow, had been struck by a powerful explosion. Boris Aronstein, an independent oil and gas analyst, said that the Ukrainian drone strikes had caused "the most severe crisis in recent years", adding that the size, coordination and repeated waves of the drones makes Russia unable to repair the refineries before the next attack occurs.[23] According to Reuters, Crimea and Russia's far east were the first territories to experience gasoline shortages in August.[24]
on Russia's oil industry
435miles
Luga
terminals (3)
Tuapse terminal
In September 2025, Reuters reported that Russia was seeing certain fuel grade shortages, with the reduced refinery runs caused by the drone attacks and high borrowing costs leading to private filling stations being unable to stockpile fuel according to retailers and traders. According to Reuters, the attacks on some days had reduced Russian oil refining by almost a fifth, and cut exports from key ports. According to five retailers and traders in the Russian fuel market during September, problems from the shortages started to emerge in the Volga river region and in southern and central Russia as well.[24] On 29 September, Forbes reported that the issues with fuel had worsened quickly and spread across much of the country, with rising prices, rationing, long queues and pumps running dry in some cases.[25]
In October 2025, BBC Verify and BBC Russian reported that Ukrainian drone attacks reached a record level of 14 refineries targeted in August, while eight had been targeted in September and 12 in August, and that 21 out of Russia's 38 large refineries had been hit since January 2025.[26] Meduza reported that some gas stations were shutting down altogether due to being unable to raise prices because of antitrust restrictions. In Crimea, Russian occupation officials limited gasoline sales to 20 liters per customer and imposed price caps.[27]
In 2026
According to a 17 June 2026 analysis by The Economist, Ukraine had conducted 685 deep strikes in 2025, and was on track to complete over 800 deep strikes in 2026 at the current pace, indicating a significant intensification.[11]
In early July 2026, Euromaidanpress quoted the Pilotless Systems Forces of Ukraine as saying they had increased successful strikes deep inside Russian-held territory by 1,150% since the beginning of 2026.[28]
The deepest strike so far has been the 7 July 2026 drone attack on the Omsk refinery, Russia's largest oil refinery, located almost 2,500 kilometres from Ukraine.[18]
List of oil industry facilities in Russia hit by Ukrainian strikes
Oil refineries, oil terminals and other oil industrial infrastructure in Russia, struck by Ukrainian attacks since 2025, ranked by refining or transloading capacity. The distance from Ukrainian-controlled territory is indicated in kilometres.
Oil refineries
| Facility | Region | Operator | MTPA[d] | Distance (km)[e] |
Date of strike(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Omsk refinery | Omsk Oblast | Gazprom Neft | 22.0 (2024[29]) | 2500 | 6 July 2026[30] |
| Kirishi Refinery (Kinef) |
Leningrad Oblast | Surgutneftegas | 17.5 (2024[f]) | 810 | March 2024,[32] 14 September 2025,[29][32][33] 4 October 2025,[29][32] 8 March 2026,[29] 26 March 2026,[32] 5 May 2026,[34][31] 9 July 2026[31] |
| Ryazan refinery | Ryazan Oblast | Rosneft | 13.1 (2024[29]) | 480 | 24 January 2025,[35] 20 February 2025,[36] 2 August 2026,[29] 5 September 2025,[29][37] 23 October 2025,[38] 15 November 2025,[36] 24 February 2026,[29] 15 May 2026,[39] |
| Kstovo refinery | Nizhny Novgorod Oblast | Lukoil (NORSI) | 15.0[29] | 800 | 5 April 2026,[29] 20 May 2026,[29] 24 June 2026,[29][40] 2 July 2026[29][40] |
| Yaroslavl refinery (YANOS) | Yaroslavl Oblast | Slavneft | 14.9 (2024[29]) | 700 | 1 October 2025,[g] 12 December 2025,[29] 24 June 2026[41], 6 July 2026[42] |
| Volgograd refinery | Volgograd Oblast | Lukoil | 13.7 (2024[29]) -40% (2026)[29] |
500 | 11 February 2026,[29] 1 June 2026[40] |
| Perm refinery | Perm Krai | Lukoil | 12.6 (2024[29]) | 1485 | 29 April 2026,[43] 7 May 2026[44] |
| Moscow Refinery | Moscow | Gazprom Neft | Offline[h] | 475 | 17 May 2026[39], 12 June 2026[46], 18 June 2026[29][47] |
| Tuapse Refinery Tuapse oil terminal |
Krasnodar Krai | Rosneft | 12.0[29] | 500[i] | 24–25 January 2024,[48] 17 May 2024,[49] 22 July 2024,[50] 14 March 2025,[51][29] 6 October 2025,[29] 2 November 2025,[29] 16 April 2026,[52] 20 April 2026,[52] 28 April 2026,[52] 1 May 2026,[53] 26–27 May 2026[54] |
| Syzran refinery | Samara Oblast | Rosneft | 9[55] | 800 | 18 April 2026[56], 21 May 2026[57], 12 July 2026[55] |
| TANECO | Tatarstan | Tatneft | 17.0 (2024[29]) | 1150 | 12 June 2026,[40] 8 July 2026,[58] 7–8 July 2026[59] |
| TAIF-NIK | Tatarstan | Sibur-RT | 8.5[59] | 1150 | 7–8 July 2026[59] |
| Antipinsky refinery | Tyumen Oblast | RI-Invest | 6.0~9.0[60][29] | 2000+ | 20 June 2026[60] |
| Novokuibyshevsk Refinery | Samara Oblast | Rosneft | 5.74 (2024[29]) | 900 | 20 September 2025[61], 19 October 2025[62], 2 June 2026[40] |
| Ufimsky refinery | Bashkortostan | Bashneft | 3.8 (2024[29]) | 1400 | 3 March 2025,[63] 11 October 2025,[64] 25 June 2025,[65] 1 July 2026.[66] |
| Saratov refinery | Saratov Oblast | Rosneft | 5.8 (2024[29]) | 700 | 21 November 2025,[29] 30 May 2026[67], 8 July 2026[68] |
| Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat | Bashkortostan | Gazprom | 6.5~7.2[j] | 1300[72] | 9 May 2024,[70] 18 September 2025,[72][73] 24 September 2025[71], 13 July 2026[74] |
| Ilsky refinery | Krasnodar Krai | INPZ | 6.6[29][k] | 500 | At least 16 times between May 2023 and 2 June 2026,[76] 10 July 2026[75] |
| Afipsky refinery | Krasnodar Krai | SAFMAR | 6.25[l] | 200 | 10 February 2025,[77] 7 August 2025,[78] 29 November 2025,[78] 14 March 2026,[78] 11 June 2026[79], 14 July 2026[74] |
| Kuibyshev refinery | Samara Oblast | Rosneft | 4.7 (2024)[80][29] | 850 | 9–10 June 2026[80] |
| Slavyansk Refinery | Krasnodar Krai | Slavyansk ECO | 5.2[29] | 350 | 17 December 2025,[81] 24 June 2026,[41] 28 June 2026[29] |
| Novo-Ufimsky refinery |
Bashkortostan | Bashneft – Novoil | 3.8 (2024[29]) | 1400 | 1–2 April 2026[82] |
| Krasnodar refinery | Krasnodar Krai | SAFMAR | 3.0[83][l] | 375 | 30 August 2025[83][29] |
| Ukhta refinery | Komi Republic | Lukoil | 3.0 (2025[29]) | 1720 | 12 February 2026[29] |
Oil terminals and other facilities
| Facility | Region | Operator | MTPA[d] | Distance (km)[e] | Date of strike(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sheskharis oil terminal Grushova Balka oil depot |
Port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai |
Transneft | 19.8 (2025[m]) | 340 | Sheskharis: 17 May 2024,[84] 2 March 2026,[85] 6 April 2026,[n] 23 May 2026[90] Grushovaya: 23 May 2026,[90] 8 June 2026[91] |
| Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal (NOFT) | NCSP & Gunvor | 5.0 | 17 May 2024[84] | ||
| Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka CPC marine terminal | Caspian Pipeline Consortium | 48.0[o] | 29 November 2025[92] | ||
| Port of Primorsk | Leningrad Oblast | Transneft | 60.0[93] | 1087[93] | 12 September 2025,[94] 22–23 and 25 March 2026,[29][93] 5 April 2026,[95] 3 May 2026[29] |
Ust-Luga Multimodal Complex
|
Leningrad Oblast | Ust-Luga Oil JSC Nevskaya: Gazprombank & Transneft-Baltika Novatek |
32.9 (2025[p]) 9.0[q] |
875 | 21 January 2024,[48] 24 August 2025 (Novatek),[97] 22, 25, 27, 29, 31 March 2026,[29][96][98][99] 6 July 2026[29] |
| Petersburg Oil Terminal | Leningrad Oblast | Petersburg Oil Terminal JSC[r] | 12.5[101] | 1100[101] | 18 January 2024,[48] 3 June 2026,[101][102] 4 July 2026[103] |
| Tikhoretsk oil pumping station | Krasnodar Krai | Transneft | 45 | 300 | 12 March 2026[104] |
| Port of Taman | Krasnodar Krai | OTEKO | 20.0 (LPG)[105] | 247 | 13 June 2024,[106] 13 May 2026,[107] 13 June 2026[108] |
| Vysotsk oil terminal | Leningrad Oblast | Lukoil | 9.0 (2025[29]) | 18 April 2026,[29] 6 July 2026[29] | |
| Port Kavkaz | Krasnodar Krai | Rosmorport | 2.5 | 300 | 20–21 June 2026[60] |
| Cherkassy LPDS | Bashkortostan | Transneft-Ural | 2.0[109] | 1500[109] | 8 July 2026[109] |
| Taganrog oil terminal[75] | Rostov Oblast | Kurgannefteprodukt[75] | 1.2[110] | 170 | 10 July 2026[75] |
| Tvernefteprodukt oil depot[111] | Tver Oblast | Surgutneftegas[112] | (6,400 m³) | 520[111] | 9 July 2026[112] |
| Yugnefteprodukt oil depot[111][112] | Stavropol Krai | Lukoil[111][112] | 0.15 (5,600 m³) | 500[111] | 9 July 2026[111][112], 13 July 2026[113], 18 July 2026[114] |
| Noginsk oil depot | Moscow Oblast | 18 July 2026[115] |
Impact
On 4 July 2026, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine estimated 42.74% of Russia's oil refining capacity had been disabled at that time, while the International Energy Agency (IEA) said "more than 20%" of capacity has been knocked offline.[116] Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated in early July 2026 that Russia's capacity to produce and export oil had been reduced by 40% due to the Ukrainian mid- and long-range drone strikes.[117] The Financial Times reported that Russia produced 4.1 million barrels of oil per day in June 2026 (28% below the 5-year average, and 35% below design capacity); the fuel shortage had so far affected 50 million people (35% of the Russian Federation's population); and by 9 July the majority of regions of Russia had local authorities or retailers imposing fuel sales restrictions.[118]
Exiled Russian energy expert Mikhail Krutikhin concluded in mid-July 2026: "I think some of the oil capacity of Russia has been lost forever, because of the closure of the [oil] wells right now. Russia is not going to recover, even five years after the war."[119]
Notes
- The umbrella term "Defence Forces of Ukraine" (sometimes also simply called "the Ukrainian military") refers to all armed institutions of Ukraine engaged in the defence of Ukraine against the military aggression of the Russian Federation.
The largest of these, answering to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, are grouped into the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU). The ZSU include: the Ukrainian Ground Forces, the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), the Ukrainian Air Force, the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces, the Ukrainian Navy, the Ukrainian Marine Corps, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR), the Special Operations Forces, the Military Police, the Logistics Forces, the Medical Forces, and so on.
Reporting to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine are: the National Guard of Ukraine (mostly the 1st Azov Corps and the 2nd Khartiia Corps), the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU, known for Operation Spiderweb), and the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (including the Ukrainian Sea Guard).
Many of these organisations have their own drone forces, but are not part of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), which in April 2026 accounted for only c. 31.15% of all Russian personnel losses inflicted by Ukrainian drone operations.[14] Certain deep strike drone operations may be carried out through inter-service cooperation; for example, USVs such as the Sea Baby are operated by the Ukrainian Navy, in coordination with the HUR and SBU. - "Ukraine’s deep strike campaign extends to the maritime domain through unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), notably the Magura and Sea Baby. These systems demonstrate sophisticated solutions for operating in E-W-heavy environments... The operational effectiveness of these EW-resilient systems is evidenced by the destruction of approximately one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, forcing the fleet to withdraw from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk." Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2026).[17]
- Estimated distance as the drone flies in kilometres (km) between the targeted facility and Ukrainian-controlled territory; essentially, Ukraine minus the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Although it is possible certain (drone) strikes were launched from elsewhere (such as during Operation Spiderweb), the vast majority of strikes on Russia's oil infrastructure have reportedly originated in Ukrainian-controlled territory.
- The governor of Yaroslavl Oblast Mikhail Yevrayev claimed that this fire was man-made and not the result of drone attacks.[29]
- The January 2024 attack was one of Ukraine's first long-range drone strikes. Militarnyi commented: "It is unlikely that the group of drones flew through the occupied Crimea, which is saturated with air defense systems, or across the front line in the Zaporizhzhia region. However, if the route was across the Black Sea, the drones would have flown more than 800 kilometers. It is known that Ukraine has several drones capable of covering distances of 1000 kilometers or more."[48]
- The Afipsky refinery and Krasnodar refinery have been merged as the same legal entity owned by SAFMAR. Their combined capacity was 7.2 million tonnes in 2024, and in January–June 2025 3 million tonnes.[29]
- In July 2026, The Moscow Times stated: "According to sources, total exports of petroleum products via the Novorossiysk terminals in 2025 amounted to 19.8 million tonnes."[29] As it had a separate entry for the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal, "the Novorossiysk terminals" probably refers to the Sheskharis oil terminal and Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal (NOFT) combined, but excluding the CPC terminal in Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka.
- While the Russian Ministry of Defence issued a statement on 6 April 2026 saying that the Ukrainian strikes had hit the CPC marine terminal (in Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka), it provided no visual evidence of the strikes.[86] On the other hand, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine claimed that it had attacked the Sheskharis oil terminal,[86] and most media pointed to video footage of a burning oil terminal which the Astra Telegram channel had geolocated to the Sheskharis oil terminal, filmed from the other shore of the Tsemes Bay, as indicated by the Malaya Zemlia memorial that is visible in the video between the camera and the fire across the bay.[29][86][87][88][89]
- On 6 April 2026, The Moscow Times reported the oil transloading capacity of the CPC marine terminal at Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka as "roughly 1 million barrels per day", "between 3.5 million and 4.5 million tons of crude per month", "up to 20% of Russia’s seaborne oil exports", and "around 1% of the world's oil supplies, as well as around 80% of Kazakhstan's exports".[86]
- Since April 2025, 55% of shares have been seized by the Russian state from Cyprus-based offshore holding companies owned by children of the deceased co-founder Dmitry Skigin. The remaining 45% is owned by Elena Vasilieva, widow of co-owner Sergey Vasiliev.[100] Fuel is supplied by Rosneft North-West LLC, which acquired the Petersburg Fuel Company (PTK) in 2019, liquidating it in 2021.