Stefan Toshev

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On the eve of the Serbo-Bulgarian War, Stefan Toshev was captain of the 2nd company of the 3rd Bdin Infantry Regiment. At the beginning of the war he was also appointed commander of the covering detachment at Tran, which consisted of three infantry companies and one artillery battery.^[1] During the night of 1–2 November 1885, Toshev received orders to bring his company from Filipovtsi to Tran and assume command of the troops defending the position.^[2] On the morning of 3 November, the Serbian Morava Division advanced against the Bulgarian position with approximately three times as many troops. Its forces moved in two columns and attacked before the Bulgarians had fully prepared their defences.^[3] Despite their numerical inferiority, the Bulgarians held their ground. Toshev used his small reserve to reinforce the threatened parts of the line, and the Serbian attacks were eventually repulsed after fighting that continued until late in the day.^[4] Military historian Yordan Venedikov later described the defence of the Tran position as the first Bulgarian success of the war and emphasized Toshev’s timely use of his limited reserves.^[5]

The success at Tran was not enjoyed by the Bulgarians for long, though, as during the night, Toshev was ordered to retreat towards Breznik as Serbian forces had overcome the Bulgarian detachment at Vrabcha and threatened to cut off his line of retreat. He remained at the position until all other troops had withdrawn and gave the signal for departure at about 2:00 in the morning.^[6] The march soon became disorganized when the baggage train stalled at Babin Most. To restore the movement of the column, Toshev decided on his own responsibility to disperse the wagons along side roads. An artillery piece that became trapped in a narrow ravine also had to be abandoned.^[7] The main forces reached Breznik during the afternoon and continued toward Slivnitsa that same night.^[8]

Toshev’s detachment arrived at the Battle of Slivnitsa on 5 November after an exhausting march. Without time for rest or food, his company was sent to occupy the Gradishte height and strengthen the right flank of the Bulgarian position.^[8] On 6 November, Toshev’s company, together with one Pleven and one Plovdiv company, was ordered to attack the height known as Meka Tsrev. Toshev personally led his troops forward under heavy Serbian fire, while the other two companies fell behind. During the attack, a Serbian bullet struck the scabbard of his sabre and tore away half of it, without wounding him.^[9] As the Serbian troops began to fall back, Toshev ordered his company to return to its original position so that the other two companies could catch up with his own and make a simultaneous bayonet attack, however, he soon realized that his decision had been a mistake, but by then the Serbs had fortified their position. During a second attack later that day, Toshev again led his company forward, and the Bulgarian troops captured Meka Tsrev.^[10] On 7 November, the fighting shifted toward the nearby heights of Tri Ushi. After receiving an order to attack, Toshev drew his sabre and personally led his company across the ravine separating the Bulgarian and Serbian positions. His soldiers climbed the steep slope, attacked the Serbian flank and captured the easternmost height at about 11:00.^[11] Serbian reinforcements then organized a new defence on the central height. During the renewed Bulgarian attack, Toshev again placed himself at the front of his troops. He was struck in both legs and collapsed behind a rock, where he was later found unconscious and removed from the battlefield.^[12] His wounds prevented him from returning to combat before the end of the war.^[13]

After the Serbo-Bulgarian War, Toshev continued to advance through the ranks of the Bulgarian Army. In 1886 he was appointed commander of the 3rd Bdin Infantry Regiment, and in the following year he took command of the 11th Sliven Infantry Regiment. Alongside his regular service, he devoted considerable attention to military study, reading extensively on warfare and examining Bulgarian military history, as well as the behaviour and morale of Bulgarian soldiers in battle.^[14] On 1 April 1887, Toshev was promoted to the rank of major. He subsequently commanded the 7th Preslav Infantry Regiment and, from 1890, the 8th Preslav Infantry Regiment.^[15] His advancement continued with promotion to lieutenant colonel on 2 August 1891 and to colonel on 2 August 1895. In 1899 he was appointed commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Thracian Infantry Division.^[16] Toshev was promoted to major general on 1 January 1904. He later commanded the 7th Rila Infantry Division and, from 1909, the 1st Sofia Infantry Division, which was known as the “Iron Division”.^[16]

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At the beginning of the First Balkan War, Major General Stefan Toshev commanded the 1st Sofia Infantry Division, known as the “Iron Division”. The division formed part of the Bulgarian 1st Army and was intended to operate between the fortresses of Edirne and Lozengrad, while the 2nd Army moved against Edirne and the 3rd Army advanced toward Lozengrad.^[17] Following the general mobilization of 17 September 1912, Toshev supervised the formation of the division’s companies, regiments and brigades. When war was declared on 5 October, he immediately ordered his troops to advance and cross the Ottoman border.^[18]

The division first entered major combat on 9 October, when its 1st Brigade encountered Ottoman forces around Seliolu and Gechkenli. The fighting developed unexpectedly, but the Bulgarian deployed rapidly and launched an aggressive attack that drove the Ottoman troops southward.^[19] At Gechkenli, the leading company of the 1st Sofia Infantry Regiment held back six Ottoman battalions until the arrival of reinforcements. The subsequent Bulgarian advance overran enemy batteries and forced the Ottoman corps to withdraw during the night.^[20] The action caused a disagreement between Toshev and the commander of the 1st Army, General Vasil Kutinchev. Kutinchev regarded the brigade’s advance as an impulsive departure from the original plan and ordered it to withdraw. Toshev argued that the unexpected situation required quick and decisive action, and that the victory had produced an important psyc−hological effect on both armies. Although he initially refused to abandon the captured ground, he eventually carried out the order.^[21] Toshev remained convinced that the victory at Gechkenli and Seliolu had broken the confidence of the Ottoman troops and could have been exploited more fully through an immediate continuation of the advance.^[22]

The Ottoman army defending Lozengrad was defeated shortly afterwards, and Bulgarian troops entered the abandoned fortress on 11 October. Toshev believed that the Bulgarian command failed to appreciate the full extent of the Ottoman disorganization and did not take sufficiently energetic measures to pursue the retreating forces.^[23] On 14 October the Iron Division resumed its advance eastward. After receiving information the following day that the enemy had withdrawn towards Lule Burgas, Toshev changed the direction of his division on his own initiative and moved westward toward the fighting there.^[24] When the division reached the valley of the Karagach Dere, Toshev found that a gap several kilometres wide had opened between the two brigades of the Bulgarian 6th Infantry Division. Ottoman troops had penetrated the gap and were threatening the exposed flanks of the Bulgarian units. Toshev directed his artillery against the advancing force while his infantry attacked it directly, driving it back across the river before nightfall. The intervention stabilized the front and, prevented the 6th Division from being defeated.^[25]

On 16 October, after the position at Lule Burgas had been secured, an officer from the neighbouring 3rd Army asked Toshev for assistance against the Ottoman forces advancing toward Bunar Hisar. Although his division did not belong to that army, Toshev agreed to provide support and began preparing an energetic advance for the following morning. He also informed the commander of the 10th Division, operating to the south, and requested its cooperation.^[26] He was subsequently ordered by Kutinchev to place the division on the defensive, but regarded remaining inactive while the neighbouring army was in danger as unacceptable. This decision to intervene helped preserve the wider Bulgarian position.^[27] On 17 October the Iron Division advanced against the Ottoman forces north of Lule Burgas. This occurred even though the 1st Army had been instructed to remain in reserve and avoid battle that day. After prolonged fighting, Toshev’s troops captured the opposing positions and forced the enemy to retreat eastward in disorder.^[28] The Bulgarian armies continued to press the Ottoman forces over the following days, but the pursuit was halted on 19 October. Toshev later repeatedly criticized this decision, arguing that further pressure against the retreating Ottoman flank might have brought about the collapse of the opposing army. He believed that the interruption allowed the Ottoman troops to escape and reorganize on the fortified Chataldzha line.^[29]

The combined Bulgarian 1st and 3rd armies reached the Chataldzha position on 29 October and spent four days entrenching. By then the troops had endured almost a month of continuous marching and fighting, while cholera was spreading through the ranks.^[30] Toshev later criticized the decision to attack the fortified line without adequate reconnaissance or preparation. The Ottoman defences were protected by difficult terrain, deeply entrenched positions with obstacles and strong artillery, while their precise arrangement was not sufficiently known to the Bulgarians.^[31] The attack began on 4 November along a front of approximately 25 kilometres. The 1st Sofia Division advanced on the extreme right through marshy terrain under heavy Ottoman artillery fire.^[32] On 5 November the 26th Yambol Infantry Regiment captured the Ileri Tabia fort and defeated its garrison, but received no reinforcement with which to exploit the success. After also being struck twice by Bulgarian artillery fire, the regiment was forced to abandon the captured fort with heavy losses.^[33] Toshev later maintained that reinforcements should have been sent during the night and that a general attack should have followed on the morning of 6 November. Instead, the higher command ordered a retreat while substantial reserves remained unused.^[34]

Although he sharply criticized the planning of the operation, Toshev emphasized that the Bulgarian soldiers had performed their duty under exceptionally difficult conditions. The troops advanced under direct artillery fire, with limited support from their own artillery, while suffering from exhaustion, mud and the growing cholera epidemic.^[35] The fighting continued for several more days, but neither side achieved a decisive result, and an armistice was signed on 20 November 1912.^[36] During the armistice, Toshev warned that the Ottoman army was using the delay to reorganize and receive fresh troops, weapons and supplies. He argued in late December that continued inactivity would steadily worsen the Bulgarian position, since the Bulgarian army had few remaining sources of reinforcement while the Ottoman forces were growing stronger.^[37] When hostilities resumed in January 1913, Ottoman troops attempted to advance from Chataldzha toward Bulair but failed to break the Bulgarian front. On 5 February, Toshev identified a renewed Ottoman effort against the Bulgarian forces at Chataldzha and helped drive them back across the Kara Su to their former positions.^[38]

On 6 March the Iron Division helped repel an Ottoman attempt to retake Silivri by striking the flank of the advancing coastal column.^[39] Five days later, on 11 March, the division attacked along the Elbasan–Sioryunkoy line, drove the Ottoman troops behind the Kara Su and again took position opposite the Chataldzha fortifications. During the following fighting, the Bulgarians resisted repeated attacks against their right wing and inflicted heavy losses on the Ottoman columns.^[40] Toshev was nevertheless ordered to take part in another attack near Kum Burgas on 15 March. After examining the area, he concluded that the assault lacked sufficient preparation and artillery support and initially postponed it. Kutinchev then issued a categorical order for it to proceed, but the attack failed despite heavy fighting and considerable casualties.^[41]

An armistice with the Ottoman army came into force on 31 March 1913, ending the fighting on the Thracian front and allowing the London peace negotiations to resume.^[42] In his later assessment of the campaign, Toshev praised the conduct of the Bulgarian troops but repeatedly questioned the decisions to halt successful advances or ordered attacks without adequate preparation. He attributed these missed opportunities not only to military errors, but also to political and diplomatic considerations that influenced the actions of the High Command.^[43]

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During the Second Balkan War, Stefan Toshev commanded the Bulgarian Fifth Army, whose main forces were concentrated around Kyustendil. Its task was to cooperate with the Fourth Army and help stop the Serbian advance toward the town.^[44] Toshev, however, had not been fully informed about the objectives assigned to the Second and Fourth armies in Macedonia, which limited his understanding of the wider operation.^[45]

The Bulgarian government under Stoyan Danev ordered a halt to military operations on 18 June 1913. The decision created confusion within the Bulgarian command and allowed Serbia and Greece to gain the initiative.^[46] A few days later, while the Fifth Army was advancing toward Kitka and Sultan Tepe, Toshev was ordered to stop and withdraw behind the Osogovo and Konavska mountain ranges. Believing that such a retreat would seriously weaken the Bulgarian position, he personally appealed to General Mihail Savov, who commanded the combined Fourth and Fifth armies. Savov accepted his arguments and cancelled the order.^[45] Military writer Georgi Kazandzhiev later argued that Toshev’s intervention prevented an even greater disaster for the Bulgarian army.^[45]

Toshev was in favour of a more aggressive course of action. He proposed that the right wing of the Fifth Army advance toward Kitka and Kumanovo, threatening the Serbian rear and making it more difficult for the enemy to concentrate its forces against him.^[47] The plan was not approved. Instead, units of his army were ordered to protect the right flank of the Fourth Army.^[48] On 27 June, Toshev took personal responsibility for launching another advance, this time with the aim of capturing the strategically important Kitka peak and the town of Kriva Palanka.^[48] After five days of heavy fighting and a Bulgarian victory near Machin Koria, the Fifth Army was once again ordered to retreat. Soon afterward, Romania’s invasion of northern Bulgaria forced Toshev to prepare defensive positions along the Konavska mountain range.^[49] The Fifth Army resumed its advance toward Sultan Tepe on 5 July and recovered some of its earlier positions. However, after the successful capture of Dukat peak, the High Command again ordered it to stop.^[50] Overall the Fifth army under Stefan Toshev is credited with halting the Serbian advance toward Kyustendil, taking part in the defeat of the Serbian Danube Division and the capture of Kitka, and later supported the Bulgarian counteroffensive against the Greeks at the Battle of Kresna Gorge.^[51]

Toshev later placed most of the responsibility for Bulgaria’s defeat on the policies of Stoyan Danev's government and on the mistakes and hesitation of the High Command, rather than on the conduct of the common Bulgarian soldier.^[52] His opinion was that the outcome of the war was especially bitter, because the Bulgarians had won a number of battles against Serbia and Greece but were nevertheless forced to accept the Treaty of Bucharest.^[53] On 5 August 1913 he was promoted Lieutenant General.

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When Bulgaria entered the First World War, Toshev was appointed commander of the Third Army. Its initial mission was to defend the country’s long northern and northeastern frontier, including the Danube, Dobruja and Black Sea coastline. The army initially consisted of the 4th Preslav and 5th Danube infantry divisions, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade and the newly formed 12th Infantry Division. While the First and Second armies fought on the Serbian and Macedonian fronts, the Third Army remained concentrated between Ruse and Varna, preparing a defensive line approximately 200 kilometres long.^[54]

This prolonged period of defensive inactivity was unpopular among many of the army’s officers and soldiers, who wished to participate more directly in the fighting. Toshev nevertheless used the time to construct roads, trenches and fortified positions. When Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente in August 1916, the Third Army was assigned the principal role in the campaign for Dobruja. It was placed under the overall authority of Field Marshal August von Mackensen’s newly formed army group, but Toshev retained operational command of the Bulgarian forces.^[55]

Campaign plan and the battle of Tutrakan

Toshev’s conception of the campaign differed substantially from Mackensen’s. The German field marshal favoured the rapid seizure of both Tutrakan and Silistra, followed by an early crossing of the Danube and an advance into Romania. Toshev regarded the liberation of Dobruja as Bulgaria’s immediate objective and considered it dangerous to divide the available forces between two powerful fortresses. He argued that the Third Army should first concentrate its main strength against Tutrakan, while leaving only covering detachments before Silistra and Dobrich. After Tutrakan had fallen, the army could redirect its forces against the remaining Romanian positions.^[56]

At a conference at Gorna Oryahovitsa on 31 August 1916, Toshev defended four principal points: the Third Army had to begin with a virtually certain success; Tutrakan was to be its first objective; all available forces were to be concentrated against the fortress; and only screening forces were to be left before Silistra and Dobrich. Despite an intense dispute, Mackensen eventually accepted this plan. Toshev then organized an echeloned advance, placing the main striking force under Major General Panteley Kiselov, commander of the 4th Preslav Division.^[57]

Tutrakan was among Romania’s strongest fortified positions. It possessed several defensive lines, numerous forts, artillery emplacements, concrete shelters, barbed-wire obstacles and concealed communications. Its garrison numbered approximately 39,000 men and was supported by 246 guns and 78 machine guns. Toshev nevertheless rejected Mackensen’s suggestion that the fortress might require a siege lasting several months. He maintained that delay would allow Russian reinforcements to reach the region and that every available minute was therefore important.^[58]

The assault began on 5 September with a powerful artillery barrage. The 4th Preslav Division delivered the main attack against the southern forts, while supporting formations struck other sectors. After the artillery had disrupted the Romanian positions, the Bulgarian infantry attacked the fortifications in successive waves. The main defensive line was penetrated during the first day, and on 6 September the assault continued against the second line. The Romanian commander abandoned the battlefield before the fighting had ended, and the garrison capitulated later that day.^[59]

The victory produced more than 28,000 prisoners and the capture of approximately 150 guns, while also eliminating a fortified position that had threatened Bulgaria’s northern frontier. Toshev congratulated Kiselov and the Preslav Division, emphasizing both the material and moral importance of the victory. The speed of the operation also proved his insistence on concentrating the army’s strength against a single objective, rather than dispersing it between Tutrakan and Silistra. German participation in the assault was comparatively limited, and Toshev later rejected attempts by both enemies and allies to minimize the predominantly Bulgarian character of the victory.^[60]

Battle of Dobrich and the advance through Southern Dobruja

While the attack on Tutrakan was taking place, other formations of the Third Army under General Todor Kantardzhiev advanced toward Dobrich. The fighting around Dobrich lasted several days and involved Bulgarian units fighting against Romanian, Russian and Serbian forces. Local inhabitants assisted the army by carrying ammunition, supplying food and water, evacuating the wounded and providing medical aid. The Bulgarian cavalry division under Ivan Kolev played a decisive role in disrupting the opposing formations and threatening their flanks.^[61]

The victories at Tutrakan and Dobrich allowed the Third Army to recover almost all of Southern Dobruja within approximately eight days. Silistra was evacuated by its defenders, and the Romanian and Russian forces withdrew toward the prepared defensive lines farther north. These early victories gave the Bulgarian army the strategic initiative, but they also brought Toshev into increasingly serious disagreement with Mackensen over the direction of subsequent operations.^[62]

Disputes with Mackensen and the Battles of Kubadin

Mackensen wished to advance rapidly towards Constanța and the Danube crossings. Toshev believed that the principal concentration of enemy forces had first to be defeated in the centre of the Kubadin position. His proposed operation sought to break the fortified front between Kubadin and Rasova, cut the enemy’s route of retreat across the Danube and drive the remaining forces toward the Black Sea. Mackensen instead divided the allied troops into eastern and western groups and assigned Toshev command of the western group, which was initially expected largely to contain the enemy while the eastern group delivered the main blow.^[63]

Toshev objected both to the division of the Third Army and to what he considered premature attacks without adequate artillery support, reconnaissance or reserves. During the first attempt against the Kubadin position in September 1916, the numerically inferior Bulgarians confronted heavily fortified Russian, Romanian and Serbian forces. The initial assaults achieved local successes but failed to break the entire position, and the opposing forces soon mounted powerful counterattacks. Toshev ordered his exhausted formations to withdraw to previously prepared positions rather than risk their destruction before fresh enemy reinforcements.^[64]

For the remainder of September and the beginning of October, the Third Army resisted repeated attacks. Its cavalry and infantry fought for extended periods against larger formations, preventing Russian cavalry from turning the army’s flank and stopping attempts to penetrate toward the Danube. Romanian forces also crossed the river near Ryahovo in an attempt to strike the rear of the Bulgarian position, but Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian forces contained and eliminated the bridgehead.^[65]

Mackensen continued to press for immediate renewed offensives, while Toshev insisted that the army first had to be regrouped, reinforced and supplied with additional heavy artillery. Their disagreements became increasingly personal. Mackensen at times attempted to bypass Toshev’s operational judgment, reorganized the allied forces without securing his agreement and demanded attacks that Toshev regarded as wasteful. Toshev repeatedly refused to commit his soldiers to actions that he believed lacked sufficient preparation, declaring that Bulgarian lives should not be sacrificed merely to satisfy the timetable of the German command.^[66]

The second major attack on the Kubadin position began on 19 October after additional German forces and heavy artillery had arrived. Although the initial assault was checked, the fighting on 20 and 21 October broke the main defensive line. Toshev skilfully employed his reserves and artillery, reinforced threatened sectors and supported the divisions that penetrated deeply into the Entente positions. The 4th Preslav Division captured approximately 2,300 enemy soldiers and commanders, while the First Sofia Division, the cavalry and the attached Ottoman formations advanced on adjoining sectors. The opposing armies subsequently began an organized withdrawal.^[67]

The fall of the Kubadin position opened the road to Constanța, Medgidia and Cernavodă. Bulgarian and allied forces occupied Constanța on 22 October, Medgidia on 23 October and Cernavodă on 25 October, severing the principal railway connection with Bucharest. The success once again supported Toshev’s argument that the decisive blow should be concentrated against the centre of the enemy’s fortified system rather than dispersed across a broad front.^[68]

Removal from command

Despite the victory, the conflict between Toshev and Mackensen did not subside. Mackensen removed formations from Toshev’s command to support operations farther north and continued to demand advances before the Third Army had received the reinforcements requested. Toshev considered this treatment damaging not only to his personal authority but also to the dignity and operational independence of the Bulgarian command. He asked the Bulgarian High Command to relieve him, although his first request was refused.^[69]

Toshev continued directing operations in Northern Dobruja and strengthening the army’s extended front. He opposed abandoning Tutrakan and Silistra when Mackensen proposed withdrawing their garrisons, a decision later justified when Romanian forces attempted a landing near Ryahovo. He also continued to advocate the complete occupation of Dobruja before the allied forces advanced toward Bucharest. On 16 November 1916 he again submitted his resignation. It was accepted, and he was formally replaced by General Stefan Nerezov on 23 November.^[70]

The campaign continued after his departure, and the remaining parts of Northern Dobruja were occupied during December 1916 and the beginning of January 1917. The Third Army reached the lower Seret, completing the removal of Romanian and Russian forces from the region. Toshev’s principal contribution had been the planning and execution of the opening operations, the concentration against Tutrakan, the defence of the army during the enemy counteroffensive and the eventual breakthrough of the Kubadin position.^[71]

Later appointments during the war

In recognition of his service, Ferdinand promoted Toshev to the rank of general of the infantry and initially retained him at the Bulgarian General Headquarters. He was subsequently appointed governor-general of the Macedonian Military Inspection District. The district included nine administrative areas, and Toshev assumed the post on 16 January 1918. He was also entrusted with organizing the defences of the Aegean coast, an area considered strategically important because Bulgaria’s access to the Aegean Sea might be threatened at the conclusion of the war.^[72]

In June 1918 Toshev was appointed commander of the Fourth Army, whose front extended along the Struma River and the Aegean coast. Following Bulgaria’s surrender and the demobilization of the field army, he became head of the Fourth Military Inspection District at Gumurdjina. He remained there until June 1919, when he left active military service after more than four decades in the Bulgarian Army.^[73]

Between 1923-1924 he was a chairman of the "Association of the reserve officers". In October 1923 he led the "Narodna Priznatelnost" committee whose aim was to give assistance for the victims of the Communist insurgents during the September Uprising.^[74]

General Stefan Toshev died on 27 November 1924 in Plovdiv and was buried in Sofia. One town (General Toshevo) and a village are named after him.