FGR-17 Viper

In 1972, the Viper program began as a study to replace the M72 LAW. In 1975, a program designated ILAW (Improved Light Antitank Weapon) issued a request for proposals to the defense industry. In 1976, after studying the industry proposals, the U.S. Army designated General Dynamics as the prime contractor, changing the ILAW program name to "Viper."

The main requirements for the ILAW/Viper program was a disposable weapon in the same weight and size category as the M72 LAW, with major improvements in accuracy, safety, and penetration, and without a major increase in cost per round over the M72 LAW, which it was to replace.

When the ILAW requirement was first issued, the Army wanted an individual antitank weapon with such a low cost that it would be as common in infantry units as the hand grenade. All these requirements, which included items contradictory to each other, proved to be too great a hurdle for General Dynamics. This resulted in subsequent issues that led to highly publicized congressional inquires into a classified GAO report which stated that the Viper "barely meets the low end of the Army's requirement" and concluded that "Viper did not demonstrate any significant superiority over the M72 LAW."

Journalists soon discovered that when the prime contractor was named in 1976 for the Viper program, General Dynamics had told the Army that when mass production for the Viper was reached, the cost of Viper would only be $78.00 per round before inflation. Despite the negative publicity, the Army decided to continue the Viper program and make improvements. In December 1981, General Dynamics was awarded a $14.4 million contract to start production for 1,400 Viper rounds.

Shortly after this contract was issued, there were also reports of safety problems with the first production lot during field evaluation tests by the U.S. Army. Test firings had shown Viper rounds to have a safety problem with its fuze system, that caused the warhead to explode shortly after launch. One report detailed an accident at Fort Benning, Georgia where a helicopter pallet of Viper rounds was found to be damaged by static electricity.

In February 1982, in a move that took even the strongest supporters of the Army by surprise, the Army issued a second contract worth $83.7 million for 60,000 more Viper rounds. In December 1982, following the anger caused by the signing of this second contract and because of the earlier GAO report on the Viper, the massive cost overruns, and the safety concerns revealed in the Army's evaluations, Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH) inserted an amendment into the Army's funding bill. This amendment deleted 69% of the Viper funding and mandated testing of available light antitank weapons which were already in production, including non-U.S. models, with a report due back to Congress in 1983.

External images
VIPER brochure 1981
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Section 3

About this time, General Dynamics made the decision not to compete in the tests mandated by Congress, because of the Army's demand for a fixed price contract on any future Viper production lots that were to include safety improvements. This meant that after the Army had spent over $250 million on a M72 LAW replacement since 1975, the Viper program was at an end.^[2][3][4]

In September 1983, with General Dynamics's decision to refuse a fixed price contract request, the Army canceled all contracts for the FGR-17 Viper. Two months later, the testing mandated by Congress found that the Swedish designed AT4 was the most suitable off-the-shelf option to replace the M72 LAW. The AT4 did not meet every requirement, but it was the only one to meet most of the requirements. Congress agreed, and funded the AT4 as the future M72 LAW replacement.^[5][6][7] The US Marine Corps, who had also intended to purchase Viper, instead adopted a modified version of the Israeli B-300 rocket launcher, the Mk 153 SMAW.