Victory Plan for Ukraine
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
ContextRusso-Ukrainian war
DraftedOctober 16, 2024
Condition
- NATO membership invitation to Ukraine
- Just end to the Russo-Ukrainian war (Point 1)
| Ukrainian: «План перемоги» (Plan peremohy) | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Type | Peace enforcement |
| Context | Russo-Ukrainian war |
| Drafted | October 16, 2024 |
| Condition |
|
| Amendment | 3 secret annexes (Points 2—4, partly) |
| Expiration | Not meant for signing[1] |
| Languages |
|
Five-point plan[2]
Unveiled at the Verkhovna Rada by Volodymyr Zelensky on 16 October 2024[3] | |
In October 2024, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy unveiled the Victory plan for Ukraine,[4] which includes the solution to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and description of future national defense guarantees.[5] The official goal of the plan is "to change the circumstances in such a way that Russia will be forced to peace".[6]
The plan includes five points: one geopolitical, two military, one economical and one related to national defense and safety.[7] The second, third and fourth points of the plan have classified conditions included, that were introduced only to the political leaders of the US, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy.[8][9]
- Inclusion of Ukraine into NATO and the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war. This implies geopolitical determination in Europe. This will be "a testament to the determination of Ukrainian partners" (mainly key Euro-Atlantic countries) and "will show how the partners see Ukraine in the renewed continental security architecture in the future".[10][11][12]
- Strengthening of the national defense. Implies the strengthening of Ukrainian positions on the territory of Russia in order to avoid the creation of buffer zones on the Ukrainian territory, lifting restrictions on strikes inside the Russian territory, strengthening Ukraine's air defense to a sufficient level of protection and joint defense operations with neighboring states within the reach of their air shield; access to satellite intelligence data of Ukrainian partners in real time, irreversible strengthening of the positions of the Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine and the destruction of Russia's offensive potential on the occupied territory of Ukraine.[10][11][12]
- Deterrence. Implies the placement of a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic package of deterring Russia's armed aggression and its military capabilities inside the Ukrainian territory.[10][11][12]
- Strategic economic potential. Envisages the investment of international partners in the production of critically important natural resources, such as uranium, titanium, lithium and graphite.[13]
- National safety. This point is designed for the post-war period. Zelenskyy assumed that in case of an agreement, Ukrainian units will be able to replace separate US military contingents stationed in Europe.[14]
Reaction
France: French ministry of foreign affairs stated that it supports the plan.[15]
Germany: Chancellor Olaf Scholz has gone on record to say that Germany does not support the idea of inviting Ukraine to NATO during wartime.[16]
Comparative assessment
In August 2025, Nik Hynek and Michal Šenk suggested the template for analysis of peace plans in interstate war with assessments of respective suggestions during ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. Two right-most columns are added for the November 2025 two 28-point drafts.
Comparative Table
| Criterion | Ukraine "Victory" Agenda | Russia Maximalist Design | U.S. Mediated Partition | Europe–Ukraine Counter‑Initiative[17] | China–Brazil "Friends of Peace" Plan | Istanbul Draft (2022 revival) | U.S.–Russia Draft Plan (2025) | European Proposal (2025) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforcement mechanisms | Strong emphasis on Western guarantees[18][19] | Minimal; relies on Russian dominance[20] | International monitors envisaged[21] | EU/NATO backing; sanctions leverage[22][23] | Vague; multipolar rhetoric[24] | Weak; limited monitoring[25] | None specified; relies on bilateral recognition[26][27][28] | NATO-style guarantees from Western allies[29][30] |
| Recovery & reconstruction | Western aid central[31] | Russia assumes control of occupied areas[32] | Partition with aid to both sides[33] | EU-led recovery funds[34][35] | Development aid promised[36] | Limited; undefined[37] | Rebuild Ukraine using seized Russian funds[38][39] | Western economic aid[40][41] |
| Societal alignment | High domestic support for sovereignty[42] | Russian domestic narrative only[43] | Divisive; Ukrainians reject partition[44] | Strong Ukrainian civil society backing[45] | Low resonance in Ukraine[46] | Mixed; contested[47] | Mixed signals; neutrality imposed[48][49][50] | Strong Ukrainian public support[51][52] |
| Security guarantees | NATO/EU integration[53][54] | Neutrality enforced by Russia[55] | U.S./UN guarantees proposed[56] | NATO umbrella[57][58] | Multipolar guarantees (China, Brazil)[59] | Neutrality clauses; weak guarantees[60] | Ukraine neutral; conditional U.S. guarantees[26][27][61] | NATO Article 5 mirror; robust guarantees[29][62] |
| Territorial concessions | Rejects concessions[63] | Demands recognition of annexations[64] | Partition envisaged[65] | Rejects concessions[66] | Freeze lines; ambiguous[67] | Crimea/Donbas unresolved[68] | Recognizes Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk as Russian; freeze Kherson/Zaporizhzhia[38][69] | Crimea remains under Russian control; Ukraine retains claim[29][70] |
| Accountability / justice | War crimes prosecution central[71] | Russia absolved of responsibility[72] | Deferred accountability[73] | Strong emphasis on justice[74] | Downplayed[75] | Deferred[76] | Amnesty, prisoner exchange only[26][77][50] | War crimes trials, reparations[40][50] |
| External mediation | Western allies[78] | Russia only[79] | U.S. broker[80] | EU role[81][35] | China–Brazil mediation[82] | Turkey broker[83] | U.S.–Russia backchannel[48][84][28] | European-led diplomacy[29][30] |
| Neutrality / alliances | Rejects neutrality[85] | Demands neutrality[86] | Neutral buffer envisaged[87] | NATO integration[88][89] | Neutrality promoted[90] | Neutrality clause[91] | Ukraine constitutionally barred from NATO[26][61] | Ukraine eventually joins NATO and the EU[51][62] |
| Economic aid / incentives | Western aid packages[92] | Russian subsidies[93] | Aid split between entities[94] | EU recovery funds[95][35] | Development aid promised[96] | Limited[97] | Frozen Russian assets diverted; U.S. profit share[38][39] | Western weapons, aid[29][41] |
| Durability / stability | High if backed by West[98][99] | Low; coercive[100] | Fragile; partition unstable[101] | Stronger with EU/NATO support[102][89] | Weak; lacks enforcement[103] | Fragile; draft abandoned[104] | Politically fragile; contradiction, vague wording[26][105][106] | High if Western support sustained[51][70] |
- Sources
- Hynek, N. & Šenk, J. (2025). Ukraine–Russia peace plans: historical lessons, operationalising criteria, and comparative assessment. DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2025.2585235.
- Sollfrank, A. & Boeke, S. (2024). Enablement and Logistics as Critical Success Factors for Military Operations: Comparing Russian and NATO Approaches. The RUSI Journal, 169(7), 10–22. DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2024.2434137.
- Mello, P. A. & Saideman, S. M. (2019). The politics of multinational military operations. Contemporary Security Policy, 40(1), 30–37. DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2018.1522737.
- Cancian, M. F. & Snegovaya, M. (2025). The Unfinished Plan for Peace in Ukraine: Provision by Provision. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Published 24 Nov 2025: CSIS analysis.
- Media references: Axios (18 Nov 2025), POLITICO (19 Nov 2025), Al Jazeera (21 Nov 2025), Sky News (23 Nov 2025), Newsweek (24 Nov 2025), The Independent (24 Nov 2025).
