Siege of Breslau

Strategic background

Breslau (left) vs 1. Ukrainian Front lineup

According to plans of the future offensive, developed by the Soviet general staff, Breslau was likely to be in operational zone of the 1. Ukrainian Front. Commanded by marshal Konev, along the 1. Belorussian Front of marshal Zhukov it was one of the 2 strongest formations of this order in the Red Army. By the end of 1944 it held the 350-km-long section of the frontline between Warsaw and the Carpathian Mountains and during an operational pause it was getting ready for another assault. Its objectives, specified on November 29, 1944, included capturing Cracow, the Upper Silesian industrial basin, and Lower Silesia.^[21] The most important target, however, was reaching the Oder in its middle-lower course, below its confluence with the Neisse; this would, in turn, later serve as a springboard for the future final offensive towards Berlin. The orders specified neither the timing nor detailed troop lineup for the future assault on Breslau.^[22] The Germans, uncapable of offensive action and overstreched in defensive positions,^{[note 2]} were organised in Army Group “Centre” (general Reinhard) in the north and Army Group “A” in the south (general Harpe). The latter, holding the frontline opposite the 1. Ukrainian Front, was composed of (north to south) 9. Army (Lüttwitz), 4. Panzer Army (Gräser), 17. Army (Schulz) and 1. Panzer Army (Heinrici).^[24]

Plan abandoned: 3. Guards Tank Army

Rybalko ("3 гв.ТА") diverted south^{[note 3]}

The Soviet assault, launched on 12 January 1945 and later to be known as the Vistula-Oder Offensive, was from the onset massively successful.^[25] On the right flank the sparheading formation of the 1. Ukrainian Front was the 3. Guards Tank Army of general Rybalko; on 16 January it captured Częstochowa, some 150 km from Breslau.^[26] Either on this or on the following day Rybalko’s staff prepared the first plan to capture Breslau.^[27] His tank corps, divided into 2 groups, were to reach the outskirts of the city on 25 January and commence a pincer assault, which on 27 January would produce the seizure of the city. The army proceeded as planned, and on 19 January its vanguard units reached the town of Wieruszów, some 80 km from Breslau and located on the pre-1939 frontier between Poland and Germany.^[28] However, on 20 January Konev ordered Rybalko to turn south, towards Oppeln, apparently intending to trap German troops fighting in Upper Silesia in a kessel.^[29] Rybalko’s plan to capture Breslau was abandoned. According to a present-day historian the scheme was ambitious yet realistic, especially given the opposing German 17. Army was in total disarray and barely capable of mounting a co-ordinated defense. Re-directing the 3. Guards Tank Army is referred as Konev’s mistake; eventually the Upper Silesian kessel did not materialize, and instead of swift takeover Breslau would be subject to long and heavy combat.^{[30][note 4]}

Failed offhand attempt: 52. Army

Weide at the outskirts of Breslau

The operational zone vacated by the 3. Guards Tank Army was taken over by the 52. Army, unlike the former a rather standard field formation, with limited armour and mechanised potential; it was commanded by general Koroteev. On 20-23 January its right-flank unit, the 73. Rifle Corps, was engaged around Kępno and Gross Wartenberg against hastily assembled German troops. They consisted of 269. Infantry Division and Kampfgruppe “Krafft”,^{[32][note 5]} both units of the XXXXVIII Corps, which in turn formed part of almost disintegrated and withdrawing 17. Army of general Schulz.^{[note 6]} Gross Wartenberg (50 km from Breslau) was taken on 23 January^[35] and the fightings moved towards Oels (25 km from Breslau), which in turn fell on 25 January.^{[36][note 7]} On 26 January first units of the Soviet 73. Rifle Corps neared the Weide, a small right tributary of the Oder, flowing on the north-eastern outskirts of Breslau (some 8-10 from the centre of the city). It is here that the 269. ID and KG “Krafft” mounted a defensive line which stopped the Soviets. Following 2 days of fighting and with no apparent success, on 27 January general Martirosian, commander of the 73. Rifle Corps, ordered his man to assume defensive positions. The attempt to capture Breslau offhand failed.^{[38][note 8]}

Failed southern bridgehead attempt: 52. Army

Oder swampland near Wasserborn

Koroteev altered his strategy. While the right-flank 73. Rifle Corps was storming northern perimeter of Breslau, the 78. Rifle Corps (general Akimov), also forming part of the 52. Army, was ordered to establish bridgeheads south-east, in-between Breslau and Ohlau. The left bank of the Oder was defended by a motley assortment of various German sub-units, including Ersatz battalions, NCO-school battalions, Luftwaffe men organized as infantry, Volkssturm, loose artillery batteries and minor tank detachments. On 26 January the Soviets managed to cross the river in few spots near the villages of Märzdorf (20 km south-east of the centre of Breslau) and Wasserborn (10 km). During next week the intense combat followed. The position of Red Army soldiers at Wasserborn became dire and eventually their regiment from the 31. Rifle Division became fully encircled. Some of its components managed to break through, yet on 3 February the bridgehead was lost. At Märzdorf neither the Soviets managed to deliver a breakthrough punch nor the Germans succeeded in pushing them back to the Oder. As apparently both sides ran out of resources, their positions stalled. Either on 2 February or the following day the 78. Rifle Corps was given new orders, and soon the entire 52. Army would be directed elsewhere.^[40]

Failed northern bridgehead attempt: 52. Army

Soviets crossing the Oder^{[note 9]}

Having failed to cross the Weide on 26-28 January, Martirosian shifted his focus. On 28 January first soldiers of the 73. Rifle Corps appeared near the confluence of the Weide and the Oder, some 9 km from north-western suburbs of Breslau. Amidst heavy fighting against improvised German sub-units from training and logistics formations the following day the Soviets crossed the partially frozen Oder and established a bridgehead near the village of Peiskerwitz.^{[note 10]} During the following 10 days it became the object of extremely fierce combat between the 50. Rifle Division and then its replacement, 254. Rifle Division (all 73. Rifle Corps), and the Germans, reinforced by the 1. SS Fortress Regiment “Besslein”.^{[note 11]} Eventually on 10 February the Soviets evacuated the bridgehead.^[44] During this period fightings along the Weide continued; local attacks and counter-attacks moved the frontline here and there, yet no breakthrough has been achieved. The defence strengthened, as new units, raised in the city, were being deployed, above all the Fortress Grenadier Regiment “Sauer”.^{[note 12]} Eventually, in mid-February the entire 52. Army was given other tasks. Only one of its divisions, the 294. Rifle Division, was seconded to the newly approaching 6. Army and remained along the Weide blocking the city from the north. Another attempt to seize Breslau failed.^[46]

Strategic background

two large bridgeheads clearly visible

In the very late January of 1945 the Vistula-Oder Offensive was entering its late phase; the 1. Belorussian Front was approaching the lower Oder and its vanguard units were already some 150 km from Berlin. The frontline in Lower Silesia was running largely along the Oder; the right wing of the 1. Ukrainian Front reached the outskirts of Glogau, and the left wing was in the Moravian Gate, where the upper Oder flows between the Carpathians and the Sudetes. On 31 January Konev issued new orders: his northern armies were to reach towards and then cross the lower Neisse, while southern armies were to perform a breakthrough raid between the Oder and the Sudetes and cross the upper Neisse; final objectives for the 1. Ukrainian Front were already in Saxony and Brandenburg. Two large bridgeheads were to serve as springboards of the campaign, later to be named the Lower Silesian Offensive: near Steinau-Maltsch 45 km north-west of Breslau and near Ohlau-Brieg 35 km south-east of Breslau.^[47] It was expected that around 5-6 February Breslau would be encircled, and around 10 February the city would be captured.^[48] At the time Lower Silesia was defended by Army Group “Center” of general Schörner^{[note 13]} (re-organised former Army Group “A”);^[49] it consisted of 4. Panzer Army in the north (Gräser), 17. Army in the center (Schulz) and 1. Panzer Army in the south (Heinrici).

Left arm: 5. Guards Army

2 February: withdrawal to Breslau

The right flank of the Soviet force assembled in the Ohlau-Brieg bridgehead was the 5. Guards Army, commanded by general Zhadov. It commenced the offensive on 4 February,^[50] though its result was disappointing. During 5 days of combat the Soviets advanced no more than 10-15 km; they were opposed by armoured and infantry divisions of the XVII. Corps (Tiemann) and the Korpsgruppe “Breslau” (Koch-Erpach), both from the 17. Army. The breakthrough was achieved on 11 February by the 34. Guards Rifle Corps, and on 12 February the Soviet riflemen reached the railway line, leading south from Breslau to Glatz and then across the Sudetes to Bohemia.^[51] As at the time the right arm of the Soviet advance was well in progress, the encirclement of Breslau was getting increasingly likely, and the corridor linking Breslau with the Sudete foothills was only some 15 km wide. For a moment the German counter-attack broadened it,^[52] yet Soviet superiority was clear and on 13 February the units of the 5. Guards Army and the 6. Army met; some German units, like the 269. ID, were getting split, some sub-units pushed north towards Breslau, and some south towards the Sudetes. German counter-attacked briefly re-opened the corridor, but on 16 February the 33. Guards Rifle Corps reached Domslau, Kanth and Kostenblut south-west of Breslau.^[53]

Right arm: 6. Army

Liegnitz, February 1945

The left flank of the Soviet armies assembled in the Steinau-Maltsch bridgehead was formed by the 6. Army of general Gluzdovsky.^{[note 14]} He was ordered to move south, then east, and finally north – to Breslau.^{[note 15]} The timeline was ambitious: Konev’s order expected the 6. Army to capture Breslau “on the fourth day of the operation”.^[56] The 6. Army commenced their assault on 8 February^[57] and was fairly successful, even though its right-wing units were delayed by fightings in Liegnitz.^[58] On 9 February its left flank reached the outskirts of Neumarkt. On the same day the strong 7. Guards Mechanized Corps^[59] (the formation subordinated directly to command of the 1. Ukrainian Front and deployed to assist the 6. Army) reached the Breslau – Berlin highway.^[60] Tanks of the corps immediately turned east but were confronted by 8. Panzer Division from the 17. Army. On 11-12 February the frontline seemed stabilised, as the Soviet 74. Rifle Corps remained blocked at Neumarkt and the German XVII. Corps failed to push the Soviets away from the highway. However, on 13 February^[61] the 7. Guards Mechanized Corps - perhaps the key unit to be credited for the successful encirclement^[62] - achieved a breakthrough, penetrated some 17-18 km west of Breslau and at Rothsürben its vanguard units met troops from the 5. Guards Army.^[63] Germans counter-attacks briefly re-opened the corridor,^[64] but on 15 February it was soon closed again.^[65] On 16 February Konev wired Moscow that Breslau was now fully and firmly surrounded.^[66]

Germans

Hans von Ahlfen^{[note 29]}

It is not clear whether the Breslau fortress was subordinated to command of the 17. Army or directly to command of the Army Group "Center".^{[note 30]} The first commander of the fortress garrison was Generalmajor Johannes Krause;^{[note 31]} on 3 February 1945 he was replaced^{[note 32]} by Hans von Ahlfen, freshly nominated from Oberst to Generalmajor. On 8 March 1945 von Ahlfen was in turn replaced by Generalleutnant Hermann Niehoff.^{[note 33][note 34]} Initially the only other general present was Generalleutnant Rudolf Koch-Erpach, head of the VIII. Military District (Lower Silesia); in late January he left, nominated commander of a panzer corps.^[115] In early February Generalmajor Siegfried Ruff was flown to Breslau to assume command of the 609. division (in March promoted to Generalleutnant).^{[note 35]} The only other general briefly present - though not member of the garrison - was Generalleutnant der Luftwaffe Friedrich Cranz,^{[note 36]} who in mid-March arrived in Breslau by plane to inspect airfield facilities; he died on 17 March when for unclear reasons his plane failed to take off from the Klein Gandau airstrip.^[119] The chief of staff was initially a young captain Hans-Wilhelm Erdmann.^{[note 37]} Once von Ahlfen assumed command, this role was taken over by major Albrecht Otto.^{[note 38][note 39]} In early April Otto was about to be dismissed and his replacement was already appointed by OKH; however, for reasons which are unclear he failed to make it to Breslau and Otto remained the chief of staff until surrender.^[124] Volkssturm was commanded by SA-Obergruppenführer Otto Herzog.^[125] Headquarters of the Breslau garrison was initially located in Liebichshöhe;^{[note 40]} on 14 April it was moved to the former Augustian convent.

It was initially planned to defend Breslau with 5 infantry divisions, the idea which evaporated upon near disintegration of the Eastern Front in January 1945.^[127] Eventually the core of German garrison of Breslau was composed of 2 formations: 1) autonomous fortress regiments and 2) the 609. Division. The fortress regiments (Festungs-Grenadier-Regiment) were initially named A, C, D, E and B,^[128] later to be re-named after their commanders.^{[note 41]} They were raised in early 1945 usually on basis of existing local Lower Silesian sub-units, e.g. regiment A on basis of Aufklärungs-Ersatz- und Ausbildungs-Abteilung in Oels, regiment D on basis of 1. SS-Ersatz- and Ausbildungs-Bataillon in Deutsch Lissa, and regiment E on basis of Luftwaffe ground staff from closed or evacuated airfields.^[129] The 609. z.b.V. Division^{[note 42]} had its staff formed in late January in Dresden; also in this case the division was raised mostly on basis of existing units, like 8. Wehrmacht-Unteroffizierschule in Frankenstein, though some evacuated from distant locations, like 48. Ersatz- und Ausbildungs Flugabwehrkannonenabteilung from Hohensalza. Perhaps the most experienced sub-units of the division were battalions from the 269. Infantry Division, which in January manned the frontline on approaches to Breslau; the division partially broke apart during encirclement, and part of it was pushed to the city.^[130] Specialised and support sub-units were either raised in Breslau and surroundings or withdrew to the city during earlier combat. Military police were combing road crossings and railway terminals for soldiers from disintegrated units, marauders, these on leave, convalescents etc., who were all directed to replenishment centres. Volkssturm, raised in Breslau but also in other Lower Silesian cities, were divided into combat and construction battalions.^[131] For administrative purposes the former were organized in regiment groups (Regimentsgruppe), yet in combat VS did not operate on their own and the battalions were usually attached to Wehrmacht regiments.^[132] Estimates as to the number of German combatants differ enormously. Some historians provide figures as low as 35,000,^[133] 37,000^[134] or "probably fewer than 40,000".^[135] Ahlfen and Niehoff in their book claimed 45,000-50,000;^{[note 43]} this latter figure is fairly frequently repeated in historiographic accounts.^[138] In latest monograph one scholar arrived at 55,000.^{[note 44]} Some settle for estimates as high as 70,000^{[note 45]} or even 80,000.^{[note 46]}

Hermann Niehoff

Artillery was integrated in Artillerie Regiment "Breslau", commanded by sub-colonel Egmont Urbatis.^{[note 47]} Divided into 4 major groups (Gruppe Nord, Grupe West, Gruppe Südwest and artillery of the 609th division),^[142] it was a rather motley collection built on basis of various sub-units from Breslau and around; in total, it operated some 200 artillery pieces. Perhaps the most important type were 10.5 mm leFH 18/40 howitzers, divided into 15 batteries; many were brand new, produced by Borsig Werke in Markstädt.^[143] Heavy howitzers were represented by 4 batteries of 15 mm sFH 18. The heaviest fire was possible thanks to 1 battery of 21 mm Granatwerfer GR 19. There were 4 batteries made of Soviet artillery pieces (e.g. A-19, ZIS-3) and 2 batteries made of pieces from Polish and Yugoslav armies,^[144] mostly the French Schneider Mle 1897. A separate AA artillery formation (not subordinated to Urbatis) was formed on basis of 150. Schwere Flak Artillerie Regiment; its core were some 90 famous 8.8 cm guns in various versions, apart from Flak 36, 37, 41 and 43 pieces and other single units.^[145] Self-propelled artillery was reduced to a single company, named Gepanzerte Kampfgruppe "Venzke". Its vehicles were 2 Jagdpanzer IV/70 L guns, 2 unidentified guns on Pzkpfw III chassis (perhaps StuG III), 6 StuG 40 ausf. G guns, 6 Pzkpfw II ausf. F tanks,^{[note 48]} and 4 Sd.Kfz. 124 Wespe howitzers.^[148] Firepower was delivered also by armored train, built by the Breslau FAMO^{[note 49]} shortly or perhaps even during the siege; its key weapon were 8.8 cm guns and it was manned by some 70 soldiers and railwaymen.^[150]

HQ until 14 April (present view)

HQ since 14 April (present view)^{[note 50]}

Garrison of Festung Breslau:^{[note 51]}

Soviets

Vladimir Gluzdovsky (earlier picture)

During the encirclement there were 2 Soviet armies engaged in combat: 6. Army and 5. Guards Army. During the very first days of the siege one formation of latter, namely the 34. Rifle Corps, was storming the city from south-east, along the left bank of the Oder; they made rather little progress. Some divisions of the corps were being withdrawn from the frontline since 19 February, and the remaining ones left on 22 February. Their positions were taken over by units of the 6. Army.^[153] Hence, the 5. Guards Army is not accounted for in this section.

The 6. Army (6-я общевойсковая армия) was subordinated to command of the 1. Ukrainian Front. Since late 1944 its commander was general lieutenant Vladimir A. Gluzdovsky; the chief of staff was since March 1944 general major Fiodor D. Kulishev. Apart from them the members of the War Council, a specific military-political body operational in the Red Army of the time which formed part of the army command layer, were general major of aviation Vasiliy I. Klokov^{[note 52]} and colonel Piotr T. Taran. The backbone of the army were 2 rifle corpses (стрелковый корпус). The 22. Rifle Corps was commanded by colonel Fyedor V. Zakharov; of its 2 divisions, the 218. Rifle Division was led by colonel Piotr S. Yeroshenko, and the 309. Rifle Division by colonel Boris D. Lev. The 74. Rifle Corps was commanded by Alexandr V. Vorozhyshev. Out of its 3 divisions, the 181. Rifle Division was commanded by colonel Pavel I. Morozov, the 273. Rifle Division by colonel Dmitriy P. Sinkin^{[note 53]} and the 359. Rifle Division by colonel Piotr P. Kosolapov. The army artillery was led by general major Vladimir A. Kvashnevskiy^{[note 54]} and mechanised units by colonel Piotr D. Bobkovskiy.^{[note 55]} Another notable leader was colonel Ivan. A. Pyerepelitsa,^{[note 56]} commander of the 294. Rifle Division; originally part of the 52. Army and bogged down at the northern outskirts of Breslau, it was ordered to block the city and subordinated to command of the 6. Army.^{[note 57]} One more and the 4th general involved on the Soviet side was general major Danil M. Krasnokutskiy, who commanded the strongest non-organic unit delegated to the 6. Army, the 31. Breakthrough Artillery Division. Headquarters of the 6. Army was initially located in Wilkau; on 21 February it was moved to the von Bonim palace in Gross Gohlau.^{[160][note 58]}

A present-day scholar puts the 6. Army in the rubric of at best mediocre. Though a formation of this designation was operational on the Eastern Front until the mid-1944, during the spring fightings in Ukraine it suffered so heavy losses that its divisions were transferred to other armies, while staff and skeletal structures were placed in reserve. The army was being re-built since late 1944, mostly with recruits drafted in the summer and fall in the Volhynia region. Most recruits got drafted from rural settlements and were unaccustomed to large urban environment.^[162] As a complete formation the army reached the frontline in December 1944, deployed on the Sandomierz bridgehead. However, it was kept in reserve and did not fight the Germans during the Vistula-Oder offensive. Only in late January it was transferred to Lower Silesia and since early February commenced the pincer operation against Breslau, which marked the baptism of fire for many if not most of the soldiers.^[163] Though it was planned to raise the army according to the 3-corps blueprint, typical for Soviet armies, it was eventually declared battle-ready only with the 22. Rifle Corps and the 74. Rifle Corps. Moreover, instead of the usual 3 infantry divisions, the former was composed of only 2 divisions; with total strength of 5 infantry divisions, the 6. Army compared badly e.g. to the 52. Army, which when approaching Breslau was composed of 9 divisions.^{[note 59]} The bright side was that the 6. Army was not depleted by battle casualties. Its manpower was officially 34,678 men;^[164] together with soldiers from delegated units, when the siege began Gluzdovsky had 57,914 men under his command.^{[165][note 60]}

Each division should have been equipped with own divisional artillery, be it field guns (like F-22 76 mm pieces), ant-tank (M-42 45 mm or ZIS-2 57 mm pieces) or AA (61-K 37 mm and 52-K 85 mm pieces); usually they should have amounted to around 60 pieces (plus mortars), but there is no clear information available as to the number of these guns in divisions of the 6. Army. The organic army artillery was 159. Artillery Brigade; it was composed of 2 battalions (in Soviet nomenclature divizion) of ML-20 152 mm howitzers (24 pieces each) and 1 battalion of A-19 122 mm pieces (12 guns). The 531. Mortar Regiment was equipped with 120 mm mortars, while the 1587. AA Regiment fired 85 mm guns. In total, the 6. Army had 347 artillery pieces and 381 mortars at their disposal. However, there were numerous units, mostly artillery, seconded under Gluzdovsky's command from reserve of the 1. Ukrainian Front or from other armies. The key one was the 31. Breakthrough Artillery Division; it was composed of 6 various brigades, including field (ZIS-3 76 mm), howitzers (M-30 122 mm), super heavy howitzers (B-4 203 mm), mortars (wz. 1943 160 mm), and rocket launchers (BM-13-12); in total, it delivered 255 guns and mortars.^[167] The heaviest artillery were Br-5 280 mm mortars, grouped in two separate batteries. Mobile armor support was provided by 350. Self-propelled Artillery Battery (SU-76 guns, number unclear) and 349. Guards Heavy Self-propelled Artillery Regiment (ISU-152 guns, at least 15). Units attached later provided 5 T-34 tanks, 14 IS-2 tanks, 4 ISU-122 guns and 1 SU-122 gun.^[168] In total, Gluzdovsky had around 600 artillery pieces at his disposal.

6A HQ since 21 February (present view)

Soviet troops engaged in the siege of Breslau:^{[note 61]}

February

Soviet artillery at Kürassierstrasse

In mid-February units of the 5. Guards Army on the eastern flank and these of the 6. Army on the western flank were holding a frontline running latitudinally some 5-6 km south of the market square; some Soviet maps from this period feature a demarcation line between assault sectors of both armies drawn up to the Hauptbahnhof.^{[note 68]} It is not clear whether when planning his advance, Gluzdovsky considered a joint operation with the neighboring army or whether he was aware that starting 19 February the 5. Guards would be being withdrawn.^[193] It is known, though, that he grossly underestimated the opponents; initially his intelligence claimed the German garrison was 18,000 men, in late February raising this figure to 31,000.^[194] This might have contributed to overly ambitious Soviet planning. Gluzdovsky ordered both divisions of the 22. Rifle Corps^{[note 69]} to advance from south-west on a section of some 2.5 km length and apparently expected them to penetrate into the inner city within a day or two.^[195] There were 572 artillery pieces amassed; the tactics was to form tens of shock groups, composed of infantry battalion with mortars and flamethrowers, pioneers,^{[196][note 70]} 2-3 guns and 2-3 gunned armoured vehicles.^[198] There were some 5,500 men in front combat sub-units.^[199] The key axis of advance was to be from Hartlieb/Oltashin across Krietern and Kleinburg towards the Hindenburg Platz. The 74. Rifle Corps was to deliver auxiliary punch from the west, from Neumarkt to Deutsch Lissa and the western suburbs.

The Soviet assault commenced on February 16;^[200] its immediate objective was the railway embankment and Südpark, located north of it.^[201] However, combat in the loosely built, half-rural suburban area produced slow progress;^[202] 3 battalions managed to cross the embankment only on 19 February^[203] or 20^[204] and seized southern edge of Südpark; the following day some sub-units penetraded into Kurasierstrasse.^[205] However, counter-attacks by improvised Kampfgruppen, including companies composed of HJ Volkssturm teenagers, pushed the Soviets mostly back across the railway line;^[206] this would later give rise to the Kinder von Breslau narrative.^[207] In the West the 74. RC crossed the Weistritz^{[note 71]} and approached Schmiedefeld; paratroopers who landed on the Klein Gandau airfield on 21 February^[210] managed to push the Soviets out of Schmiedefeld and stabilised the western frontline; this saved the airfield, which would be operated for further 6 weeks.^[211] It is supposed that the Soviet command was confident they would take the city in days and underestimated the importance of air deliveries; this was why until April they did not attempt further penetration in the west.^[212]

On 22 February the 22. RC resumed assault, narrowing the sector of advance.^{[note 72]} The 218. Rifle Division penetrated well north of the embankment into Kleinburg; fighting took place in suburban setting of prestigious Professoren-Siedlung, gradually giving way to densely built quarters; at this stage there were already barricades erected and passages blown up across walls of neighboring buildings.^[214] On 22 February the 309. RD reached the Kurasier-kaserne, a large barracks compound, which during next few days would be passing from hands to hands a few times.^[215] In 22-23 February the 315th Battalion fired 113 280 mm shells, at a range of 4-5 km.^[216] On 23 February the Red Army men seized the tram depot at Lohestrasse, which marked borders of dense urban infrastructure. On 24 February the Soviets for the last time re-captured the Kurasier-kaserne and firmly established themselves north of the Kurasierstrasse.^[217] During next few days their key objective was Hindenburg Platz; this is where - also along the Steinstrasse - the frontline stalled on 26-27 February.^{[note 73]} On the right flank battalions from the 273 RD. seized the Städtische Gaswerk in Dürrgoy.^[219][220]

juvenile German defenders

During some 10 days along the key axis of assault the Soviet troops advanced some 2.5 km^[221] and were now some 2.5 km from the market square and some 1.5 km from the Hauptbahnhof. Though falling dramatically short of gains envisioned in the original Gluzdovsky's order, this would prove quite a success compared to territorial gains that would be recorded during assaults in March and April. Of the 3 divisions advancing, until March the left-flank 218. RD lost 2,571 men, the centrally positioned 309. RD lost 1,871 and the right-flank 273. RD lost 1,867;^[222] in total in February (including the encirclement operation) the 6. Army lost 12,499 soldiers, out of this 2,986 having been irrecoverable losses (KIA, MIA, heavily wounded).^[223] German losses are not clear. However, the "Wehl" regiment and various battle-groups, like Kampfgruppe “Zielske” or Kampgruppe “Hirsch”, which manned the western section, were withdrawn from the frontline and replaced by the "Mohr" regiment, reinforced with new VS battalions.^{[note 74]} Along the eastern section both regiments from the 609. Division, "Schulz" and "Reinkober", remained on their positions.

March

Soviet infantry advancing^{[note 75]}

In early March the Soviets kept advancing from the south along the frontline of some 4.5 km length. The 359. RD moved on the left flank from northern Krietern towards Gräbschen and Gabitz (1.5 km), west of Gabitzerstrasse. The 309. RD moved towards the centre between Gabitzerstrasse and Strasse der SA (0.7 km).^[225] The 218. RD moved towards the centre between Strasse der SA and Lohenstrasse (0.7 km).^[226] On the right flank, the 273. RD moved from Herdain and Dürrgoy towards Huben (1.5 km). The Red Army thrust focused on the 1.5 km central section between Gabitzerstrasse and Lohenstrasse;^{[note 76]} the wings were providing auxiliary support. The opposing German line-up was the "Mohr" regiment, which in late February replaced "Wehl" along Strasse der SA,^[227] the "Kersten" regiment along Lohenstrasse, and "Reinkober" on the German left flank, this is on the eastern section; all these regiments were reinforced by various improvised kampfgruppen, composed mostly of Volkssturm battalions attached to single Wehrmacht companies.^[228]

The first two weeks of March marked one of the two most fierce periods of the Breslau fighting.^{[note 77]} On the central section, riflemen from 309. and 218. rifle divisions and the opposing "Mohr" and "Kersten" defenders were engaged in combat not for single city blocks, not for single buildings, but at times for single floors.^{[note 78]} The Soviets kept advancing in their shock groups, each composed of few hundred infantry supported by pioneers blowing up walls where necessary, with field guns and self-propelled artillery placed some 150-300 metres behind. The defenders employed Goliaths^[231] and used to transport dismantled pieces, especially the Puppchen launchers, to upper floors.^[232] The district, densely built up with 3-5 floor residential buildings, many of magnificent architecture, was systematically being turned into rubble.^{[note 79]} In every week a single Soviet division was losing some 350-500 men;^{[note 80]} German losses are not clear, yet it is known they rotated the VS battalions every some time.^{[note 81]} The Soviet advance was painstakingly slow; until mid-March on the crucial central section they advanced some 350 metres, reaching Augustastrasse and Victoriastrasse; since 10 March they were making close to no progress,^[237] and since 15 March no progress at all.^[238]

Smaller scale assaults continued on auxiliary sections. In early March in the flanking south-western industrial district of Gräbschen the Soviets deployed 222. Tank Regiment, which advanced along Gräbschenerstrasse; they seized the bus depot and railway line, yet confronted by 5 platoons of Panzerjägerabteilung the tanks stalled; the entire unit was withdrawn on 22 March.^[239] Around this time on the right flank the 273. RD advanced through Dürrgoy^{[240][note 82]} but failed to take the Heilig-Geist-kirche; this huge concrete construction^{[note 83]} controlled access to Huben from south-east and would remain in German hands until surrender.^[242] In the north units of the 294. RD and 77. FR with little success tried to cross the Weide, opposed by "Wehl", "Sauer" and the paras;^{[note 84]} in late March the 294. RD was moved elsewhere and its sector was taken over by the 77. FR.^[244] In the centre, following a period of less intense combat, on 18 March and on 25 March the 218. RD renewed attacks between Lohenstrasse and Bohrauerstraße (section taken over from 273. RD), but failed.^[245] Since 18 March they were fighting against the "Besslein" regiment, as "Mohr", in combat for 3 weeks, was sent to Klein Gandau to rest.^[246] In the second half of March the Soviets gained almost no territory, again except some success of the 309. in Gräbschen on 28-29 March, where they seized train depot, sporting ground and Raabelplatz.^[247]

central frontline section was densely built-up; not a single building is left standing

German losses sustained in March are unclear; a present-day historian extrapolates some fragmentary data and estimates 3,300 KIA and 12,500 WIA from mid-Feb until end-March,^[248] while the official Wehrmacht register evidenced 2,038 KIA in March and 3,006 KIA since the siege began.^[249] In March the Soviet divisions advancing in the central sector suffered over 2,000 casualties each; the 22. Rifle Corps recorded 1,350 irrecoverable casualties (KIA, MIA and very heavy WIA) out of some 6,700 total losses; the 6. Army lost in total 12,886 men, out of these 2,764 KIA. Given reinforcements were merely 2,717, at the end of March Gluzdovsky had only 41,000 men under his command^[250] and despite emergency measures, combat potential of the 6. Army was dwindling.^{[note 85]} Along the key axis of assault during the entire month the Red Army moved some 0.5 km. Though at the closest point they were some 0.8 km from the Hauptbahnhof, it seemed that their resources were running out. During the very last days of March the 309. RD was ordered to vacate their entire sector. It was to be taken over by the neighboring 218. RD, which was now stretched from 0.7 km to some 1.5 km. It was a clear sign that Gluzdovsky decided to abandon further attempts to seize the city from the south, where his troops were going into defence.^[253]

April

Klein Gandau airport

In late March Gluzdovsky prepared for assault from the west and re-grouped his troops. While the 22. Rifle Corps after 6 weeks of combat assumed defensive positions in the south, it was the 74. Rifle Corps which was now supposed to deliver a breakthrough punch. There were 3 infantry divisions marked for this task.^[254] The 294. RD (moved from the Weide front) was to advance on the left flank, on the north, from Masselwitz towards Pilsnitz and Kosel. The 359. RD (so far in the rear) was in the centre, to proceed from Schmiedefeld towards Klein Gandau. The 112. RD (fresh as reinforcement from the 13. Army)^{[note 86]} was on the right flank, to attack from Schmiedefeld towards Maria Höfchen and Klein Mochbern.^[255] All divisions manned sectors of similar length, in total amounting to some 6 km. German lines, running chiefly along the railway embankment, were defended by “Mohr” and “Hanf” regiments, with the usual VS battalions. The defenders were well aware of the threat forthcoming, as massive moves of people and machinery were easily detected; Niehoff reinforced his men by single companies of paratroopers, pioneers, SS (detached from “Besslein”) and Panzerjäger-Abteilung.^[256]

The Soviet assault commenced on 31 March and initially produced little progress.^{[note 87]} The riflemen failed to take the embankment, even at spots defended by VS.^{[note 88]} However, on 2 April a company of the 359. RD and tanks of the 222. TR achieved a breakthrough, exploited it, and reached the south-western corner of the Klein Gandau airfield.^[260] Repeated German counter-attacks failed, and on 4 April the airport was already controlled by the Soviets; fighting moved to the Breslau-Mochbern railway station. On the left flank the Soviets have crossed the Lohe, and on 5 April took the suburb of Kosel.^[261] However, by weekend the Red Army advance stalled, especially that the 294. RD was withdrawn and directed towards Berlin.^[262] The period of 8-18 April was marked by a stalemate; localised combat did not move the frontline, which remained in loosely built eastern part of the industrial district. Soviet losses were smaller than these sustained in early March.^{[note 89]} The Germans suffered record casualties; 1 April was the only day when they exceeded 120 KIA, while 2 April was one of 5 days during the entire siege, when there were more than 100 killed.^[264] Shattered battalions were merged.^{[note 90]}

On 18 April the renewed Soviet assault was commenced by the 74. RC; though it lost the 294. RD, it was reinforced by the 218. RD. The combat focused on two key objects: the large Breslauer Schlachthof slaughterhouse^{[note 91]} and even larger Linke-Hoffman Werke plant.^{[267][note 92]} Though the defenders eventually abandoned both, except one city block the Soviets failed to cross another railway embankment. An attempt to cross it in Schrobergarten on the left flank, performed by the 374. Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, ended in a carnage; 3 StuG guns knocked out 13 of 15 Soviet ISU-152 guns.^{[note 93]} During next few days heavy fighting along the axis of Frankfurter Strasse followed, yet with little territorial change. On 22 April Gluzdovsky re-organized his assault, and for the first time ordered the 22. And 74. Rifle Corps to advance simultaneously.^[269] Both re-launched their offensive on 24 April, which commenced the second period of most ferocious combat. The Soviets engaged 6 divisions, though none had more than 3,500 people in its ranks.^[270] Listing German line-up barely makes sense, as following mergers sub-units were organized in various improvised kampfgruppen; battalions from former “Mohr”, “Hanf” and “Besslein” regiments prevailed.^[271] During 4 days of combat in partially industrial, partially suburban and partially densely built residential quarters, the frontline moved some 0.6-0.8 km; the Soviets captured a huge AA bunker at Striegauer Platz^{[note 94]} but failed to gain ground much further.

Striegauer Platz bunker (now museum)

On 28 April both sides were already bleeding white; combat intensity decreased and the frontline stalled some 1.5 km from the market square^[273] and some 2.5 km from the Hauptbahnhof.^[274] Following the failed March attempt to storm the city from the south, also the April offensive from the west came to a standstill. The Red Army lost 14,252 men, including 964 officers;^[275] as reinforcements amounted to some 8,000 men, by the 1 May Gluzdovsky had some 34,000 men under his command.^[276] German losses are not clear; Niehoff declared that during the peak combat period in April, the garrison was losing some 700 men a day,^[277] while the official register evidenced 1,929 killed in April, slightly less than in March.^[278] However, since the fall of Klein Gandau the garrison was no longer able to send their WIA out of the city; it is estimated that some 6,000 soldiers were in lazarets.^[279] Another critical problem was ammunition, especially artillery shells;^{[note 95]} technicians tried to invent improvised charges; their evaluation differs from source to source.^{[note 96]}

May

German envoys on their way

Once fightings along Frankurter Strasse decreased, since 28 April there were only local skirmishes recorded in the city;^{[note 97]} until surrender further 298 German soldiers died,^[284] even though some might have been WIA who perished in lazarets. In early May some 80 members of NKFD, who were earlier calling for surrender in flyers^[285] and over loudspeakers,^{[note 98]} were sent across the frontline on infiltration mission. They were identified and local combat followed;^[286] seventeen captured NKFD men were executed.^[287] On 1 May information about Hitler’s death reached Breslau; it was not made public until the following day, together with news about the surrender of Berlin.^[288] Niehoff contemplated breakout and ordered his planning officers to consider its feasibility;^[289] some decisions taken might suggest he was serious about it, and Soviets ordered specific preparations when their intelligence provided an early warning.^[290] In few days the German staff worked out their evaluation; though there were merely some 30 km to lines held by the 17. Army, with few vehicles, almost no fuel, no armoured support and lots of wounded, exhausted soldiers, they concluded that any attempt to break out would end up with a carnage.

On 4 May the Soviets came out with their offer; they proposed honourable surrender and declared unilateral ceasefire as of 6 am this day, and Red Army trucks with loudspeakers started moving along the frontline. Also on 4 May a group of Evangelical and Roman-Catholic clergy were admitted by Niehoff; they claimed the only was out was to lay down arms. Accounts from this meeting differ; it seems that the general remained polite yet non-committal.^[291] However, later the same day he invited the minister Ernst Hornig to come again and make the same representation to some 25 highest officers.^[292] Once the reverend left, Niehoff asked those gathered for their opinions. Except 4 SS officers, most of these who voiced out agreed.^[293]

It is not clear when Niehoff made up his mind. In line with Soviet proposals, early morning of 5 May he sent his envoys to the Soviets; they soon returned with Gluzdovsky’s conditions, which adhered to internationally accepted POW standards. Niehoff gathered his commanders once more, and proclaimed that he opted for surrender. The only other general present, Ruff, concurred; the only person protesting was Volkssturm commander, SS-Obergruppenführer Herzog. Either late evening on 4 May or on 5 May Niehoff contacted Schörner.^{[note 99]} According to the former, the marshall declared “I will retake Breslau. You, Niehoff, will fight until the last man”; Niehoff replied he would surrender anyway, to be treated to a firm response: “I expect of you, Niehoff, to remain faithful to our deceased Führer”. At this moment the general hung up.^[297] However, it seems that some time later Niehoff got at least a tacit approval on part of both Schörner and commander of the 17. Army, Hasse.^[298]

Either on 4 or 5 May Niehoff met Hanke, the highest civilian and NSDAP authority, who also after Hitler’s death kept declaring that the fight would go on; Hanke was aware that following deposition of Himmler, he had been nominated the SS Reichsführer. Two Niehoff’s accounts, one given to his GRU interrogators few days after surrender and another provided in his book, differ. It appears that Hanke asked for assistance to get out.^[299] The general suggested – apart from "a honourable solution" – that he might issue the gauleiter a fake Soldbuch of a private, or hide him heavily bandaged among the WIA, or clear a passage across minefields so that Hanke could make it on foot.^[300] Eventually very early on 6 May Hanke boarded a Fieseler-Storch aircraft, parked inside of the Jahrhunderthalle, and took off from the Friesenwise airstrip.^{[note 100]} It is not clear whether Niehoff approved of, authorised, merely tolerated or was even aware of the departure,^{[note 101]} especially that the aricraft was operated by a Luftwaffe pilot.^{[note 102]}

Niehoff and Soviet officers^{[note 103]}

Early morning on 6 May Niehoff sent his envoys anew: the purpose was to make sure that combatant rights will be honoured also in case of the SS soldiers.^{[note 104]} Before mid-day they were assured that SS combatants would be treated with full POW rights; on their way back they stepped on own land mine, leaving all of them wounded, one very heavily.^{[note 105]} Having received the message Niehoff wrote another message, accepting the conditions. New envoys were dispatched and crossed the frontline around 3 pm, but the Soviets were disappointed the general did not show up in person.^[309] They sent their own team, which were admitted by Niehoff in his headquarters. Eventually the general with his ADC, his batman and Soviet envoys boarded two cars^{[note 106]} and drove to the Hauptbanhof; from there they walked to Villa Colonia at Kaiser-Friedrich-Strasse, where the instrument of capitulation was signed. A banquet followed, while one copy of the document was sent to the headquarters of the German garrison. It arrived around 8 pm, shortly before Soviet troops started to enter the city.^[311] By this time Gestapo managed to execute 40 Czechs, suspected of having taken part in conspiracy and held in the Strafgefängnis Breslau prison.^{[312][note 107]}

Military

A British historian claims the Germans lost around 5,700 KIA.^{[note 121]} According to von Ahlfen and Niehoff, the German garrison lost 6,000 KIA and 23,000 WIA, and these figures are frequently repeated in historiography,^[354] though a times with reservations.^{[note 122]} In the mid-1960s Polish scholars considered 6,276 KIA an understated figure.^[356] Some non-scientific sites consider 8,500^[357] or even 9,000.^[358] A scholar who specialises in Wrocław funeral history claims that out of 15,000 German soldiers buried in Breslau during the war or shortly afterwards and evidenced by Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, only some 10% died before the siege; this would reportedly point to irrecoverable German losses of some 13,500 KIA.^{[note 123]} At least 64 Germans were executed by their own side for alleged defeatism or as deserters.^{[360][note 124]} The highest-ranking ground troops German soldier killed in Breslau identified was a major, count Adolf von Seidlitz-Sandreczki.^{[note 125]}

According to internal Soviet military reports, the Red Army suffered 7,107 KIA and 24,427 WIA.^{[363][note 126]} The number of soldiers, buried at Soviet military section of the Skowronia Góra cemetery was officially stated as 7,121.^{[note 127]} A Russian scholar opts for 7,177 KIA.^[366] Latest Polish figures based on cemetery statistics pointed to 8,000 dead. A present-day historian opts for a figure somewhere between 7,000 and 8,000 killed.^[367] Various works - usually not focused on the Breslau siege - offer estimates like 60,000,^{[note 128]} 65,000^[370] or 70,000^[371] total Soviet losses, apart from claims that the siege cost the Soviets 65,000 KIA.^{[note 129]} These figures are dismissed by others,^{[note 130]} who claim 31,604^[374] or 31,500.^[375]. The highest-ranking ground troops Soviet soldier killed in Breslau identified was political commissar of battalion in the 181. RD, major Yakov I. Chapichev.^[376]

Civilian

There is no register of civilian casualties. Estimates provided by some apparently well-informed individuals - e.g. by head of sanitary services in the fortress, dr Paul Mehling^{[note 131]} - point to some 80,000 dead; reportedly 50,000 perished until end of March, and 30,000 afterwards.^[378] This figure is often accepted by historians.^[379] However, in public circulation there are figures which might range from 17,000,^[380] 20,000,^[381] 29,000^{[note 132]} or 40,000^[383] to 150,000^[384] or even 170,000.^[385] To this number one might also add - though technically not victims of the siege itself - civilians who perished during evacuation in late January and those who suffered various types of violence after the war.^{[note 133]}

Urban

towering Lutherkirche^{[note 134]}

According to later official municipal Polish statistics, out of 32,000 residential buildings some 50,4% were damaged (including some 10,000 completely destroyed); the same percentage applies to 19,000 industrial and similar real estate. Of 620 public buildings, some 46% were more or less damaged, many beyond repair. Out of the total of 90,400 cubic metres of urban substance, some 69% were lost.^[388] The amount of rubble removed is estimated to have been between 8m cubic metres,^[389] 18m ^[390] and 25m;^[391] in comparison, 22m were removed from Warsaw in 1945–1949^[392] and 0.6m from Barcelona in 1939.^{[393][note 135]}

Some symbolic buildings, marking the city skyline and standing as icons of Breslau, were destroyed.^{[note 136]} The key example is Martin Luther Church with its 90 metre tower, the highest point in the city. Opened during a grand ceremony on anniversary of birth of Martin Luther in 1896, the church was blown up by German pioneers when building the inner city airstrip. Similar fate awaited the St. Paul Church with its iconic twin towers; it was demolished by pioneers when preparing defensive positions near Striegauer Platz.^[395] One more example is the magnificent main post office building; it was heavily damaged by artillery fire and aerial bombardments and what remained of it - according to some still suitable for repair works - was levelled by the Poles after the war.^[396] There are numerous other buildings on the list.^{[note 137]}