Trump v. Barbara

Trump v. CASA

Many district court judges quickly blocked the order by issuing universal injunctions, including Judge Deborah Boardman, who said "no court in the country has ever endorsed the president's interpretation. This court will not be the first."^[19] These cases were consolidated into Trump v. CASA, Inc. (2025). The Trump administration asked the US Supreme Court to limit the injunctions to the plaintiffs who were suing against the order.^[20] On June 27, 2025, the Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that federal district courts generally cannot issue nationwide injunctions, avoiding the underlying birthright citizenship question. Justice Brett Kavanaugh appeared to endorse class-wide injunctions in his concurring opinion.^[21]

Barbara v. Trump

The day of the court's ruling in Trump v. CASA, the American Civil Liberties Union, seeing a class action as the best means to challenge the order, filed Barbara v. Trump, asking the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire to grant a class-wide injunction covering those who would not qualify for birthright citizenship under the executive order.^[22] The representative plaintiff, Barbara, a Honduran citizen, is only known by her first name because she fears for her and her family's safety.^[23] CASA de Maryland filed a similar motion as well.^[24] On July 10, 2025, Judge Joseph Laplante granted the ACLU's request, certified a class of born and unborn babies who would be deprived of their citizenship per the administration's policy, and issued a preliminary injunction blocking the order from being enforced upon that class.^[25][26][27]

Washington v. Trump

A separate case, Washington v. Trump (2025), that had been consolidated with Trump v. CASA at the Supreme Court and similarly had its nationwide injunction lifted, was heard in full in June 2025 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On July 23, 2025, that court ruled that Trump's executive order was unconstitutional, the first appeals court to reach this finding, and deemed that this case necessitated a national injunction based on the Supreme Court's limited exceptions outlined in CASA.^[28] Though the administration had also petitioned this decision to the Supreme Court, it had not been picked up along with Barbara.^[1]

For petitioners

Eighteen amici curiae were filed in support of President Trump,^[35] including New York University law professor Richard Epstein,^[36] legal scholars Hans von Spakovsky and Ilan Wurman, Senators Ted Cruz and Eric Schmitt, Representatives Claudia Tenney, Chip Roy, and 27 other Republican members of Congress, Gun Owners of America, the organization Citizens United, and the Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund,^[37] the Republican attorneys general of 25 U.S. states and Guam,^[38] and the Federation for American Immigration Reform.^[39]

For respondents

After the class respondents filed their brief on February 19, 2026, they were joined in condemnation of the order by briefs in 42 amici curiae from across the legal profession, civil rights groups, and others. Organizations writing in response included the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the League of Women Voters, and the National Urban League,^[40] as well as more than 200 other immigrants' rights, legal defense, civil rights, veterans' rights nonprofits and organizations, 19 labor unions, hundreds of legal scholars and professors, and scholars on migration, sociology, economics, and political science.^[41]

Support also came from elected officials, including 217 Democratic members of Congress,^[42] more than 130 state and local governments and dozens of current and former judges,^[43] and over a dozen "former White House lawyers, senior government officials, federal judges, governors, and members of Congress who were appointed or nominated by Republican presidents, or who were elected as Republicans."^[44]

Sauer's argument

Justice Sotomayor said of Sauer that "you are asking us to overrule Wong Kim Ark."^[55][58] Sauer responded that he was not^[59] and argued that he was only asking the Court to narrow it, claiming that it only decided permanent lawful residents due to its use of the word "domicile"^[55][60][a] and that it supported Trump's order. Justice Gorsuch replied, "Well, I'm not sure how much you want to rely on Wong Kim Ark."^[56]

Sauer argued that the Citizenship Clause required both U.S. birth and being "subject to the jurisdiction" of the U.S., which he interpreted as requiring primary national allegiance. Citing historical practice, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and precedent, he argued that citizenship had traditionally depended on allegiance and permanent lawful domicile. Because parents who are only temporarily or unlawfully present lack permanent lawful domicile and sufficient allegiance, he concluded, their U.S.-born children would not automatically be citizens.^[55][60][50]

"[Y]ou're taking ... a revisionist [position] with respect to a substantial part of our history", Justice Kagan said.^[55][58] Like Justices Gorsuch and Jackson, she questioned these arguments' textualism.^[55][62] Sauer never mentioned the Lincoln administration, though Justice Thomas asked him to start with Dred Scott.^[55][62] He did, however, argue textually that the Fourteenth Amendment was only intended for newly emancipated slaves and their children, citing late nineteenth-century attorneys Alexander Porter Morse, Francis Wharton, and George D. Collins, who interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly.^[55][63]

Sauer cited Elk v. Wilkins (1884), which held that Native American children born on Indian reservations with tribal sovereignty were ineligible for birthright citizenship, as they were equivalent to "the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government".^[55][64][b] Justice Sotomayor asked him about United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy (1957), in which the Court had reasoned that "of course" a child of illegal aliens was "an American citizen at birth". She also asked about the executive order's possible retrospective application.^[55][62][66]

Sauer claimed that birthright citizenship "spawned a sprawling industry of birth tourism" and that people from enemy nations "flocked to give birth" in the U.S., yet when Chief Justice Roberts asked him about the prevalence of birth tourism, Sauer answered that "no one knows for sure."^[55][67] Eventually, he gave a large figure, to which Roberts replied: "Having said all that, you do agree that that has no impact on the legal analysis before us?"^[55][62] Justice Kavanaugh also seemed to consider these words more relevant to public policy than judicial interpretation.^[55][51] Sauer argued "we're in a new world now ... where 8 billion people are one plane ride away" from having a U.S. citizen child. Roberts replied, "well, it's a new world. It's the same Constitution".^[55][68] The exchange was viewed as a blow to Sauer's argument.^[62][69][70]

Wang's argument

Wang argued that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed citizenship to everyone born in the U.S. with narrow and sometimes historical exceptions (e.g., children of diplomats, foreign ships, enemy forces). Citing English common law, the Amendment's history, and precedent, she argued that "subject to the jurisdiction" referred to geographic jurisdiction, not parental allegiance or lawful domicile, that Wong Kim Ark rejected a domicile requirement, that birthright citizenship does not depend on a parent's legal immigration status or intent, and that Sauer's interpretation contradicted the Amendment's purpose.^[55][60][50]

Justice Alito asked whether the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 use the same citizenship test to confront Wang with a possible inconsistency in her argument, but Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the two laws have different texts, suggesting they may also have different meanings. Justice Barrett's questioning closely tracked Wang's core argument, suggesting that cases like Indian tribes, occupying armies, and foundlings were not exceptions to birthright citizenship so much as situations outside its scope.^[55][62]

President Trump left during Wang's arguments.^[71] If only for practical, administrative reasons, the Court seemed likely to rule against him.^[51] Justice Kavanaugh first suggested doing so via Wong Kim Ark as Fourteenth Amendment precedent. Then he raised the doctrine of constitutional avoidance^[55][33][51] and said that the decision could rest narrowly on statute (the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952) granting birthright citizenship. Wang agreed to either basis, but Sauer favored the latter as avoiding broad constitutionalization and facilitating new laws.^[55][51]

An hour after leaving, Trump posted on social media: "We are the only Country in the World STUPID enough to allow 'Birthright' Citizenship!"^[71][c] Trump's assertion was incorrect since, at that time, over 30 other countries offered birthright citizenship unconditionally, including most of the Americas.^[73]

Majority opinion and concurrences

The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, and joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson, ruled on the issue.^[76] The opinion held that "[p]eople born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are 'subject to the jurisdiction' of the United States and are citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause".^[79][80]

Rejecting the government's argument that the Fourteenth Amendment tied birthright citizenship to primary allegiance based on parental domicile, the opinion held that the Citizenship Clause imposed no such requirement and found little historical support for that interpretation:^[79][80][81]

Attempts to narrow Wong Kim Ark by noting that the Court's opinion repeatedly referred to the domicile of Wong's parents fail because the holding's underlying reasoning cannot be squared with a domicile requirement; the Court exhaustively canvassed the text and history of the Citizenship Clause and at no point identified any evidence that the ratifiers thought themselves to be imposing a domicile limitation.

The opinion traced a history of U.S. citizenship from English common law and jus soli, or the right of soil, as carried to America and, after the American Revolution, prevailing in every state.^[79][81] The opinion cited Lynch v. Clarke (1844), a case at New York's state high court which found that an Irish child whose parents lived in New York for four years was a citizen by birth.^[79][82] But in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), the opinion continued, the U.S. Supreme Court departed from common law and adopted a view that citizenship was based on jus sanguinis, or the right of blood, in order to exclude the descendants of slaves.^[79][81] This was repudiated by abolitionists, it noted.^[79][82]

Amid the American Civil War (1861–1865), the opinion continued, President Abraham Lincoln's attorney general Edward Bates issued a landmark legal opinion that "every person born in the country is, at the moment of birth, prima facie a citizen ... without any reference to race or color, or any other accidental circumstances." This affirmed the right of soil, the majority's opinion noted.^[79][83] Congress' Radical Republicans, it noted, followed Bates' opinion, further affirming jus soli with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which declared "all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, ... citizens".^[79][83][81]

But, the majority's opinion continued, the act's opponents argued that Congress could not grant citizenship in such a vast way, with rulings following Dred Scott that might render Bates' opinion and the new act unconstitutional. Therefore, the majority's opinion held, both Congress and the states finished the matter by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, putting the "great question of citizenship" over and "beyond the legislative power" as settled constitutionally, "once and for all". With this, the opinion explained,^[79][83][81]

A child born on American soil and subject to American law was made an American citizen .... To be 'subject to' the jurisdiction of the United States, then, is to 'liv[e] under' its 'dominion', ... a meaning reinforced by the Clause's territorial focus on those born 'in' the United States. The Citizenship Clause uses jurisdiction in its ordinary sense—referring to the power of the United States to govern those within its territory.

The opinion reaffirmed the principle of "[w]hat the Court held in Wong Kim Ark", namely that "the Citizenship Clause incorporated the common law and granted citizenship to nearly all children born in the United States". The opinion added that "in the 128 years since, [the Court has] repeatedly understood the rule ... to guarantee citizenship to all children born in the United States and subject to its power."^[80] The opinion concluded that "citizenship, then and now, was the right to have rights—to freely participate in our political community. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment extended that promise to 'every free-born person in this land.' We keep that promise today."^[79][74][75]

Jackson's concurrence

Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor as to the introduction and first part,^[79] called the Reconstruction Amendments an "anticaste, antisubordination reset for the Nation, not a mere spot treatment for the dark stain of slavery", and warned against "Justice Thomas's telling elid[ing] the entire point of the Second Founding".^[79][84] The concurrence called it "the ultimate irony" that his dissent rejected Dred Scott and yet endorsed Dred Scott's core claim that "for certain people, being born on American soil will not suffice to confer citizenship", an "odious claim that the Citizenship Clause plainly rejects".^[85]

Quoting social reformer and abolitionist Frederick Douglass^[86] on the importance of national memory,^[79][85] the concurrence set the Citizenship Clause within Black Americans' long struggle for freedom and equal rights, and within a "universalist" understanding of liberty and equality^[79][87] as they "fought for the shared humanity of all people".^[79][88][89] The Fourteenth Amendment's framers aimed toward the "'perfect equality of every human being before the law'", the concurrence concluded, and "a majority ... remembered this today ... and preserved the most basic ... principle of our Nation's founding—that all human beings are created equal—once more".^[85]

Kavanaugh's concurrence and dissent

Justice Kavanaugh's opinion concurred in the judgment voiding the executive order but dissented from the majority's reasoning, arguing that the Citizenship Clause does not necessarily guarantee citizenship to children of "foreign citizens unlawfully or temporarily in the country". It accepted, however, that Congress has long operated on the understanding that it does, incorporating that view into the Nationality Act of 1940 and later immigration statutes. On that basis, the opinion concluded that the executive order is unlawful, though not necessarily unconstitutional,^[79][86] with legal and political implications if Congress were to amend the governing citizenship statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), with new legislation.

In a footnote, the opinion read that "nothing in this opinion is intended to suggest how birthright citizenship should be addressed as a policy matter".^[79][90] However, it was reported as "implicitly inviting Congress to address the situation"^[90] and elsewhere that "the dissenters would encourage Congress to use legislation to change the federal statute ... that codifies the Citizenship Clause to add new exceptions to citizenship as in Trump's order".^[81]

Dissents

Justice Thomas wrote his longest dissenting opinion in his tenure on the Court,^[91] which Justice Gorsuch joined,^[84][78] interpreting the Citizenship Clause narrowly.^[3] Quoting Frederick Douglass,^[79][86] the opinion argued that American blacks were entitled to citizenship as Americans with "no other homeland" or foreign allegiance, a status not true "for the children of foreign temporary visitors".^[79][91] The opinion further argued that the Fourteenth Amendment had first centered on "equal rights for the freed blacks" but had been "repurposed" to grant citizenship to children of undocumented immigrants and temporary visitors.^[79][84] (The majority opinion termed this historical argument "revisionist".)^[79][84]

Justices Alito and Gorsuch also wrote separate dissenting opinions.^[92] Alito's opinion called Barbara "one of the most important decisions in the history of the Court" and "a serious mistake." It argued that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred citizenship only on children who, at birth, owe allegiance solely to the United States, and read Wong Kim Ark as limited to children of parents lawfully present and permanently domiciled in the country.^[93] Gorsuch's opinion would have rejected the facial challenge because, in its view, the executive order was lawful at least as applied to children born to temporary visitors.^[94]