The Man of Reason
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![]() Cover of the first edition | |
| Author | Genevieve Lloyd |
|---|---|
| Language | English |
| Subject | Western philosophy |
| Publisher | Methuen |
Publication date | 1984 |
| Publication place | United Kingdom |
| Media type | Print (Hardcover and Paperback) |
| Pages | 138 (original edition) |
| ISBN | 978-0415096812 |
The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy (1984; second edition 1993) is a book about the association between maleness and reason in western philosophy by the Australian philosopher Genevieve Lloyd. The work received positive reviews. It has been called a twentieth century classic of feminist thought, and is widely read in the Nordic countries.
Lloyd discusses the relationship between gender and ideals of rationality, and the related issues of relativism and cultural relativism, and addresses the "maleness" of "character ideals centred on the idea of Reason", which in her view has implications for how gender difference is understood. She discusses philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, René Descartes, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Simone de Beauvoir, beginning with a discussion of her The Second Sex (1949).[1]
Lloyd contends that rationality, when conceptualized as a moral or character trait rather than merely a cognitive faculty, has historically been constructed in contrast to qualities ascribed to women.[2] This gendered dichotomy—reason as male, emotion or irrationality as female—is shown to permeate philosophical traditions, even in instances where philosophers did not explicitly intend to make gendered distinctions.[3] The book situates itself within broader feminist critiques of seemingly neutral intellectual traditions, paralleling the work of scholars such as Carol Gilligan, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Susan Moller Okin. [4] While some feminist thinkers have explored gender biases in science or moral theory, Lloyd focuses specifically on the philosophical construction of reason itself. She avoids potential charges of self-refutation by framing her critique not as a rejection of reason, but as an analysis of how reason has been historically defined in gendered terms.[5]
