Simons campaign in Eastern Anatolia

Simon I the Great (Georgian: სიმონ I დიდი, romanized: simon I didi), also known as Svimon (Georgian: სვიმონი, romanized: svimoni;) ( c. 1537 – 1611), of the Bagrationi dynasty, was a Georgian king (mepe) of Kartli from 1556 to 1569 and again from 1578 to 1599. His first tenure was marked by war against the Persian domination of Georgia. In 1569 he was captured by the Persians, and spent nine years in captivity. In 1578 he was released and reinstalled in Kartli. During this period (i.e. his second tenure), he fought as a Persian subject against the Ottoman domination of Georgia. Simon I’s campaigns against the Ottomans unfolded during and after the Ottoman–Safavid War of 1578–1590, when the Ottomans tried to impose themselves over Kartli by occupying Tbilisi and other key fortresses. First, Simon reorganized resistance inside Kartli. He managed to recapture Samshvilde and Dmanisi, both of which the Ottomans had fortified. He then drove the Ottoman garrison from Tbilisi and briefly restored Georgian rule in the city, although the Ottomans returned later. In this phase, his wars were mainly about expelling Ottoman detachments and reclaiming his own strongholds. Once his internal position stabilized, Simon began to strike outward. He carried the war into Ottoman territory, pushing into northeastern Anatolia. Georgian sources state that he attacked Ardahan, Oltisi (modern Oltu), and Artvin, burning garrisons, destroying or converting mosques, and carrying off captives and booty. His raids extended toward Erzurum, the main Ottoman fortress of the region. While he never captured Erzurum itself, he disrupted its supply lines and raided the surrounding countryside. These expeditions had several purposes: they weakened Ottoman frontier defenses, signaled to the population of Kartli that resistance was possible, and demonstrated that Georgian armies could not only defend but also carry the fight into Ottoman lands. Some later Georgian accounts even extend his reach as far as Kutaisi and other areas of western Georgia, though those were more short-lived assertions of influence than permanent conquests. Simon's Anatolian campaigns never created lasting territorial gains, but they forced the Ottomans to commit significant resources to hold their northeastern frontier. They also elevated Simon’s standing among Georgians as the king who could both liberate Tbilisi and menace Ottoman Anatolia at its doorstep.

When the peace between the Safavids and the Ottomans collapsed and the Turkish general Lala Mustafa Pasha drove the Persians out of Georgia in 1578, it roused the Safavids to come to take further action. Then incumbent Safavid king Mohammad Khodabanda wanted a puppet ruler in Kartli that was popular amongst the local population. Therefore, he ordered for Simon I to be released from prison and offered him the crown of Kartli on the demand that he would convert to Islam. Having been imprisoned for nine years, Simon I's resolve was weakened. In the same year he accepted the Safavid king's demands, and, in order to invade Tbilisi, he received cannon and 5,000 Qizilbash soldiers led by general Ali-Qoli Khan. Simon led a successful guerilla war against the Turks, recovered most of Kartli by 1579, and put a siege to Tbilisi. At the same time, he induced the prince Manuchar II Jaqeli to revolt against the Ottoman rule in Akhaltsikhe, and attempted to get support from Pope Clement VIII, Emperor Rudolph II and Philip II of Spain. The negotiations, however, failed to yield any serious results. In 1580 Simon I repulsed Ottoman invasion of Kartli, and in 1582 defeated main Ottoman army on the field of Mukhrani, which had a lasting impact as Ottomans were at the height of their power and such a defeat shuttered the myth of their invincibility. Simon I's Persian monolingual seal of the same period reads: "Allah, who has no equal, knows that Semiyun (Simon) is a slave of the Shah from the bottom of his heart, 933 (1585)".

During Simon I's eastern Anatolian campaign, the Battle of Artvin became one of the most tactically successful engagements for the Georgian forces. The Ottomans and their allies advanced through difficult mountainous terrain, expecting a direct confrontation. Simon I deliberately positioned the main Kartlian force at the front, openly blocking the enemy's advance and drawing their full attention. While the Ottomans concentrated on the frontal engagement, Khevsur and Pshav detachments, experienced in mountain warfare, moved silently through forested slopes and narrow passes. Using their knowledge of the terrain, they attacked the Ottoman rear and flanks simultaneously, striking supply lines and command units. This sudden encirclement caused confusion and panic within the Ottoman ranks. Caught between Kartlian pressure from the front and highland warriors attacking from behind, the Ottoman formation collapsed. The battle ended in a decisive Georgian victory, demonstrating effective coordination between regular forces and mountain fighters, and highlighting Georgian superiority in terrain-based warfare.

Simon I's offensives against Oltisi Artvin and Ardahan took place in the late 1570s and early 1580s during the height of his resistance against Ottoman power in the Caucasus. After the Ottomans extended their frontier following the Treaty of Amasya and the outbreak of the Ottoman–Safavid wars their garrisons pushed deep into Georgian lands Simon responded by launching counteroffensives into frontier districts. Oltisi (modern Olti) was a fortified post controlling the approaches between Tao-Klarjeti and Erzurum. Simon gathered his forces and struck swiftly catching the Ottoman garrison unprepared. The Georgian troops stormed the walls and after sharp fighting seized the fortress. The garrison was largely wiped out and the population either fled or was put to the sword. The capture of Oltisi gave Simon a base for deeper raids and threatened Ottoman supply lines in Erzurum vilayet Artvin was another key fortress town on the Çoruh valley serving as a crossing point between Anatolia and Georgian lands. Once Oltisi fell Simon advanced westward toward Artvin. Georgian forces surrounded the town cut off its roads and attacked in waves. The defenders offered resistance but the fortress was eventually taken by storm. Artvin was sacked its warehouses and armories looted and much of the Ottoman garrison destroyed. The fall of Artvin meant that the Ottomans lost one of their main bulwarks in eastern Anatolia and Simon's raiders could now move freely along the river valleys Ardahan was the strongest of the three holding a large Ottoman garrison and guarding the approaches to Erzurum and Kars. Simon's men carried out a sudden night assault exploiting weak points in the walls. Fighting raged in the streets as Georgians overwhelmed the defenders. Ardahan's fall was followed by a thorough plundering of the town livestock and supplies were carried back to Kartli and the Ottoman presence was temporarily driven out of the region. This victory was symbolic since Ardahan had been one of the Ottomans’ newest acquisitions and its loss exposed the fragility of their frontier

• Battle of Karagak
• Battle of Khresili
• Battle of Digomi
• Battle of Rukh
• Category:History of Georgia (country)
• Category:Wars involving the Ottoman Empire

1. Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the Mediterranean World After 1492, p. 85, edited by Alisa M. Ginio, first edition (1992), Routledge, hardcover, ISBN 978-0-7146-3492-0
2. Rayfield 2012, p. 176.
3. Beradze 2012, p. 466.

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• Mikaberidze, Alexander (2015). Historical Dictionary of Georgia. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. doi:10.5771/9781442241466. ISBN 978-1-4422-4146-6.
• Rota, Giorgio (2017-02-03). "Conversion to Islam (and sometimes a return to Christianity) in Safavid Persia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries". In Norton, Claire (ed.). Conversion and Islam in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-317-15979-7.