Nguyễn Quốc Định

From a scientific point of view, Định has always claimed to be a disciple of Duguit and Scelle. Theoretically inscribed in the objectivist current of international law, he retains above all a certain distrust of interstate voluntarism as the foundation of international law, and prefers a rather pragmatic, rather sociological approach to the combination of social needs and the interest of the subjects of the law. However, he sees in certain developments in international society the confirmation and even a going beyond of what, at the time of Georges Scelle, could still seem like a "dogma", in particular the principle of "functional duplication" according to which States are the necessary and almost exclusive actors of a real international society. “Only the institutional conception of international law opens the way to its authentic improvement following the proven model of domestic law” (Droit international public, Paris, LGDJ, 1976, p. 98).^[3] Only to the extent that the imperfections of international law are assumed to be temporary “is it possible to treat international law as part of the law” (ibid.).^[1]

Its “fundamental option” is expressed in the following terms: “With the adjustments, clarifications and enrichments provided by the lineage of its supporters, sociological objectivism has won wide support. Not only is this theory attractive because it reflects the profound conviction in the progressive development of international law, but it also provides, on the scientific level, the valid bases for a systematic analysis of the important modifications of this law at the time. contemporary which is that of international solidarity. […] An objectivist conception of international law must be constantly open, attentive and sensitive to the capricious realities of international legal life. Because, if it is a truly essential characteristic of international law, it is because, for a long time yet, it will suffer from the contradictions imposed on it by the sovereignty of the State with which it must coexist” (p. 112).^[1][3]

It is therefore not a revolutionary scientific thought that is expressed in the restrictive framework of its license course included in the first edition of the Public International Law textbook, at the end of the ten years of presentation of this course to the University of Paris. This may also explain the absence or restricted presentation of certain themes, which may have been corrected in later versions, which were aimed at a wider audience.

Định has had the opportunity in more specific studies to reject the “extreme” conclusions of Georges Scelle, characteristic of the “idealistic aspect” of his theory; for example by excluding the idea that the incompatibility of two conventional norms can result in the nullity, and not only the unenforceability, of the “irregular” norm.^[1]

Can his scientific thinking be taxed as “conservative” in that he does not give sufficient credit to the “Third Worldist” challenge to “classic” international law, so militant in the 1970s? Its rejection of voluntarism as the basis of the obligatory nature of international law explains certain solutions deemed traditionalist, for example the opposability of existing general customs.

After the end of the Vietnam War he moved to France where he lived out the remainder of his life.