Reactions to the Boeing 737 MAX groundings

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Boeing issued a brief statement after each crash, saying it was "deeply saddened" by the loss of life and offered its "heartfelt sympathies to the families and loved ones" of the passengers and crews. It said it was helping with the Lion Air investigation and sending a technical team to assist in the Ethiopia investigation.^[3][4][5] Boeing dedicated a fountain adjacent to its aviation museum on its corporate campus in memory of those on board the accident flights.^[6]

After the grounding, Boeing suspended 737 MAX deliveries to customers, but continued production at a rate of 52 aircraft per month.^[7] In mid-April, the production rate was reduced to 42 aircraft per month.^[8] In May 2019, Boeing reported a 56% drop in plane deliveries year on year.^[9] In July 2019, after reporting its financial results, Boeing stated that it would consider further reducing or even shutting down production if the grounding lasts longer than expected.^[10][11] On December 15, the Boeing board considered a management proposal to suspend production for several months, until the MAX is cleared by the FAA to return to commercial service.^[12] Production was suspended from January 2020, to prioritize the delivery of more than 400 new aircraft from storage bases.^[13][14] Boeing is unlikely to resume its pre-grounding production target of 57 aircraft per month until 2022.^[15]

In April 2019, lawyers, analysts and experts criticized Muilenburg's delivery of Boeing's public statements as contradictory and unconvincing.^[16] They said Boeing refused to answer tough questions and accept responsibility, defended the airplane design and certification while "promising to fix the plane's software", delayed to ground planes and issue an apology, and yet was quick to assign blame towards pilot error.^[17][18] Muilenburg's handling of the 737 MAX crisis only added to the frustration between Boeing and its stakeholders, resulting in his removal from office in October 2019, as well as the retirement of Boeing's senior legal counsel, J. Michael Luttig.^[19][20][21]

On October 11, 2019, Boeing's board removed Dennis Muilenburg as chairman and replaced him with David L. Calhoun, a former boss of GE Aviation. Boeing had resisted earlier calls from shareholder activists to split the roles.^{[22][23][24][25]} Some critics of corporate governance have said that Calhoun is a prime example of "overboarding" due to his multiple positions held concurrently on many boards.^[26] On December 23, 2019, the Boeing board had voted unanimously for David Calhoun to replace Dennis Muilenburg as chairman and president effective January 2020.^[27][28] Muilenburg reportedly departed Boeing with stock options and additional assets worth about $80 million, but no severance.^[29][30][31] Congressman Peter DeFazio, Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, commented: "Based on what we've discovered so far in our investigation into the design, development and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX, it's clear Dennis Muilenburg's ouster was long overdue. Under his watch, a long-admired company made a number of devastating decisions that suggest profit took priority over safety. Furthermore, reports that Muilenburg attempted to pressure FAA into rushing the MAX back into service are highly troubling and I commend Administrator Dickson for making it known that FAA will take as much time as it needs to ensure safety comes first".^[32]

In July 2019, Boeing announced the retirement of 737 program leader Eric Lindblad, the second person to depart that post in two years. He held the job less than a year, but was not involved in development of the MAX. His predecessor, Scott Campbell, retired in August 2018, amid late deliveries of 737 MAX engines and other components. Lindblad assumed the role shortly before the program became embattled in two accidents and ongoing groundings. He will be succeeded by Mark Jenks, vice president of the Boeing New Midsize Airplane program and previously in charge of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.^{[33][34][relevant? – discuss]}

On October 22, Boeing named Stan Deal to succeed Kevin McAllister, who has faced a number of problems beyond the MAX crisis during his three years as president and chief executive of Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA).^[35][36]

On December 4, 2019, Boeing Commercial Airplanes announced the retirement of its chief engineer John Hamilton, age 58, who had been appointed as the leader of Boeing's response to the crashes.^[37]

On December 26, 2019, Boeing announced that J. Michael Luttig, a senior adviser to Boeing's board of directors and former general counsel for the company, is retiring at the end of 2019.^[38] He was one of the highest paid general counsels of publicly traded companies; he helped to establish Boeing's defense over the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes.^[39]

Between the Ethiopian accident and US groundings, Boeing stated that upgrades to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control software, cockpit displays, operation manuals and crew training were underway due to findings from the Lion Air crash.

As non-U.S. countries and airlines began grounding the 737 MAX, Boeing stated: "at this point, based on the information available, we do not have any basis to issue new guidance to operators."^[40] Boeing said "in light of" the Ethiopian Airlines crash, the company would privatize^[41] the roll-out ceremony for the first completed Boeing 777X.^[42]

When the FAA grounded the MAX aircraft on March 13, Boeing stated it "continues to have full confidence in the safety of the 737 MAX. However, after consultation with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and aviation authorities and its customers around the world, Boeing has determined – out of an abundance of caution and in order to reassure the flying public of the aircraft's safety – to recommend to the FAA the temporary suspension of operations of the entire global fleet of 737 MAX aircraft."^[43]

Boeing anticipated software deployment before April, and said the upgrade would be made mandatory by an FAA Airworthiness Directive.^[44] The FAA stated it anticipated clearing the software update by March 25, 2019, allowing Boeing to distribute it to the grounded fleets.^[45] On April 1, the FAA announced the software upgrade was delayed because more work was necessary.^[46]

On March 14, Boeing reiterated that pilots can always use manual trim control to override software commands, and that both its Flight Crew Operations Manual and November 6 bulletin offer detailed procedures for handling incorrect angle-of-attack readings.^[47][48]

On April 4, 2019, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg acknowledged that MCAS played a role in both crashes. His comments came in response to public release of preliminary results of the Ethiopian Airlines accident investigation, which suggested pilots performed the recovery procedure. Muilenburg stated it was "apparent that in both flights" MCAS activated due to "erroneous angle of attack information". He said the MCAS software update and additional training and information for pilots would "eliminate the possibility of unintended MCAS activation and prevent an MCAS-related accident from ever happening again".^[49] Boeing reported that 96 test flights were flown with the updated software.^[50][51]

In an earnings call that took place on April 24, 2019, Muilenburg said the aircraft was properly designed and certificated, and denied that any "technical slip or gap" existed. He said there were "actions or actions not taken that contributed to the final outcome".^[52] On April 29, he claimed that the pilots did not "completely" follow the procedures that Boeing had outlined. He said Boeing was working to make the airplane even safer.^[53][54]

On August 4, 2019, Boeing stated they conducted around 500 test flights with updated software,^[55] and Wired reported that one test flight involved multiple altitude changes.^[56]

On October 20, 2019, in response to harsh reactions to the publication of Forkner's controversial messages about MCAS simulation during development, Boeing issued a statement about misinterpretations and how it informed the FAA of the expansion of MCAS to low speeds.^[57] On December 26, 2019, after the dismissal of Dennis Muilenburg, Boeing turned over to the FAA a new set of "disturbing" messages written in part by Forkner regarding MCAS development.^[58][59] On January 9, 2020, Boeing released the conversation details to the House Transportation Committee, stating that it "regret[s] the content of these communications, and apologize to the [Federal Aviation Administration], Congress, our airline customers, and to the flying public for them."^[60]

The House Transportation Committee published a summary of its findings on March 6, 2020. It identified a "culture of concealment" at Boeing and a weak regulatory environment as factors which contributed to the crashes. It acknowledged a wider range of contributory causes, but focused on the MCAS. Boeing's not classifying this as "safety critical", part of its efforts to avoid regulatory oversight and investigation, demonstrated inappropriate influence by Boeing over the FAA, which had then overruled safety concerns flagged by its own experts.^[61][62]

At the same time, the Ethiopian Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau published a summary of initial conclusions from its own investigation, which suggested that the plane design was the cause of the crashes.^[63]

FAA Administrator Dickson defended the omission of MCAS: "The FAA therefore decided to remove the MCAS reference from the draft AD so that flight crews would focus on runaway stabilizer recognition instead of attempting to troubleshoot MCAS".^[64] The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure report cited the strong disagreement of Dr. Mica Endsley, a senior officer at the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society and a former Chief Scientist of the U.S. Air Force, who testified that when MCAS is triggered by incorrect sensor data, the pilot cues are "significantly different than the cues received with a runaway stabilizer trim".^[65]

Following panel review recommendations, Boeing has strengthened its engineering oversight. As of August 2019, Muilenburg receives weekly reports of potential safety issues from rank-and-file engineers – thousands will report to chief engineers rather than to separate programs, helping them reach senior management more effectively.^[66]

In September 2019, The New York Times reported that Boeing board will call for structural changes after the 737 MAX crashes: changing corporate reporting structures, a new safety group, future plane cockpits designed for new pilots with less training. The committee, established in April, did not investigate the Max crashes, but produced the first findings for a reform of Boeing's internal structures since then. It will recommend that engineers report to the chief engineer rather than business management, to avoid pressure from business leaders against engineers who identify safety issues. The committee found that inter-group communication was lacking within engineering and between the Seattle offices and corporate headquarters during the certification work. The safety group will ensure information is shared and the certification work is independent. The group will report to senior leadership and a new permanent committee on the board.^[67][68]

The board said in September that Boeing should also work with airlines to "re-examine assumptions around flight deck design and operation" and recommend pilot training criteria beyond traditional training programs "where warranted".^[69]

In May 2019, engineers said that Boeing pushed to limit safety testing to accelerate planes certification, including 737 MAX.^[70] FAA said it has "received no whistleblower complaints or any other reports ... alleging pressure to speed up 737 MAX certification." Former engineers at Boeing blamed company executives of cost-cutting, over more than a decade, yielding to low morale and reduced engineering staffing, which "they argue contributed to two recent deadly crashes involving Boeing 737 Max jets."^[71]

In June 2019, Boeing's software development practices came under criticism from current and former engineers. Software development work for the MAX was reportedly complicated by Boeing's decision to outsource work to lower-paid contractors though these contractors did not work on MCAS or the AoA disagree alert. Management pressure to limit changes that might introduce extra time or cost was also highlighted.^[72][73]

In December 2019, former Boeing manager Ed Pierson testified to Congress that he had previously alerted the Boeing leadership before the second crash that the 737 Max factory was unsafe.^[74] He did not report concerns about MCAS, but rather an unsafe working environment and a workforce that was critically overworked that could lead to critical mistakes. According to Pierson, Boeing had ramped up monthly production to the point where some employees were working seven days a week for weeks on end. This harried process led to parts being installed out of sequence and debris being left in aircraft. This increased risk for human error became so apparent that Pierson sent an email to the chief of the 737 program stating "for the first time in my life, I'm sorry to say that I'm hesitant about putting my family on a Boeing airplane." The day before Pierson testified, NBC Nightly News aired an interview with Pierson revealing the whistleblower's repeated attempts to contact Boeing executives and the FAA.^[75] In January 2021, Pierson raised further safety concerns and published a new report in which he claims that quality problems at the Renton plant and electrical issues have not been satisfactorily investigated.^[76]

Boeing's former Chief Technical pilot Mark Forkner has invoked the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, to avoid submitting documents to federal prosecutors investigating the crashes.^[77] He managed pilots in the Flight Technical and Safety group within Boeing's customer services division.^[78] On October 17, Boeing turned over some 10 pages of Forkner's correspondence showing concern with MCAS in simulator sessions in 2016. The next day, FAA Administrator Dickson, in a strongly worded letter, ordered Muilenburg to give an "immediate" explanation for delaying disclosure of these documents for months.^{[79][80][needs update]}

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In May 2019, executives of Airbus told reporters they do not view the relationship between Boeing and the FAA as having been corrupted. They compared the EASA and the FAA, saying "EASA has a slightly different mandate than the FAA. EASA is a purely safety orientated agency."^[81] Airbus Chief Commercial Officer Christian Scherer did not feel the 737 MAX is a variant that has stretched the original 737 too far: "The MAX is not one stretch too many, in my humble opinion". Airbus leader Remi Maillard stated: "We work hand in hand with the regulators, and with the OEMs to adopt the safety standards. But, to be clear, our internal safety standards are even more stringent than what is required by the regulators". Scherer remarked on the way manufacturers can learn from accidents: "Whenever there is an accident out there, the first question that gets asked in an Airbus management meeting is: can we learn from it?"

On April 30, 2019, Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury said the 737 MAX grounding "is not changing the mid- to long-term picture" as "[Airbus is] limited by the supply chain": it should reach a monthly A320 production rate of 60 by mid-2019 before 63 in 2021 while Boeing reduced MAX monthly output to 42 from 52.^[82]

On November 17, 2019, at the Dubai Air Show, Airbus Chief Commercial Officer, Christian Scherer, firmly rejected the notion that Airbus was benefiting from the grounding of Boeing 737 MAX. Speaking to CNBC, he said, "I really need to correct that cultural belief. This does not benefit anyone in this industry, the least of which would be Airbus. It's a tragedy, it is an issue for Boeing to resolve, but it is not good for competitors to see problems on any one particular airplane type."^[83]

The 737 MAX's primary competitor is Airbus's bestseller aircraft, the A320neo. The A320neo continued to win orders in the wake of the Boeing 737 MAX grounding, booking over US$11 billion in orders,^[84] with additional orders from airlines that are either canceling their 737 MAX orders altogether, or reducing quantities.^[85] However, Airbus cannot take advantage of the situation because the A320's production slots are limited.^[86] The Airbus A320's backlog is sold out through 2025.^[87]

Deliveries for the A320 family and the Boeing 737 series have been as follows:

•   Airbus A320 family deliveries^[88][89]
•   Boeing 737 series deliveries^[90][91]

The A320neo and the 737 MAX both use engines from the CFM LEAP family, with different thrust requirements. After EASA issued an airworthiness directive regarding potential excess pitch during specific maneuvers, Airbus made a preemptive change to the A320neo flight manual to protect the aircraft in such situations.^[92] In response to the EASA recommendations, Lufthansa temporarily blocked the rearmost row of seats until a flight computer update increases the effectiveness of the aircraft's AoA protection.^{[citation needed]}

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U.S. labor unions representing pilots and flight attendants had different opinions on whether or not to ground the aircraft. Two flight attendant unions, AFA and the APFA, favored groundings,^[93] while pilot unions such as the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association,^[94] APA, and ALPA, expressed confidence in continued operation of the aircraft.^[95]

In a private meeting on November 27, 2018, American Airlines pilots pressed Boeing managers to develop an urgent fix for MCAS and suggested that the FAA require a safety review which in turn could have grounded the airplanes.^[96][97] A recording of the meeting revealed pilots' anger that they were not informed about MCAS. One pilot was heard saying, "We flat out deserve to know what is on our airplanes."^[98] Another US pilot asked for more training prior to his first flight on the 737 MAX several months before the first crash of Lion Air Flight 610.^[99] Afterwards, in June 2019, the American Airlines pilot union openly criticized Boeing for not fully explaining the existence or operation of MCAS: "However, at APA we remained concerned about whether the new training protocol, materials and method of instruction suggested by Boeing are adequate to ensure that pilots across the globe flying the MAX fleet can do so in absolute complete safety".^[100] Boeing vice president Mike Sinnett explained that the company did not want to make changes in a rush, because of uncertainty whether the Lion Air accident was related to MCAS. Sinnett said Boeing expected pilots to be able to handle any control problems.^[96]

The U.S. Aviation Safety Reporting System received messages about the 737 MAX from U.S. pilots in November 2018, including one from a captain who expressed concern that systems such as the MCAS are not fully described in the aircraft flight manual.^[101][102] Captain Mike Michaelis, chairman of the safety committee of the Allied Pilots Association at American Airlines said "It's pretty asinine for them to put a system on an airplane and not tell the pilots … especially when it deals with flight controls".^[103]

U.S. pilots also complained about the way the 737 MAX performed, including claims of problems similar to those reported about the Lion Air crash.^[104] Pilots of at least two U.S. flights in 2018, reported the nose of the 737 MAX pitched down suddenly when they engaged the autopilot.^[105] The FAA stated in response that "Some of the reports reference possible issues with the autopilot/autothrottle, which is a separate system from MCAS, and/or acknowledge the problems could have been due to pilot error."^[106]

On October 7, 2019, Southwest Airlines pilots sued Boeing declaring that Boeing misled the pilot union about the plane adding that the planes' grounding cost its pilots more than $100 million in lost income, which Southwest labor union wants Boeing to pay.^[107] The head of the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA), Jon Weaks, said in a note to pilots on November 13, 2019, that "Boeing is increasingly publicizing that they may have to shut down their production line due to running out of room to store completed MAX aircraft. There is some concern that this is simply another tactic to push the (return to service) timeline up."^[108]

In a letter dated October 30, 2019, to Boeing's CEO, American Airlines' Association of Professional Flight Attendants President Lori Bassani wrote: "The 28,000 flight attendants working for American Airlines refuse to walk onto a plane that may not be safe and are calling for the highest possible safety standards to avoid another tragedy." She also met with dozens of elected officials in Washington after the congressional testimony of Boeing's CEO.^[109]

Flight crew unions at Air Canada, Sunwing and WestJet support the American flight attendant unions who expressed safety concerns about the MAX return. Sections of the Canadian Union of Public Employees called on Transport Canada to take its responsibility in ensuring a safe return of these planes in the air.^[110]

In November, the president of the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, which represents employees at United Airlines Holdings, said: "We're not good with that, … If we're not confident it's safe, we're not going to work it and the planes don't fly. We've been clear with the FAA, the airlines and with Boeing that we need to see that – we need to see EASA, Canada, Australia, on board. We need all these assurances because there was a break in public trust here." The AFA-CWA represents 50,000 flight attendants at 20 carriers, including United Airlines and Alaska Air Group.^[111][112]

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A March 2019 poll suggested that 53% of American adults would not want to fly on a 737 MAX plane if the aircraft were to be cleared by the FAA the following week.^[113] In July, Southwest Airlines reprinted aircraft safety cards that were shared between the MAX and the rest of the Southwest 737-800 fleet.^[114] An IBD/TIPP Poll surveying Americans in January 2020, found that among the 61% who are closely following news of the MAX, 56% would avoid flying on it once it has reentered service.^[115]

Investment company UBS does not "anticipate significant share erosion" as it ran a public poll run showing 8% of the U.S. flying public would never fly the 737 MAX, (dropping to 3% when including that two-thirds seldom or never check the aircraft type before booking a flight), while 60% would fly it after at least six months of safe operations and a tenth would fly it after one to three months, not mattering much as airliner procurement time-frames are five to ten-plus years.^[116] The survey found that 70% would hesitate today to book a flight on the MAX.^[117]

A study for Atmosphere Research Group, led by consultant Henry Harteveldt, of U.S. passengers between April 27 to May 1 shown that within six months of its return, 14% would definitely fly on a MAX, at least 20% say they will definitely avoid the plane and over 40% said they'd be willing to take pricier or less convenient flights to stay off the MAX.^[117]

Various strategies to reinstate public confidence into the MAX are being proposed.^{[118][119][120][vague]}

On September 12, 2019, Boeing started an advertisement campaign, in which employees praise its planes' safety.^[120] Information packages for travelers about the safety of the redesigned MAX are being prepared by Boeing with the support of airlines.^[121] Boeing also produced video capsules showing support from chief pilot Jennifer Henderson.^[122]

For Marian Pistik, head of asset management at International Airfinance Corporation, the case of the MAX is unprecedented due to allegations of wrongdoings. The groundings of the DC-10 and of the Dreamliner could not be directly compared to the global Boeing 737 MAX grounding: "there was no suspicion that Boeing or any OEM knew of the problem and tried to disguise it or […] any suspicion of wrongdoing or not being compliant or forthcoming with the issues of the 737 Max."^[123]

In November 2020, when the FAA ungrounded the 737 MAX, families and friends of the victims criticized the FAA and Boeing, saying that the process was "rushed" and that the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crash was still under investigation.^{[124][125][126]}

A new technical certification program, the Systems Software Integrator (SSI)^[127] through National Institute for Certification in Engineering Technologies, was developed in part due to the response of issues cited in integrating the controls systems to the 737 MAX which caused the loss of control.^[128]