Louth v Diprose
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Diprose v. Louth (No.2) (1990) 54 SASR 450, Supreme Court (Full Court) (SA)
| Louth v Diprose | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Court | High Court of Australia |
| Citations | [1992] HCA 61, (1992) 175 CLR 621 |
| Case history | |
| Prior actions | Diprose v Louth (No.1) (1990) 54 SASR 438, Supreme Court (SA); Diprose v. Louth (No.2) (1990) 54 SASR 450, Supreme Court (Full Court) (SA) |
| Court membership | |
| Judges sitting | Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson Toohey, Gaudron & McHugh JJ |
| Case opinions | |
| The transaction is unconscionable, as emotional dependence or attachment is a special disability whereby taking advantage of the dependent constitutes unconscionable conduct. The conduct of defendant (appellant), knowing the plaintiff's infatuation and the defendant's manipulation of it so that he was "unable to make a worthwhile judgment as to what is in his best interest", affirming King CJ (Diprose v Louth (No. 1) (1990) 54 SASR 438, at p 448), was "dishonest and smacked of fraud" (6:1) (per Mason JJ, Brennan, Dean, Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh JJ; Toohey J dissenting). | |
| Keywords | |
| Unconscionable conduct, unconscientious dealing, undue influence, undue weakness | |
Louth v Diprose,[1] is an Australian contract law and equity case, in which unconscionable conduct is considered.[2][3][4]
Solicitor Louis Donald Diprose (the plaintiff/respondent) was infatuated with Carol Mary Louth (the defendant/appellant), whom he had met in Launceston, Tasmania in 1981. He showered her with gifts and, at one time, proposed to her; she, however, refused. Subsequently in 1985 the defendant informed the plaintiff that she was depressed and was going to be evicted and, if this happened, she would commit suicide (this was largely untrue). In response, the plaintiff agreed to buy her a house and, at her insistence, put it in her name. In 1988 when their relationship deteriorated, the plaintiff asked the defendant to transfer the house into his name. She refused and he brought proceedings seeking to recover the house.
At the trial in the Supreme Court of South Australia, the court of first instance, the plaintiff won, with King CJ holding that for the defendant to retain the house and land would be unconscionable and thus the plaintiff was beneficially entitled to the land.[5] The defendant subsequently appealed to the Full Court of South Australia again, however, the defendant lost on appeal, with Jacobs ACJ and Legoe J forming the majority and Matheson J dissenting.[6] The defendant then filed special leave for an appeal to the High Court of Australia, which was granted.