Three Peaceful Acts and One Reduction
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The Three Peaceful Acts and One Reduction (Chinese: 三和一少; pinyin: Sānhé yīshǎo) is a critical summary of Wang Jiaxiang's views on foreign affairs by Mao Zedong and others, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, in 1962. After the Great Chinese Famine, Wang, Head of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, proposed to strive for a peaceful international environment and to provide foreign aid in a realistic and realistic manner. Mao and others summarized it as "to make peace with imperialism, to make peace with revisionism, to make peace with India and reactionaries of various countries, and to provide less support for national liberation movements". Wang was criticized and dismissed from his post as a result, and was rehabilitated in 1979 during the Boluan Fanzheng.
Reactions

From 1959 to 1961, China experienced the Great Chinese Famine, during which tens of millions of people died. However, it was also one of the periods when China provided the most enthusiastic foreign aid.[1][2] At the same time, the Sino-Soviet split became public, and the two sides argued on issues such as the 14th Dalai Lama in Tibet, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Sino-Indian border dispute, and the Great Leap Forward. In 1960, the Soviet Union suddenly withdrew 1,390 experts from China and terminated 600 contracts, leading to a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations.[3][4][5][6][7]
Following the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in early 1962, under the severe domestic and international situation, Wang Jiaxiang, then Head of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and others put forward a series of prudent and pragmatic foreign affairs proposals, including that foreign aid should be realistic and within its means, strive for a peaceful international environment, adopt a moderate approach, and pay attention to the strategy of struggle in order to overcome or alleviate difficulties; for this purpose, it is necessary to avoid an open breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations, avoid attracting all the sharpness of American imperialism to China, avoid a Korean-style war, and adopt negotiation to resolve the Sino-Indian dispute.[1][2][8][9] In the spring of 1962, Wang Jiaxiang presided over the writing and review of the outline "On the issue of supporting other countries' anti-imperialist struggle, national independence and people's revolutionary movement - realistic and within its means", believing:[1][10]
Given the current extraordinary circumstances, we must proceed with extra caution. We must avoid overstepping boundaries, avoid excessive emphasis, and avoid making unwarranted promises of support. When making such promises, we must leave room for maneuver and avoid overestimating our capabilities. In some areas, we may even need to moderately tighten our belts. We must also clarify in advance any issues that we cannot fulfill in the future to avoid being caught off guard.
In July 1962, the World Peace Council held a World Peace Conference in Moscow to fight for universal disarmament. China sent a delegation headed by Mao Dun. The delegation spoke in accordance with the "low-key" policy agreed upon in advance by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, emphasizing the position of upholding the banner of peace. Mao Dun's speech was drafted by Wang Jiaxiang. Wang Jiaxiang believed that in such a disarmament conference, the focus of the speech should be to explain the issue of peace thoroughly. Therefore, the speech highlighted the idea of "peace is precious". The common document adopted by the disarmament conference afterward was much lower in tone than Mao Dun's speech. It did not contain any words against US imperialism. The Soviet Union was also relatively satisfied with the Chinese delegation's approach, but it aroused dissatisfaction among representatives of several Asian and African countries. Mao Zedong then criticized the Chinese delegation, saying, "They have broken away from the left, strengthened the right, and increased the wavering of the centrists."[8][10][11][12]

In the summer of 1962, Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party critically summarized Wang Jiaxiang's views on foreign affairs: “Make peace with imperialism, make peace with revisionism, make peace with India and reactionaries of other countries, and support national liberation movements less”, namely, Three Peaceful Acts and One Reduction.[1][2][10][12] At the Beidaihe Central Working Conference held in August, Mao linked the Three Peaceful Acts and One Reduction in foreign policy with the Three Freedoms and One Guarantee in domestic policy, and believed that “new right-leaning thoughts have emerged in the Party”.[10][12] At the 10th Plenary Session held in September, the Three Peaceful Acts and One Reduction was criticized. After that, Wang Jiaxiang was effectively removed from his post as Head of the International Department, moved out of Zhongnanhai, and was no longer an important leader of the Party.[1][8][9][13][11][12] Since the 1960s, the Chinese Communist Party has vigorously exported communist revolution in Southeast Asia, providing assistance to communist organizations and guerrilla groups in many countries, including the Communist Party of Indonesia, the Malayan Communist Party, the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the Communist Party of Burma, the Communist Party of Thailand, and the Communist Party of the Philippines.[14][15][16][17][18] In February 1964, when meeting with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and other foreign guests, Mao mentioned again.[19][20][21][22][23]
In the first half of 1962, some people within our Party advocated "Three Freedoms and One Guarantee" domestically, with the aim of dissolving the socialist collective economy and undermining the socialist system. "Three Peaceful Acts and One Reduction" was their international program, while "Three Freedoms and One Guarantee" was their domestic program. These people included members of the Central Committee, secretaries of the Secretariat, and even vice premiers. Besides them, every ministry, every province, and even more branch secretaries were involved. In the summer, we held working conferences and a plenary session of the Central Committee, exposing all these problems.
In March 1954, Mao interrupted while listening to a report, “In 1962, there was another uproar about not talking about class and class struggle, and the various departments were not stable! Deng Zihui wanted to implement the ‘ household contract responsibility system.’ Wang Jiaxiang used to be sick, but he was healthy for six months and wanted to ‘three harmonies and one less.’ He was very enthusiastic! Now we want to ‘ three struggles and one more ’.... At that time, they wanted to implement ‘three harmonies and one less’ internationally and ‘three self-reliance and one contract’ domestically.”[24]
During the Cultural Revolution, Kang Sheng and others further proposed that the diplomatic policy implemented in the 17 years before the founding of the People's Republic of China was "three surrenders and one elimination"[25] (some say that Wang Li elevated "three peace and one reduction" to "three surrenders and one elimination"),[1][26][27][12] and Mao Zedong agreed to criticize it. Wang Jiaxiang was criticized and persecuted, and was placed under house arrest. He died in 1974.[1][2][8][9][13]
Aftermath
During the Boluan Fanzheng, in February 1979, the International Department of the CCP Central Committee submitted a "Request for Instructions on the Rehabilitation of the So-called 'Three Peaceful Acts and One Reduction' and 'Three Reductions and One Extinction' Issues" to the CCP Central Committee.[11] On 9 March 1979, the International Department of the CCP Central Committee issued a "Circular on the Rehabilitation of the So-called 'Three Harmonies and One Less' and 'Three Reductions and One Extinction' Issues," which pointed out that the charges of the so-called "Three Harmonies and One Less" and "Three Reductions and One Extinction" revisionist line imposed on the International Department and the entire foreign affairs front by Kang Sheng, the "Gang of Four," and others should be rehabilitated.[28][13] After the reform and opening up, on the advice of then Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Deng Xiaoping decided to stop exporting revolution and cut off aid to the communist parties of Southeast Asian countries, which greatly changed the relations between China and the governments of neighboring countries.[29][30][31]
References
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- 1 2 3 4 "王稼祥的"三和一少"". 大众网 (in Chinese). 2009-07-01. Archived from the original on 2014-08-11.
- ↑ 彭学涛; 郑瑞峰 (2009-06-01). "中俄揭秘档案:毛泽东四会赫鲁晓夫(组图)(4)". 中国新闻网 (in Chinese). 《文史精华》. Archived from the original on 2009-06-08.
- ↑ "6月24日:中苏两党关系公开破裂". 人民网 (in Chinese). 2013-06-24. Archived from the original on 2025-02-16.
- ↑ "20世纪60年代初期苏联驻华商务机构撤销问题的历史考察". 人民网 (in Chinese). 《当代中国史研究》. 2015-01-12. Archived from the original on 2024-06-11.
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- ↑ 陈小平 (2002年). "20世纪50至60年代"中苏大论战"的背后──评吴冷西的《十年论战(1956-1966)──中苏关系回忆录》". 《当代中国研究》 (3). Archived from the original on 2022-04-12.
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- 1 2 3 "王稼祥:不能为了党员数量而降低党的质量、党的水平". 人民网. Archived from the original on 2019-04-10.
- 1 2 3 4 "王稼祥被指责搞"三和一少"前后". 江苏党史网. 《世纪风采》. 2021-02-19. Archived from the original on 2025-03-16.
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- 1 2 3 吴兴唐 (2014-12-29). "首任中联部长王稼祥:"三和一少"问题平反". 新浪 (in Chinese). 《中国新闻周刊》. Archived from the original on 2025-03-16.
- ↑ 梁衡 (2011-07-19). "揭秘:邓小平为何决定停止"输出革命"?". 凤凰网 (in Chinese). 《北京日报》. Archived from the original on 2018-06-29.
- ↑ 塞巴斯蒂安·斯特兰高(Sebastian Strangio) (2012-05-16). "中国的援助让柬埔寨胆量倍增" (in Chinese). 耶鲁大学. Archived from the original on 2021-05-17.
- ↑ "马来亚共产党战败史:被遗忘在丛林中的华人革命". 凤凰网 (in Chinese). 千龙网. 2010-03-01. Archived from the original on 2020-03-18.
- ↑ 金津 (2016-08-31). "马共的革命与终结". 《华夏文摘》 (in Chinese). 《炎黄春秋》. Archived from the original on 2017-06-30.
- ↑ "流亡中国的东南亚共产党遗族". 《快乐老人报》. 《共产党员》. 2012-08-20. Archived from the original on 2013-10-04.
- ↑ 丁抒 (April 2009). "大跃进/大饥荒和文化大革命" (in Chinese). 香港中文大学. Archived from the original on 2020-06-27.
- ↑ 戴煌 (2002-03-18). "庐山会议到文化大革命(一)". 《华夏文摘》 (in Chinese). 《“‘造神运动’的教训——为庆祝新中国五十华诞而作”》. Archived from the original on 2021-04-23.
- ↑ "中国共产党大事记·1964年". 人民网 (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2024-08-06.
- ↑ "党史百科:中央工作会议(1964年5月15日-6月17日)". 人民网. Archived from the original on 2020-06-27.
- ↑ 何云峰 (2011年). "毛泽东晚年在接班人问题上的三大心结". 《湖南科技大学学报》(社会科学版). Archived from the original on 2025-02-14.
- ↑ 毛泽东 (March 1964). "在一次汇报时的插话". 马克思主义文库 (in Chinese). 1968年汉版《毛泽东思想万岁》. Archived from the original on 2025-02-10.
- ↑ "第十七章 参加毛主席的生日家宴". 马克思主义文库 (in Chinese). 《戚本禹回忆录》. Archived from the original on 2022-03-21.
- ↑ 卜偉華 (2006年). "文革中的外交極左問題" (PDF). 《二十一世纪》. 6 (95). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2022-11-06 – via 香港中文大学.
- ↑ 程映虹 (2006年). "向世界输出革命──"文革"在亚非拉的影响初探". 《当代中国研究》 (3). Archived from the original on 2025-02-21.
- ↑ "中国共产党大事记·1979年". 人民网 (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2024-08-06.
- ↑ 梁衡 (2011-07-19). "揭秘:邓小平为何决定停止"输出革命"?". 凤凰网 (in Chinese). 《北京日报》. Archived from the original on 2018-06-29.
- ↑ "面对现实 实事求是:邓小平认错感动李光耀". 人民网. 《老年生活报》. Archived from the original on 2020-02-04.
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