Urbain de Saint-Gelais

In Comminges the bishop enjoyed relations with the minor nobility of the Haut-Comminges.^[130] He also looked to the local ecclesiastical authorities. Clerics themselves would only defend their churches against royalist attack, however they would also proffer their support to combatants. Particularly in the Haut-Comminges churches were made into fortified strong points. This climaxed in the Val d'Aran, where the churches were transformed into châteaux ecclésiaux (church castles). Meanwhile, in the Bas-Comminges the ringing of bells would serve as an advanced warning system of attacks. It is from the bell-towers that the Comminges ligue acquired its name - the Ligue Campanère (Gascon: Campanau - bell tower).^[131] This Ligue Campanère would develop in 1591.^[132] The term itself would not be used before March 1594, rather in correspondence with Felipe it was referred to as the Ligue Campanelle (with the same meaning).^[133]

In the Estates, regulations were established for villages military organisation, with a chief to preside over each one while there would also be a general chief over the wider organisation (though the name was left blank). Rules of conduct were established with those who violated them to face the justice of the ligue.^[134] The territories under the authority of this Ligue Campanère did not map exactly to the borders of Comminges, including communities in the territory of Rivière-Verdun.^[135]

The bishop of Comminges' role in the establishment of the Ligue Campanère is laid bare by the three epicentres of the movement. His see of Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges, Alan (the site of his episcopal château) and the rich lands around Puymaurin. He would only serve as its 'protector' however, and refused to be its official leader.^[132] Though it would be compared with the Croquants movement in Limousin, it claimed representation among all three orders (clergy, nobility, commons).^[72] In a further differentiation from other rebel peasant movements, those of the Campanère were anti-peace, and worked with the ligueur nobility to prosecute the war against the 'heretic king' Henri IV.^[136]

While the ligue received the approval of the parlement of Toulouse and the ligueur lieutenant-général of Guyenne, it would not be until January 1592 that the Estates of Comminges gave their approval.^[132] During a meeting of the Estates of Comminges at L'Isle-en-Dodon on 14 January 1592, the ligue was approved over the objections of the royal judge Sébastien de Cazalas. Those parishes that refused to register would be considered enemies.^[97] They declared that the organisation under the particular protection of the bishop of Comminges. He would provide his moral authority while the marquis de Villars took the command of governor.^[137]

During 1590, the bishop spent some time in Picardie alongside the ligueur prince, the duc d'Aumale.^[57]

The Spanish king, Felipe, was insistent on the need for the endorsement of the provincial Estates, refusing to send soldiers into France without the taking of such a step. As a result of this, the bishop of Comminges prodded the marquis de Villars to undertaken negotiations with the Estates of Guyenne both to acquire more troops directly, and to endorse a mission to Felipe to acquire more soldiers still.^[138] Therefore, the marquis de Villars ordered the convening of the provincial Estates of Guyenne, to meet at Gimont on 23 May 1590.^[139] While full records of the meeting are lacking, it was agreed to support the ligueur war effort, for the preservation of Catholicism. To this end the clergy would sacrifice a portion of their tithes to pay for soldiers. Such funds did not stretch sufficiently however, and thus the bishop of Comminges was tasked with meeting Felipe, and requesting 4,000 infantry and 450 cavalry with pay for four months. These troops would pass through the Val d'Aran and Comminges.^[127] There was concern that the Spanish soldiers might be ill disciplined, and therefore it was requested that they be well trained.^{[140][141][142]}

Aware of the effort of the estates of Guyenne to receive Spanish support through Guyenne, the maréchal de Matignon (royalist lieutenant-général of Guyenne) visited Comminges in May 1590. He endeavoured to exploit opposition to the ligue that he picked up on in the comté, chiefly from the town of Salies. He further enjoyed the support of a member of the Estates of Comminges (a syndic named Baptiste de Lamezan).^[143] At a meeting of the Estates of Lombez back in February, Lamezan helped lead the assembly to the possibilities of considering a truce with Matignon, or submitting to his authority.^[144] The Estates of Comminges were brought closer to the ligue by the meeting of the Estates of Guyenne that transpired in May.^[144]

On route to the Spanish court, the bishop of Comminges had intended to review the defences and soldiers of the upper-Garonne valley. However, this did not come to pass, due to the spread of an epidemic in the region.^[145]

During the absence of the bishop, Villars was in Comminges to protect the province from the intrusions of Matignon. He compelled the submission of Saint-Gaudens to the ligue and then placed a client of the bishop of Comminges, named the seigneur de Luscat (who had been entrusted by the bishop with the guard of Saint-Bertrand) in charge of the place.^[144]

Having received the bishop, Felipe dispatched Joaquim Claros to get a sense of the hostility in France between the party of Joyeuse and that of the bishop of Comminges.^[113]

The bishop was in Spain from July until the end of 1590. He endeavoured to see soldiers sent so that they might resist the royalist forces of the duc de Montmorency and maréchal de Matignon. In August 1590, 6,000 Spanish soldiers were duly provided, entering the kingdom at Port-la-Nouvelle near Narbonne and providing the support the vicomte de Joyeuse required to fend off Montmorency and the seigneur de Lesdiguières.^[146] Felipe promised also an army of intervention into Guyenne, and to this end began assembling soldiers in Aragón.^[147]

In September the bishop presented to Felipe a letter from the marquis de Villars and several of the diocese of Gascogne.^[144] Villars also dispatched his own representative Pedro Saravia to thank the king for his provision of soldiers and assure him of the loyalty of the nobility to the Catholic cause.^[148]

While Comminges was absent from France, his colleague from the Estates General, Tournier, attempted to effect the purge of the parlement of Toulouse that he had envisioned. The plot was uncovered in September 1590 and Tournier, having barricaded himself on the Île de Tounis [fr] was forced to capitulate.^[149]

Moving beyond the mandate he received from the Estates of Guyenne, the bishop of Comminges presented a grandiose plan to the Spanish king on the Garonne axis through the intermediary of Saraxia. The plan was only one part of a broader memorandum which also featured contributions by others, such as father Basile who opined that Villars was inexperienced, and Comminges was devoted to the Catholic cause but suffered from an over abundance of ambition and was liable to promise more than he could fulfil.^[150] In the part of the memorandum produced by Comminges, the bishop proposed a plan by which both Bordeaux and Toulouse would be carried for the Spanish crown. The plan bore similarities to one proposed by the Breton ligueurs to Felipe.^[148] Both Lanssac and Comminges held influence in this region. For the seigneur de Lanssac his seigneurie was close to Bourg on the confluence of the Garonne and Dordogne, for Comminges he enjoyed control of the abbey of Bourg.^[151]

The bishop outlined the path of the Spanish invasion to the sovereign. They would enter the diocese of Comminges through the Val d'Aran, then head down the Garonne to first Toulouse and then Bordeaux. Comminges assured Felipe that he would have 12,000 disciplined soldiers to join with the Spanish contingent (i.e. the Campanères). Bourg-sur-Gironde was in the hands of Lanssac, and the other key citadel that controlled access to Bordeaux was Blaye, held by the seigneur de Lussan who Lanssac intended to bribe thereby bringing him over to their cause. Further to this, Marmande was held by the baron de Castelnau, Agen by the seigneur de Caupėne and various other strongpoints were held by men of the bishops network.^[149] By this means a Spanish force would be landed like had been accomplished at Le Blavet in Bretagne to see to the reduction of Bordeaux.^[150]

In Comminges opinion, the nobility of Guyenne were all driven by pecuniary concerns, and it would be necessary for Felipe to provide pensions suitable to the dignity of the nobles in question. He contrasted the situation in Guyenne, where the nobles could be dealt with in this way, with Languedoc where in his estimation there were no nobles of note to treat with, and rather it would be the urban consulates with which the Spanish had to negotiate. Comminges and the marquis de Villars envisioned the provision of supplies for the invading Spanish armies, both in terms of victuals and powder.^[152] Villars announced that Spanish soldiers would be entering Comminges to the Estates of the province on 20 September. In return for offering such resources to the Spanish, the Estates of Comminges hoped to receive the liquidation of the Protestants of Foix and L'Isle-Jourdain. Villars meanwhile fancied himself the commander of the Spanish forces in France.^[152]

The bishop of Comminges asked for the provision of 1,000 ducats so that two cannons might be forged for his bishopric of Saint-Bertrand (due to its control of the Garonne) and a further 2,000 ducats to garrison the place. In regards to broader policy, Comminges opined that the people should be appeased through the reduction of the ordinary tax burden (no more than 40,000 écus for Guyenne and Gascogne). In addition to the appeasing quality, it would allow for the easier collection of the dîme and revenues could instead be farmed on river traffic, which would bring in one million d'or in Comminges estimation.^[147] It would be this policy of light ordinary taxation that the Spanish agent Mendoza represented with the Seize when he met with them in Paris.^[153]

The mission of the bishop to the Spanish court was, in the estimation of the historian Brunet, blessed with a degree of conviviality, slickened by the bishops strong command of the Castilian language. Beyond this Felipe had promised the hoped for military interventions.^[147]

Arriving back in the Val d'Aran on 8 January 1591, the bishop undertook the inspections of the region that he had intended to undergo prior to leaving for Felipe's court. He signed a concordat and liaised with the local militia captains.^[154] He was accompanied by many captains from the Haut-Comminges on route to the ligueur estates that were convened at Agen. He was to inform these deputies of the imminent arrival of Spanish aid.^[155] As he was departing from Aran back into France through the pass of Saint-Béat in February, his party was intercepted by a Béarnais (i.e. royalist) force directed against him by the regent of Béarn, Catherine. The fort of Saint-Béat which commanded access to Spain through the Val d'Aran was a target for Catherine.^[149] Thanks to the captains that were with him the royalist ambush was forced back to the château de Cier-de-Luchon.^[154][155]

One of the captains with him, Barbazan subsequently led a successful siege of Cier-de-Luchon, with the royalist captain who had led the ambush and several others being executed after its conclusion.^[156] Meanwhile, Comminges passed through the comté de Comminges in safety on his way to Agen. This safety would not be replicated in Gimont or L'Isle Jourdain.^[156] A bloody engagement was fought against some royalist garrisons in which three of Comminges' party were killed and a further five wounded, while the royalists who had assaulted them lost thirteen dead and twenty one wounded. Despite this, Comminges was able to reach Agen on 23 February for the ligueur estates. The royalist estates of Guyenne were being held simultaneously in Lectoure.^[157]

The same day as Comminges arrived at the Estates, he wrote to the Spanish secretario (secretary) Idiáquez outlining the ideal route for Spanish aid to take into France. Specifically he proposed the Port de la Bonaigua which would be a longer route with worse roads, but would allow the force to draw up together without risking enemy attack. Brunet judges his proposed route to have been the most sound. The estates of Comminges were to provide the money for the logistical support in the operation.^[158]

Word of the imminent Spanish arrival was greeted with delight in Agen. Matignon was declared to be deposed, and the duc de Mayenne was urged to elevated the marquis de Villars to the post of governor of Guyenne. An army of 3,000 arquebusiers and 600 horsemen was to be raised for Villars.^[159] Villars with enthusiasm took on the role, even before letters patent (by which Mayenne gave him the powers of governor if not the title) in his favour had been published. Meanwhile, in the royalist estates of Lectoure, subsidies were voted on and defensive preparations agreed to combat a Spanish invasion.^[157]

Back in Alan, the bishop of Comminges made the friendly offering to the Spanish king of the acquisition of fish and birds for the king's palace at Aranjuez, which was then under construction.^[147] His episcopal château d'Alan would not be subject to threats despite its ill-secure position.^[130]

It would be the family of Aure-Larboust, also nobles of the Haut-Comminges but royalist rather than ligueur, who would particularly confound the plans of the bishop of Comminges over the coming years due to their influence in the region.^[160]

In March 1591, Felipe intended to assume control of the condato de Ribagorza (county of Rbiagorza) on the Franco-Spanish border.^[145]

Villars entrusted the bishop of Comminges with the mustering of soldiers to fight the royalists in Comminges. The royalists threatened Nébouzan, Samatan, Saint-Plancard and Montaut. With active combat in the region, Mayenne came south to undertake a siege of Monségur. The Comminges militia was active under the authority of the bishop and were further enlivened by the coming arrival of the Spaniards. Villars saw to the conquest of Fleurance, Cologne, Touget and Puycasquier.^[159]

Depots for the Spanish troops were set up in Samatan, L'Isle-en-Dodon and Aurignac. The expenses of this could not be supported by the grants offered in the Estates of Guyenne and therefore the province of Comminges would be expected to contribute (though Villars consented to reducing the rate). The Estates of Comminges agreed to support Villars' army in its operations throughout Guyenne through payment of the octet tax.^[161] The Estates begged Villars to support local garrisons in Comminges out of the general Guyenne treasury, however he refused, leaving the Estates to turn more towards the local rural ligueurs. He agreed to ensure the Spanish would be a disciplined force, and would not enter towns loyal to the ligue in Comminges.^[162]

In 1591, Comminges made an appeal to Spain for a military intervention into southern France across the central pyrénées.^[163] By this means he hoped the Protestant strongholds that menaced Toulouse would be reduced, and then the army would move on to capture first Bordeaux, then go on to Bretagne.^[146] The contact between the southern leaders of the ligue and Spain is described as 'intense' by Souriac at this time.^[164]

From May 1591, Comminges half-brother the seigneur de Lanssac was in Spain making a grandiose pitch to the king for a Spanish annexation of Guyenne and Bretagne.^[165] Having failed to get an endorsement for his project he retired back to France to join with the bishop in Alan.^[166]

Comminges and his half-brother Lanssac would receive a pension of 2,400 livres from Felipe.^[4]

On 1 June 1591, the marquis de Villars announced to the Estates of Comminges that he was departing from the province. Command in his absence was left in the hands of a local: the capitain de Savignac. The bishop of Comminges shared in Villars' mood of optimism, opining that the tranquillity was such he did not feel the need to bother the Spanish crown with the news.^[167]

The bishop of Comminges wrote directly to Felipe on 17 July, something he did only rarely. In this letter Comminges endeavoured to hurry along the Spanish provision of aid into France. The Protestants, who he had imagined would be exterminated, were rather alleged to be preparing an attack against the harvest collection.^[168]

There was a divide in the ligue between the Hispano-ligueurs typified by the radical Parisians who in 1591 wrote to Felipe asking him to take the crown of France under his protection, and the Mayenniste party that would subsequently suppress the radicals in the capital during December 1591 with great brutality.^[169] The bishop referred to what the historian Descimon has termed the Mayenniste party as politiques.^[51] Mayenne's crushing of the radicals in Paris in December would entirely discredit him in the eyes of the bishop of Comminges. The bishop also identified in a letter in November 1591, a third party, those who saw one of Henri IV's Catholic relatives as the proper candidate for the throne. For Comminges, this group was bringing to Henri IV the neutral Catholics.^[105][170] The bishop of Comminges was a Hispano-ligueur.^[146][164] Comminges opposed the pretensions to the crown embodied by the duc de Mayenne, and advocated for the candidacy of the Spanish infanta (princess) Isabel Clara Eugenia. To this end he suggested to Felipe that he (Comminges) write in favour of her claim and the invalidity of Salic Law (the French agnatic laws of succession) under a foreign pseudonym.^[147] He wrote to Felipe several times urging him to convince Mayenne to back down from his claims. He further wrote against the principal of Salic Law as having relevance for determining succession. In addition to writing to Felipe, he also wrote to the estranged wife of Henri IV, Marguerite, urging her to support the Spanish infanta's claim.^[86]

The province of Aragón in north-eastern Spain had traditionally enjoyed many liberties. When in 1591, Felipe attempted to have a former minister of his named Antonio Pérez, who was hiding from him in Aragón, charged by the inquisition, the people of Zaragoza rose up in rebellion to free Pérez. Felipe looked to send an army from Castile to crush this nascent rebellion.^[171] There is debate about whether the army that Felipe raised was initially intended to fulfil his promise to the French ligueurs before being then redirected towards dealing with the revolt, or whether it was always intended for the revolt. Brunet finds far more evidence for the former hypothesis.^[172][146]

An army gathered under the command of Alonso de Vargas combining 800 veterans of the Invincible Armada and 15,000 militiamen for an invasion of France. From Ágreda they were instructed to march on Zaragoza, to Vargas' annoyance. This force entered Zaragoza on 12 November and began a harsh repression. The distraction of this large force from entering France at a crucial moment in the fortunes of the royalist party saved the cause of Henri IV in the eyes of the historian Cloulas.^[172][146]

In the eyes of the bishop of Comminges, the hands of the regent of Navarre, Catherine were to be seen at work in the revolt in Aragón, and even desired to see it spread to Catalunya. Suspicious of Béarnais merchants, the bishop advised Villars and the parlement of Toulouse that only agents of the Spanish crown should be allowed to cross the border between the kingdoms.^[173]

The bishop of Comminges connected through the people of the Val d'Aran with the Spanish commander Vargas and the army of occupation in Aragón.^[142] While they hoped the occupation force would cross the Pyrénées it would never do so.^[174]

Catherine did indeed, as Comminges anticipated, intend to stoke the flames of the revolt in Spain through control of parts of Comminges and the Val d'Aran. She looked to resecure the châteaux de Saint-Béat and Cier-de-Luchon by which Spanish soldiers would be prevented from entering the kingdom. From here she would seize on the Spanish side of the frontier, the site of Castèth Leon [fr].^[173] In the assessment of the bishop, this was not a prelude to a broader scale invasion of the kingdom, but rather the royalists hoped that by securing these places they would for very little investment frustrate Felipe's cross border plans (as it was challenging to bring to bear artillery and large armies in that region).^[175]

Felipe was tied down by both revolts in the northern provinces of Spain and the bankruptcy of his kingdom. Souriac makes the further point, that given the state of the southern provinces of France, a Spanish army of more than 30,000 was logistically impractical, even with the promises of ligueur support. This view was indeed held by Vargas' second in command Francisco de Bobadilla who believed it would be challenging to maintain an army in impoverished land.^[176] He thus characterises the appeals for Spanish intervention, more as an artifice of rhetoric than a practical invasion plan.^[164]

During this period the bishop of Comminges once again assumed the role of a man of war with the authority invested in him by Villars. He approved the raising of arquebusiers which travelled to Lombez to arrest Protestants who had come from Béarn. Two royalist compagnies under the command of ten captains approached with the intent of seizing Saint-Béat and Cier-de-Luchon. This was foiled, and subsequently the château de Cier-de-Luchon was torn down. It was agreed that 300 men of the Val d'Aran would aid in the defence of Benasque.^[175] Alongside two commanders in whom he placed confidence, the bishop of Comminges oversaw the distribution of soldiers and the fortification of key points. He advised scaling down the 35 soldiers to be found in Castèth Leon to 20 due to its central place in the valley.^[177]

When the commander Bardaxi attempted to bribe the sergeant in command of Castèth Leon, the bishop of Comminges had him dismissed. He further tried to assure himself of some Spanish cavalry, even if he understood the many body of the Spanish army was occupied crushing the revolt.^[178] His main force would comprise a levy of montagnards while regular troops would simply support this force.^[179]

The Ligue Campanère showed itself hostile to the network of châteaux in the region and worked towards their destruction.^[180] The ligueurs reduced the former system of Castellanies in Comminges to a tax district, though even this was liable to be subject to challenge.^[181]

In April 1592, the brother of Villars, the marquis de Montpezat conducted a mission into Aragón to request military support. The royalists thus feared that come the summer an army of 12,000 would cross the border in favour of the ligue under Villars' authority.^[182]

The bishop wrote to the ligueur duc d'Aumale in 1592, who was operating in Picardie, to provide him comfort.^[86]

Further debate was held in the Spanish court as to the feasibility of an invasion of southern France during 1592. In July, Felipe came back around to the idea of invading southern France. Rather than Comminges this would be through an invasion of Basse-Navarre in the west and another operation with Joyeuse in the east. By the end of August 1592, Felipe had abandoned this plan, resolving to maintain his force in Aragón.^[176]

On 20 September 1592, the duc de Mayenne established the marquis de Villars as the ligueur lieutenant-général of Guyenne. Despite being his son-in-law Mayenne was cautious about the prospect of investing Villars with the full governorship of Guyenne.^[174] Subsequently, Villars invested the bishop of Comminges with the authority to 'wage war on the enemy' with a group of hommes d'armes (men-at-arms).^[86] Villars himself fantasised about being the leader of the Spanish army that would cross the Pyrénées, he lacked much of a military reputation however.^[174]

Much to Comminges' irritation, the marquis de Villars decided to employ the Ligue Campanère in November 1592 for a purpose external to the local defence if Comminges, i.e. the capture of Tarbes for the ligue and the invasion of Bigorre (a territory over which Henri IV was comte). The ligueurs were open to this, despite the opposition of the bishop of Comminges.^[182] The bishop desired the organisation to remain in Comminges for local defence.^[132] Villars created much of the apparatus of a campaigning army, including surgeons and bakers. The offensive mission was a success, Ibos was seized and Pontacq put to siege.^[183] Nevertheless, no Spanish invasion resulted.^[184]

In early 1593, an Estates General met at the insistence of Felipe who was then in a position of strength. Thee deputies determined on the need to secure a Catholic king that enjoyed approval of both the Spanish and Papacy. Henri outflanked the meeting by announcing his intention to convert to Catholicism. Felipe then made a clumsy attempt to push forward the rights of his daughter, the Infanta, who the bishop of Comminges had historically championed. By insisting that she be married to the erzherzog von Österreich rather than a French prince he damaged the credibility of her candidacy.^[185] The walk back of this position to a marriage between the Infanta and the young duc de Guise could not repair the damage and on 23 July the election of a new king was indefinitely postponed by the delegates of the ligueur estates. On 25 July 1593, Henri abjured Protestantism, this represented a major blow to the ligue. Defections to the royalist party began to flow forth. For the southern Hispano-ligueurs this period between the abjuration and the declaration of war between France and Spain represented the most covert period of their correspondence.^[186]

During 1593, Villars maintained garrisons in many southern towns he had fortified such as Agen, Mirande and Grenade. The first objective in this was to maintain the security of the surrounding farmland which would then be taxed. The bishop of Comminges worked towards this end in the region of Rivière-Verdun.^[187]

In this year truces were agreed between Henri and Mayenne at the national level and Villars and Matignon in Guyenne. These truces permeated only slowly into Comminges. For example, the royalist governor of L'Isle-Jourdain, du Bourg and the governor of Mauvezin, the seigneur de Maravat continued to raid into Comminges so that they could support their garrisons.^[188] Just as these royalists remained mobilised, so too did the Ligue Campanère. In June 1593, the Estates of Samatam approved of the raising of bands. These soldiers were to monitor du Bourg and Maravat's bands.^[189] Villars commanded that upon sighting the enemy, the tocsin was to be raised in a town, and the people armed, on pain of being considered an enemy.^[190]

On 27 August, the commander of the Spanish army of occupation in Aragón, Vargas was recalled and disgraced. This was a blow to the ligueurs in Guyenne, as he was one of the firmest Spanish supporters for an international expedition into the kingdom.^[191]

On 1 January 1594 the five-month truce between the French royalists and the ligueurs expired, as a result of this defections to the royalist cause bloomed. First Cambrai and then Meaux made their peace with the royalists, the latter having been under the command of one of Mayenne's closest advisors, the marquis de Vitry. In his capitulation Vitry explained there was no legitimate reason to make war against the king now that he was Catholic.^[191] The parlement of Aix was the next to defect to the royalists. By now almost all bishops were in the royalist camp. On 22 March, Paris was betrayed to Henri by its ligueur governor the comte de Brissac.^[192] In the wake of this shocking coup, an order circled through the remaining ligueur centres from Toulouse urging them to hold firm until the Pope had made a decision.^[193]

As the situation became more desperate, the bishop of Comminges' plans became more creative. In a letter to Felipe written on 2 January he proposed the calling of a crusade.^[193] A Papal legate would need to be sent with full plenipotentiary powers with complete authority over the ecclesiastical territories of Aquitaine and Narbonne. He proposed the cardinal de Joyeuse for this role. The cardinal would preach the message of the crusade, and instruct the non-payment of the dîme and noble disobedience. The people at large would be brought into this campaign of civil disobedience. The duca di Savoia, son-in-law to Felipe would lead the crusade.^[194]

As with the similar movement led by the cardinal d'Armagnac in 1568, the medieval Saint Dominic who had preached against the Cathar heresy served as the model.^[194]

The cardinal de Joyeuse wrote to Comminges from Roma, where he was with the Pope, urging him to defer to the duc de Mayenne in all affairs. Brunet argues this demonstrates the ill suitably of the moment for the bishop's proposed crusade.^[193]

Even in Spanish territory, communications between the bishop and the Spanish crown were not necessarily secure at this time. In 1594, the governor of Benasque informed Comminges that a packet of his correspondence had arrived in Benasque but had not been received in Madrid. Thus they had been stolen inside Spanish territory. Often sensitive information was communicated orally by the messenger who brought the letter.^[116] Even when unencrypted precautions were taken in the communications, the bishop of Comminges used the pseudonym 'Modestino Cortese' (supposedly a Florentine cleric of the Val d'Aran), something he had employed since at least February 1588.^[142][167] Sometimes getting carried away he would switch from the third person to the first person in describing the bishop of Comminges. In these final years of rebellion he (likely with his brothers consent) took to signing his correspondence as 'Lanssac'.^[195][116]

In 1594, a royalist satire was published named 'La Satyre Ménippée'. This satire brought up both the bishop of Comminges and his half-brother for attack. They were satirised as having recruiting many 'honest' people for a crusade against 'miscreants and infidels'.^[4] The skill of the bishop in attracting both greats and the humble people was noted by the satire.^[14]

On 16 February 1594, the bishop of Comminges sent a long memoire for Felipe's attentions from Alan, titled "Expediens pour prévenir et traverser les pernicieux desseings du Vendosme et ces adhérens tant desclarés manifestement que couvertement" (Expedients to stop and overcome the pernicious designs of Vendosme [by which was meant Henri IV] and those both openly and covertly declared in loyalty to him.) This correspondence was signed to Lanssac.^[196]

The bishop of Comminges and his brother the seigneur de Lanssac endeavoured to reassure Felipe of the merits of the popular ligueur movement.^[190] They explained that the people, clergy and much of the nobility of Gascogne had formed syndics both to oppose heresy and exactions imposed on them.^[132][190] He then explains how after the arrest of some 'good Catholics' and 'rich bourgeois' for failure to pay these taxes led to the mobilisation of 12,000 ligueurs to see to their release. When Villars became aware of the intentions of this group, he had the offenders released. The section of correspondence to the Spanish king concludes by arguing that the Christian order would be strengthened and improved. The bishop understood this moment to be a sensitive one, in which Henri IV risked being victorious. Therefore, he made a case for the invasion of the kingdom by a Spanish army again. The rights of the Infanta to the French throne would be recognised, military aid would be channelled towards Bretagne, where the duc de Mercœur held strong. To triumph in Bretagne would require 3,000 cavalry and 10,000 footsoldiers. He outlined three invasion routes into the kingdom, of which he preferred a crossing of the Pyrénées.^[197] The devotion of Comminges and his brother, Lanssac, to the Spanish crown (with their willingness to lay down their lives and property for the cause) was emphasised. They then spoke of the Spanish king maintaining the openness of the passages and gates of Saint-Girons, Saint-Béat, Benasque, Aure and Louron, and capturing the towns and châteaux of Saint-Girons, Saint-Béat, Saint-Bertrand, Saint-Gaudens, Montréjeau and Sarrancolin. It was hoped these would be maintained in Spanish service and through their control allow the passage of a Spanish army.^[198]

Gascon gentleman and foot-soldiers would be raised, numbering 3,900. The bishop of Comminges and his brother would see to the casting of cannons which would allow the army to make their way up to Bec d'Ambès on the confluence of the Garonne and Dordogne. Lanssac would lead a Spanish contingent with a position equivalent to that held by the Spanish commander Bobadilla, i.e. second in overall command.^[191] Once here a fort would be built within six weeks. The Spanish king would, after a year, be able to recoup the costs of the soldiers with a surplus of 400,000 écus. At this point in the campaign, they would join up with the Spanish general Águila who would come down the coast from his base of operations in Bretagne and disembark with his infantry.^[198] The army would then force the Dordogne through the expedient of the Spanish galleons. The land force would make its way up into Poitou with support from the naval arm before capturing Saint-Nazaire where Felipe would assure himself of 600,000 écus. Moving into Bretagne, Port-Navalo would be fortified and the Spanish king would be able to count upon 1,500,000 écus annually from the territory. The nobility and cities would then recognise the Infanta as their sovereign.^[199]

To further confound the royalists, a feigned attack on the Picard frontier would be launched by the army of the Netherlands in concord with the young duc de Guise and his cousin the duc d'Aumale.^[199] Meanwhile, Comminges would assembly a force (the Ligue Campanère) to secure the mountainous frontiers for the Spanish sovereign. No place in this plan was accorded to the marquis de Villars, with whom Comminges held a grudge for the Bigorre expedition. The place of Villars in the expedition was occupied by the seigneur de Lanssac, however there was some embarrassment in this for Comminges who worried his brother was of insufficient pedigree for such a responsibility.^[200]

With the truce increasing the tax burden the Ligue Campanère began to take on the form of a confederacy. While the Estates General of 1593 was meeting in May 1593, in Boulogne a confederation was declared, over the opposition of the increasingly politique Estates of Comminges.^[184] The bishop of Comminges was not blind to this political development in the ligue and saw in it opportunity for Spain. Continuing in his long address of 16 February he explained to the Spanish king that given the 'mood of the people' (i.e. their fiscal revolts) Felipe should strike while the opportunity was presenting itself, and send a leader with great authority, wise in the ways of statecraft and war. This personage would come to Alan to rendezvous with Comminges and the seigneur de Lanssac who would play host to a diet of the leaders of the Ligue Campanère to treat with the Spanish representative.^[195] He compared this confederation with that of the Swiss which the French kings had long used. As with the Swiss, these confederates would not become subjects of Felipe, but would rather serve as his allies.^[191] For Comminges though the confederates were a much stronger body that the Swiss Cantons as they respected the place of the nobility and the clergy in society. Through leaning on this organisation, the Spanish king could assure himself of 4,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry with the added advantage that the ligueurs, unlike the Swiss would be of the same religion, language and customs as he was. These were not a 'venal' people in Comminges estimation.^[201] He then compared the control and access they would grant to the Spanish over the frontier to the French holds on the Marchesato di Saluzzo (marquisate of Saluzzo) and other holdings in Piemonte in years gone by. He concluded by noting that timing was sensitive, and that while this project was feasible for the Spanish king now, if he tarried a few months it might cease to be possible as every effort was being expended by the royalists to subjugate them. If Felipe had any concerns about the projects Comminges and Lanssac were presenting him, he need only say the word and they would come to him.^[196]

With the capitulation of much of the ligue in Provence, its governor the duc d'Épernon continued to hold out against the king. His opposition was more personal, he likely feared Henri intended to invest the government of Provence in a Protestant relative.^[202] He was not however affiliated with the ligue, and through the duc de Joyeuse intimated to Felipe that he would affiliate himself with it in return for military support.^[192] At the request of Felipe in February 1594, Comminges and his brother the seigneur de Lanssac made appeals to the duc d'Épernon in Provence and duc de Montmorency to try and rally these men to the ligueur cause. Lanssac travelled to Provence and Languedoc to meet with the men. As a condition for his joining the cause, Montmorency demanded the seizure of Toulouse and the head of the duc de Joyeuse.^[174] The bishop of Comminges had many contacts in Toulouse and thus drew up a plan. The principal parlementaires would call for him and he would assume authority in the city. Joyeuse would then be seized and the parlement purged of those sympathetic to their royalist colleagues in Carcassonne. ^[202]

The bishop of Comminges and his half-brother appealed to the Spanish crown in the defence of Juan de Bardaxí whose son was now serving as a ligueur agent in the south. The father had been sentenced by the inquisition for his conduct in the uprising of Zaragoza. Meanwhile, the son, Antonio de Bardaxí, ensured the security of the Spanish emissary sent to the brothers, and also conducted spying for them in Béarn. As such, Comminges and Lanssac requested of Felipe on 23 February that he would suspend the sentence against Juan.^[96]

The Estates of Comminges, which met in Samatan in March 1594, resolved to send their submission to Henri IV. To this end the royal judge Cazalas and Péguilhan were dispatched. The Ligue Campanère was to be dissolved. From his camp at Laon in August 1594, Henri accepted the submission of the Comminges Estates and confirmed their privileges.^[203] The consequences of the dissolution of the Ligue would not take long to manifest, as the bishop of Comminges found himself directly threatened for the first time in the civil war.^[204]

Losing heart for a moment, on 30 March the bishop of Comminges proposed to abandon his bishopric and looked to an exile in Italia or Spain. To replace him in Comminges he proposed an Italian cardinale to Felipe.^[204]

As the tide of the war turned against the ligueurs, the threat now became a penetration of royalist forces across the border into Spain, rather than the other way around. To this end, members of the house of Larboust moved into the Aure and Louron valleys with 200 arquebusiers, imposing garrisons in the region. A tower was raised to watch over the pass of the Port de Venasque, helping to strangle the passage of information and supplies between the ligueurs and Aragón. The Larbousts also enjoyed intelligence networks in Saint-Béat, Saint-Gaudens, Montréjeau and Valentine.^[204]

The ligueurs of the south imagined the royalists would be ready to cross the frontier once the snows had cleared in May.^[204]

In a further letter to Felipe, the king was assured that the bishop of Comminges and seigneur de Lanssac would maintain secrecy in all affairs and that they would continue to relay what they discovered to be transpiring both in the interior of the kingdom and on the border.^[205]

During April, the sieur d'Ysaut and Antonio de Lamothe joined forces with the 1,000 arquebusiers the brothers had raised under the command of the seigneur de Tajan.^[96] Of these 1,000 arquebusiers, 350 were musketeers, and there was a further 200 horsemen. Tajan was the candidate to lead the hypothetical Spanish army that would cross the border.^[174] Brunet argues the force actually under Tajan's command was likely largely composed of men of the Ligue Campanère. It was responsible for dissuading royalist attacks and protecting Comminges.^[206] The bishop of Comminges and the seigneur de Lanssac were impatient to use this force for the attack on Saint-Bertrand and Saint-Béat.^[205]

In a letter written by a ligueur of Toulouse on 7 April, it is reported that several 'heretic' royalist captains (among them du Bourg and Larboust) approached this ligueur force to enquire as to its purpose. They were informed that it was for the defence of the religion. This inspired the mirth of the royalists, who opined that the force could not challenge Henri IV [referred to as Vendôme by the author]. Nevertheless, the author notes the royalists made sure not to provoke the force, before disengaging and promising not to violate Comminges.^[205]

Holding this large force in arms was an expensive endeavour however, and after fourteen days, the bishop of Comminges authorised the soldiers to go to ground, going forward despite being numerous they would rarely assemble.^[194] The bishop wrote to the Spanish about the exfilitration of Tajan to Spain on 12 April .^[206] This exfiltration was supported by the agent Bardaxi with whom the Saint-Gelais brothers had often dealt.^[207] That same day he bemoaned to Felipe that he was a 'Cassandra' who had seen clearly without being believed.^[208]

Henri IV wrote to Comminges' brother in April, threatening to have his head cut off if he did not see to the surrender of Calais and Boulogne to him within three months. The historian Brunet asks how Henri could imagine Lanssac and his brother had any influence in Picardie at this late hour in the war.^[193] He then explains that the cities were held by families of the Haut-Comminges who were supporters of the bishop and the cathedral chapter. In the event, Calais would fall to the Spanish in April 1596.^[209]

Comminges and his half-brother remained potent locally through the support they continued to enjoy from the governor of Benasque (Ramada) and several captains like the seigneur de Ramefort and the seigneur de Latoue and Liéoux.^[208]

The royalists and ligueurs now competed for the receipt of the tax revenue of Comminges, with both expecting to receive the revenue. There was a determination among all not to end up paying both the royalist and ligueur tax collectors.^[208] Despite being a domain of Henri IV, the baronnie d'Aspet would provide financial contributions to Villars and the bishop of Comminges, and would not renounce the ligue until 1597.^[210]

A few weeks before he would make his feigned capitulation to the royalists and submission to Henri, the bishop of Comminges was pitching a proposal for a crusade to Felipe II.^[211]

At some point in 1594, Comminges was to be found in Lyon, Brunet cites this as an example of the flexible mobility of the ligueurs of the south-west to act outside their territories.^[57]

Thanks to the efforts of the royalists, Villars reported to Felipe that the common (Catholic) people had now risen up against him, refusing to pay their exactions. Larboust threatened to destroy the crops of Nébouzan if they refused to swear their loyalty to the royalist cause. As such, on 16 June the militia of Nébouzan, which had affiliated with the ligue, came over to the royalist camp. This militia would attempt to force Saint-Gaudens from 8 to 10 July. Saint-Gaudens was defended by Luscan and captains like the sieur d'Ysaut.^[212]

From Alan, on 20 June, the bishop of Comminges hurriedly wrote up a capitulation to Henri IV alongside his half-brother the seigneur de Lanssac.^[213] According to Le Roux, in this capitulation the bishop stated that Henri's conversion to Catholicism was the design of god who was the first and last cause of all actions.^[214] He compared Henri to emperor Constantine. He then inserted Henri into a genealogy of providential kings (including David, Solomon and Theodosius) and noted that he would pray that Henri enjoyed victories like David and was as devoted to the glory of god as Theodosius.^[215] He continually stressed his humble obedience and stated he would serve the king more dutifully than any bishop had in prior times.^[216] Comminges' half-brother was less eloquent than he and made his plea on the grounds of the virtue of royal clemency and noting that he had failed to uphold the natural obedience that was due to a king.^[217]

Henri granted his pardon easily to the bishop of Comminges, the situation for his brother was more complicated and Lanssac's submission would not be accepted and he would continue to scheme until his death in 1622. Comminges provided financial support to his brother.^[218]

Around the same time as the faux capitulations of Comminges and Lanssac many of the Lorraine-Guise princes made their peace with the royalist cause also, including the duc d'Elbeuf in June, and the young duc de Guise in October.^[219]

Despite his nominal capitulation to Henri, Comminges was still requesting the provision of between 5,000 and 6,000 men and 500 cavalry be provided from Aragón through the port de Venasque on 25 June.^[213]

The siege of Saint-Gaudens was led by the baron de Larboust, his uncle Adrien d'Aure-Larboust and the seigneur de Caupène who had governed Agen for the ligue in former times. Their force, also formerly of the ligue comprised 8,000-9,000 infantry and 600 horse with four cannons brought to bear from L'Isle Jourdain. With little desire other than peace at this point, the people of Saint-Gaudens rose up against Villars' authority and on 13 July the town was conquered for the royalists.^[213] The ligueur governor of Saint-Gaudens, Luscan was allowed to depart from the town, and maintain his governorship of Saint-Bertrand.^[220]

Saint-Gaudens conquered, the populace prepared to advance on Saint-Bertrand so that they might seize the bishop of Comminges.^[213]

Saint-Bertrand avoided a royal attack with a feigned capitulation delivered to the seigneur de Caupène. Royalists would not enter Saint-Bertrand, and Luscan maintained 50 men-at-arms there. He would continue to resist the crown alongside the bishop of Comminges, the seigneur de Lanssac, the marquis de Villars and the marquis de Montpezat. Their resistance was enabled by the firm stand of Toulouse under the duc de Joyeuse.^[220]

Joyeuse, like with his brother the cardinal de Joyeuse had vowed not to submit to Henri until such time as the Pope granted him absolution, something he had yet to do. Nevertheless, the parlement of Toulouse had voted on 7 May to send emissaries to Henri.^[221] On 25 July the emissaries returned from Paris with the king's conditions for the submission of Toulouse, one of which was the relief from the command of the city of Joyeuse, to be replaced by the seigneur de Cornusson as sénéchal de Toulouse. Joyeuse reacted with hostility to these proposals.^[222]

With soldiers preying on those taking the roads (after the truce established with du Bourg in July) Gascogne entered revolt. In the estimation of the bishop of Comminges and the marquis de Villars in their reports to Felipe this revolt was distinct from that of the Croquants in the Limousin in that it lacked the latter's anti-noble character. The revolt angered the Estates of Comminges, who saw themselves as the sole representative of the Three Estates in Comminges.^[210] The Campanères moved towards an anti-fiscal revolt.^[223]

In the summer of 1594, the duc de Joyeuse made an effort to oust Comminges from Alan, however the bishop was rescued by the intervention of the marquis de Villars. The bishop related the intervention of Villars with '50 horseman' to the Spanish secretario Idiáquez in a letter of 16 August.^[203]

In a further development in August, Henri resolved in his war council on an invasion of Spain that would seize Pamplona. Well informed of this by his spies, Felipe authorised the granting of funds to the ligueurs of Guyenne and Languedoc.^[224] Joyeuse was to be afforded 10,000 écus a month, Villars 5,000 écus and the bishop of Comminges and his brother 300 ducats. Brunet notes that by this time, that Comminges' brother, the seigneur de Lanssac was absent from the correspondence sent to Felipe by the final hold out ligueurs.^[225] The two men would be paid by Ramada, the governor of Benasque. Payments were delivered in a spotty fashion. The bishop of Comminges hoped for the delivery of 100,000 écus for Benasque, Castèth Leon, Tajan, Montbérault and the bishop of Couserans. This money would allow for the raising of a force of 3,000 infantry and 600 cavalry and the seizure of ten to twelve cities in the surrounds of Toulouse. Felipe would not however increase the sum he was providing, nor would he send troops.^[222]

On 29 August, Comminges wrote to Henri boasting that Saint-Bertrand had submitted to the royalists first and that thanks to the interventions of the bishop most of the towns had not required the siege that had been needed for Saint-Gaudens.^[213]

Conscious of the continued support Felipe was offering to the ligueurs, and keen to have the border secured, the maréchal de Matignon resolved to capture Comminges' see of Saint-Bertrand from its governor Luscan. Thus Adrien d'Aure-Larboust was ordered to seize it and on 20 November 1594 he did so, probably with his militia, putting the town to the sack.^[155][226]

Having left the town on Matignon's instructions, Saint-Bertrand fell under the tutelage of a Protestant captain named Teserly who caused grief for the canons of Saint-Bertrand in the seven weeks his soldiers were present until they were bribed to leave for 1,000 écus.^[227] The bishop of Comminges fumed to Henri that reparations were required for this infamous treatment of Saint-Bertrand.^[228]

One of the conditions demanded by the city of Toulouse for its submission to Henri, was absolution for the murders of Duranti and Daffis that had been committed under the watch of Comminges' government. They also made many requests against the access of Protestants to the parlement and the position of the duc de Montmorency (who they did not wish to govern them). War was declared between France and Spain on 17 January 1595, and Joyeuse chose to feign his submission after that point. The duc still wrote to Felipe in February about the 'intrigues of Navarre'.^[229]

In 1595, Henri appealed to Comminges to submit to the crown. Comminges dithered, making excuses to the king on the grounds of the plague that was ravaging Comminges. When he wrote to Henri in August he explained his long silence on the grounds that he understood it to be possible for the plague to be transmitted even by paper and thus had avoided all actions.^[225]

Embittered by the continued lack of promised support from Felipe, Villars and Montpezat began their submission to Henri in September 1595, requesting a truce with Matignon while they negotiated with the king.^[230]

Even at this late hour, the bishop of Comminges informed Felipe that he had a plan, however unlike previous plans he had presented to the Spanish crown, this one was to be presented orally. Felipe instructed him to communicate with the Beltrán III de la Cueva y Castilla [es] (duque de Alburquerque), the virrey de Aragón (viceroy of Aragón). ^[231]

Comminges' continued opposition to Henri was based on the rumours fed to him from Paris that Henri supported Calvinist seminaries and worked with Genève to bring across Protestant advisors to the parlement.^[231]

On 17 September 1595 the Pope granted absolution to Henri IV. In the weeks that followed he reached an agreement with the duc de Mayenne.^[232] After this act, Comminges finally made his genuine submission to Henri, Brunet places the elaborate submission in which the bishop compared the monarch to Constantine and recognised him as the 'most Christian majesty' here, as opposed to 1594.^[8]

A few months after Comminges' submission, on 4 December 1595, almost a year after his false submission, Joyeuse announced his submission to the duc de Montmorency.^[233]

Though Comminges sought a reduction in the tax burden imposed upon him, he consented to the impositions of Matignon. With the income of his bishopric, Comminges supported his half-brother the seigneur de Lanssac who was excluded from the royal pardon.^[8] The seigneur de Lanssac would continue to liaise with the Spanish until 1618.^[234]

There would be no Protestant worship in the comté de Comminges or Toulouse with the Edict of Nantes.^[235]

The bishop of Comminges died in Alan on 5 February 1613.^[236][8]

Brunet summarises the life of the bishop of Comminges as demonstrative of a complete lack of personal ambition, with his energies entirely devoted to the ligueur cause.^[237]

• Baumgartner, Frederic (1986). Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate: The Bishops and the Wars of Religion 1547-1610.
• Brunet, Serge (2000). "L'Évêque Ligueur Urbain de Saint-Gelais (1570-1613): Du Comminges à Toulouse, ou la Voie Espagnole". In Mironneau, Paul; Pébay-Clottes, Isabelle (eds.). Paix des Armes, Paix des Âmes.
• Brunet, Serge (2001). "Anatomie des réseaux ligueurs dans le sud-ouest de la France (vers 1562-vers 1610)". Religion et politique dans les sociétés du midi. Congrès national des sociétés historiques et scientifiques.
• Brunet, Serge (2016). "La Ligue Campanėre (Pyrénées Centrales) et la fin des Ligues Hispanophiles de Guyenne et de Languedoc (1585-1596)". In Brunet, Serge (ed.). La Sainte Union des Catholiques de France et la fin des Guerres de Religion (1585-1629).
• Brunet, Serge (2016b). "Introduction". In Brunet, Serge (ed.). La Sainte Union des Catholiques de France et la fin des Guerres de Religion (1585-1629).
• Brunet, Serge (2023). "Jeanne d'Albret, Pierre d'Albret, Évêque de Comminges, et la «Trahison» de Blaise de Monluc. Aux Origines de la Ligue dans le Sud-Ouest de la France". In Berriot-Salvadore, Evelyne; Chareyre, Philippe; Martin-Ulrich, Claudie (eds.). Jeanne d'Albret et sa Cour.
• Carpi, Olivia (2012). Les Guerres de Religion (1559-1598): Un Conflit Franco-Français. Ellipses.
• Cloulas, Ivan (1979). Catherine de Médicis. Fayard.
• Descimon, Robert; Ruiz Ibáñez, José Javier (2005). Les Ligueurs de L'Exil: Le Refuge Catholique Français Après 1594. Champ Vallon.
• Gellard, Matthieu (2014). Une Reine Épistolaire: Lettres et Pouvoir au Temps de Catherine de Médicis. Classiques Garnier.
• Greengrass, Mark (1983). "The Sainte Union in the Provinces: The Case of Toulouse". The Sixteenth Century Journal. 14 (4). doi:10.2307/2540579. JSTOR 2540579.
• Holt, Mack P. (2005). The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629. Cambridge University Press.
• Jouanna, Arlette; Biloghi, Dominique; Le Thiec, Guy (1998). "Index des Noms de Personnes". In Jouanna, Arlette; Boucher, Jacqueline; Biloghi, Dominique; Le Thiec, Guy (eds.). Histoire et Dictionnaire des Guerres de Religion. Éditions Robert Laffont.
• Jouanna, Arlette (1998). "Le Temps des Guerres de Religion en France (1559-1598)". In Jouanna, Arlette; Boucher, Jacqueline; Biloghi, Dominique; Le Thiec, Guy (eds.). Histoire et Dictionnaire des Guerres de Religion. Éditions Robert Laffont.
• Knecht, Robert (2010). The French Wars of Religion, 1559-1598. Routledge.
• Le Roux, Nicolas (2000). La Faveur du Roi: Mignons et Courtisans au Temps des Derniers Valois. Champ Vallon.
• Le Roux, Nicolas (2003). "Guerre Civile, Entreprises Maritimes et Identité Nobilaire: Les Imaginations de Guy de Lanssac (1544-1622)". Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance. 65 (3).
• Le Roux, Nicolas (2006). Un Régicide au nom de Dieu: L'Assassinat d'Henri III. Gallimard.
• Le Roux, Nicolas (2020). Portraits d'un Royaume: Henri III, la Noblesse et la Ligue. Passés Composés.
• Le Roux, Nicolas (2022). 1559-1629 Les Guerres de Religion. Gallimard.
• Lhoumeau, Charles Sauzé de (1940). Un Fils Naturel de François Ier: Louis de Saint-Gelais, baron de la Mothe-Saint-Héray. Société Française d'Imprimerie et de Librairie.
• Ribera, Jean-Michel (2018). Diplomatie et Espionnage: Les Ambassadeurs du Roi de France auprès de Philippe II - Du Traité du Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) à la mort de Henri III (1589). Classiques Garnier.
• Souriac, Pierre-Jean (2008). Une Guerre Civile: Affrontements Religieux et Militaires dans Le Midi Toulousain (1562-1596). Champ Vallon.