No innovation without representation
Principle in the philosophy of technology
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No innovation without representation is a principle in the philosophy of technology and science and technology studies holding that the groups and social interests likely to be affected by a technological change should be represented while that technology is still being defined, rather than after it has been deployed. The phrase echoes the slogan no taxation without representation and is associated with the philosopher of technology Steven L. Goldman, who used it as the title of a 1992 essay on technological action in democratic societies. Goldman argued that the principle does not require members of the public to become expert in science or engineering, only that their views be heard before consequential decisions are settled.[1]
Related formulations appear in the work of the political philosopher of technology Langdon Winner, who wrote that interests likely to be affected by a particular kind of technological change ought to be represented at an early stage in defining what that technology will be,[2] and of the sociologist of science Massimiano Bucchi, who discussed the phrase in relation to what he termed a parliament of things for emerging technical democracies.[3]
Arguments for public participation
In a 1997 review of justifications for public participation in technical decision-making, Carl Mitcham catalogued several arguments that have been advanced in support of the principle:[4]
- Expertise is not neutral. Technical decision-making is never wholly neutral or objective, and specialists are subject to corporate and other external influence whether or not the wider public takes part.
- Long-term benefit. Participation is held to produce better outcomes over time than its absence.
- Self-interest of experts. Specialists may advance their own interests at the expense of the public, even though modern technology is commonly justified on the grounds that it promotes human welfare.
- Those affected have a claim. People who bear the consequences of a technological decision have a claim to a voice in making it.
- Moral autonomy. Individuals' moral agency is abridged when decisions bearing on their lives are made for them by others.
- Improved decisions. Broader participation is expected to identify the choices with the most positive effect.
- Education through participation. Taking part in technical decisions is itself a means by which participants become better informed.
- Absence of moral consensus. Where no strong shared moral position exists, wider participation is presented as the fairest route to a decision.
Limits and criticism
Richard Sclove has argued that not every technical decision warrants collective deliberation. Requiring a formal or committee review each time someone buys a fork or sells a pencil sharpener would divert attention from significant technological questions and consume resources without corresponding benefit. On this view, technologies already established without controversy form part of the ordinary social background, and democratic scrutiny is appropriate chiefly for decisions with wide-reaching effects.[5]
Mitcham also records the counterargument that rule by democratic elites may, at least in principle, protect civil liberties and minority rights more reliably than extensive direct participation. The drafting of the United States Bill of Rights by a small group has been offered as an illustration, on the grounds that a fully participatory process might have taken years to reach the same result.[4]
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry
The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry in Canada is frequently cited as a case in which affected communities were represented before a decision was reached.[5] Natural gas discoveries in the Mackenzie Delta around 1970 prompted proposals for a pipeline running south through territory inhabited by Indigenous peoples. In 1974 the federal government appointed Thomas Berger, a justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, to inquire into the terms under which a right-of-way might be granted.[6]
Rather than confining proceedings to formal hearings in regional centres, Berger took the inquiry to all 35 communities along the proposed route, hearing evidence from residents in their own languages, and later held hearings in cities across southern Canada. Indigenous and environmental organizations received funding to present expert witnesses, and CBC North broadcast reports from the hearings in English, French, and several Indigenous languages, making the proceedings accessible both to the communities concerned and to a national audience.[7]
Berger's 1977 report recommended that no pipeline be built across the northern Yukon and that construction through the Mackenzie Valley be deferred for ten years to allow land claims to be settled. The government accepted the moratorium, and the pipeline proposals were shelved.[8]
Cultural pluralism
Sclove has linked the principle to cultural pluralism, arguing on two grounds that pluralism should be treated as a condition of a successful democratic approach to technology. First, equal respect for people entails respect for their cultural inheritance, since undermining a culture erodes the social basis of its members' sense of self and purpose. Second, people share a common interest in living in a society and a world made up of many cultures.[5]