Strategic frivolity
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Strategic frivolity in foreign policy defines shortsighted political decisions that are not connected to the long-term interests of the country making those decisions.[1][2][3] Henry Kissinger used the term in his book World Order (2014)[4] while describing the policies that caused the First World War and remarked that "history punishes strategic frivolity sooner or later".[1]
Kissinger had introduced the notion of frivolity in his book Diplomacy (1994), describing the actions of the statesmen in the second half of the 19th century that eventually led to the First World War. In particular, he singled out the actions of Napoleon III, who considered the foreign policy of France as "an instrument he uses to secure his rule in France", per the words of Baron Hübner. "Frivolity is a costly indulgence of a statesman", and Napoleon quickly got trapped in the crises he manufactured without thinking through the long-term consequences; after antagonizing Russia by joining the Crimean War in 1853 and supporting the Polish Uprising in 1863, he found no support against the German assertiveness already in 1864 during the Second Schleswig War. The control over the power arrangements in Germany, enjoyed by France for centuries (since Cardinal Richelieu), was lost in a flash.[5]
In World Order, Kissinger describes how diplomatic resolutions of the First Moroccan Crisis, the Second Moroccan Crisis, and the Bosnian Crisis created an impression that risk-taking to appease the nationalistically-inclined journalists and agitated public is a normal way of conducting the foreign policy. Statesmen became accustomed to pushing other major powers over issues of secondary interest, counting on diplomats to find ways to avoid actual wars. The overall European status quo actually was acceptable to all major powers (there were no territorial disputes in Europe with the exception of Alsace–Lorraine), yet it took just two weeks from Austria-Hungary's 10-point ultimatum to Serbia to a start of hostilities. Europe never recovered from this indulgence.[6]