Draft:Battle of Banks Ford
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The Battle of Banks Ford took place on May 4, 1863, near Fredericksburg , Virginia , and was one of the battles of the Chancellorsville Campaign of the American Civil War. It is sometimes considered one of the phases of the Battle of Chancellorsville or combined with the Battle of Salem Church , which took place the day before at the same location. On May 3, 1863, Federal General Sedgwick attacked the Confederate positions on the heights behind Fredericksburg with three divisions, repelled the enemy, and reached the rear of General Robert E. Lee's army. On the morning of May 4, Jubal Early attacked him from the rear and recaptured the heights. During the day, General Lee intended to attack with three divisions and, if possible, destroy Sedgwick's corps in order to then attack Hooker's main army with all his forces. This plan failed due to poor coordination and, in part, to the fault of General McLaws . The VI Corps was able to withdraw unmolested across the Potomac River, but this retreat disrupted the plans of Federal commander-in-chief Joseph Hooker and forced him to abandon the campaign.
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| Battle of Banks Ford | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of American Civil War | |||||||
 Map representing the Battle of Banks Ford | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 United States |
 Confederate States | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| John Sedgwick[1] | Robert E. Lee[1] | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 20,500[1] | 23,000[1] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 900 killed[a] | 1200 killed[b] | ||||||
Background
On April 27, 1863, Federal commander-in-chief Joseph Hooker launched the Chancellorsville Campaign. His plan was to advance part of his army to the rear and flank of the enemy army. Three Federal corps began advancing east: Howard's XI Corps, Slocum's XII Corps, and Meade's V Corps a total of 39,795 men. Two corps remained in place: Reynolds's I Corps on the left flank and Sedgwick's VI Corps in the center.[3]
On the evening of April 28, the VI and I Corps were ordered to cross the Rappahannock to attract the attention of the Confederates. Hooker ordered the capture of Franklin's Crossing and Fitzhugh's Crossing near Fredericksburg in the pre-dawn and early afternoon hours. The morning fog allowed the Union troops to cross undetected. On the south bank of the river, the Federals were met by enemy pickets, who fired a couple of volleys at the attackers and retreated. By 9:45 a.m., three bridges had been built.[4]
By the evening of April 29, General Lee learned of the enemy's appearance on his left flank and sent orders to Generals Anderson and McLaws : General McLaws was to take up positions at Fredericksburg and be ready to reinforce the left flank, and General Anderson was ordered to concentrate at George Chancellor's plantation, where the roads leading from the Rapidan crossings converged, and create a defensive line there.[5] On April 30, General Lee studied the enemy positions at Fredericksburg and decided that Hooker was not planning his main attack there. He decided to leave some troops in positions at Fredericksburg and attack the enemy's western group with the bulk of his forces.[6] Jubal Early's division, reinforced by Barksdale's Mississippi brigade, remained on the heights near Fredericksburg. Lee ordered Early to observe the enemy, to hold back his advance if possible, and if defense was impossible, to retreat to Guinea Station, covering the railroad and warehouses.[7]
On May 1, Hooker's three corps flank Lee's army, met with Anderson's and McLaws's corps, and retreated to the heights near Chancellor's House. On May 2, Jackson attacked Hooker's right flank and routed his XI Corps.[8] That evening, Hooker ordered Sedgwick to go on the offensive and attack Lee's army from the rear. Sedgwick was not able to begin his attack until the morning of May 3. The Second Battle of Fredericksburg began : at 10:00 a.m., Sedgwick's corps attacked Marye's Heights and took it by storm. Early's division retreated south, assuming that Sedgwick was aiming for Richmond. But Sedgwick turned west. At Salem Church, he encountered Cadmus Wilcox's brigade, and the Battle of Salem Church began . Wilcox's brigade repulsed the first attack of Sedgwick's division, and the onset of darkness prevented Sedgwick from continuing. Meanwhile, Lafayette McLaws's division approached to reinforce Wilcox. Sedgwick felt increasingly insecure after the battle. He was in unfamiliar terrain, three miles from the crossings, and knew nothing of the enemy's numbers, which were located both to the west and to the south. He needed clear orders, but they were not forthcoming. He did not resume the battle until nightfall, nor did he secure Marye's Heights.[9]
That night, General Anderson's division was preparing to attack Hooker's left flank, but Lee reversed this decision and sent Anderson to join McLaws and Early. Now 25,000 Confederates remained in the Chancellorsville positions (against 75,000 Union troops), and 23,000 men were assembled to attack Sedgwick's corps (19,000 men[c]). Lee did not know that Reynolds's corps had left to join Hooker, so he believed that Sedgwick had two corps. Sedgwick also believed that 15,000 men from Richmond had come to Lee's aid. Thus, both Lee and Sedgwick overestimated each other's numbers by half.[11]
Forces of the parties
In the battle, the Federals deployed the VI Corps of the Army of the Potomac under the command of Major General John Sedgwick. It consisted of three divisions and numbered, according to various estimates, 19,000 to 21,000 men. General Lee deployed three divisions against it, totaling approximately 23,000 men.[12]
Battle
Morning
On the morning of May 4, Jubal Early sent his division to attack the rear of Sedgwick's corps. Leading the charge was John Gordon's brigade , recently promoted to brigadier general and commanding a brigade for the first time. Early intended to attack with his entire division, but Gordon interpreted the order to mean that only his brigade was to attack. After explaining the mission to his men, he resolutely marched with his brigade along Telegraph Road toward Fredericksburg and reached Lee's Hill, where he found no enemy units. The brigade proceeded to Marye's Heights, but found no enemy there either. It so happened that none of the generals in the Army of the Potomac considered securing Marye's Heights after their capture on May 3. John Gibbon's division was ordered to hold Fredericksburg, and he assumed that Sedgwick would secure his own lines of communication. But Sedgwick did nothing about it. He may have decided that it was Gibbon's work, but he did not even bother to check it.[13]
In his memoirs, Gordon describes his attack slightly differently. He writes that his regiments came under enemy fire, and at that moment Early's order came to halt the attack, but it was too late to change anything, so he ordered it to continue. His men rushed forward and took the "fort," and General Early later remarked that if the attack had failed, Hodon would have had to be court-martialed for disobeying orders.[14]
Having occupied Marye's Heights, Early ordered Barksdale's brigade to resume its former position and probe the enemy's position in Fredericksburg. Barksdale sent a skirmish line toward the town, but it encountered such strong Federal resistance that Barksdale immediately withdrew his men. Early ordered him to remain in position and hold off the Federals if they attempted to advance from Fredericksburg.[15]
Meanwhile, Gordon turned west in search of the enemy, and his men spotted an artillery train crossing Marye's Heights along the Plank Road. Clement Evans's 31st Georgia Regiment charged down the slope, across the creek, and up the hill toward the road. The train's guards fired a few shots and scattered. The Georgians captured about 30 prisoners, 30 or 40 horses and mules, and several supply trains. However, the 31st had gotten far behind its brigade and, unaware that it had come under fire from Thomas Neill's Federal brigade, did not notice . On Early's orders, General Smith advanced to Gordon's aid, placing his brigade on Gordon's left, while the 13th Virginia Regiment was sent to support the 31st. With the assistance of the Virginians, the Georgia Regiment was able to withdraw from its position.[16]
Meanwhile, further to the left, the 58th Virginia Regiment engaged in a firefight with the 7th Maine and 49th New York Regiments. Soon, the Virginian commander, Colonel Francis Board, discovered that his regiment was left alone and ordered a retreat. At that moment, the Union troops launched a counterattack, routing the 58th and capturing the regimental colors. The color bearer was shot by Corporal John McVane, who later received the Medal of Honor for this action. Some of the 58th Virginia's enlisted men hid in a wooden building, where they were surrounded and captured. Early, realizing he was facing a strong enemy force, ordered a retreat. In this morning attack, Gordon's and Smith's brigades lost 204 men (200 of them captured), of which the 58th Virginia Regiment lost 101 men.[17][18]
Not daring to fight Sedgwick alone, Early reported the situation to McLaws and proposed an attack. He stated that if McLaws attacked from the front, Early himself would strike Sedgwick's rear with two divisions. However, McLaws was unsure whether his forces were sufficient for a frontal attack and proposed that Early attack first. He believed that if Early attacked Sedgwick's rear, the Federals would be forced to change positions and a weak point would be discovered somewhere. McLaws also reported the situation to General Lee and requested reinforcements. Lee promised to send Anderson's division, and McLaws then ordered that no battle be commenced until Anderson arrived. General Early was informed that Anderson would move to the right of McLaws and join the left flank of Early's division, and that until then it would be better not to attempt attacks.[19]
In this regard, Stephen Sears wrote that General McLaws's character most closely resembled that of his opponent, Sedgwick. He was just as cautious, dependent, and favored specific, precise orders. He acted confidently under Longstreet's supervision, but that morning, when his personal initiative was required to make a decision, he succumbed to exactly the same indecision as Sedgwick.[20]
Day
At 11:00 a.m., Anderson's division (three brigades: Wright's , Posey's, and Perry's) arrived at the designated position. At the same time, General Lee reported to McLaws's headquarters near Salem Church. What he saw greatly indignant him. Valuable time had been wasted: no one had conducted a reconnaissance and no one could tell where the enemy's battle lines were. Lee ordered a reconnaissance in force and personally went to reconnoitre. Gradually, it became clear that Sedgwick's corps had taken up a horseshoe-shaped position, with its flanks resting on the Rappahannock. It also became clear that only one corps occupied this position. Lee personally placed the brigades in their positions, but the deployment of Anderson's brigades took time: to reach the position, they had to traverse a difficult route over difficult terrain. This took longer than expected.[21][22]
Stephen Sears wrote that this loss of time strangely benefited the Army of Northern Virginia. Had the offensive begun in the morning (as Lee had planned), Hooker could have assisted Sedgwick for example, by sending reinforcements from the north bank of the Rappahannock or by launching an attack from his own position. But since the Confederates attacked late in the day, Hooker decided to do nothing simply because he wouldn't have had time to complete the maneuver before dark anyway.[23]
It was already getting dark, and Colonel Seldon Connor, commander of the 7th Maine , remarked that if the rebels were to achieve anything by nightfall, it was time to begin. "And no sooner had I spoken the words," he later wrote, "than they actually began, attacking our whole line with overwhelming force." The signal to attack was given by Alexander's artillery at 5:30 PM. Immediately, three of Early's brigades and three of Anderson's (approximately 11,000 men) began the attack. Early's division attacked the positions of Albion Howe's division : Neill's and Grant's brigades (approximately 6,200 men). Howe had already discovered at 1:00 PM that the enemy was concentrating on his front and realized that an attack would soon follow. He carefully studied the terrain and positioned his regiments so that they would have an easy retreat if necessary. Neil's brigade was in the front line, with Grant's Vermont brigade 500 yards behind it. It was a clever, well-thought-out position.[24][25]
Early sent Harry Hayes and Robert Hook's brigade to attack this position. John Gordon's brigade advanced to the north, targeting the enemy's far left flank. Smith's brigade remained in reserve. Because the terrain was extremely uneven, Early was unable to use his artillery. Two 20-pounder Parrott guns fired a few shots , but it was mainly an infantry battle. Early's brigades were considered the main attack, and Anderson's three brigades were to support it on the left.[26]
Hayes's advancing brigade was caught in the flank by a volley from the 5th Vermont Regiment, but continued the attack, striking the flank and rear of the 20th New York Infantry . Its colonel, Ernst von Wegesack , was immediately wounded, and the regiment fled through the position of the 7th Maine and Rigby's Battery. The 21st New Jersey also began to retreat. Neil's brigade's ranks were disrupted, and he ordered a retreat to the second line. Neil's brigade "was smashed like a pitcher thrown against a rock," Major Hyde of the 7th Michigan later recalled. Early was close to breaking the Union line, but at that moment his brigades lost their formation. General Hook was wounded and replaced by Colonel Isaac Avery, who was unaware of the plan of attack, and his brigade became entangled with Hayes's brigade, disrupting its ranks. Some of Hayes's regiments broke forward and came under fire from their own units. "Half our men were so worn out by the march that they could not keep up with the rest," recalled Lieutenant Henry Henderson of the 9th Louisiana. "Officers had lost their companies, and companies had lost their officers. Regiments were left leaderless. There were no friendly men in sight, and the enemy was threatening our right flank." Furthermore, the attackers now faced the veteran Vermont Brigade.[26][27][28]
Grant's Vermont regiments awaited Hayes's Louisiana troops, lying behind a low ridge. After allowing the enemy to reach them within musket range, they rose to their feet and opened fire on the Louisiana troops, whose strength was already at its limit. Caught in this sudden volley, the Louisiana troops began to retreat, and some were immediately captured. Hayes lost 445 men that day, 129 of them captured. Among the captured, oddly enough, were three of the five colonels, two lieutenant colonels, and a major.[29]
Meanwhile, John Gordon's Georgia Brigade advanced toward Taylor's Hill, threatening the Federal units guarding Banks Ford. This advance was spotted from artillery positions near Falmouth, and 20-pounder guns opened heavy fire on the Georgians. Upon learning of this maneuver, Sedgwick dispatched Frank Wheaton's Pennsylvania Brigade to intercept. This brigade managed to stabilize the front.[30]
Anderson's brigades also advanced and pushed back Bartlett's skirmish line, but came under heavy artillery fire, which forced them to halt. Bartlett wrote that the attack was repulsed only by the skirmish line and artillery.[2]
But despite the successfully repulsed attack, Sedgwick decided to carry out what he had planned that morning: retreat closer to the crossings. At 18:45, he gave the order for a general retreat. General Newton selected a site for the new position, and the VI Corps retreated there under cover of darkness and fog. Only at 21:30 did Wilcox's two regiments and Kershaw's brigade follow the retreating enemy. They captured several prisoners, but their success was limited. As a result, Sedgwick retreated to a convenient height, dug trenches, and his position was now covered by 34 guns from the north bank of the river. By 22:00, a second bridge was built across the Rappahannock. This new position was much stronger than the previous one, and General Howe believed that it could be successfully held, so retreating beyond the Rappahannock was pointless.[31][32]
Aftermath
Sedgwick retreated to a favorable position, but continued to overestimate the strength of the forces opposing him and believed himself in great danger. Another circumstance worried him: during the day, Hooker had promised to come to his aid as soon as he heard gunfire.[d] Now he undoubtedly heard gunfire, but no help arrived (Hooker decided that he would not be able to achieve anything before dark anyway), and instead a request came for a full report on the corps' position and the units opposing it. Sedgwick received no promises of help or reinforcements.[23]
At 9:45 PM, he sent Hooker a message: "The enemy is pressing me. I am preparing to retreat across the river if necessary." Hooker received this message around 11:00 PM and was shocked by the news. He had been considering all day how to withdraw part of his forces across the river, move them to Banks Ford, and, having reached the position of Sedgwick's corps, attack the enemy there. But the entire plan hinged on Sedgwick holding the bridgehead, and now that plan was crumbling. Stephen Sears wrote that it was in those final hours of May 4 that Hooker began to lose faith in the success of the entire campaign. Hooker had followed his plan for eight days, but Stoneman had failed him with his unsuccessful raid , and now Sedgwick had failed him, and as a result, the plan collapsed, and there was nothing to replace it with. Under these circumstances, Hooker held a council at Bullock's house to gather the opinions of his subordinates. The generals spoke out en masse against retreat, but Hooker did not follow their advice.[34]
At 11:50 p.m., Sedgwick sent Hooker another message:
My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by guns from the north side of the Banks' Ford. If I had only this army to care of, I would withdraw it to-night. Do you operations require that I should jeopard it by retaining it here? An immidiate reply is indispensable, or I may feel obliged to withdraw.
— Banks' Ford Va., May 4 1863 11:50 pm[35]
Hooker received this message after 1:00 a.m. He agreed to retreat, but a second telegram, sent around midnight, soon arrived: "I will hold my position as ordered." Sedgwick changed his mind largely because he did not want to take responsibility for the retreat. Hooker rescinded the retreat order, but it was too late: his first telegram reached Sedgwick, and he began withdrawing. By 5:00 a.m., Sedgwick's corps had crossed the Rappahannock and removed the pontoon bridges.[36]
With the loss of his foothold at Banks' Ford, Hooker had no choice but to abandon the campaign. In despair, he told Meade that he was ready to hand over the Army of the Potomac to him, that he was fed up with it all, and that he wished he had never been born.[37]
Douglas Freeman wrote that General Lee made no serious mistakes during the Chancellorsville Campaign, and the only thing he could be faulted for was the battle of May 4, when he failed to organize an attack in time. This was again an instance where Lee failed to motivate one of his subordinates—this time McLaws.[38]