Nuclear forensics
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Nuclear forensics is the investigation of nuclear materials to find evidence for the source, the trafficking, and the enrichment of the material. The material can be recovered from various sources including dust from the vicinity of a nuclear facility, or from the radioactive debris following a nuclear explosion.[1][2]
Results of nuclear forensic testing are used by different organisations to make decisions. The information is typically combined with other sources of information such as law enforcement and intelligence information.[2][3]
Origins
The first investigative radiochemical measurements began in the early days of nuclear fission. In 1944, the US Air Force made the first attempts to detect fissiogenic 133Xe in the atmosphere in order to indicate the production of plutonium through the irradiation of uranium and chemical reprocessing in an effort to gather intelligence on the status of the German nuclear program. However, no 133Xe was detected.
Post-RDS-1
In the subsequent years it became increasingly valuable to gather information on the Soviet nuclear weapons program, which resulted in the development of technologies that could gather airborne particles in a WB-29 weather reconnaissance plane. On September 3, 1949, these particles were used to determine that the detonation time of the first Soviet atomic test, "Joe 1".[4][5] Further analysis revealed that this bomb was a replicate of the "Fat Man", which was the bomb dropped on Nagasaki in 1945. This investigative methodology combined radiochemistry and other techniques to gather intelligence on nuclear activities.
During the 1961 Soviet nuclear tests, most of the Novaya Zemlya shots were likely monitored by RB-47 aircraft flown from RAF Brize Norton and elsewhere. In August, Khrushchev had announced the existence 100 megaton Soviet bomb, ultimately tested as the Tsar Bomba. A JKC-135A was rapidly outfitted to monitor the test, under Operation Speed Light Bravo. Photomutiplier detectors in UV, visibile, and near-IR were used, with multiplication factors above 100 million. Cine and stills cameras were used, with lens resolutions up to 70 mm. One side of the aircraft was scorched. It has been argued that if the Tsar Bomba had been configured to yield 100 megatons instead of the decided 50, that the aircraft would have been destroyed.[6]
The United Kingdom worked with the US to monitor Soviet tests. RAF debris collection missions flew from the summer of 1949 from Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Gibraltar, filling the North Atlantic. British scientists also used unconventional methods for sourcing possible bomb debris: workers holidaying in Europe were instructed to collect pinecones, and crates of tea leaves were imported from China.[7]
Post-Cold War
The first seizures of nuclear or otherwise radioactive material were reported in Switzerland and Italy in 1991. Later, reports of incidents of nuclear material occurred in Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary and other central European countries. Nuclear forensics became a new branch of scientific research with the intent of not only determining the nature of the material, but also the intended use of the seized material as well as its origin and about the potential trafficking routes. Nuclear forensics relies on making these determinations through measurable parameters including, but not limited to chemical impurities, isotopic composition, microscopic appearance, and microstructure. By measuring these parameters, conclusions can be drawn as to the origin of the material. Identification of these parameters is an ongoing area of research, however, data interpretation also relies on the availability of reference information and on knowledge of the fuel cell operations.
The first seizures of nuclear materials from trafficking in the early 1990s allowed the nuclear forensic methodology to be adopted by a wider scientific community. When scientific laboratories outside the weapons and intelligence community took an interest in this methodology was when the term "Nuclear Forensics" was coined. Unlike standard forensics, nuclear forensics focuses mainly on the nuclear or radioactive material and aims to provide knowledge of the intended use of the materials.[8]
In 1994 560 grams of plutonium and uranium oxide were intercepted at Munich airport in an airplane coming from Moscow.[4] The precise composition was 363 grams plutonium (87% of which was Plutonium-239) and 122 grams of uranium.[4] It later emerged through a German parliamentary enquiry that the purchase had been arranged and financed by the German Federal Intelligence Service.[9]
U.S. Department of Energy official Jay A. Tilden has advocated for the use of nuclear forensics science to assign responsibility for, or resolve ambiguity about, "unattributed nuclear events," such as accidents at nuclear facilities, nuclear weapons mishaps in denied geographic areas, accidental nuclear detonations, the limited use of nuclear weapons and subsequent denial of responsibility by the perpetrator, and attempts to blame a clandestine nuclear attack on non-state actors.[10] An example of an unattributed nuclear event was the September 2017 unattributed release of the radioisotope ruthenium across central and eastern Europe and Asia.[11]
Chronometry
Determining a nuclear material's age is critical to nuclear forensic investigations. Dating techniques can be utilized to identify a material's source as well as procedures performed on the material. This can aid in determining the information about the potential participant in the "age" of the material of interest. Nuclides, related through radioactive decay processes will have relative sample concentrations that can be predicted using parent-daughter in-growth equations and relevant half-lives. Because radioactive isotopes decay at a rate determined by the amount of the isotope in a sample and the half-life of the parent isotope, the relative amount of the decay products compared to the parent isotopes can be used to determine "age". Heavy element nuclides have a 4n+2 relationship, where the mass number divided by 4 leaves a remainder of two. The decay network begins with 238Pu and proceeds through the in-growth of long-lived 234U, 230Th, and 226Ra. If any member of the 4n+2 decay chain is purified it will immediately begin to produce descendant species. The time since a sample was last purified can be calculated from the ratio of any two concentrations among the decaying nuclides.
Essentially, if a nuclear material has been put through a refinement process to remove the daughter species, the time elapsed since purification can be "back-calculated" using radiochemical separation techniques in conjunction with analytical measurement of the existing parent-daughter ratios. For example, the α decay of 239Pu to 235U can be used as an example of this procedure. with the assumption of a perfect purification time T0 then there will be a linear relationship between the in-growth of 235U and time elapsed since purification. There are, however, various instances where the correlation is not as clear. This strategy may not apply when the parent-daughter pair achieve secular equilibrium very rapidly or when the half-life of the daughter nuclide is significantly shorter than the time that has elapsed since purification of the nuclear material, e.g. 237Np/233Pa. Another possible complication is if in environmental samples, non-equivalent metal/ion transport for parents and daughter species may complicate or invalidate the use of chronometric measurements. Special age-dating relationships exist, including the commonly employed 234U/230Th and 241Pu/241Am chronometers. In special circumstances, parent-granddaughter relationships can be used to elucidate the age of nuclear materials when the material is intentionally made to look older through the addition of daughter nuclides.
Chronometry is based on the concept that the composition of the nuclear material changes as samples are prepared and analyzed. This barrier can be substantial for species that decay quickly or whose daughter products put forth spectral interferences. The decay of 233U, for example, has a t1/2~1.6×105years which is rapid in comparison to many species and yield 229Th, which emits an α particle that is isoenergetic, having the same energy, as the parent. To avoid this, freshly prepared samples as well as complementary analysis methods are used for confident nuclear materials characterization. The decay of nuclear samples makes rapid analysis methods highly desirable.[12]