Jessica Brown
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Jessica Brown is Professor of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. She researches epistemology, philosophical responsibility and methodology. Her main publications include Anti-Individualism and Knowledge (2004), Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge (2018) and Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents (2024).
Education and career
Jessica Brown received her PhD at Oxford University.[1] She is a Professor of Philosophy in the Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology at the University of St Andrews.[2]
She was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2018.[3]
Research
Brown's interests are on epistemology, more precisely on contextualism, invariantism and pragmatic encroachment.[4]
Selected works
- Brown, J. (2004) Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. Cambridge: MIT Press.[5][6][7][8][9]
- Brown, J. & Gerken, M. (Eds.). (2012). Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, J. (Ed.). (2011). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, J. (2018). Fallibism: Evidence and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[10][11]
- Brown, J. (2024). Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[12][13]