Pax Silica
US-led technology and AI supply-chain security initiative
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Pax Silica is a United States-led international initiative focused on securing supply chains for advanced technologies such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI) and rare earth elements. The initiative implicitly targets reducing reliance on China and countering its dominance in these fields.[1][2][3]
Pax Silica | |
|---|---|
| Motto: "Securing the Silicon Supply Chain" | |
| Type | Summit |
| Membership | |
| Leaders | |
| Jacob Helberg | |
| Establishment | |
• Pax Silica Declaration | December 11, 2025 |
Website www | |
The initiative is coordinated by the U.S. Department of State and was launched in December 2025 alongside the signing of the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration by an initial group of partner countries.[4][5]
Launch and background
During the 2020s, governments increasingly treated supply-chain resilience in semiconductors, critical minerals, and AI-related computing infrastructure as a national-security priority, amid export controls, industrial policy measures, and geopolitical competition over the technologies underpinning advanced manufacturing and AI. Pax Silica was presented by US officials as an economic-security framework aimed at aligning policies and investment among "trusted partners" that host major technology firms and key industrial capacity.[4][6] Pacific Forum's analyst Akhil Ramesh, writing for the National Interest magazine, described the initiative as understanding that: "economic security today is inseparable from control over energy, critical minerals, high-end manufacturing, and advanced models."[7]
On December 11, 2025, the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit and a planned signing of the Pax Silica Declaration, describing Pax Silica as the Department's flagship effort on AI and supply-chain security.[8] The initial summit was held in Washington, D.C. on December 12, 2025. The State Department fact sheet described cooperation areas including connectivity and data infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, logistics, mineral refining and processing, and energy.[4]
The initiative describes itself as a "positive-sum" partnership intended to reduce "coercive dependencies" and improve resilience across the full technology stack, from mineral extraction and processing through chip manufacturing and computing infrastructure.[4] US officials described Pax Silica as a framework for coordinating flagship projects and policy alignment across partner countries, including supply-chain mapping, investment and co-investment initiatives, and protection of critical infrastructure and sensitive technologies. Reuters reported discussions of projects linked to trade and logistics routes and an industrial park initiative in Israel.[9] Gulf countries, such as the UAE and Qatar, are betting on attracting AI companies with cheap energy.[10] Moreover, the UAE's potential to invest in Pax Silica's activities has been noted as a fundamental asset for the initiative.[11][12][13] In early 2026, the U.S. announced plans to contribute $250M toward an investmest consortium that's intended to strengthen energy and critical mineral supply chains. [14]
Membership
Pax Silica participation has been discussed in terms of (1) countries that have signed the declaration and (2) countries invited to summit discussions or publicly reported as prospective signatories but which had not (as of mid-January 2026) signed the declaration.
Countries that signed the Pax Silica Declaration
Seven countries signed the declaration at the December 12, 2025, summit in Washington, D.C.:[5]
Some countries who attended the initial conversations did not immediately sign, while additional countries were invited to join after the discussions concluded. The following are the later signatory members on the declaration:[5]
Netherlands (joined December 17, 2025[15]; "non-signing partner")[16]
Qatar (joined January 13, 2026)[17]
United Arab Emirates (joined January 14, 2026)[18]
India (joined February 20, 2026)[19]
Sweden (signed March 17, 2026)[20]
Finland (signed April 16, 2026)[21]
Philippines (signed April 17, 2026)[22]
Norway (signed May 6, 2026)[23]
European Union (signed June 23, 2026)[24]
Germany (signed June 23, 2026)[24]
Greece (signed June 23, 2026)[24]
Argentina (signed June 26, 2026)[25]
Chile (signed June 26, 2026)[25]
Costa Rica (signed June 26, 2026)[25]
El Salvador (signed June 26, 2026)[25]
Kazakhstan (signed June 26, 2026)[25]
Panama (signed June 26, 2026)[25]
Countries invited / participating, but not yet signed
At launch, US materials and contemporaneous reporting described additional invited participants and observers, including:
Canada – observer/participant in related discussions, per US briefing materials; not listed among signatories.[6]
Taiwan – participated in summit sessions according to a State Department briefing; not listed among signatories.[6]
Estonia – became an observer and signed the declaration on June 26, 2026[26]
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union were also noted by US officials as present in an observer capacity, but are not countries.[6]
Reception and criticism
Philippines
Following the Philippines' accession to the initiative in April 2026, the Pax Silica initiative drew criticism over issues related to land use, sovereignty, environmental impact, and foreign involvement in strategic industries. Beginning in April and May 2026, various farmers' groups, civil society organizations, and political blocs raised concerns about its potential effects on local communities, governance arrangements, and the country's role in emerging technology and critical-mineral supply chains.[27][28]
In April 2026, agricultural organizations such as Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka (PKSM), and Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya ng Pilipinas (Pamalakaya) opposed the proposed conversion of agricultural and coastal areas for large-scale industrial development. KMP described the planned economic security zone within the Luzon Economic Corridor as a "massive sellout", arguing that it could accelerate land conversion, resource extraction, environmental degradation, and the displacement of farming and fishing communities. Critics also pointed to the scale of the planned project, which includes a 4,000-acre (approximately 1,618-hectare) artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing hub in New Clark City, Tarlac, arguing that large-scale industrial development could affect surrounding communities, food security, and land-use patterns.[29][30]
In April 2026, the Scientists and Technologists Oppose the US War (STOP US War) coalition, a network of scientists, technologists, environmental advocates, and civil society organizations that includes AGHAM, the Computer Professionals' Union, and the Kalikasan People's Network for the Environment, opposed the initiative, arguing that it could facilitate what they described as "resource plunder" and environmentally harmful extractive activities. The coalition expressed concern that the Philippines' substantial deposits of nickel, copper, cobalt, chromite, and rare earth minerals could be increasingly directed toward foreign-led supply chains for artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, and advanced technologies. Critics argued that the initiative risked reinforcing the country's role as a supplier of raw materials while foreign partners captured a larger share of value-added manufacturing and technological development.[31]
Some critics linked these concerns to proposed cooperation with Israel on critical minerals, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity. Critics also expressed concern over growing foreign interest in Philippine mineral resources following remarks by Israeli Ambassador to the Philippines Dana Kursh, who stated that the Philippines' abundant nickel and other critical minerals could complement Israel's expertise in artificial intelligence, chip design, cybersecurity, and other technological solutions. Kursh described the Philippines as a potential key partner in the initiative, noting that Philippine mineral resources could help address supply-chain requirements that Israel could not fully meet domestically.[32]
Environmental organizations and advocacy coalitions likewise expressed concern in April 2026 regarding the environmental impact of semiconductor and artificial intelligence infrastructure, citing high electricity and water consumption requirements, increased demand for critical minerals, and potential industrial waste management challenges associated with advanced manufacturing facilities.[33]
Some activist groups also criticized the initiative's relationship with broader United States–Philippines economic and security cooperation. These groups argued that the integration of critical-mineral extraction, semiconductor manufacturing, and artificial intelligence infrastructure with strategic economic corridors could increase the Philippines' exposure to geopolitical competition and make key industrial facilities potential targets during regional conflicts.[29]
In May 2026, several political groups, including members of the Makabayan Bloc, raised concerns regarding sovereignty and governance arrangements associated with the initiative. These concerns included questions about the extent of foreign involvement in the proposed industrial zone and reports of proposed special arrangements for foreign personnel. Makabayan representatives stated that such arrangements could raise issues regarding national sovereignty and constitutional jurisdiction, while government agencies and project proponents maintained that the development would remain subject to Philippine law and regulatory oversight.[28]
In May 2026, controversy arose over the legal status of the proposed Pax Silica economic security zone in New Clark City. On May 18, 2026, during a site visit by U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg, Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) president Joshua Bingcang stated that the United States had requested that the zone operate under U.S. law and that U.S. personnel be granted diplomatic immunity. Bingcang said the Philippine government rejected the proposal and maintained that the project would remain subject to Philippine law and jurisdiction.[34][35][28]
On 25 May 2026, Helberg disputed reports that the United States had sought diplomatic immunity, stating in a post on X that his earlier remarks had been "taken out of context" and that the U.S. position was intended to provide legal certainty and predictability for investors rather than diplomatic immunity. A spokesperson for the United States Department of State later declined to directly address the discrepancy between Helberg's account and statements made by Philippine officials.[36]
European Union
In May and June 2026, some policymakers and analysts in the European Union raised concerns regarding regulatory autonomy and the bloc's relationship with United States technology policies as discussions on accession progressed. Critics argued that participation could affect the EU's strategic autonomy in areas such as export controls and semiconductor policy, while supporters maintained that the initiative would strengthen supply-chain resilience among partner economies.[37]
Netherlands
In June 2026, discussion surrounding the initiative in the Netherlands focused on export-control policies affecting the Dutch semiconductor industry, particularly ASML. Some officials and industry representatives expressed concern that additional restrictions on technology exports to China could affect commercial operations and competitiveness.[38]
India
From late 2025 through early 2026, discussion in India centered on the country's absence from the initiative's original membership. Some commentators and opposition politicians questioned India's exclusion despite its growing semiconductor sector and participation in other technology partnerships.[39]