The Complexity of Cooperation
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First edition | |
| Author | Robert Axelrod |
|---|---|
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Princeton University Press |
Publication date | 2011 |
| Pages | xiv, 232 pp. |
| ISBN | 0691015678 |
| OCLC | 36327288 |
| Preceded by | The Evolution of Cooperation |
The Complexity of Cooperation, by Robert Axelrod, is the sequel to The Evolution of Cooperation. It is a compendium of seven articles that previously appeared in journals on a variety of subjects. The book extends Axelrod's method of applying the results of game theory, in particular that derived from analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) problem, to real world situations.
Axelrod explains the Tit for tat (TFT or T4T) strategy emerged as the most robust option in early IPD tournaments on computer. This strategy combines a willingness to cooperate with a determination to punish non-cooperation. In these articles, however, he shows, that under more complex circumstances, such as the possibility of error, strategies that are a little more cooperative or a little less punitive do even better than TFT. Generous TFT, or GTFT, cooperates a bit more often than TFT, while Contrite TFT or CTFT defects less frequently.