Device-independent quantum cryptography
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A quantum cryptographic protocol is device-independent if its security does not rely on trusting that the quantum devices used are truthful. Thus the security analysis of such a protocol needs to consider scenarios of imperfect or even malicious devices. Several important problems have been shown to admit unconditional secure and device-independent protocols. A closely related topic is measurement-device independent quantum key distribution.
Dominic Mayers and Andrew Yao[1] proposed the idea of designing quantum protocols using "self-testing" quantum apparatus, the internal operations of which can be uniquely determined by their input-output statistics. Subsequently, Roger Colbeck in his thesis[2] proposed the use of Bell tests for checking the honesty of the devices. Since then, several problems have been shown to admit unconditional secure and device-independent protocols, even when the actual devices performing the Bell test are substantially "noisy," i.e., far from being ideal. These problems include quantum key distribution,[3][4] randomness expansion,[4][5] and randomness amplification.[6]
Key distribution
The goal of quantum key distribution is for two parties, Alice and Bob, to share a common secret string through communications over public channels. This was a problem of central interest in quantum cryptography. It was also the motivating problem in Mayers and Yao's paper.[1] A long sequence of works aim to prove unconditional security with robustness.[citation needed] Umesh Vazirani and Thomas Vidick[3] were the first to reach this goal. Subsequently, Carl A. Miller and Yaoyun Shi[4] proved a similar result using a different approach.