Operation Saluting October

Operation Saluting October was planned by Lieutenant General Pyotr Gusev, commander of the Soviet military mission in Angola.^[1] It was modeled after Operation Second Congress, a similar unsuccessful offensive towards Mavinga planned by Colonel General Konstantin Kurochkin in 1985.^[1] Kurochkin was the former head of the Soviet mission and remained the primary liaison between Gusev and the Soviet Ministry of Defence.^[1] He was greatly supportive of Gusev's plans and personally flew to Angola in June 1987 to endorse Saluting October before the Angolan government and the FAPLA general staff.^[1] Kurochkin and others in the Soviet Ministry of Defence were also instrumental in persuading Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to approve extensive funding for Saluting October.^[8] Gorbachev was then slashing defence spending, and looking to reduce the enormous open-ended commitment of Soviet military aid to Angola in particular.^[9] However, he agreed to approve the funds and materiel to support FAPLA operations for one more year.^[8] This decision was apparently made after consultations between the Angolan and Soviet political leadership in March 1987.^[10] Thereafter, the Soviet Union transported approximately $1 billion USD worth of military hardware to Angola in a massive airlift carried out with Antonov An-24 cargo aircraft, with as many as twelve per day landing in Luanda just prior to Saluting October.^[11] This equipment was then offloaded and picked up by Angolan Ilyushin Il-76s, which in turn flew them directly to FAPLA's staging areas.^[11][5] The deliveries from the Soviet Union included large numbers of tanks and armoured personnel carriers recently withdrawn from its own military campaign in Afghanistan.^[12] These were initially rotated out to Tashkent and from there flown directly to Luanda by the AN-24s.^[12] American diplomat Chester Crocker described this movement of materiel as "Moscow's largest logistical effort to date in Angola", involving over a thousand Soviet military personnel.^[13] The influx of hardware in 1987 was accompanied by a notable increase in the number of advisers, pilots, and security troops attached to the Soviet military mission.^[14]

Orchestrating the capture of Mavinga had been the prime objective of the Soviet military mission since the early 1980s.^[1] The town itself had been largely destroyed and abandoned during the early years of the civil war, but it was also the site of the largest airfield under FALA's control.^[15] The airstrip at Mavinga was one of the few in the country that could accommodate heavy lift aircraft carrying supplies and weapons from UNITA's two major external allies, South Africa and the United States.^[15] The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) routinely kept FALA resupplied this way, via covert flights out of Kamina in neighbouring Zaire.^[16] Mavinga was also the centre of a vast smuggling operation involving illegally mined kimberlite and other resources, which FALA used to help finance its war effort.^[17] If Mavinga fell, FALA would lose this vital logistics lifeline, and FAPLA would be able to rapidly airlift more troops and equipment into the region, in close proximity to the UNITA political and military headquarters at Jamba.^[15] The FAPLA general staff hoped this in turn would allow them to concentrate more forces around Mavinga for an offensive on Jamba, which would ideally be scheduled the following year, between June and September 1988.^[18]

Aside from the capture of Mavinga, secondary objectives of Saluting October included disrupting FALA's insurgency in central Angola, and expanding the coverage provided by FAPLA's strategic air defence network to the extremities of the country's southern and eastern borders.^[18] It was hoped that the offensive would give FAPLA forces in the rear an opportunity to regain the initiative while FALA was distracted by the threat to its logistics lifeline.^[18]

Crocker observed that "it was the Soviets who pushed this offensive; they had the influence to prevail in allied decision-making since they paid the bills and provided the hardware. More precisely, it was the Soviet military and Communist Party hardliners who wanted the offensive," intent on ensuring a final decisive victory for their FAPLA ally.^[13] In public exchanges with their Western counterparts, Soviet officials were supportive of a negotiated end to the Angolan conflict, but privately they urged the Angolan government of the need to secure a unilateral military solution as soon as possible.^[13] Kenyan historian Gilbert Khadiagala wrote that both the Soviet and Angolan political leadership were seduced by the idea of a quick, definitive military solution, and by July 1987, had become increasingly unwilling to engage with an American initiative led by Crocker aimed at securing peace talks with UNITA.^[19] Indeed, Moroccan political scientist Zaki Laidi pointed out that Soviet hardliners had always been opposed to American diplomatic initiatives in Angola, and their enormous contribution of military aid was partly to dissuade the Angolans from ruling out a battlefield solution in favour of a "regional settlement sponsored by the United States".^[20]

According to Victoria Brittain, a journalist for The Guardian, Crocker's "briefings to journalists that summer described Cuba and the Soviet Union as being, like Angola, determined to go for a military solution against UNITA."^[21] However, Brittain asserts that the Angolan government rejected the notion of peace talks mediated by the US because Crocker was unwilling to discuss ending American military aid to FALA.^[21] The continued assurance of American support also encouraged UNITA to be uncompromising in its demands for peace on its terms.^[21]

A CIA white paper commented on "Moscow's determination to see the struggle through without compromise with UNITA," and found that the Soviet government had adopted a "hard line of opposing reconciliation under any circumstances other than UNITA's surrender."^[22] The agency assessed that most Angolan political leaders believed "they can avoid talks through a military victory," and prominent FAPLA generals were "seemingly enthralled by the military hardware FAPLA continues to acquire, and....assume that it will eventually prove decisive against UNITA."^[22]

The head of operations for the FAPLA general staff, General Roberto Leal Monteiro, stated that the government was not discarding the notion of peace talks altogether, but wished to revisit them later from a position of military strength.^[23] According to Monteiro, Saluting October was approved partly because dos Santos believed that a successful offensive on Mavinga would give him considerably more leverage at the negotiating table.^[23]

Political scientist Jeffrey Herbst attributed dos Santos's decision to pursue the offensive to the fact that UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi had recently secured a commitment of $15 million in military aid from the US, making it desirable to inflict a major defeat on FALA before it could be further strengthened by American funding and materiel.^[10]

In his analysis of the Angolan government's decision to greenlight Saluting October, American journalist Karl Maier claimed that "the idea of wiping out UNITA had been an obsession ever since the [Angolan leadership] took control of Luanda at independence in November 1975, and the mirage of total victory had clouded the leaders' vision" to tactical realities on the ground.^[24]

Previous FAPLA offensives towards Mavinga had been unsuccessful, which Soviet advisers blamed on shortages of equipment, improper reconnaissance, and failure to safeguard the rear of the units involved.^[5] Consequently, Saluting October was to integrate more heavy armour and artillery with the FAPLA infantry, and the Soviets devoted more resources to training Angolan reconnaissance troops and combat engineers.^[5] As a result, three new independent reconnaissance battalions were formed for the purposes of screening the advance.^[5] FAPLA was also supplied with more sophisticated bridging equipment.^[5]

The outlined offensive relied heavily on the logistical and technical support provided by Soviet advisers attached to FAPLA on the company level.^[11][25] The advisers were expected to accompany their Angolan counterparts during battlefield engagements, although this was contrary to the official stance espoused by the Soviet government.^[26] Unofficially, the decision on what extent the advisers should be involved in hostilities was left to the discretion of the FAPLA and Soviet command hierarchy in Angola.^[26] Pilots and air crews from the Soviet Air Forces would also provide support for the ground operations.^[27][8] Sovietologist Peter Vanneman wrote that "the evidence of Soviet pilots participating [in Saluting October] is substantial, including eyewitness reports and taped conversations of the pilots."^[11] The Soviet Foreign Ministry publicly stated that Soviet helicopter pilots and air crews would be available to support the FAPLA offensive, but denied they would take direct part in hostilities.^[11] There were a number of East German military advisers attached to the units involved as well, fulfilling various non-combat roles.^[28] Russian historians Gennady Shubin and Andrei Tokarev wrote:

Although the government of the USSR declared that the Soviet military did not participate in the battles in Angola, this operation was record-breaking in the number of Soviet military advisers, specialists, and interpreters who took part in it. Along the whole front, along the line of contact with the enemy, in the combat units of Angolan brigades and at the frontline command posts of the front, districts, and military zones, there were Soviet military advisers. They were there despite the battles, artillery shellings, and bombardments.^[29]

On the personal orders of Fidel Castro, Cuban combat forces - then present in large numbers in Angola to shore up FAPLA's counter-insurgency efforts - were explicitly forbidden from participating in Saluting October.^[1] Cuban disagreements with the Soviet and FAPLA general staff in the past had resulted in much of the support roles during Soviet-directed FAPLA offensives being filled by East German advisers instead.^[30][31] However, the East German National People's Army was uninterested in contributing regular ground troops to fully replace the role of Cuban combat formations, claiming that this would not make up for FAPLA's deficiencies.^[32] The East German advisers attached to the FAPLA brigades were primarily engaged in signals intelligence; their task was to monitor FALA and South African radio traffic in the operational area.^[28] The remainder were technicians who serviced and maintained the electronic equipment in the air defence systems.^[33]

"Don't get into such wasting, costly, and finally pointless offensives," Castro vented to Gusev's staff. "And count us out if you do."^[34] In his work Cuba, Africa, and Apartheid's End, Isaac Saney declared that this "reflected not only Cuban non-participation in, but also serious disagreement on the viability of the military operation...the planning of the offensive exposed the different perspectives that existed between Soviet and Cuban military advisers."^[35] Castro and the Cuban general staff opposed Saluting October on the grounds that FAPLA was being forced to adopt tactics more applicable to Soviet conventional operations in central Europe than an offensive against an irregular fighting force on the broken African terrain.^[36] Per Saney, "Cuban military advisers argued that Moscow did not appreciate the differences between Africa and Europe...Castro stated that Moscow adopted an 'academic concept' rather than a realistic appraisal of what was required in Angola."^[35] Gusev and his chief of staff, Ivan Ryabchenko, had planned Operation Saluting October based on their experiences moving similarly sized units in the Soviet Union, and had failed to take into account the logistical disadvantages and technical shortcomings of the FAPLA forces involved.^[2][13] Their emphasis was on concentrating large numbers of troops and materiel, then directing these concentrations against fixed targets–an approach the Cubans argued was "neither suitable nor applicable to Angola", where maximum mobility and flexibility were demanded.^[35]

Cuban opposition to Saluting October increased as preparations continued throughout 1987.^[24] Castro complained the Soviets still "believed they were fighting the Battle of Berlin, with Zhukov in command...they did not understand...the theatre of the fight and the kind of war we had to fight in this scenario."^[35] Once the Soviet and FAPLA preparations became public, Cuban diplomats took the unprecedented step of publicly criticising the planned offensive to the international press, and reiterating on several occasions that their military forces would not take part in it.^[24]

To FAPLA, the experience of planning and executing an operation of such massive proportions was relatively new, but the Soviet military mission was convinced that a decade of exhaustive training on its part had created an army capable of undertaking a complex multi-divisional offensive.^[3]

The South African government learned of Operation Saluting October as early as March 1987.^[37] At the beginning of the year, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos had written a letter to sympathetic lobbyists in the US, asking them to prepare statements in light of an upcoming new offensive against FALA.^[38] The contents of the letter were later leaked to South African officials, making them aware of Saluting October several months before the FAPLA preparations became public knowledge.^[38] Colonel Anatoly Polozok, a military attaché at the Soviet embassy in Botswana, separately passed details of Gusev's plans to South Africa's National Intelligence Service.^[35] Polozok reported the Cubans' growing opposition to Saluting October as well.^[35] This information was promptly shared with the US and UNITA.^[35] Piet Nortje observes that despite the South African warnings, UNITA "chose to ignore the danger for some months," making little preparations of its own until the FAPLA buildup was obvious.^[39]

The US government had learned of Operation Saluting October by April 1987.^[40] Aside from information received from South African sources, American officials were keenly monitoring Gorbachev's airlift of materiel to Luanda, as well as its rapid transfer to FAPLA's forward operating bases.^[40]

Chester Crocker noted that according to his sources, the Soviet military mission favoured a large offensive because they had assigned undue relevance to static objectives on their maps that held little tactical significance.^[13] In reality, Crocker wrote, "this was a low-intensity bush war spread across a vast country where high-value targets were scarce. The key military resources were reliable people and the capability for sustained and rapid maneuver. Soviet-led FAPLA offensives bore little relation to Angolan conditions."^[13] The United States Department of Defense was reportedly baffled by the decision to launch such a complex offensive better suited for the European theatre, concluding that "the Soviets have developed no specific doctrine to deal with the insurgency in Angola," and had little recourse other than conventional military tactics.^[41]

The CIA evaluated that a slow-moving and cautious FAPLA offensive involving multiple brigades would take advantage of FAPLA's "traditional strengths in firepower, air power, equipment, and numbers."^[42] It also pointed out that FAPLA would be largely road-bound, and when operating in areas where the road network was limited or nonexistent, the advance would be "channeled along a narrow frontage leaving the insurgents free use of interior areas."^[42] Furthermore, the CIA had confidence in FALA's ability to blunt the FAPLA advantage in armour and aircraft using recently supplied anti-tank missiles and MANPADs.^[42] The agency's analysts predicted that if "the insurgents were to be in serious danger, the South Africans would probably directly intervene in the combat to the extent necessary to remove the immediate threat."^[42] The CIA notably did not consider this a successful outcome, as it was likely to raise the risk of escalation by Cuba and the Soviet Union.^[42] According to its reports, a more successful outcome would be if FALA were to score an independent victory without the need for major South African intervention.^[42] This could potentially be accomplished by increasing guerrilla attacks in other parts of the country while simultaneously stalling the offensive through attacks on the overextended FAPLA supply lines.^[42] If the pressure on FAPLA's rear became too great, the CIA judged that Luanda would abandon the offensive rather than risk allowing its forces to become pinned down short of Mavinga.^[42]

Preparations for Operation Saluting October commenced in April 1987.^[7] The offensive was to involve two FAPLA divisions composed of eight brigades staged around Cuito Cuanavale, for a total of 10,000-11,000 troops, 150 T-54/55 and T-62 main battle tanks, 30 PT-76 light tanks, and several organic batteries of M-46 and D-30 towed howitzers.^[7][5] In total, the force had around 500 armoured fighting vehicles.^[39] These were essentially motorised infantry brigades transported by truck and BTR-60PB armoured personnel carriers, each with an attached tank company, an armoured reconnaissance company, and six batteries of towed artillery.^[43] The decision to rely on motorised infantry mounted in wheeled vehicles was deliberate, as Soviet tracked vehicles experienced difficulties in the sandy soils of eastern Angola.^[29] Standard Soviet military tracks were simply not designed for the terrain in this region, and specialised tracks were required to achieve the most optimal off-road movement.^[29] This would prove to be a serious tactical disadvantage for the FAPLA tanks, and was a major factor in keeping them road-bound wherever possible.^[29]

The enormous fleet of trucks required to carry the infantry and supplies were primarily Brazilian Engesa 4X4 EE-15s, as well as the larger 6X6 EE-25s and EE-50s, which FAPLA had acquired in large numbers the previous year.^[29] These trucks were not held in high regard by FAPLA's Soviet advisers, who considered them primitive and unreliable.^[44] FAPLA also used various models of older Soviet trucks and East German IFA W 50s, which had more powerful engines and better off-road performance.^[44]

The FAPLA 47, 16, 21, and 59 Brigades were to spearhead the offensive on Mavinga.^[7] The FAPLA 8, 13, 25, and 66 Brigades provided security for the rear areas of the main offensive as it progressed, including guarding the lengthy supply lines needed to keep the front-line brigades in the field.^[7][39] Gusev believed this would prevent the leading brigades from being encircled.^[5] Previous offensives had also failed due to successful FALA attacks on FAPLA's extended supply lines, cutting the advancing units off from their logistics bases.^[45] Using half the force to provide rear security was thus perceived as essential.^[39] 8 Brigade's sole task was to provide security for the supply convoys between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale, while 25 Brigade provided security for the supply convoys from Cuito Cuanavale to the front.^[46] 13 Brigade provided security for the forward staging areas at Cuito Cuanavale.^[46] 24 Brigade was held back as a mobile reserve, and 66 Brigade's objective was to secure the bridgeheads behind the four leading FAPLA brigades after they had successfully carried out their river crossings.^[46]

Also deployed to the operational area was the FAPLA 52 Air Defence Brigade, equipped with six 9K33 Osa air defence systems.^[5] Two of the 52 AD Brigade's 9K33 Osa batteries were deployed with the leading brigades, and another two with the rearmost brigades.^[5] The remaining two were positioned around Cuito Cuanavale to protect the airfield and staging areas there.^[5] They were supplemented in this role by at least one battery of S-125 Pechoras, which were notably placed under the direct control of the Soviet military mission rather than FAPLA.^[29] Technical support for the air defence equipment was provided by the East German military mission.^[33] An East German security contingent was also detailed to guard the fixed radar installations at Cuito Cuanavale against potential FALA sabotage efforts.^[33]

The size of the collective FAPLA force deployed in Saluting October was noticeably smaller than that organized for the abortive Operation Second Congress.^[47] However, on the whole it was composed of units that were considerably better equipped and trained than those that had taken part in the previous offensive.^[47]

Air support for the offensive was provided by two squadrons of FAPLA's 25th Aviation Combat Regiment, based in Menongue.^[48] Despite Castro's moratorium on the involvement of Cuban ground forces, Cuban fighter pilots were allowed to fly reconnaissance missions for FAPLA, as well as escort the IL-76 flights and truck convoys bringing supplies to the front.^[49][5] Ground attack and strike missions generally remained the responsibility of Angolan pilots.^[49] On August 30, six Cuban pilots arrived in Menongue to begin flying reconnaissance missions in support of Saluting October.^[5] They were also permitted to fly escort for their Angolan counterparts, who were primarily focused on ground attack and strike missions.^[12] As the campaign intensified, Soviet fighter pilots participated in these missions as well.^[8][12] To keep the extent of their involvement covert, the Soviet pilots operating out of Menongue often logged their operational sorties as training flights.^[50]

FAPLA had supported its ground forces heavily with Mil Mi-25/35 attack helicopters and armed Mil Mi-17 transport helicopters during Second Congress.^[6] Nevertheless, few helicopters appeared in the order of battle for Saluting October.^[6] Two Mi-17s and Mi-35s were used for patrol duties in the rear, and other Mi-17s were on standby for casualty evacuation and search and rescue operations.^[6] These were often operated by Soviet, Cuban, and the occasional East German pilots and aircrew.^[6][31] Due to the heavy losses of helicopters to FALA ground fire during Second Congress, the FAPLA general staff was reluctant to deploy them in large numbers.^[6] FAPLA had lost almost its entire original fleet of Mi-25/35s by the end of 1985; although new replacements had been delivered by the Soviet Union in 1986, the general staff did not authorise their deployment in combat missions again until October 1987, when Saluting October was already nearing its end.^[51]

Aside from the FAPLA regular forces, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), was enlisted to provide security for supply convoys.^[52] MK militants were also ordered to carry out small diversionary attacks on FALA forces north of Cuito Cuanavale to prevent them from shifting south to reinforce Mavinga.^[52] Medical support for these operations was provided by the East German government, which frequently airlifted wounded MK personnel from Angola to its own hospitals for treatment.^[52] South African historian Maren Saeboe wrote that "as a conventional military force MK was hardly a solid defence line. But the guarding of convoys and trains was crucial to keeping supply lines open both for civilians and military personnel."^[52] About 900 MK militants were mustered to assist FAPLA with security duties,^[7] although none played a major role in the offensive itself.^[52]

Shortly after the FAPLA buildup became apparent, UNITA announced its renewed willingness to reach a negotiated settlement with the Angolan government.^[45] As a precondition to peace talks, UNITA offered to reopen the section of the Benguela railway under its control, and allow the normal traffic of freight to resume.^[45] In early June 1987, Angolan Foreign Minister Afonso Van-Dúnem agreed in principle to this proposal, but the government later reversed its decision.^[19] While the Angolan leadership was dismayed by the disruption to trade, and was willing to consider an indirect agreement with UNITA to keep the Benguela line secure, it was not willing to accede to UNITA's demands for a nationwide ceasefire.^[19] When it became clear that further bargaining was futile, UNITA requested more military aid from the US to stave off the upcoming offensive.^[45] "It is a question of life or death for UNITA," Savimbi commented in an interview with Western journalists. "On their side, it is a question of lose and start to negotiate. On our side, it is lose and disappear."^[12]

The eight FAPLA brigades were assembled in their forward operating areas around Cuito Cuanavale by mid-July.^[7] However, most of the month was spent clearing out local FALA resistance from the area.^[7] Consequently, the 47, 16, 21, and 59 Brigades moved out of Cuito Cuanavale and began their advance towards Mavinga well behind schedule, on August 14.^[7] The infantry advanced on foot and mounted in BTR-60PBs and Engesa trucks, sweeping for FALA insurgents.^[2] The tanks were located at the rear.^[2] The four leading brigades advanced in dispersed box-like formations covering between five and eight square kilometres each, with the mechanised troops concentrated in the centre and dismounted infantry on the flanks.^[5] 16 Brigade occupied the eastern flank of the offensive, 21 Brigade occupied the centre, and 47 and 59 Brigades underpinned the western flank.^[5]

Gusev's plan called for 47 and 59 Brigades to approach Mavinga from an easterly direction, while 16 and 21 Brigades advanced from the north, enveloping the FALA forces between Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga in a pincer movement.^[43][35] The objective of this double envelopment was to eliminate the FALA presence west of Mavinga, leaving the town vulnerable.^[47] Once the main body of the FALA force was dealt with, the brigades would collectively advance eastwards, hopefully turning the flank of the FALA defenses at Mavinga.^[47] According to the Soviet projections, the four brigades would be able to reach and capture Mavinga by the end of September.^[53] The FAPLA brigade commanders had repeatedly expressed reservations about splitting the force and fighting on two fronts, arguing that a single assault on Mavinga would be more linear and sufficient.^[3]

Prior to the primary offensive, a large FAPLA force massed at Lucusse carried out a feint action towards the settlements of Cassamba and Cangamba, intending to draw FALA away from Mavinga.^[4] This feint involved FAPLA's 3, 39, 43, and 54 Brigades.^[18] The brigades began their movements in July, and had secured most of their objectives by early August.^[18] They then returned to Lucusse.^[4]