Talk:Existence

Hey @Phlsph7,

Congrats on another GA! Two notes with respect to historical figures:

The serious one is that Heidegger is not correctly represented. He uses the term Existenz only to refer to Dasein's "mode of being". Paraphrased in normal language (which Heidegger would reject), Being and Time presents existence as something like the base-level activity of human life. Although it is hardly a model article, I cleaned up fundamental ontology a while ago, which elaborates on this point somewhat.

According to Heidegger, everyone else mentioned in the article is wrong because they are all proceeding upon a set of assumptions that are false. The real question of being is a question about meaning; fundamental ontology is hermeneutics. He claims in this way to have "overcome" metaphysics. (In my own judgment, he just changed the topic of conversation...)

I see, however, that you have four sources for two sentences on this. Are you sure you're reading them correctly? I'm confident of my grasp of this material, but that does not mean I might not be wrong!

In sum, I think Heidegger should either be jettisoned entirely or else given a more substantial treatment, perhaps in the section on "Modes and degrees of existence".

Second, I was surprised by the absence of Spinoza! I was going to add a few sentences about Hegel, but the most natural way to do this, in the context of this article, would probably involve reference back to Spinoza's substance monism (as well as Aristotle, of course—who is already represented, of course).

I'll wait for your comments (or those of anyone else!) before making any edits.

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 19:49, 26 December 2023 (UTC)

@PatrickJWelsh: Thanks for the feedback and the insightful comments. I adjusted the formulation to get it a little closer to Heideggers contrast between beings and being and added one more source. The formulation in its current form reflects Nicholson 1996 and Boyle 2017. Their relevant passages are available online. I also added a footnote to clarify Heideggers own terminology. But let me know if you think that it is still problematic. In that case it might be better to not mention Heidegger.

I think having a short discussion of Spinoza and Hegel would be a good addition. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:06, 27 December 2023 (UTC)

Hey @Phlsph7,

I made some edits to the short paragraph on Heidegger. Since he makes such a big deal out of the etymology of Existenz and uses it only for the mode of Dasein's being, I think this article should adhere to his own practice, even if some sources occasionally use the term "existence" when glossing the ontological difference. You footnote is good on this.

Also, you'll see that I added a source, but I can't make my inline citations appear correctly in the multiref template, which I've never used. I expect it's something simple and obvious, but I can't see what. Can you fix this? All of the bibliographic and citational information is there.

I'll keep my eyes out for a good source to support a few sentences on Spinoza and Hegel.

Cheers, Patrick J. Welsh (talk) 17:24, 2 January 2024 (UTC)

@PatrickJWelsh: Your adjustments sound good, thanks for ensuring that the article stays faithful to the terminology. I fixed the multiref template, it was only missing the closing tag "}}" at the end. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:46, 3 January 2024 (UTC)

I need help from someone with a better understanding of the article. Should this be reworded to: For instance, to deny that dinosaurs exist means that the property of being a dinosaur has not been instantiated? User1042💬✒️ 15:21, 8 January 2024 (UTC)

Your paraphrase is correct and more concise. Normally, it would be preferable. However, I feel that, in this case, the more lengthy expression is better since it makes it more explicit in what sense existence is a property of properties. I slightly reformulated the passage to better clarify this point. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:06, 8 January 2024 (UTC)

This is actually very well written IMO, excepting some concepts which drop in a bit quick. So not a copy edit, but here are some queries:

• Ontology: you get into this in the lead without giving much of an idea of what it is: The main philosophical discipline studying existence is called ontology. The orthodox view is that it is a second-order propertyor a property of properties. - something is needed between these two sentences to bridge the gap

  The lead section is probably not the best place to go into this since its purpose is to provide a concise summary of the body of the article. The term has a wikilink so people can follow it to learn more. I added a footnote to the section "Definition and related terms" to clarify this term. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

There are also things in the MOS about the lead that ask that everything is comprehensible, and that people don't have to follow links to understand terms. See WP:EXPLAINLEAD and WP:TECHNICAL: they ask that the "lead section [is] understandable using plain language", does "not assume that the reader is well acquainted with the subject" and that "Terminology in the lead section [is] understandable on sight to general readers". Difficult I know. On links, see MOS:NOFORCELINK, "as far as possible do not force a reader to use that link to understand the sentence" --Jim Killock (talk) 23:10, 26 March 2024 (UTC)

I added a footnote to provide a short definition. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:21, 27 March 2024 (UTC)

Thanks! Some editors frown on footnotes as a means to deal with this issue, as they cannot be accessed on some device, but I will leave that for your future conversations on these points. Jim Killock (talk) 21:08, 27 March 2024 (UTC)

• they state that there are some individuals that do not exist. Oh right? This made me laugh out loud, I am sure it is not meant to do that but it needs more explanation for the drive-by reader. An example would help, eg "such as fantastical creatures, or false gods".

  Agreed, Meinongianism can sound like quite a paradoxical view depending on how it is expressed. I added an example. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

  Careful tho, as now it sounds like universalists don't believe in Santa Claus. Jim Killock (talk) 23:12, 26 March 2024 (UTC)

  I hope they are not offended. :) Phlsph7 (talk) 08:24, 27 March 2024 (UTC)

• `Meinongians - needs a brief explanation as to what these are (ie, people following the thought of Meinong or something.

  Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

• A closely related issue is whether different types of entities exist in different ways or to different degrees. Degrees of what?

  Degrees of existence. I reformulated the sentence to make this clearer. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

• metaphysics - needs a brief explanation of what this is

  I added a footnote to the section "Definition and related terms" to clarify this term. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

  that works for me Jim Killock (talk) 23:53, 26 March 2024 (UTC)

• But the concept of nonexistent objects is not generally accepted - presumabluy because fantasies exist on some level - this might warrant a mention.

  I added a short explanation. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

Stopping there. This is an easier read than I expected but it's also a bit late. I may come back to this tho. Jim Killock (talk) 19:46, 24 March 2024 (UTC)

Hello Jim Killock and thanks for your suggestions. I hope to nominate this article for featured article status soon so more feedback would be welcome. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

Here's another one:

• An example of a thin concept of existence is to state that existence is the same as the logical property of self-identity - this feel like it needs an additional sentence to explain it, or an example.

  Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:22, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

• This distinction was introduced by Martin Heidegger, who calls it the ontological difference and contrasts individual beings with being, the latter of which he presents as the horizon against which beings become the specific beings that they are: this is quite hard work. Could this be explained a bit more?

  I gave it a try but I'm not sure that I was successful. The idea itself is difficult so I'm not sure that there is a concise and accessible way to get it across. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:22, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

• Second-order theorists usually hold that quantifiers rather than predicates express existence Predicates is not described, making this hard to follow. Likewise, the next paragraph, is hard to understand without an explanation of "predicate". I would not footnote this.

  That's a good point since readers may not be familiar with this terminology. I added a short definition. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:22, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

• The "Ronald McDonald does not exist" paragraph: this is quite hard work. It might help to say what the exac problem is. I think you mean to say that for philosophers this sentence appears to mean "The existing entity Ronald McDonald does not exist".

  Agreed, this part is challenging. I reformulated it in the hope of making it at least a little easier. The key point is about how the meaning of the expression Ronald McDonald is interpreted. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:19, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

• Overall these paragraph highlight that language can obscure deeper problems, which philosophy has to unpack. Something which states this simply may also help the reader. eg "some of the problems relating to existence reflect asumptions about existence made in our everyday language, which do not bear closer scrutiny".

  Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:29, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

In the next section, I think I need some of the changes above to make further useful comment, to make sure I am still following this correctly. The language is generally very clear, but it is easy to trip over the less defined or unfamiliar concepts (ontology, predicate, etc).

A different approach is to claim that negative singular existentials lack a truth value since their singular terms do not refer to anything. The term "truth value" needs an explanation, or an alternative phrasing "ie, a lack a thing that is true" or whatever. Jim Killock (talk) 18:52, 30 March 2024 (UTC)

The explanation was given in the following sentence but I found a way to avoid it by merging the two sentences. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:34, 31 March 2024 (UTC)

I believe that "The central dispute about the nature of existence is whether it should be understood as a property of individuals", citing the SEL, must require context. The idea that establishing the nature of existence belongs solely to professional western philosophers is a fallacy. (20040302 (talk) 16:58, 10 June 2024 (UTC))

Thanks for the suggestions. I tried to reformulate this sentence to weaken the claim and mention the context of the dispute. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:15, 11 June 2024 (UTC)

Phlsph7, Thank-you for your effort and vigilance.

On another note, the depiction of anattā (buddhism) is woefully limited, and doesn't appear to represent any of the many schools of Buddhist thought. Probably the most academic approach (in Buddhism) to anattā can be found in the Madhyamaka tradition(s) where we see 'self' (that which is being denied in the phrase 'anattā') as "an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence of that is anattā" (Buddhapalita). The point being that 'self' is a technical term in that it applies to all phenomena. The Madhyamaka, however, are not deeply concerned with existence (seeing it as a concept that depends upon context, rather than as a metaphysical state) - however, many Abhidharma schools use existence / non-existence as a major dichotomy for all phenomena (normally subsequent to empty and prior to momentariness: A classic non-momentary existent is an absence, such as the absence of a parrot in my nose). I will endeavour to put something better here at some point. 20040302 (talk) 02:57, 1 July 2024 (UTC)

I agree, it would be more interesting for our article if this concept was not restricted to people but applied to all phenomena. However, our source, Smith & Worden 2003, p. 18, explicitly restricts it to people: Anatta (people change). Anatta means 'no separate self' or 'no permanent identity or soul'. If we want to use a wider formulation, we should make sure that the sources are not limited to one particular school of Buddhism, such as Madhyamaka. The passage from Smith & Worden 2003 present it as Buddha's own position. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:38, 1 July 2024 (UTC)

Well, in this instance such an assertion would be unreliable. While Smith & Worden may be reliable in their own field, their understanding of Buddhism would be flawed. Not at all unusual - at times it seems that every academic likes to correlate their convictions with a view they perceive as being "Buddhist" - not recognising their own self-imposed interpretation or gloss. What can one say?

The thing is - once we recognise anicca - continual change (everything is as Heraclitus' river), we may collapse into a view that 'anicca: nothing persists (not even for a moment) therefore, nothing exists, therefore nothing is meaningful'. Anatta is a consequence of anicca - and (therefore) is not confined to living beings, otherwise we would be able to point out objects that cannot change (no heat, speed, motion, reflection, charge, direction - nothing) but we cannot. Buddhism overturns the extreme view of 'nothing matters' through accepting karma (consequence): while nothing persists, this moment determines the universe of the next moment, and therefore everything matters.

20040302 (talk) 12:52, 5 September 2024 (UTC)

While I was browsing, I typed in "nonexistence" into the search bar, and got lead to (the top of) this page. I clicked the link for nonbeing, and at the bottom of that page, in "See Also", there was a link for "nonexistence". I clicked it and got lead back here. But I noticed that in both cases, the URL indicated that it was trying to send me to a section titled "Context_in_philosophy". I tried searching through the page's history to see if I could find that section (because it seems like it was renamed into a different section), but this page has a lot of traffic, because even after expanding the revisions per page to 500, I can't even go back a whole year. I tried combing through more pages but I don't really have the energy now to comb through revisions, especially given the binary search method I usually use to narrow down in which revision an edit happened isn't working here due to the sheer volume of edits and the many forms this page's table of contents have taken over the years. Just thought I'd point this problem out so if someone perhaps is willing to figure out if the section needs to be added in or if its contents were really moved to another section, they could fix the redirect.

Also, I just realized this, but the section (or more likely the redirect) being gone is kind of ironic in a similar way that the infamous repeated vandalism of the page "Nothing" is, although whatever broke this redirect is (probably) not vandalism. 74.98.241.87 (talk) 03:13, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

While we're speaking about it, @Phlsph7, do we prefer nonexistence or non-existence? I presume the former, but there are numerous instances of the latter throughout. Remsense ‥ 论 03:19, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

@IP, I've simply changed the redirect to point to the page without further specification, as the term is treated in bold in the lead, and as the two concepts are tightly interwoven, there's no clear place in the article to specifically point to. Remsense ‥ 论 03:21, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

Thanks for fixing the redirect, it seems to be working now. Looking at a few reliable philosophy sources, the spellings nonexistence and non-existence are both used. I guess either option would be fine as long as there is consistency within the article. I defaulted to nonexistence for this purpose, I hope I got all now. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:54, 27 October 2024 (UTC)

The article could address the concept of partial existence as a distinct and relevant state within the broader discussion of existence. Currently, the it focuses on existence in absolute terms—something either exists or it does not—but this overlooks cases where entities exist in a partial or incomplete manner (where they are simply incomplete in a way that is essential to their nature).

For example, a puzzle piece exists fully, but its existence is partial in relation to a completed puzzle. Partial existence is not a case of an object failing to exist in some way; a fragment of pottery can be viewed as an incomplete pot, but it doesn’t make the fragment any less real. Whitehead (in Process and Reality) discusses how entities often exist as parts of a larger process, never complete in themselves, but fully real. 2601:204:F100:B900:B924:82E4:F562:59AB (talk) 04:42, 5 December 2024 (UTC)

We can only include concepts previously discussed in reliable sources. Remsense ‥ 论 04:57, 5 December 2024 (UTC)